AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 17004/90

                      by R.H.

                      against Norway

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 19

May 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, Acting President

                 F. ERMACORA

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

           Sir   Basil HALL

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ RUIZ

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 11 September 1986

by R.H. against Norway and registered on 9 August 1990 under file No.

17004/90;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, born in 1962. He resides

at Bærum, Norway. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Gustav

Høgtun, a lawyer practising in Oslo.

A.    The particular facts of the case as submitted by the applicant

      In 1986 the applicant lived together with a young Norwegian

woman. They were not married. In June 1986 she became pregnant, the

applicant being the father. In early August they went to Israel and

planted three trees as a symbol of their wish to have the child. The

mother, however, changed her mind and together with the applicant she

consulted a clinic in order to obtain information about a possible

abortion, the applicant however being opposed to such a step.

      As the mother was determined to go through with the abortion and

as the foetus was now more than 12 weeks old she was called to appear

before a board of two doctors on 1 September 1986 and state her

reasons. It does not appear that any medical reasons were submitted in

support of an abortion but rather social indications seem to have been

the reasons for the request. The request was granted on the same day

and the abortion was carried out on 5 September 1986, when the foetus

was 14 weeks and 1 day old. The actual abortion followed a routine

procedure according to which the mother received medicine whereby

"birth" was provoked. The foetus would in such circumstances

"suffocate" and appear in the same manner as during normal birth. The

applicant was not entitled to participate in the above proceedings and

was not consulted or heard before the abortion was carried out.

Subsequently the applicant requested the hospital to hand over to him

the remains of the foetus in order to inter them in accordance with his

Jewish faith. However, his request remained unanswered.

      Prior to these events, on 31 August 1986, the applicant had

applied for an injunction (begjæring om midlertidig forføyning) in

order to prevent the mother from terminating the pregnancy. The

application was rejected by the City Court on 6 September, by the High

Court on 17 September and by the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court

on 23 October 1986.

      On 10 March 1987 the applicant instituted proceedings in the City

Court of Oslo (Oslo Byrett) against the State represented by the

Ministry of Social Affairs claiming vindication and damages inter alia

on the ground that the abortion allegedly had been carried out contrary

to Articles 2, 3, 8 and 9 of the Convention in respect of himself and

the foetus. By judgment of 14 June 1988, which was rendered following

hearings held from 26 to 31 May 1988, the City Court dismissed some of

the applicant's claims and for the remainder found in favour of the

State. The Court did not find that any Convention rights had been

violated.

      The applicant appealed against the judgment to the High Court of

Eidsivating (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett). The Court was composed of three

professional and four lay judges, one of whom was Director of Finances

(økonomichef) at the hospital where the abortion had been carried out.

Hearings were held from 30 October to 3 November 1989. The Court heard

five experts, three witnesses and the representatives of the parties.

Before the High Court the applicant claimed inter alia as follows:

1)    that he was entitled to receive information concerning the

foetus,

2)    that he was entitled to receive information as to whether a

danger to the mother's life or health was invoked as a reason for the

abortion,

3)    that he was entitled to be heard on the question whether or not

to terminate the pregnancy,

4)    that the abortion was illegal as being inhuman treatment in

respect of the foetus,

5)    that he was entitled to receive the remains of the foetus after

the abortion in order to inter them in accordance with his religion,

6)    that he was entitled to have the foetus interred after the

abortion,

7)    that it was illegal to put the foetus to death, and

8)    that the State was not entitled to allow the abortion since the

mother did not fulfil the requirements under Norwegian law for

terminating the pregnancy after 14 weeks and 1 day.

      By judgment of 17 November 1989 the High Court rejected the

applicant's claims. In respect of the Convention the High Court stated

inter alia:

      (translation)

      "The question arises whether the Norwegian Act on Termination of

      Pregnancy violates Article 2 of the Convention when it allows

      board approved abortion on social indications in the 15th week

      of the pregnancy. The High Court refers as a starting point to

      the Supreme Court judgment in the Børre Knutsen case ... . The

      Supreme Court left the question open whether Article 2 of the

      Convention protects the unborn life at all and stated in this

      connection:

           'In any case the provision must be regarded as not imposing

           any far-reaching restrictions on the legislator's right to

           set the conditions for abortion. The Norwegian Act, under

           which the woman herself makes the final decision whether or

           not to terminate her pregnancy, provided the operation can

           be made before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy, is

           similar to the legislation of a number of other countries

           belonging to the same culture and which also have acceded

           to the European Human Rights Convention. This is hardly

           immaterial to the consideration of a matter of

           international law.'

      This view on the protection of the foetus under the Convention

      was expressed by the Supreme Court after considering the

      Commission's decisions in the case of X v. the United Kingdom

      (No. 8416/79, Dec. 13.5.80, D.R. 19 p. 244) and the case of

      Brüggemann & Scheuten v. Germany (Comm. Report 12.7.77).

      Thus the High Court finds that a possible protection of the

      foetus under Article 2 must be decided on the basis of a balance

      of interests to the extent that the protection is adapted to the

      degree of biological maturity of the foetus at every stage of its

      development on the one hand and the considerations which likewise

      speak in favour of allowing the woman to terminate a pregnancy

      on the other. The Supreme Court found that an abortion based

      solely on the woman's choice within the first 12 weeks of

      pregnancy was not in violation of Article 2. Having regard

      thereto the High Court does not find that a system, which

      protects a foetus in requiring a board to establish that the

      pregnancy, birth or care for the child might place the woman in

      a difficult situation of life, would be in violation of Article

      2 either.

      (The applicant) has submitted that the rights of the foetus were

      particularly strongly protected under Article 8 of the Convention

      due to the agreement he had with the mother not to terminate the

      pregnancy.

      ...

      This provision protects the individual's right to family life and

      according to the Commission's reasoning in the Brüggemann &

      Scheuten case this provision goes far in protecting the woman's

      right to abortion. The High Court therefore finds that the

      provision does not protect the family as such where this runs

      counter to the rights guaranteed to a spouse.

      (The applicant) has furthermore invoked Article 3 of the

      Convention.

      ...

      The arguments in this respect are based on the assumption that

      a 14 week and 1 day old foetus can feel pain. The High Court

      finds that this cannot be decisive and recalls that it would not

      be contrary to Article 2 to terminate the pregnancy.

      Nevertheless, the High Court will not exclude that the foetus may

      be protected under Article 3, but this could be so only in

      situations which are alien to Norwegian reality. Torture requires

      that the evil is intended.

      The abortion in this case was carried out with the use of

      medicine in that the mother received such medicine as provoked

      an abortion by strong contraction of the uterus so that the

      foetus dies due to lack of oxygen as the blood supply stops. The

      foetus will then come out in the same way as during a birth.

      The method is used since it minimises the risk of complications

      for the mother. The process takes such a long time that it is not

      justifiable from a medical point of view to keep the woman under

      anaesthesia. Instead she receives painkillers comparable to

      morphine. The experts have stated that it was not possible to

      anaesthetise the foetus separately. The possible pain the foetus

      may suffer was thus based on medical grounds out of consideration

      for the woman. It is furthermore very doubtful whether the foetus

      can feel pain at all when it is 14 weeks and 1 day old. The High

      Court does not need to consider this since its probability is so

      small that Article 3 would not in any event require the

      legislator to have regard thereto when considering the woman's

      interests which are based on medical reasons. It would be a kind

      of pain which is experienced outside the centre of conscience

      known to the human brain.

      (The applicant) has submitted that Article 8 has been violated

      since he was not considered a party during the proceedings before

      the board and could not have its decision tried in the courts.

      The High Court recalls that the Commission in the case of X v.

      the United Kingdom concluded that Article 8 did not protect the

      potential father's procedural rights.

      ...

      The Commission found that, when considering what rights a father

      had under Article 8, one should take into account the rights of

      the woman being the person concerned with the pregnancy and whose

      interests should be protected first of all. The Commission

      furthermore concluded that the father's right to respect for his

      family life did not go as far as giving him such procedural

      rights.

      ...

      Finally, (the applicant) has submitted that Article 9 has been

      violated since he was not given the remains of the foetus in

      order to inter them in accordance with his religious convictions.

      ...

      The right to manifest one's religion is not unlimited when it

      violates the rights of others. Having regard to the woman's

      rights under Article 8, as interpreted by the Commission in the

      case of X v. the United Kingdom, the High Court finds that (the

      applicant's) right to manifest his religion was not violated. To

      give the foetus to him in order to inter it could be extremely

      degrading to the woman who has decided to terminate a pregnancy.

      Such a step must accordingly depend on the woman's acceptance.

      Therefore the High Court concludes that the European

      Convention on Human Rights was not violated."

      The applicant asked for leave to appeal against the judgment to

the Supreme Court (Høyesterett). In addition to the issues considered

by the High Court the applicant also complained of the fact that the

Director of Finances at the hospital where the abortion was carried out

had participated as a lay judge. On 22 May 1990 the Appeals Committee

of the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      (translation)

      Act no. 50 of 13 June 1975 on Termination of Pregnancy as amended

      on 16 June 1978

"Section 2.  If a pregnancy leads to serious complications for a woman

she shall be offered information and advice about the assistance

society may offer her. The woman has a right to advice in order to

enable her to take the final decision.

      If the woman considers, after having been offered information

etc. as mentioned and advice in accordance with Section 5, subsection

2, that she nevertheless cannot go through with the pregnancy, she

takes the final decision as regards the termination of the pregnancy

if this can be done before the end of the 12th week of pregnancy and

serious medical reasons do not speak against it.

      After the 12th week of pregnancy termination of pregancy may take

place if

a)    the pregnancy, birth or care for the child may involve an

unreasonable burden on the woman's physical and mental health. Regard

must be paid to whether she has a predisposition for malady;

b)    the pregnancy, birth or care for the child may place the woman

in a difficult situation of life;

c)    there is a great danger that the child may contract serious

illnesses as a result of hereditary predisposition, illness or

injurious influence during pregnancy;

d)    ...

e)    ...

      When considering the request for termination based on the

conditions mentioned above under a)-c) regard must be paid to the

woman's entire situation, including her ability to provide care for the

child in a satisfactory way. Particular importance shall be attached

to the woman's own opinion on the situation.

      The requirements for accepting termination of pregnancy must

increase with the progress of pregnancy.

      After the 18th week a pregnancy cannot be terminated, except if

there are particularly serious reasons for such a step. If there is

reason to presume that the foetus is viable, a termination of pregnancy

cannot be authorised.

...

Section 4.  A request for termination of pregnancy shall be made by the

woman herself. ...

Section 5.  A request for termination of pregnancy shall be submitted

to a doctor. A request after the 12th week of pregnancy may also be

submitted to a board.

      A woman who has requested termination of pregnancy shall be

informed by the doctor (or the board) about the nature of the

intervention and its medical effects. If she so wishes, she shall also

receive the information and advice which is mentioned in Section 2,

subsection 1.

...

Section 7.  If the medical intervention cannot be carried out before

the end of the 12th week of pregnancy the doctor shall, after the woman

has received the information etc. as mentioned in Section 5, subsection

2, immediately forward the request together with a written report of

the grounds advanced by the woman and of his own observations, to the

board mentioned in subsection 2. If the request has been sent directly

to the board it shall deliberate and decide as soon as the case is

ready. ...

      Decisions on termination of pregnancy are taken, after

consultation with the woman, by a board composed of two doctors.

Section 8.  The board's decision to allow or refuse termination of

pregnancy shall be accompanied by reasons. The woman, or her

representative, shall be informed of the reasons for the decision...

...

Section 10.  If the pregnancy involves an imminent risk to the life or

health of the woman, it may be terminated regardless of the

requirements set out in this Act."

COMPLAINTS

      Under Article 2 of the Convention the applicant complains that

the termination of the pregnancy involving a 14 week old foetus was

unnecessary in order to protect the mother's life or health.

Furthermore, he had entered into an agreement with the mother not to

deprive the unborn child of its life and he had expressly undertaken

to care for the child after its birth. He had vigorously protested

against the abortion from the time it was contemplated by the mother.

      Under the circumstances which existed in this case, the applicant

maintains that the lack of protection of the unborn child under

Norwegian law is unsatisfactory and constitutes a violation of Article

2 of the Convention.

      The applicant also complains that no measures were taken to avoid

the risk that the 14 week old foetus would feel pain during the

abortion procedure. He submits that this constitutes inhuman treatment

or torture. Furthermore, his request to receive the remains of the

foetus in order that they might be buried in keeping with his religious

beliefs was rejected. This, in his opinion, constitutes degrading

treatment. The applicant invokes Article 3 of the Convention.

      The applicant further submits that he had an agreement with the

mother to the effect that an abortion would not be carried out and he

had made clear his willingness to assume sole responsibility for the

child after its birth. Under these circumstances, he complains that

Article 6 has been violated as he had no right to 1) object to the

proposed abortion; 2) apply to the court in order to prevent or

postpone the abortion; 3) be consulted about the proposed abortion; 4)

be informed about the abortion; 5) demand that the abortion board

consist of impartial individuals and 6) request possession of the

unborn child's remains.

      Under this provision the applicant also complains that one of the

lay judges in the High Court was an employee at the hospital where the

abortion was carried out, and that therefore his case was not heard by

an impartial tribunal.

      Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant submits that he

and the mother were living together as a family although they were not

married and that he had insisted, and the mother had agreed, that no

abortion would take place. Under these circumstances, so the applicant

alleges, Article 8 of the Convention must ensure that a father to a 14

week old foetus has a minimum of rights regarding his unborn child

where the health of the mother is not endangered. In this case, a

foetus of this age should be considered to be a part of his family.

      In respect of Article 9 of the Convention the applicant submits

that the unborn child meant something particular to him and that, at

least at the beginning, the mother shared and accepted this view. The

planting of three trees in Israel, one for each of the parents and one

for the unborn child, illustrates this. The taking of the foetus's life

in the absence of a medical necessity was obviously not in accordance

with that concept nor was the denial of his request to be given the

child's remains in order to inter them.

      Such a step would not have implied a lack of respect for the

wishes of the mother. There is no evidence that the mother was asked

about her wishes regarding this matter by the doctors or any other

persons employed by the hospital. Therefore, the applicant finds that

he was unnecessarily denied a manifestation of his conscience and

religion which for him was extremely important and vital to his health

and well-being.

      In order to prevent the termination of the pregnancy, the

applicant sought the services of an attorney to intervene on his

behalf. However, the board would not listen to any argument from the

applicant. Furthermore, the applicant's attorney filed a complaint with

the ordinary courts but these complaints were not admitted. No other

effective remedy exists in Norway. The applicant considers this to be

a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

      Finally, the applicant submits that his actions were based on the

conviction that the life of an unborn child should be protected and it

should not be deprived of life for non-medical reasons. His

relationship with the mother rested on that condition which was also

accepted by the mother. Furthermore, the pregnancy and birth of the

child in question was planned. It was the result of an agreement

between two free, independent and equal persons, mature and under no

pressure whatsoever. In these circumstances, the applicant complains

that discrimination exists against him as he was completely excluded

from any decisions made concerning the welfare of his own child. He

refers to Article 14 of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that under the circumstances which

existed in the present case the lack of protection of the life of the

unborn child under Norwegian law was contrary to Article 2 (Art. 2) of

the Convention.

      The Commission accepts that the applicant, as a potential father,

in the circumstances of the present case was so closely affected by the

termination of the pregnancy that he may claim to be a "victim", within

the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, of the

legislation complained of as applied in the present case. The

Commission also accepts that he has exhausted domestic remedies as

required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention for which reason the

Commission must examine whether the case discloses any appearance of

a violation of Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention (cf. No. 8416/79,

Dec. 13.5.80, D.R. 19 p. 244).

      Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention reads:

      "1.  Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.  No one

      shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution

      of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for

      which this penalty is provided by law.

      2.   Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in

      contravention of this Article when it results from the use of

      force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

      a.   in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

      b.   in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape

           of a person lawfully detained;

      c.   in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot

           or insurrection."

      The Commission first notes that the term "everyone" is not

defined in the Convention, nor is the term "life" but it finds that

Article 2 (Art. 2) contains two separate though interrelated basic

elements. The first sentence of paragraph 1 sets forth the general

obligation that the right to life shall be protected by law. The second

sentence of paragraph 1 contains a prohibition of intentional

deprivation of life. This prohibition is delimited by the exceptions

mentioned in the second sentence itself and in paragraph 2. The

Commission recalls that in its decision mentioned above it stated:

      "All the above limitations, by their nature, concern persons

      already born and cannot be applied to the foetus.

      Thus both the general usage of the term 'everyone' ('toute

      personne') in the Convention ... and the context in which this

      term is employed in Article 2 (Art. 2) ... tend to support the

      view that it does not include the unborn."

      However, the Commission also recalls that the first sentence of

Article 2 (Art. 2) imposes a broader obligation on the State than that

contained in the second sentence. The concept that "everyone's life

shall be protected by law" enjoins the State not only to refrain from

taking a person's life "intentionally" but also to take appropriate

steps to safeguard life (cf. for example No. 11604/85, Dec. 10.10.86,

D.R. 50 p. 259).

      The Commission finds that it does not have to decide whether the

foetus may enjoy a certain protection under Article 2 (Art. 2), first

sentence as interpreted above, but it will not exclude that in certain

circumstances this may be the case notwithstanding that there is in the

Contracting States a considerable divergence of views on whether or to

what extent Article 2 (Art. 2) protects the unborn life.

      The Austrian Constitutional Court found, for example, that

Article 2 para. 1 (Art. 2-1), first sentence, interpreted in the

context of Article 2 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 2-1, 2-2), did not cover the

unborn life (Decision of 11 October 1974, Erk. Slg. (Collection of

Decisions) No. 7400, EuGRZ 1975, p. 74) whereas the German Federal

Constitutional Court, when interpreting the provision "Everyone has a

right to life" in Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law stated that

"'everyone'... is 'every living human being', in other words: every

human individual possessing life; 'everyone' therefore includes unborn

human beings" (judgment of 25 February 1975).

      When considering the Norwegian abortion legislation in the light

of Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention the Norwegian Supreme Court

stated:

      "... abortion laws must necessarily be based on a compromise

      between the respect for the unborn life and other essential and

      worthy considerations. This compromise has led the legislator to

      permit self-determined abortion under the circumstances defined

      by the Act.

      Clearly, such a reconciliation of disparate considerations give

      rise to ethical problems, and clearly too, there will be some

      disagreement about the system embodied in the Act. The reactions

      to the Act show that many ... view it as an attack on central

      ethical principles. But it is equally relevant that others - also

      from an ethical point of view - regard the Act as having done

      away with an unacceptable legal situation.

      It is not a matter for the courts to decide whether the solution

      to a difficult legislative problem which the legislator chose

      when adopting the Act on Termination of Pregnancy of 1978, is the

      best one. On this point, different opinions will be held among

      judges as among other members of our society. The reconciliation

      of conflicting interests which abortion laws require is the

      legislator's task and the legislator's responsibility. The

      legislative power is exercised by the People through the

      Storting. The Storting majority which adopted the Act on

      Termination of Pregnancy in 1978 had its mandate from the People

      after an election campaign in which the abortion question was

      again a central issue, decided moreover not to take the

      initiative towards any statutory amendment. Clearly, the courts

      must respect the solution chosen by the legislator" (cf. No.

      11045/84, Dec. 8.3.85, D.R. 42 p. 247 at p. 253).

      Having regard to this it is clear that national laws on abortion

differ considerably. In these circumstances, and assuming that the

Convention may be considered to have some bearing in this field, the

Commission finds that in such a delicate area the Contracting States

must have a certain discretion.

      As regards the circumstances of the present case the Commission

recalls that the Norwegian Abortion Act itself allows self-determined

abortion within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. From the 12th week

until the 18th week of pregnancy a termination may be authorised by a

board of two doctors if certain conditions have been fulfilled. After

the 18th week a pregnancy cannot be terminated, unless there are

particularly serious reasons for such a step. However, if there is

reason to presume that the foetus is viable, a termination of pregnancy

cannot be authorised.

      Furthermore the Commission recalls that the mother, after having

received information and advice about the assistance society may offer

her, wanted to terminate a pregnancy of 14 weeks and she appeared

before a board of two doctors who decided, as appears from the High

Court judgment of 17 November 1989, to authorise the abortion, having

concluded that the pregnancy, birth or care for the child might place

her in a difficult situation of life as set out in Section 2,

subsection 3 b of the Act.

      As the present case shows there are different opinions as to

whether such an authorisation strikes a fair balance between the

legitimate need to protect the foetus and the legitimate interests of

the woman in question. However, having regard to what is stated above

concerning Norwegian legislation, its requirements for the termination

of pregnancy as well as the specific circumstances of the present case,

the Commission does not find that the respondent State has gone beyond

its discretion which the Commission considers it has in this sensitive

area of abortion. Accordingly, it finds that the applicant's complaint

under Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant also complains that no measures were taken to avoid

the risk that the 14 week old foetus would feel pain during the

abortion procedure. He submits that this constitutes inhuman treatment

or torture and invokes Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention which

reads:

      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

      treatment or punishment."

      The Commission has not been presented with any material which

could substantiate the applicant's allegations of pain inflicted upon

the foetus other than what appears from the courts' judgments mentioned

above. Having regard to the abortion procedure as described therein the

Commission does not find that the case discloses any appearance of a

violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The Commission has

reached the same conclusion in respect of the applicant's complaint

under this provision that his request to receive the remains of the

foetus was rejected. It follows that this part of the application is

also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant submits that he had an agreement with the mother

to the effect that an abortion would not be carried out and he had made

clear his willingness to assume sole responsibility for the child after

its birth. Under these circumstances, he complains that Article 6

(Art. 6) has been violated as he had no right to 1) object to the

proposed abortion; 2) apply to the court in order to prevent or

postpone abortion; 3) be consulted about the proposed abortion; 4) be

informed about the abortion; 5) demand that the abortion board consist

of impartial individuals and 6) request possession of the unborn

child's remains.

      Under this provision the applicant also complains that one of the

lay judges in the High Court was an employee at the hospital where the

abortion was carried out, and that therefore his case was not heard by

an impartial tribunal.

      In so far as relevant Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...

      everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by an ... impartial

      tribunal ..."

      The Commission recalls that in order for Article 6 (Art. 6) to

apply to the proceedings in question it must first ascertain whether

there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least on

arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (cf. for example

Eur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A, no 180-B,

p. 36, para. 27). It is undisputed that under Norwegian law the

applicant had no right at all to participate in the proceedings

concerning the termination of the pregnancy. Thus he cannot claim on

any arguable ground that he had a right under domestic law. It follows

that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with

the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.    Under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention the applicant submits

that he and the mother were living together as a family although they

were not married and that he had insisted, and the mother had agreed,

that no abortion would take place. Under these circumstances, so the

applicant alleges, Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention must grant a

father to a 14 week old foetus a minimum of rights regarding his unborn

child, where the health of the mother is not endangered. In this case,

a foetus of this age should be considered to be a part of his family.

      In respect of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention the applicant

submits that the unborn child meant something particular to him from

a religious point of view. He complains that the taking of the foetus's

life in the absence of a medical necessity and the denial of his

request to be given the foetus's remains in order to inter them denied

him the right to manifest his conscience and religion.

      It is true that Articles 8 and 9 (Art. 8, 9) of the Convention

guarantee the right to respect for private and family life and freedom

to manifest one's religion. However, the Commission finds that any

interpretation of the potential father's right under these provisions

in connection with an abortion which the mother intends to have

performed on her, must first of all take into account her rights, she

being the person primarily concerned by the pregnancy and its

continuation or termination. The Commission therefore finds that any

possible interference which might be assumed in the circumstances of

the present case was justified as being necessary for the protection

of the rights of another person.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    The applicant furthermore complains about discrimination as he

was completely excluded from any decisions made concerning the welfare

of his own child. He refers to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention has no independent existence since it has effect solely in

relation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the

other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.

Furthermore, it safeguards individuals against discriminatory

differences only if they are placed in analogous situations (cf. for

example Eur. Court H.R., Rasmussen judgment of 28 November 1984, Series

A no. 87, pp. 12 and 13, paras. 29 and 35).

      In relation to the termination of a pregnancy and the proceedings

and decisions concerning this the Commission does not find that the

applicant was placed in an analogous situation with the mother.

Accordingly, there has been no discriminatory treatment within the

meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention for which reason this

part of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.    The applicant finally complains, under Article 13 (Art. 13) of

the Convention, that he had no effective remedy in Norway in respect

of his opposition to the termination of the pregnancy.

      The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) has been

interpreted by the European Court of Human rights as requiring a remedy

in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as

"arguable" in terms of the Convention (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R.,

Boyle and Rice judgment of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para.

52). However, having regard to its above conclusions in respect of the

Convention complaints submitted the Commission finds that the applicant

does not have any arguable claims. Furthermore, the Commission recalls

that the Norwegian High Court considered all complaints which the

applicant has submitted to the Commission. In these circumstances the

Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13)

of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is also

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Deputy Secretary to the Commission  Acting President of the Commission

         (J. RAYMOND)                         (S. TRECHSEL)