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NOVIFLORA SWEDEN AKTIEBOLAG v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 14369/88 • ECHR ID: 001-1378

Document date: October 12, 1992

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 2

NOVIFLORA SWEDEN AKTIEBOLAG v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 14369/88 • ECHR ID: 001-1378

Document date: October 12, 1992

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 14369/88

                      by NOVIFLORA SWEDEN AKTIEBOLAG

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

12 October 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, Acting President

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mr.   F. MARTINEZ

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Deputy to the Secretary to the Commission.

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 29 April 1988

by NOVIFLORA SWEDEN AKTIEBOLAG against Sweden and registered on

8 November 1988 under file No. 14369/88;

      Having regard to

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

      the Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

      7 May 1991 and the observations in reply submitted by the

      applicant on 20 September 1991;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as they appear from the submissions of the

parties, may be summarised as follows.

      The applicant is a limited liability company with its

headquarters in Stockholm. Before the Commission it is represented by

Mr. Jan Axelsson, of the law firm Johansson & Sjöstedt, Stockholm, who

is also a member of the board of the applicant company. The other

members of the board are the owner of the above law firm (D.J.) and a

Dutch citizen.

      The applicant company's registered address - Jungfrugatan 18,

Stockholm - is the same as the address of a branch office of the above

law firm. The main office of the law firm is located at Södertälje.

      The applicant company carries on business as a wholesale

distributor of flowers.

Particular circumstances of the case

      At the request of the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank)

of The Hague in relation to an investigation concerning tax offences

allegedly committed in the Netherlands by the Dutch affiliate of the

applicant company the State Prosecutor for Special Cases (stats-

åklagaren för speciella mål) on 2 November 1987, in application of

Sections 1 and 2 of the 1975 Act on the Use of Certain Means of

Coercion at the Request of a Foreign State (lag 1975:295 om användning

av vissa tvångsmedel på begäran av främmande stat; hereinafter "the

1975 Act") ordered and conducted a search of the applicant company's

premises in Stockholm and subsequently of the main office of the law

firm. Two Dutch police officers were present at the search of the main

office, where a considerable number of documents pertaining to the

applicant company as well as to its Dutch affiliate were seized. In the

course of the search the Dutch police officers were informed of the

contents of the documents found so as to enable them to assess their

relevance for the investigation in the Netherlands.

      At a hearing before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm

on 6 November 1987 the applicant company, represented by D.J.,

contested the lawfulness of the seizure. D.J. submitted that he had

received the documents in his capacity as advocate (advokat; i.e.

member of the Swedish Bar Association) and that the primary issue to

consider was the lawfulness of the search, as it had been conducted at

a law firm. The State Prosecutor for Special Cases submitted that the

search had been carried out, as D.J. was a representative of the

applicant company and as the company had the same address as the law

firm.

      The District Court concluded that the seizure was lawful.

      The applicant company appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea

hovrätt).

      On 16 November 1987 the Prosecutor lifted the seizure and

returned the seized documents.

      On 25 March 1988 the Svea Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal,

finding that, as the seizure had been lifted and the documents handed

back, the lawfulness of the seizure could not be examined, irrespective

of whether or not the Prosecutor had been empowered to lift the

seizure.

      The applicant company appealed to the Supreme Court (högsta

domstolen).

      On 9 August 1988 the Supreme Court requested the Prosecutor-

General (riksåklagaren) to supply information as to whether photocopies

of the seized documents had been handed over to Dutch authorities.

      In his reply of 28 August 1988 the Prosecutor-General denied that

copies had been handed over by him or by the State Prosecutor for

Special Cases.

      On 6 October 1988 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal's

decision and referred the case back to that Court for a new

examination. The Supreme Court considered it established that

photocopies of part of the seized documents had been made prior to the

lifting of the seizure, but that they had not yet been handed over to

the Dutch authorities. However, neither the Code of Judicial Procedure

(rättegångsbalken) nor the 1975 Act authorised a Prosecutor to lift a

seizure, as it may then no longer be reviewed by a court as to its

lawfulness. The photocopies could, however, not be regarded as seized

property and, therefore, the 1975 Act did not apply to them. Provided

the seizure were considered unlawful the handing over of photocopies

of seized documents to the Dutch authorities would also be excluded.

The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal regarding the lawfulness

of the seizure as such should have been examined by the Court of

Appeal.

      At a witness hearing before the Regional Court of The Hague on

13 October 1988 the two Dutch police officers assisting at the search

confirmed that they had received photocopies of certain seized

documents prior to the outcome of the court review of the lawfulness

of the seizure. It further transpired that they had spent a week

examining the seized documents at premises of the Swedish police.

      On 14 September 1989 the Svea Court of Appeal found that the

seizure had been unlawful. It also considered it established that

certain seized documents had been photocopied prior to the lifting of

the seizure. Following the lifting the original documents had been

returned, but copies had been kept by the State Prosecutor for Special

Cases. The Court of Appeal noted that the registered address of the

applicant company was not the address of the main office of the law

firm, but that of its branch office. Moreover, although D.J. was the

only member of the board of the applicant company authorised to act

alone on the company's behalf, the Court found nothing contradicting

his statement that the seized documents had been handed over to him in

his capacity as advocate.

      Following the Prosecutor-General's appeal the Supreme Court on

14 September 1990 quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal. In view

of the fact that the seizure as a whole had been lifted it limited its

examination to the question whether the seizure had been lawful as

regards the photocopied documents. It noted that the main part of those

documents pertained to an appeal lodged on behalf of the applicant

company with the National Board of Customs (generaltullstyrelsen) by

Mr. Jan Axelsson. The remainder of the seized documents, also

pertaining to the applicant company, had been entrusted either to D.J.

or other staff members of the law firm in their capacity as advocates

or assistants to an advocate. The Supreme Court started from the

assumption that all photocopied documents had contained information

entrusted to an advocate or to an advocate's assistant in this capacity

or which he or she had acquired while acting in such a capacity. Thus,

the documents had been protected from seizure under Chapter 27, Section

2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure and the seizure had been unlawful.

The question of the lawfulness of the remainder of the seizure did not

call for any further action.

Relevant domestic law

(a)   The conditions for a seizure and the property that may be

      seized

      According to Section 1 of the 1975 Act objects or written

documents may, under certain conditions, at the request of a foreign

state be seized and handed over to that state. The conditions under

Sections 1 and 2 are, insofar as they are of relevance to the present

case, that a person in the foreign state is suspected, accused or

convicted of an offence which is punishable in that state and that the

objects or written documents to be seized can be reasonably assumed to

be of significance for the investigation of that offence.

      By reference in Section 2 of the 1975 Act to Chapter 27, Sections

2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure the seizure of written

documents is subject to certain limitations. As far as is relevant for

the present case, no document may be seized if its contents can be

assumed to be of such a character that the person possessing the

document may not, according to Chapter 36, Section 5 of the Code,

testify as a witness concerning the document.

      Under the last-mentioned provision an advocate may be heard as

a witness concerning matters entrusted to him in his professional

capacity only if this is authorised by law or consented to by the

person for whose benefit the secrecy obligation is imposed. However,

in a criminal prosecution for an offence punishable by a minimum

sentence of two years imprisonment or more, an advocate is obliged to

testify, unless he is acting as counsel for the defence.

(b)   The conditions for a search and the premises that may be

      searched

      Under Section 2, paragraph 2 of the 1975 Act a search of premises

may be carried out, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 28,

Sections 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, for the purpose of

discovering property which is subject to seizure. From the reference

to Chapter 28, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure it follows

that for a search to be carried out there has to be a reason to believe

that an offence punishable by imprisonment has been committed.

Furthermore, a search of the premises of a person other than the one

who reasonably can be suspected of the offence may be executed only if

the offence was committed there, if the suspect was apprehended there,

or if there is a particular reason to believe that the search would

reveal an object subject to seizure.

(c)   The procedure

      Under Section 5 of the 1975 Act a request from a foreign state

is normally to be submitted to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign

Affairs. According to Sections 6 and 7 the Government shall, unless the

request is immediately rejected, transmit it as well as other documents

to the Prosecutor-General, who shall see to it that the measures

required are carried out. In this context, Chapter 27, Sections 9-13

and Chapter 28, Sections 4-10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure are to

be applied.

      Under Chapter 27, Section 12 and Chapter 28, Section 8 a seized

private document found at a search of premises may only be more closely

examined by the Court, the Prosecutor or the chief investigating

officer. However, by instruction of any of these the document may be

inspected by an expert or any other person employed for the

investigation of the offence. If the person carrying out the search is

not competent to examine a document it should be sealed by him.

      From Chapter 28, Section 4 of the Code of Judicial Procedure it

follows that the search order is normally to be issued by the

investigating authority, the prosecutor or the Court. When the search

can be assumed to be extensive or cause particular inconvenience to the

person at whose premises the search is conducted the search should not

be made without a court order, unless a delay would entail risks.

      According to Chapter 28, Section 7 the officer carrying out the

search may obtain necessary assistance from an expert or any other

person.

      According to Section 8 of the 1975 Act the District Court of

Stockholm shall immediately be notified of a seizure made under this

Act for consideration of, inter alia, whether the seizure has been

executed on lawful grounds. The Court shall hold a hearing in the case

as soon as possible. The Court's decision may, in accordance with

provisions contained in Chapters 49, 52, 54 and 56 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure, be appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal and

ultimately to the Supreme Court.

      Following the termination of the court proceedings the

Prosecutor-General shall, according to Section 9 of the 1975 Act, hand

over the matter to the Government. If the seizure has been found not

to have been carried out on lawful grounds the Government shall refuse

the request of the foreign state.

(d)   The control of as well as the State's civil liability with

      regard to the exercise of public power

      Public authorities and officials are subject to supervision both

by the Parliamentary Ombudsman (riksdagens justitieombudsman) and the

Chancellor of Justice (justitiekanslern). Both the Ombudsman and the

Chancellor can act on their own initiative as well as on the basis of

complaints from the public, and both are empowered to institute

criminal or disciplinary proceedings against an official who, by an act

or omission, has wilfully or negligently disregarded his or her duties.

      Under the Tort Liability Act (skadeståndslagen) the State may be

liable, if a person suffers losses as a result of an act or omission

by fault or negligence by an official in his or her exercise of public

power.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant company complains that the search of the main

office of the law firm was unlawful and that it had no possibility

effectively to challenge the lawfulness of the search before a tribunal

meeting the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

2.    The applicant company alleges an unlawful interference with its

right to respect for its private life and correspondence as enshrined

in Article 8 of the Convention. It refers to the seizure, the allowing

of Dutch police officers to examine documents during the search as well

as documents that were seized, the making of photocopies of seized

documents, and the handing over of copies to the Dutch authorities.

3.    The applicant company further alleges that the search, the

seizure and the subsequent handling of its property violated Article

1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

4.    The applicant company finally alleges a violation of Article 13

of the Convention in that it had no effective remedy against the

alleged violations of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 29 April 1988 and registered

on 8 November 1988.

      On 25 February 1991 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government and to request them to submit

their written observations on its admissibility and merits. The

Government's observations were submitted on 7 May 1991. On 20 September

1991 the applicant company submitted its observations in reply.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant company complains that the search of the law firm's

main office was unlawful and that there was no possibility for the

applicant company effectively to challenge the lawfulness before a

tribunal meeting the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, as far as

relevant:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

      to a ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial

      tribunal ..."

      The Commission has examined the alleged unlawfulness of the

search in connection with its considerations under Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention (see (a) below).

      As regards the alleged absence of a right to an effective court

remedy in order to challenge the lawfulness of the search the

Government submit that the search did not involve any determination of

the applicant company's civil rights or obligations or of any criminal

charge against it. Accordingly, they consider the complaint to be

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

In any case, the complaint is manifestly ill-founded, as the applicant

company did not institute any criminal proceedings against the

officials alleged to be responsible for the search, nor did it

institute any civil proceedings claiming damages. Both these

proceedings would have been conducted before tribunals meeting the

requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

      The applicant company contends that the search did concern its

civil rights and that neither criminal nor civil proceedings would have

enabled it to challenge the lawfulness of the search.

      The Commission considers that neither the search order nor the

proceedings for challenging that order determined any of the applicant

company's civil rights or obligations or any criminal charge against

it. Thus, Article 6 (Art. 6) is not applicable.

      It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

2.    The applicant company further complains that the seizure, the

allowing of Dutch police officers to examine documents during the

search as well as documents that were seized, the making of photocopies

of seized documents, and the provision of copies to the Dutch

authorities unlawfully interfered with its right to respect for its

private life and correspondence as guaranteed under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life, his home and his correspondence.

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

(a)   The lawfulness of the search and the allowing of Dutch police

      officers to assist at the search and to examine documents

      during the search

      As regards the search as such the Government submit that the

complaint is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

Whilst the allegations made by the applicant company before the

Commission were admittedly made during the review of the lawfulness of

the seizure as such they did not fall within the scope of those

proceedings. However, as the allegations, if found accurate, would

constitute a basis for public prosecution, the applicant company could

have instituted criminal or civil proceedings.

      As regards the further measures allegedly taken in connection

with the search the Government submit that the complaint is

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention, there having been

no interference with the applicant's right to respect for its private

life and correspondence. There is no indication that the seized

documents did not exclusively relate to the applicant company's

business activities. The seizure was carried out at the premises of the

lawyer representing the company in such activities. Moreover, there is

no indication that the dispatching, transmission or reception of the

company's correspondence was interfered with. In the alternative, the

Government reiterate their objection that the complaint is inadmissible

for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In any case, the Government

contend it is manifestly ill-founded, as the presence of the two Dutch

officials did not in itself render the seizure unlawful, their presence

being allowed under Chapter 28, Section 7 of the Code of Judicial

Procedure.

      The applicant company contends that the remedies referred to are

not effective for the purposes of challenging the lawfulness of a

search including its modalities.

      Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the Commission may

only deal with a complaint after all domestic remedies have been

exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international

law. An applicant must make normal use of remedies likely to be

effective and adequate in respect of the matters of which he complains

(cf. No. 10978/84, Dec. 14.10.86, D.R. 49 p. 144 [155] with further

references). The burden of proving the existence of available and

sufficient remedies lies upon the State (Eur. Court H.R., Deweer

judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 15, para. 26).

      The Commission agrees with the applicant company. The Government

have not referred to any case-law showing how any of the proceedings

referred to by the Government could be regarded as an effective remedy

under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, particularly in the

absence of any criminal proceedings having been instituted by the

Public Prosecutor or any criminal or disciplinary proceedings having

been instituted by the Parliamentary Ombudsman or the Chancellor of

Justice.

      In these circumstances the Commission concludes that the remedies

referred to by the Government cannot be considered to be effective and

adequate for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) in respect of this

complaint.

(b)   The lawfulness of the seizure and the subsequent handling of the

      seized documents

      As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the seizure as such the

Government submit that the applicant company can no longer claim to be

a victim under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, as the domestic

court proceedings terminated in the Supreme Court's finding that the

seizure, insofar as it had not already been lifted,  was unlawful. As

a consequence the seized documents were returned. The complaint is

therefore incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the

Convention.

      In the alternative, the Government reiterate their objection

mentioned under (a) that the complaint is incompatible ratione materiae

with the Convention. In any case the complaint is manifestly ill-

founded, the seizure having been made pursuant to the 1975 Act. The

domestic courts' finding that the seizure was unlawful under Swedish

law does not necessarily justify the conclusion that it was unlawful

also for the purposes of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention. In the Government's view the requirement of lawfulness

cannot require more from a Contracting State than the laying down of

reasonably precise procedural guarantees as well as an appropriate

mechanism to ensure that the relevant rules are adequately applied. The

seizure was made on the basis of an interpretation in good faith of

Chapter 27, Section 2 as well as Chapter 36, Section 5 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure. That interpretation, also upheld by the District

Court of Stockholm, was not so unreasonable as to justify the

conclusion that the seizure was not made "in accordance with the law".

Thus, taking into account the conditions laid down for the seizure, the

procedural guarantees provided and the manner in which the 1975 Act was

applied, the seizure was made "in accordance with the law".

      As regards the subsequent handling of the seized documents the

Government reiterate their objections mentioned under (a) that the

complaint is either incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention

or inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In any case

it is manifestly ill-founded, as the allegation that photocopies of

seized documents were handed over to Dutch officials or authorities has

not been sufficiently substantiated. On the contrary, both the

Prosecutor-General and Special Prosecutor stated before the Supreme

Court that no copies had been handed over by them.

      The applicant company contends that, although some photocopies

were returned following the courts' finding that the seizure was

unlawful, others had already been handed over to Dutch authorities.

Therefore, it may still be considered a victim under Article 25

(Art. 25). It further asserts that, even assuming that the seizure as

such were lawful under the terms of the Convention, there was no legal

provision authorising the photocopying of such documents, nor any

legitimate purpose justifying such photocopying pending a court review

of the lawfulness of the seizure. The applicant company refers to the

sworn statements by the Dutch police officers according to which they

had been provided with copies, and contends that the Prosecutor-General

and the Special Prosecutor were not the only public officials to have

access to these photocopies. The fact that, when seized, the

correspondence had already been delivered can be of no relevance.

      The Commission recalls that where an applicant, by using remedies

within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, obtains

adequate redress at the domestic level for the alleged violation of the

Convention he can no longer claim to be a victim of that violation (cf.

No. 12719/87, Dec. 3.5.88, D.R. 56 p. 237 [243-244] with further

references). In the present case there is no indication in the file

confirming the Government's assertion that subsequent to the courts'

finding that the seizure was unlawful the seized documents were

returned. On the contrary, it has been established by the domestic

courts that the original documents were returned already at a time when

the seizure was still considered lawful and only after photocopies had

been made. Thus, the Government have failed to show that the applicant

company obtained redress.

      In these circumstances the Commission concludes that the

applicant company can still claim to be a victim under Article 25

(Art. 25) of the Convention.

      The Commission further observes that the Government have not

referred to any case-law showing how any of the proceedings referred

to by them (see (a) above) could be regarded as an effective and

adequate remedy for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention in respect of the present complaint. It follows that this

objection must also be rejected.

      The Commission has carried out, in the light of the parties'

submissions, a preliminary investigation of the complaints under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. It considers that they raise

questions of fact and law of such complex nature that their

determination requires an examination of the merits. The complaints

cannot therefore be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.

3.    The applicant company further alleges that the search, the

seizure and the subsequent handling of the seized documents violated

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      As regards the seizure the Government reiterate their objection

mentioned above that the complaint is incompatible ratione personae

with the Convention. In the alternative, it is manifestly ill-founded.

The seizure admittedly interfered with the applicant company's use of

the seized documents. However, the interference was lawful and

justified in the general interest and not disproportionate to the

legitimate aim pursued, that is to ensure that they could be handed

over to the Dutch crime investigating authorities.

      As regards the other measures complained of the Government submit

that the complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the

Convention, as those measures did not interfere with the applicant

company's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). In the

alternative, the Government reiterate their objection mentioned above

as regards non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.

      The Commission observes that the facts of the present complaint

are similar to those referred to in the complaints under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention. The Commission has rejected the

Government's objections to the admissibility of those complaints. It

cannot exclude at this stage the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) to the facts at issue. Accordingly, the present complaint

must also be admitted.

4.    The applicant company finally complains of a violation of

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in that it had no effective

remedy against the alleged violations of its Convention rights.

      Article 13 (Art. 13) reads:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      As regards the seizure the Government reiterate their objection

mentioned above that the complaint is incompatible ratione personae

with the provisions of the Convention.

      As regards the other measures complained of under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention the Government reiterate their

objection mentioned above that the complaint is incompatible ratione

materiae with the Convention. In the alternative, it is manifestly ill-

founded, as the remedies available to the applicant have not been

exhausted.

      The Commission finds that insofar as the complaint relates to the

complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, found

to be incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the

Convention, the present complaint must be rejected on the same ground.

      Insofar as the complaint relates to the complaints under Article

8 (Art. 8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

which have been admitted the present complaint must also be admitted.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,

      the complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention,

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention and

      Article 13 of the Convention, the last-mentioned insofar as it

      relates to the issues under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

      and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (P1-1); and

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Deputy to the Secretary to               Acting President of

     the Commission                        the Commission

      (K. ROGGE)                            (S. TRECHSEL)

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