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GRAFSTRÖM v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 16792/90 • ECHR ID: 001-1328

Document date: June 29, 1992

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 6

GRAFSTRÖM v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 16792/90 • ECHR ID: 001-1328

Document date: June 29, 1992

Cited paragraphs only



                  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                    Application No. 16792/90

                    by Jack GRAFSTRÖM

                    against Sweden

     The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

29 June 1992, the following members being present:

          MM.  C.A. NØRGAARD, President

               S. TRECHSEL

               G. JÖRUNDSSON

               A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

               A. WEITZEL

               J.-C. SOYER

               H.G. SCHERMERS

               H. DANELIUS

          Sir  Basil HALL

          Mr.  F. MARTINEZ

          Mrs. J. LIDDY

          MM.  L. LOUCAIDES

               J.-C. GEUS

               M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

               B. MARXER

          Mr.  H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission.

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 4 August 1989 by

Jack GRAFSTRÖM against Sweden and registered on 28 June 1990 under file

No. 16792/90;

     Having regard to

-    the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     12 June 1991 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant on 1 and 20 August, 5 and 25 September, 3 October 1991

     and 24 January and 17 March 1992;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1931.  He is a

marketing and advertising consultant resident at Lidingö.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and apparent

from the documents, may be summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

a.   The 1985 census

     In 1985 a compulsory population and habitation census was carried

out in Sweden, pursuant to the Act on the 1985 Population and Housing

Census (lag 1984:531 om 1985 års folk- och bostadsräkning; hereinafter

"the 1984 Census Act").

     The population census concerned every person born in 1969 or

earlier and resident in Sweden or otherwise obliged to be registered

in Sweden at the time to which the requested particulars referred. The

following information was requested:

-    the name and the personal identity number of the participant

-    whether he had had a gainful employment for at least one hour

     during 4-10 November 1985 and, in the affirmative, what kind of

     employment

-    the designation of his real property

-    the parish in which the real property was situated

-    his address

-    the name of the occupier of the dwelling.

     The housing census concerned every permanent occupier of a

dwelling in Sweden at the time to which the requested particulars

referred. The following information was requested of persons born in

1969 or earlier and permanently resident in a dwelling:

-    his name

-    his personal identity number

-    his position in the household.

     As regards the position in the household the following options

were available:

-    "married or living together with somebody"

-    "single or other inhabitant"

-    "the child of somebody in the household".

     Moreover, the participant was to state:

-    the number of rooms in the habitation

-    the form of tenure (upplåtelseform)

-    whether the dwelling had a kitchen or a kitchenette

-    whether it had a bathroom or a shower-room

-    whether it had a toilet and whether there were one or more

     dwellings in the building.

     Property particulars were to be submitted by those who owned, at

the time to which the particulars referred, one or more dwelling-houses

in Sweden. The following particulars were requested in respect of the

real property:

-    the county, municipality and parish where the property was

     situated

-    the property designation

-    the type of property (agricultural or other kind of property)

-    the name and address of the owner

-    the category of the owner (the State, municipality, municipal

     housing company, housing co-operative, private individual or

     other kind of owner).

     The following particulars were requested in respect of the

dwelling-house:

-    the number of the building (byggnadsnummer)

-    the housing type (dwelling-house for one household, dwelling-

     house for two households, multi-dwelling house, some other kind

     of dwelling-house)

-    the number of housing units in the house

-    the year of construction and the year of conversion

-    the main source of heating and the type of fuel used

-    the existence of a lift in multi-dwelling houses and dwelling

     houses other than those for one or two families.

     The following particulars were requested in respect of a housing

unit:

-    the number of rooms

-    the existence of a kitchen or kitchenette

-    the name of the owner of the housing unit

-    the number of the housing unit (lägenhetsnummer)

-    if the housing unit was not let, the reason why.

     The applicant's, his  wife's and their children's names, personal

identity numbers and address were already printed on the census form

distributed to them.

     The applicant, who was obliged to participate in the whole of the

census, returned the form without completing it, stating that the

questions were of a strictly personal character.

     Subsequently, the Central Office of Statistics (Statistiska

Centralbyrån; hereinafter "the COS") unsuccessfully requested the

applicant to complete the form.

     At the request of the COS, the County Administrative Board

(länsstyrelsen) of the County of Stockholm on 7 August 1986 ordered the

applicant, under penalty of a fine (vite) of 600 SEK, to submit the

information requested. The applicant refused to submit the information.

     In the subsequent proceedings before the County Administrative

Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm instituted by the COS,

the applicant objected to the imposition of the fine and requested a

hearing. He argued that he had refused to complete the census form only

insofar as the requested particulars went beyond what was required by

the civic registration (folkbokföringen).

     On 19 November 1986 the Parliamentary Census Commission (folk-

och bostadsräkningskommissionen; hereinafter "the Census Commission")

remarked on the COS's handling of the information obtained in the 1985

census, having regard to the fact that it had commissioned private

companies to process particulars regarding the professions of the

participants without notifying the Census Commission in advance.

     On 27 November 1986 the County Administrative Court informed the

applicant that it considered a hearing unnecessary in the case, having

regard to the parties' written submissions. If he were to pursue his

request for a hearing the applicant was to inform the Court of the

evidence he wanted to invoke at the hearing and what he wanted to show.

     In a subsequent letter to the County Administrative Court the

applicant accepted that the case could be examined without a hearing

provided the Court found a hearing unnecessary.

     By a decision of 20 February 1987 the County Administrative Court

(länsrätten) rejected the applicant's request for a hearing and ordered

the fine to be paid.

     The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) of Stockholm which on 21 April 1987 upheld the fine.

     The applicant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Administrative

Court (regeringsrätten) and requested a hearing.

     In an opinion of 24 September 1986 to the Chancellor of Justice

(justitiekanslern) the COS argued that according to the 1984 Act and

the 1984 Ordinance on the 1985  Housing and Population Census

(förordning 1984:532 om 1985 års folk- och bostadsräkning; hereinafter

"the 1984 Ordinance") a discretion was conferred on the chief census

scrutinising officers (granskningsledarna) when deciding on which

census objectors to impose a fine. In any case, the fine was not a

criminal sanction, as it would have been relinquished provided the

objector had fulfilled his obligations.

     The COS continued:

     "Under Section 24 of the 1984 Act the COS and the chief

     census scrutinising officers were to see to it that the

     application of the Act did not lay an unnecessary burden on

     the respondents. The imposition of fines was to be a

     extreme measure ... and, thus, in the COS's view, to be

     applied in a restrictive manner and following an

     consideration in casu.

     ...

     The municipal census officers contacted 80.000 persons out

     of which 25.000 subsequently completed the census form.

     About 750 persons stated, either orally or in writing,

     without referring to any acceptable obstacle ..., that they

     refused to participate in the census. They were then

     ordered to complete the census form under penalty of a

     fine. ..."

     The COS further stated that it had been its practice to refrain

from further efforts to obtain lacking census information provided the

processing of the statistical material had reached a stage where

subsequently obtained information could no longer be processed in

accordance with its plans.

     The COS finally stated:

     "It should, however, be pointed out that even information

     which has arrived at a late stage and which therefore

     cannot be used for the planned production of statistics is

     nevertheless of interest. The personal files created on the

     basis of the census information form part of the

     information which, having regard to its great value, is

     being stored and used for research purposes and for

     production of statistics carried out on special orders over

     a large number of years subsequent to the completion of the

     material."

     In a further opinion of 16 February 1987 following press

allegations of breach of the confidentiality rules governing the

handling of the census information the COS referred to its reply to the

Census Commission in respect of the commissioning of private

enterprises to process professional particulars: no release of

information to those companies had taken place in breach of Chapter 1,

Sections 5 and 6 of the Secrecy Act. Thus, the companies had not been

granted any right to dispose of the released material. However,

following the remarks by the Census Commission certain more extensive

controls of the handling of the information by the companies

commissioned by the COS had been carried out. These had resulted in

"only minor remarks" subsequently followed up by the COS.

     As regards press allegations that cross-processing of certain

information in EDP-files pertaining to census objectors had taken place

the COS stated:

     "On 29 October 1986 the COS requested that the Data

     Inspection Board grant it a permission to create an

     "Unidentifiable Register of the Falling-Off in the 1985

     census" (avidentifierat register över bortfallet i FOB 85).

     The intention was to produce statistics of the

     approximately 55.000 persons who had not completed their

     census forms. The aim of these statistics was twofold.

     Firstly, it is important to find out whether and, if so,

     how the falling-off affects the statistics produced on the

     basis of the census information. This is important from a

     methodological point of view, even if the falling-off is,

     seen at large, minor. Statistics of the above kind would

     make it possible to assess whether the falling-off as

     regards particulars pertaining to sex, age etc. is

     different from the particulars of those who did submit the

     information.

     Secondly, the COS intended to study statistically the

     composition of the falling-off, having regard to the

     guidelines provided by the COS, i.e. in order to find out

     whether fines had been imposed according to the intentions

     in the law and these guidelines. ...

     The COS intended to obtain information from the Register of

     the Total Population (registret över totalbefolkningen)

     regarding the 55.000 persons. The information was to be

     immediately made unidentifiable... No investigation of

     individual particulars was to take place. ...

     On 19 November 1986 the Census Commission recommended the

     COS not to carry out the processing. On 8 December 1986 the

     COS withdrew its request to the Data Inspection Board..."

     The COS added that, initially, 187.000 persons had been requested

to complete their census forms. Following initial reminders about

80.000 objectors remained.  Out of those, about 25.000 returned their

forms. The remaining non-participants were those who, either on the

basis of or without a contact with a scrutinising body, were considered

to have acceptable reasons for not participating, those who could not

be reached, and those who had expressly declared their objection to the

census. The last-mentioned group of non-participants was the only one

against whom proceedings were instituted with a view to having a fine

imposed.

     In the COS's view the aim of the imposition of a fine on only a

small group of non-participants - that group consisting of persons

explicitly refusing to participate - was to exclude risks of laying an

unnecessary burden on other non-participants, that is, those who were

presumed to have an acceptable reason for not completing the census

form, regardless of whether they had been contacted or not, as well as

those who could not be reached.

     The COS concluded, however, that having regard to the large

number of cases under consideration by both municipal organs and the

COS it could not be excluded that the distinction between the groups

of non-participants had been made wrongly and that the imposition of

fines was not in line with the COS's guidelines. Such mistakes,

however, were exceptional.

     On 15 October 1987 the Chancellor of Justice rendered a decision

in which he examined whether the guidelines issued  by the COS to the

chief census scrutinising officers and the application of those

guidelines violated the principle of equality before the law as

enunciated in Chapter 1, Section 9 of the 1974 Instrument of Government

(regeringsformen). One petitioner, an author, had argued inter alia

that, as he was "a celebrity who had protested loudly against the

census, he had been sentenced to pay a fine, this constituting

'détournement de pouvoir'".

     The Chancellor found that the application of the provisions

regarding fines in the 1984 Act had not violated the Constitution or

the 1984 Act itself. In reaching this conclusion he considered that the

fine at issue was not a criminal sanction, which according to

established Swedish legal doctrine shall be applied in a general way

and be directed against everyone having committed a particular offence.

Instead, the fine was to be regarded as a means to induce somebody to

fulfil an individual obligation. However, from this distinction did not

follow that fines such as the present could be imposed in an arbitrary

manner. The principle of equality before the law also applied to this

kind of sanctions. The Chancellor concluded that he could not

the COS had not treated similar cases on an equal basis or that

irrelevant considerations had been taken into account when applying the

1984 Act to certain individuals.

     As regards the release of information to private data processing

companies the Chancellor noted that these had been inspected beforehand

so as to ensure "sufficient security as regards inter alia the

sensitivity of the integrity and secrecy of the material"; that the

Census Commission had not critisised the commissioning as such of

private companies; but that security inspections had led to remarks

that security measures be taken within the companies.

     On 8 March 1989 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the

applicant leave to appeal.

     The census form stated inter alia the following:

     " ... The information given on this form will be protected

     for 70 years according to the Secrecy Act (sekretesslag

     1980:100). Furthermore, the information is protected under

     the Data Act (datalag 1973:289). The persons handling the

     forms at the municipal authorities and at the COS are

     obliged to observe secrecy. No unauthorised persons will

     have access to the information. The contents of the form

     have been decided after consultation with the Data

     Inspection Board (datainspektionen).

     ...

     The statistics collected in the 1985 census will primarily

     be used by municipal planning officers. The census is their

     only means to find out how many households there are in the

     different parts of the municipality, how many members of a

     household are working or how many children there are in the

     household. The information is necessary for the assessment

     of the extent of child care and the building of dwellings.

     Through the census statistics it can also be determined

     where those, who reside in a certain part of the

     municipality, are working. This improves the planning of

     public transport and travel facilities. The information on

     how our dwellings are being used will be used inter alia in

     order to improve the planning of our future energy supply.

     The statistics on professions are of great importance for

     studies of inter alia the causality between diseases and

     work environment.

     The 1985 census [information] will also be used in order to

     check the civic registration [information]. ..."

b.   The 1990 census

     A subsequent census was carried out at the end of 1990. In the

population census the following information was requested: the name and

address (already printed on the form); information as to how many hours

per week the person concerned, during October 1990, had been gainfully

employed; what his daily means of transportation to his work place had

been; and his professional and educational background.

     In the housing census the following information was requested:

the names; the personal identity number; the position in the household

with respect to persons born in 1974 or earlier and permanently

resident in the house or the flat; the number of rooms with a window

in the habitation; in which form the housing was enjoyed; the number

of flats in the building; whether the habitation had a kitchen or a

kitchenette; and whether there was an elevator on the same floor as the

apartment.  Owners permanently resident in a one-family house were

further requested to state the period of five or ten years during which

the house had become ready for occupation; what kind of heating system

was used; whether the house, according to the latest taxation, belonged

to a farming-property; whether more than half of the surface of the

house was used for other purposes than housing; and whether the house

was a row house, a pair house or a link house.

     By letter of 6 November 1990 the applicant informed the COS that

he would not complete the census form, with the exception of the

questions as to his name, address, birth date and the name of his wife.

     The 1990 census form stated inter alia the following:

     "The information given will be protected under the Act on

     the 1990 Population and Housing (lagen om 1990 års folk-

     och bostadsräkning), the Secrecy Act and the Data Act".

Relevant domestic law

a.   The 1984 Act

     According to Section 1 of the 1984 Act the purpose of the census

was, on the one hand, to produce statistics for national planning,

research and general information and, on the other hand, to update the

civic registration data. According to the preparatory works (Bill no.

1983/84:85, p. 23) the enumeration was intended to be exhaustive.

     Under Section 4 personal particulars were to be returned by those

born in 1969 or earlier and resident in Sweden, or who otherwise were

to be registered in a parochial register in Sweden at the time to which

the requested particulars related.

     Sections 5, 7 and 9 prescribed what particulars were to be

requested in the census form. The reasons for requesting those

particulars were stated in the travaux préparatoires (Bill pp. 24-27).

     Under Section 8 property particulars were to be returned by those

who, at the time to which the requested particulars related, owned one

or more dwelling-houses in Sweden.

     Under Section 14 the municipalities were to be responsible inter

alia for the scrutinising of the collected information and for passing

it on to the COS when complete. With this and for other purposes the

municipality was to entrust a special census scrutinising body

(granskningsorgan).

     Section 16 authorised the chief census scrutinising officer or

his deputy to request a census participant to submit census particulars

within a certain period of time.

     A person refusing to fill out and return the census form was to

be formally reminded of this obligation (Section 17). A person

persisting in his refusal could be ordered to submit the information

under penalty of a fine of between 100 and 1.000 SEK. Such an order was

to be issued by the County Administrative Board at the request of the

COS or the chief census scrutinising officer (Section 18). No appeal

lay against the order (Section 19).

     Questions regarding the liability to pay a fine were to be

considered by the County Administrative Court at the request of the

chief census scrutinising officer or the COS (Section 20).

     Section 21 authorised the COS to obtain, for the purpose of

carrying out the census, the following information from the below

mentioned registers:

1.   from the Register of the Total Population kept by the COS:

-    the personal identity number

-    the place of residence according to the parochial register

     (kyrkobokföringsort)

-    the real property on which a person resides according to the

     parochial register (kyrkobokföringsfastighet)

-    the address

-    the relationship in the household (samhörighetsbeteckning)

-    the marital status

-    the nationality

-    the country of birth and the most recent immigration year;

2.   from the Register of Annual Income Statements

(kontrolluppgiftsregistret) kept by the COS:

-    the wage earner and employer

-    the wages obtained from gainful employment and the period to

     which the emoluments related

-    the amount of preliminary taxes paid

-    the work place number (arbetsställenummer);

3.   from the Register of Income and Wealth (inkomst- och förmögen-

hetsregistret) kept by the COS:

-    the income;

4.   from the Central Register of Enterprises (centrala företags-

registret) kept by the COS:

-    the name and form of the enterprise

-    the number of work places

-    the name, number, size, sector affiliation (sektortillhörighet),

     location and business branch code (näringsgrenskod) of the

     work places;

5.   from the Register of Key Code Areas (registret över nyckelkod-

områden) kept by the COS:

-    the area affiliation of the real properties (fastigheters

     områdestillhörighet);

6.   from the Property Taxation Registers (register över fastighets-

taxeringen) kept by the County Administrative Boards:

-    the affiliation of real properties to a densely populated area

     (fastigheters tätortstillhörighet);

7.   from the Register kept by the Central Board of Real Property Data

(registret vid centralnämnden för fastighetsdata)

-    the coordinates of real properties;

8.   from the Register kept by the Gothenburg Office for the Taxation

of Sailors administered by the National Tax Board (registret vid

riksskatteverkets sjömansskattekontor i Göteborg):

-    the persons paying sailor's tax and employed on Swedish vessels.

     Under Section 22 electronic data processing (hereinafter "EDP"),

for the purposes stated in Section 1, of census information together

with other particulars could only take place in accordance with a

formal decision or with a permission granted in accordance with the

1973 Data Act (datalag 1973:89; hereinafter "the Data Act").

     Under Section 23 the civic registration authorities could make

use of census information in order to check information obtained

through the civic registration. Such a control could, however, be

carried out by means of EDP only in accordance with a formal decision

or with a permission granted in accordance with the Data Act.

     Both Sections 22 and 23 were to be applied in a restrictive way

(Bill pp. 32-33).

     According to Section 24 the provisions on confidentiality in the

Secrecy Act applied.

b.   The Secrecy Act

     The protection under the Secrecy Act prevents documents from

being released, and imposes a secrecy obligation on individuals

handling the documents.

     Under Chapter 9, Section 4 of the Secrecy Act, authorities

involved in producing statistics are obliged to keep inter alia census

information secret. There shall be no exception to this secrecy rule

insofar as the information pertains to personal and economic

circumstances attributable to an identifiable individual.

     However, information regarding enterprises, deceased persons,

information needed for research or pertaining to statistics on

personnel and wages, and information in no way attributable to an

individual may be released, provided this could clearly not harm anyone

to which the information pertains or anyone closely related to such a

person.

     The decision to release information is made by the authority

responsible for storing the information and may be appealed to an

Administrative Court of Appeal and further to the Supreme

Administrative Court.

     Provided it is included in a public document information

regarding personal circumstances shall be protected for seventy years

and in all other cases for twenty years (Chapter 9, Section 4,

para. 2).

     Under Chapter 13, Sections 3 and 4, secret information which has

been received by an authority as a result of its research or for filing

purposes shall be kept secret by that authority.

     Chapter 14, Section 8 authorises the Government to release

information which should normally be kept secret provided there are

very strong reasons for the release. The provision is to be applied

very restrictively (Bill No. 1979/80:2, part A, p. 346).

c.   The Data Act

     A personal file created from information collected in the 1985

census has to be processed in compliance with the 1984 Act and the Data

Act.

     In order to preclude the risk of undue encroachment upon privacy

the Data Inspection Board may issue regulations to the extent this has

not been done by Parliament or by the Government (Sections 6, 6a and

18).

     Under Section 10 anyone may request an extract from the census

file of information pertaining to himself.

     If there is reason to believe that a personal particular in a

personal file is incorrect the authority responsible for keeping the

file shall immediately take reasonable measures in order to verify the

correctness of the particular and, if necessary, correct or delete it

from the file (Section 8 para. 1).

d.   The Act on Fines

     Under Section 9 of the 1985 Act on Fines (lag 1985:206 om viten)

nobody shall be ordered to pay a previously fixed fine, if the purpose

for which the fine was imposed has ceased to exist at the time when the

court considers the matter. A fixed fine may be modified by the court

provided there are special reasons for this, e.g. a change in the

person's economic situation or if his failure to fulfil his obligation

may be regarded as excusable. However, it is not for the court to

assess the appropriateness of the order to fix the fine (Bill

1984/85:96, pp.55-56).

e.   The Act on the Procedure before Administrative Courts

     Under Section 9 of the Act on the Procedure before Administrative

Courts (förvaltningsprocesslag 1971:291) a hearing may be held before

such a court if it is considered to further the investigation or to

accelerate the proceedings. If a party requests a hearing before the

County Administrative Court or the Administrative Court of Appeal, a

hearing shall be held unless it is unnecessary or there are special

reasons not to hold it.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that the obligation, under penalty of a

fine, to reveal information of a personal character by completing the

1985 and 1990 census forms was an unjustified interference with his

right to respect for his private and family life. He further complains

of the subsequent handling of the information submitted by him in the

censuses. He alleges a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

2.   The applicant complains that the singling out of certain

objectors to the 1985 census against whom proceedings were instituted

amounted to discrimination because of their political or other opinion.

He finally alleges that the information gathered by the censuses as

well as the results of voting inquiries (väljarundersökningar) carried

out within an election area (valkrets) after each election may be

matched and used for persecution or unfair treatment of inter alia

political opposition groups, certain regions, municipal districts, or

persons of a certain profession or education.  He alleges a violation

of Article 14 of the Convention.

3.   The applicant complains that the fine imposed on him amounted to

a criminal sanction; that he was refused a hearing and denied the right

to defend himself in person and to have witnesses examined on his

behalf before a civil court of law; and that those against whom penalty

proceedings were instituted were not singled out by a judicial

authority but by the COS, at the same time a party in the matter. He

alleges violations of Article 6 paras. 1, 3 (c) and 3 (d) of the

Convention.

4.   The applicant complains that he did not have an effective remedy

before a national authority with regard to the refused hearing and the

fact that the trial was not held in public.  He alleges a violation of

Article 13 of the Convention.

5.   The applicant complains that he has been unlawfully held guilty

of an omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under

national or international law at the time when it was committed; that

the 1984 Act aimed at preventing public trials and denying him the

enjoyment of his rights under Article 6 paras. 2 and 3; and that his

obligation under the 1990 census to reveal information about his

travelling violated his right to liberty of movement.  He alleges

violations of Articles 7 and 17 of the Convention as well as Article 2

paras. 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, respectively.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 4 August 1989 and registered

on 28 June 1990.

     On 25 February 1991 the Commission decided that notice of the

application should be given to the respondent Government and that the

parties should be invited to submit written observations on the

admissibility and merits of the application, limited to the issues

under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention with regard to the 1985

census.

     Following an extension of the time-limit the Government's

observations were submitted on 12 June 1991. The applicant's

observations in reply were submitted on 1 August 1991. Additional

observations were submitted by the applicant on 20 August, 5 and

25 September, 3 October 1991 and 24 January and 17 March 1992.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that the obligation to participate in the

1985 and 1990 censuses was an unjustified interference with his right

to respect for his private and family life and that he was ordered to

pay a fine for not submitting all particulars requested in the 1985

census. He further complains of the subsequent handling of the census

information. He invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which

reads:

     "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

     with the exercise of this right except such as is in

     accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

     society in the interests of national security, public

     safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

     prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

     health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

     freedoms of others."

a.   The 1985 census

     The Government admit that the obligation to complete the census

form could be regarded as an interference with the applicant's rights

under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. They submit,

however, that the census was governed by the 1984 Act, which laid down,

with sufficient precision, the conditions under which the COS was

empowered to collect census information as well as to extract certain

particulars from the EDP files listed in the 1984 Act. Both the 1984

Act and the 1984 Ordinance were published in the Swedish Official

Journal (Svensk författningssamling).  Thus, the legislation at issue

was accessible and its consequences foreseeable to the applicant.

Finally, the purpose for which the fine was imposed on the applicant

had not ceased to exist when the County Administrative Court considered

whether to order him to pay that fine. Thus, the decision was made in

accordance with the 1984 Act and the 1985 Act on Fines.

     As regards the subsequent handling of the particulars submitted

by the applicant the Government refer to Section 22 of the 1984 Act,

according to which processing of information obtained in the census

together with other information by means of EDP was only to be done for

the purposes set out in Section 1 and in accordance with the Data Act.

They further refer to Section 23, according to which the civic

registration authorities could make use of information regarding places

of residence obtained in the census, provided the address in the

register was a different one from the one stated in the census form.

However, this updating of the civic registration could only take place

by means of EDP, provided permission had been given in accordance with

the Data Act. Moreover, the Data Inspection Board decided, in

application of Section 6, para. 9 of the Data Act, that the census

material was to be stored in the National Archives, following which the

material may not be released for EDP processing unless the receiver had

obtained a licence or a permit from the Data Inspection Board.

     The applicant submits that the 1984 Act was only theoretically

accessible to the individual, as the Swedish Official Journal is not

available to ordinary citizens. Having regard to the difficult

substance of the census legislation with, for example, terms such as

"cross-processing"  and "EDP files", terms which to most individuals

are incomprehensible, there was even less foreseeability than normally.

     As regards the subsequent handling of the census information he

contends that the purpose of the 1985 census as defined in Section 1

of the 1984 Act is so vague that it authorises almost any research or

processing of information in one or several EDP files. It is admitted

by the Government that the term "research" is ambiguous. Research using

inter alia census information may continue without the individual's

knowledge for decades. There are no limitations as to the object for

the research. Whilst it may be work injuries it may as well be mental

or social handicaps, criminality etc. The definition of the term

"national planning" may depend on the particular political ideology,

the research may not be scientific and the term "general information"

may entail almost anything. He refers to Application No. 10473/83

(Dec. 11.12.85, D.R. 45 p. 121), in which the Commission examined, in

another context, the use of personal identity  numbers in Sweden. In

that case it was submitted that there existed at the time 50.000 EDP-

based files in Sweden. Today the number may be about 100.000. The Data

Inspection Board has no factual possibility effectively to control the

use of these files. Thus, the vague definition of the purposes of the

census enables cross-processing of other, possibly unknown EDP files

than those referred to in Section 22 of the 1984 Act.

     The applicant emphasises that the Government have given no

account of how the census information has been used, who has been

granted access to it and for what purposes, and whether these are in

line with the aims argued by the Government. However, information has

admittedly been released inter alia to municipal organs. Thus, further

risks for breaches of the confidentiality are being created.

     In any case, the possibility of cross-processing census

information with information in case sheets or, generally, of studying

diseases or injuries, was almost completely concealed from the census

participants when they submitted their particulars. Subsequently, mass

media have revealed that extensive surveys of certain population groups

on the basis of census information and information in other EDP files

have been carried out for allegedly medical research purposes, without

the individuals having been informed about them.

     Moreover, whilst there exists under Swedish law an obligation to

inform a private enterprise of the release of information on its

solvency and to whom that information has been released, the 1984 Act

does not impose any obligation on the authorities to inform an

individual of the release of census particulars or of the purpose of

the release, nor may he prohibit the release of such information.

Whilst it is also true that a person may check personal particulars

stored in an EDP file such a control can only be carried out if he is

aware of the existence of a particular file.

     The Commission considers that the applicant's obligation to

participate in the 1985 census and the subsequent handling of the

census particulars constituted an interference with his right to

respect for his private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8

para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 9702/82, Dec. 6.10.82,

D.R. 30 p. 239).

     Consequently, it must be examined whether the interference was

justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention. In order to be justified under this provision an

interference must satisfy three conditions: it must be "in accordance

with the law"; it must pursue one of the aims enumerated in Article 8

para. 2 (Art. 8-2); and it must be "necessary in a democratic society"

for one or more of those aims (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Margareta and

Roger Andersson judgment of 25 February 1992, para. 73, to be published

in Series A as no. 226).

     The Commission recalls that the word "law" covers both written

and unwritten law. It refers primarily to domestic law and the phrase

means that any interference must be based on such law. However, the

phrase includes two requirements which go beyond simple compliance with

the domestic law. These requirements relate to the quality of the law

and can be summarised under the headings "accessibility" and

"foreseeability". Moreover, there must be a measure of legal protection

in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities

with the rights safeguarded by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1). A law

which confers a discretion on the authorities must indicate the scope

and manner of exercise of any such discretion with sufficient clarity

to afford the necessary protection (see the above-mentioned Margareta

and Roger Andersson judgment, para. 75).

     The Commission's power to review compliance with domestic law is

limited: it is in the first place for the national courts to interpret

and apply that law (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Fredin judgment of 18

February 1991, Series A No. 192, p. 16, para. 50).

     The Commission finds that the obligation to participate in the

1985 census was based on Sections 4 and 8 of the 1984 Act which defined

with sufficient foreseeability those who were to take part in it. In

this respect the 1984 Act conferred no discretion on the COS. The 1984

Act had been published in the Swedish Official Journal and was, thus,

accessible to the applicant. Moreover, the sentencing of the applicant

to a fine was based on Sections 18 and 20 of the 1984 Act. The

Commission, therefore, concludes that the applicant's obligation to

participate in the 1985 census was "in accordance with the law" for the

purpose of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

     As regards the question whether the interference pursued a

legitimate aim the Government submit that the census was carried out

for much the same purpose as the 1981 census in the United Kingdom,

which was the subject of Application No. 9702/82 (loc.cit.), that is

in the interests of the economic well-being of the country. The

questions concerning housing particulars had the further aim of

protecting the health, as it supplied the authorities with information

on the general housing and sanitary standard of Swedish homes. Such

information was needed in order for the authorities to properly assess

factors likely to have an impact on the public health situation.

Furthermore, there is, in the present case, no indication that the

imposition of the applicant's fine and his subsequent sentence did not

pursue the same purposes as those of the 1984 Act and, thus, the

aforementioned aims under Article 8  para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.

     The applicant contends that no causality has been shown to exist

between censuses carried out in Sweden and the economic well-being of

the country, nor has it been shown that the collecting of personal

particulars and the cross-processing of such information with already

existing EDP files pursued any of the aims stated in Article 8 para.

2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. In particular, he objects to the

Government's argument that the collecting of housing particulars also

pursued the aim of health protection in that it supplied the

authorities with information concerning health risks related to

occupation and work place. The last three to four censuses have not

resulted in any significant measures aiming at improving public health.

     The Commission notes that censuses are common in the member

States of the Council of Europe. The object of such censuses is usually

to establish accurate statistical information about the population and

its housing conditions, this being in the interests of the economic

well-being of the country (cf. No. 9702/82, loc.cit.).

     In the Commission's view there is, in the present case, no

substantiation of the applicant's allegation that his obligation to

participate in the 1985 census aimed at pursuing any aims other than

the economic well-being of Sweden and the protection of health. These

are both legitimate aims under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention.

     As regards the question whether the interference was "necessary

in a democratic society" the Government refer to the purposes of the

census as stated in Section 1 of the 1984 Act. The census material is

being used for planning and research, the latter term encompassing

different kinds of research, e.g. medical research and research needed

to further the techniques used in social planning and medical research.

For instance, the census material and the possibility under the 1984

Act to extract information from certain existing EDP files provides

researchers in the field of social medicine with an opportunity to

increase their knowledge of possible explanations of work injuries and

causes of death.

     One of the purposes behind the 1985 census being medical research

the census material has to remain attributable to individual

participants by means of their personal identity numbers. This number

has frequently been used as an identifying key (sökbegrepp) for EDP-

based personal files and as a linking key (kopplingsnyckel) in the

matching or cross-processing (samkörning) of personal files. Thus, by

means of the personal identity number, researchers, for instance, in

the field of social medicine could benefit from the information in as

many ways as possible. For the same reasons the information will remain

identifiable, even though the 1985 census file is now stored in the

National Archives. However, the Secrecy and Data Acts, in particular

Chapter 9, Section 4 of the Secrecy Act, have prevented and continue

to prevent misuse of the census information.

     The Government also refer to the decision of the Chancellor of

Justice of 15 October 1987 in which he found that the COS had complied

with the Secrecy Act when collecting and processing the census

information.

     The Government further refer to Application No. 10473/83

(loc.cit.), in which the Commission found that there is no provision

in the Convention which as such expressly or implicitly prohibits the

use of personal identity numbers.

     The Government finally refer to Application No. 9702/82

(loc.cit.), in which the Commission noted that the integrity of members

of the same family or household was provided for in the census. Similar

rules applied in the 1985 census.

     The Government conclude that, having regard to the State's margin

of appreciation, the interference with the applicant's rights under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention answered a "pressing social need"

and must be considered "necessary in a democratic society".

     The applicant contends that the interference with his rights

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention was not necessary in a

democratic society. Although he would consider the name, address, sex,

age, birth and death of a person as information the collection of which

could be regarded necessary in view of a pressing social need, this

information has traditionally been and is still being collected by the

civic registration authorities.

     The applicant refutes the Government's assertion that the

collection of professional particulars was relevant for studies of the

relationship between, on the one hand, injuries and, on the other hand,

the work place and the health situation, as well as for studies of the

distribution of work. At the time of the census there existed already

a number of sources enabling such studies, for instance information

stored by the Social Insurance Offices (socialförsäkringskassorna), the

Register for Professional Injuries (yrkesskaderegistret), etc.

     The applicant also objects to the Government's argument that the

obligation to include information pertaining to the heating of

dwelling-houses was necessary in order to draw up plans for future

allocation of energy and fuel resources and as a means of assessing the

general standard of dwelling-houses. The same information could be

found in the Register of Property Units (fastighetsregistret) and in

the declarations of property units (fastighetsdeklarationer).

     Thus, as regards a large part of the information requested in the

census form, there was no pressing social need to obtain it by means

of a compulsory operation the fundamental aim of which was to increase

the control of individuals and their private lives. Pressing social

needs such as those of elderly people with low pensions and the

homeless could have been attended to in a better way by allocating the

vast resources which were spent on the census directly to those

population groups. Moreover, contrary to what the Government argue,

there is no tendency to strive to ease the burden on the public when

participating in censuses and to increase the protection of personal

integrity. The 1990 census form contained questions which were in many

aspects as penetrating as those in the 1985 census.

     The applicant accepts that there is no provision in the

Convention prohibiting the use of a personal identity number. However,

the issue in the present case concerns the particular use of that

number as a means for enabling the attribution of a large amount of

penetrating information to a certain individual, as well as the

possibility of cross-processing and matching such information with

particulars from other EDP files, with the help of that number. The

1984 Act authorises certain cross-processing, but cross-processing may

also be carried out by those who are granted access to the census

material.

     He further notes that it has been admitted by the Government that

the obligation in the census to indicate the personal identity number

enabled an attribution of particulars to an individual participant. It

has further been admitted that the personal identity numbers were and

are continuously being used inter alia for the cross-processing of EDP

files.

     In the applicant's view the crucial issues in his case are

whether there is any limit on the mapping and control of individuals

by obliging them, under penalty of a fine, to submit information;

whether such an operation can be regarded necessary in a democratic

society; and whether at a certain point that society ceases to be a

democratic one.

     The Commission recalls that the word "necessary" requires that

the interference corresponds to a "pressing social need" and, in

particular, is proportionate to the aim or aims pursued (see  e.g. Eur.

Court H.R., Moustaquim judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193,

p. 19, para. 43). It  must determine whether the reasons adduced to

justify the interference are "relevant and sufficient". Regard must

further be had to the margin of appreciation afforded to the

Contracting States (Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68).

     In the present case the Commission must decide whether the

particular operation of the 1985 census and, in particular, the

requirement of compulsory completion, backed up  by sanctions, can be

regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" to achieve the

aforementioned legitimate aims (No.9702/82, loc.cit.).

     The Commission first notes that the completed census forms are

treated with confidentiality. This is evident from the terms of the

form, which states that the information will be protected under the

Secrecy and Data Acts.

     Moreover, the census provided for the possibility that any person

born in 1969 or earlier could complete a separate form from that

completed by other members of the household, if he wished the

information to remain confidential from those other persons.

     However, as to the other features of the census it differs from

the one carried out in the United Kingdom and which was the subject of

Application No. 9702/82 (loc.cit.). In that case the names and the

addresses of the participants were not included in the census computer.

Thus, the particulars submitted by an individual participant in the

census were not attributable to him. Moreover, after the census the

questionnaires were locked away for 100 years before they are to be

passed on the Public Record Office.

     In the present case the census information is admittedly

attributable to individual participants at least by means of their

personal identity numbers. Although subsequently the census information

has been stored in the National Archives it will retain this

attributability and may be released, without limitation in time, in

accordance with the Secrecy Act and the Data Act.

     The Government have argued that the 1985 census was carried out

in the interests of the economic well-being of Sweden and the

protection of health and, thus, answered to "a pressing social need".

In particular, the attributability of the census information to

individual participants was and continues to be necessary for medical

research purposes. The Government have finally referred to the margin

of appreciation of the Contracting States under Article 8 (Art. 8) of

the Convention.

     In the Commission's view regard must be had to the nature of the

census particulars. It cannot find that their storing and

attributability to individual participants could warrant the conclusion

that the census, in the way in which it was operated, was not necessary

in a democratic society. This remains so even taking into account the

COS's possibility to extract certain particulars from the other

registers mentioned in the 1984 Act. In any case, the applicant has not

shown in what way he has been affected by any of the above-mentioned

measures, nor is there any indication of census particulars being used

for persecution or unfair treatment of inter alia political opponents,

as alleged by the applicant in his complaint under Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention. In these circumstances and having regard

to the State's margin of appreciation the Commission finds that the

particular operation of the 1985 census could be regarded as necessary

in a democratic society for the aims argued by the Government.

     It follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

b.   The 1990 census

     The applicant further complains that also his obligation, under

penalty of a fine, to participate in the 1990 census, violated his

rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

     The Commission observes that the applicant has not been fined for

not completing the 1990 census form. He cannot, therefore, in this

respect, claim to be a victim under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this part of the complaint is incompatible

ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must be

rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2.   The applicant also complains that only certain objectors to the

1985 census were ordered, under penalty of a fine, to complete the

census form. He further alleges that the census information may be

matched with results of voting inquiries carried out within an election

area, this facilitating persecution or unfair treatment of inter alia

political opponents, certain regions, municipalities or holders of a

certain profession or education. He invokes Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention, which reads:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

     ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

     political or other opinion, national or social origin,

     association with a national minority, property, birth or

     other status."

     The Government submit that Section 18 of the 1984 Act authorised

the COS to request that fines be imposed on anyone refusing to

participate in the census. The COS provided the chief census

scrutinising officers with certain guidelines according to which all

non-participants were to be listed, except where their addresses were

uncertain or incomplete. In order to investigate his reasons for not

completing the census form the non-particpant was to be contacted.

Provided he had an excuse such as a serious illness, a social or

linguistic handicap or the fact that he had been living abroad for a

considerable time, no further action against him was to be taken. In

the remaining cases the officer was to notify the COS, which was to

report such objectors to the County Administrative Board in order to

have a fine imposed. However, a condition for such a request to be made

was that a census official had been in contact with the objector.

Moreover, the assessment whether a person should be considered as

having refused to complete the census form was to be carried out in a

restrictive way, so as to avoid that persons be treated as objectors

without there being sufficient reasons for such an assertion.

     The Government further refer to the decision of the Chancellor

of Justice of 15 October 1987, concluding that it had not been shown

that the COS had not treated similar cases on an equal basis or that

irrelevant considerations had been taken into account when applying the

1984 Act to certain indivuals.

     The Government submit that the sole purpose of the imposition of

fines was to induce individuals to complete the census forms and, thus,

to prevent the statistical information from being incomplete. The fact

that fines were not imposed on every person who did not return the

census form was not disproportionate to the aim of the census. In cases

where individuals explicitly declared that they did not intend to

complete the census form in its essential parts it was natural to have

fines imposed, having regard to the risk that also many others, for

various reasons, would not complete the form. Thus, the burden on those

who expressly refused or who otherwise fell within the category against

which the COS took measures must be tolerated. When it comes to

deciding the means of exerting pressure for a specific purpose like the

present one, the State's margin of appreciation must be considered to

be wider than if the issue had been a conviction for a criminal

offence. Moreover, the order to pay the fine was issued by a court

competent to examine the legality of the imposition of the fine. This

procedure protected the individual against arbitrary application of the

1984 Act.

     The Government conclude that the imposition of fines was based

on objective criteria, had a legitimate aim and was not

disproportionate to that aim.

     The applicant submits that his complaint does not only concern

the principles behind the guidelines issued by the COS, but also the

application of those guidelines. The 1984 Act makes no distinction

between different groups of census "objectors". Thus, the selective way

of fining only a small number of objectors was not in accordance with

the law. The census information which the COS aimed at obtaining from

the non-particpants considered as objectors by the imposition of fines

was of minor importance compared with the information which the

remaining almost 55.000 non-participants did not submit. The argument

that the aim of fining certain objectors was to obtain as complete

statistical information as possible is, therefore, contradictory. It

is admitted by the Government that the 126 objectors were ordered to

pay a fine for the purpose of deterring other potential objectors. In

the applicant's view there was, however, no proportionality between the

fining of those and the aim allegedly pursued. Thus, the fines must be

considered a punishment for particular cheek and support for a

political ideology opposed to the kind of individual control sought to

be achieved by the then Government. Moreover, the selection of the 126

objectors took place without any examination by a court. The fact that

domestic courts had competence to examine both the legality and the

imposition of the fine is irrelevant, as the applicant's reason for

refusing to complete his census form was based on his criticism of the

1984 Act. In any case, by the time the Supreme Administrative Court had

rendered its decision the processing of the census information had

already ended and the grounds for imposing the fine had ceased to

exist.

     As regards the decision of the Chancellor of Justice the

applicant submits that it was almost exclusively based on the opinion

by the COS. No investigation was made in order to verify that none of

the 126 objectors were randomly selected or chosen on any other

distinguishing grounds in violation of the rule of equality before the

law, nor was any investigation carried out in order to ascertain how

many non-participants in the census refused to complete the census form

for reasons of principle and how many did not complete it for other

reasons such as passivity or practical obstacles. Furthermore, it

remains unclear from the Chancellor's decision how he has assessed the

confidentiality of the COS's handling of the census information.

     The applicant concludes that fining him for not submitting all

census particulars made him bear an individual and excessive burden.

     The Commission recalls that Article 8 (Art. 8) and the other

provisions of the Convention defining substantive rights are

supplemented by Article 14 (Art. 14) prohibiting discrimination in the

enjoyment of such rights.  A measure which as such could be in

conformity with one of the normative provisions may nevertheless

violate that provision, taken in conjunction with Article 14 (Art. 14),

if it is applied in a discriminatory manner.  However, there is no room

for the application of Article 14 (Art. 14), unless the facts at issue

fall within the ambit of one of the other substantive provisions of the

Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Inze judgment of 28 October 1987,

Series A no. 126, p. 17, para. 36, with further reference).

     The Commission has found above that the applicant's first

complaint falls within the ambit of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention. Article 14 of the Convention is therefore applicable.

     For the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, a

difference  in treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and

reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate

aim, or if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality

between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.  The

Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing

whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations

justify a different treatment in law.  The scope of the margin will

vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its

background (see the above-mentioned Inze judgment, p. 18, para. 41,

with further references).

     The Government argue that the aim of fining the applicant and

certain other objectors was to reduce the overall number of objectors

so as to obtain as complete statistical information as possible.

     The Commission observes that roughly 55.000 persons persisted in

not completing the census form following a reminder under Section 17

of the 1984 Act. Only some 800 of those were subsequently ordered,

under penalty of a fine, to complete the form. However, only about 120

persons were eventually fined. The fining was considered a practical

necessity for the administration of the census (No. 9702/82, loc.cit)

and there is no reason to believe that those who were fined were

selected on discriminatory grounds.

     The applicant's complaint that the matching of census particulars

with other material could facilitate the use of the information for

persecution or unfair treatment of inter alia political opponents has

been considered above in relation to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains that the fine imposed amounted

to a criminal sanction; that he was refused a hearing and denied the

right to defend himself in person and to have witnesses examined on his

behalf before a court of law; and that those against whom criminal

proceedings were instituted were not selected by a judicial authority

but by the COS, at the same time a party in the matter. He invokes

Article 6 paras. 1, 3 (a) and 3 (d) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-a , 6-3-d) of the

Convention.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) reads, in its relevant parts:

     "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

     or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

     to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and

     impartial tribunal established by law. ..."

     The Government submit that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention

does not apply to the proceedings before the administrative courts, as

the fine at issue was not a criminal sanction. Should the Commission

consider Article 6 (Art. 6) applicable in the case the Government

consider the complaint manifestly ill-founded. The applicant's request

for a hearing before the County Administrative Court was rejected, a

hearing being deemed unnecessary. In his appeal to the Administrative

Court of Appeal he, although referring to his submissions to the County

Administrative Court, did not complain of that refusal, nor did he

request a hearing. He must, therefore, be considered to have waived his

right to a hearing.

     The applicant contends that in the determination of his civil

obligations or, alternatively, his criminal charge he was denied a fair

and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. He

objects to the Government's assertion that he waived his right to a

hearing before the Administrative Court of Appeal. In his appeal to

that Court he had referred to his submissions to the County

Administrative Court, including his request for a hearing before that

court which was ancillary to and formed part of his subsequent appeal.

He states that it is difficult to imagine a more explicit way of

appealing than by referring to the submissions before a lower court.

     The Commission does not consider it necessary to pronounce itself

on the applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) in the present case, as the

complaint is manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.

     The Commission notes that the applicant's request for a hearing

before the County Administrative Court of Stockholm was formally

rejected. However, in a letter to the Court the applicant had

previously accepted that, provided this was the view of the Court, the

case could be examined without a hearing. Whilst it is true that in his

appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal the applicant referred to

his submissions before the first instance court, he made no express

request for a hearing before the Administrative Court of Appeal.  He

must, therefore, be considered to have waived his right to a hearing

before that court (cf. Eur. Court H.R., HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson

judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171, pp. 20-21, paras. 66-

67).

     As regards the remainder of the complaints under this provision

the Commission finds no indication of a violation of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.   The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention in that he did not have an effective remedy

before a national authority with regard to the refused hearings and the

fact that the trial was not held in public. He invokes Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:

     "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

     Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

     before a national authority notwithstanding that the

     violation has been committed by persons acting in an

     official capacity."

     The Commission notes that in his request for leave to appeal to

the Supreme Administrative Court the applicant had the possibility to

renew his request for a hearing, and that he availed himself of this

possibility. The Commission has further found above that the complaint

regarding the court proceedings as such is manifestly ill-founded.

     It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.   The applicant complains that he has been unlawfully held guilty

of an omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under

national or international law at the time when it was committed; that

the 1984 Act aimed at preventing public trials and denying him the

enjoyment of his rights under Article 6 paras. 2 and 3 (Art.6-2, 6-3);

and that his obligation in the 1990 census to reveal information

pertaining to his daily travels violated his right to liberty of

movement. He invokes Articles 7 and 17 of the Convention as well as

Article 2 paras. 2 and 3 of Protocol No. 4 (Art. 7, 17, P4-2-2, P4-2-3)

to the Convention.

     However, the Commission finds no indication of a violation of

Article 7 or 17 (Art. 7, 17) of the Convention.

     It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     As regards the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4

(P4-2) the Commission has found above that the applicant cannot claim

to be a victim under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention with regard

to his obligation to submit information in the 1990 census. In any

case, he did not submit any census particulars pertaining to his daily

travels. Consequently, he cannot, in this respect, claim to be a victim

under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

     It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione personae

with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   Secretary to the Commission      President of the Commission

         (H.C. KRÜGER)                    (C.A. NØRGAARD)

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