AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 14006/88

                      by Barbro JOHANSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

30 November 1992, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                 J.A. FROWEIN

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 5 May 1988 by

Barbro JOHANSSON against Sweden and registered on 8 July 1988 under

file No. 14006/88;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 11 October 1990 and 24 April 1991 and the observations

submitted by the applicant on 2 January, 15 April and 29 July 1991 and

20 May, 22 June 1992, 1 October and 15 November 1992;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1932. She is a nurse

resident at Mörlunda. Before the Commission she is represented by

Mr. Göran Ravnsborg, a lecturer at the University of Lund.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

      In 1971 the applicant's husband bought an agricultural property

called Brånstorp 1:6 in the municipality of Nässjö from Mrs. E.J. The

property had previously been offered for sale to the owner of the

neighbouring property, Mr. H.A., who refused it. The applicant's

husband's subsequent request for a permit to acquire the property was

rejected by the County Agricultural Board (lantbruksnämnden) of the

County of Jönköping on the ground that the property was needed to

promote the establishment of functional farm holding units. The

purchase was considered void and Mrs. E.J. remained the official owner.

      On 24 November 1982 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Eksjö

found that Mrs. E.J. was the dummy-owner of the property and that the

real owner was the applicant's husband.

      On 5 July 1983 the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten)

decided that the property was to be sold at a compulsory sale by

auction (exekutiv auktion).

      In January 1984 the property was sold at such an auction for

101.000 SEK. The applicant bid 100.000 SEK. As the purchase was never

completed a second auction was held on 16 April 1984, at which the

applicant bought the property for 100.000 SEK, hers being the sole bid.

For the purposes of the 1979 Land Acquisition Act (jordförvärvslag

1979:230, hereinafter "the 1979 Act") the auction was regarded as a

compulsory auction. The applicant therefore received information as to

her obligation under Section 16 of the 1979 Act to obtain a permit to

retain the property within two years in order to avoid a compulsory

re-sale of the property.

      The purchase was registered in the real estate register on

11 July 1984.

      By letter of 5 September 1986 the County Agricultural Board

reminded the applicant of the conditions under the 1979 Act attaching

to her purchase.

      On 3 November 1986 the applicant submitted a request to the

County Agricultural Board that she be granted a permit to retain the

property in accordance with the 1979 Act. She stated that she intended

to work the land part-time in her leisure hours. On 3 February 1987 the

County Agricultural Board rejected the request, considering that the

property was needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and

forestry.

      In her appeal to the National Board of Agriculture (lantbruks-

styrelsen) the applicant submitted that she intended to produce

material for soil improvement.

      On 20 May 1987 the appeal was rejected. The Board found that the

property, which lacked buildings and covered about 21 hectars, was not,

on its own, a farm holding suitable for development. Furthermore,

Mr. H.A. had announced his interest in purchasing an additional

property. The need for a rationalisation of H.A.'s farm holding clearly

outweighed the applicant's interest in keeping the property.

      The applicant's further appeal was rejected by the Government on

10 September 1987 on the ground that the use of the property in the

rationalisation of forestry was in the general interest.

      On 25 February 1988 the County Administrative Board (läns-

styrelsen) of the County of Jönköping at the request of the County

Agricultural Board ordered that the property be sold compulsorily by

auction in accordance with Section 16 of the 1979 Act.

      The applicant's appeal to the Government was rejected on

8 September 1988.

      At the applicant's request a special valuation of the property

was carried out. The estimated value was considered to be 300.000 SEK.

      On 11 April 1990 the applicant requested that the Government

reconsider its decisions of 10 September 1987 concerning the retention

permit and of 8 September 1988 concerning the sale of the property. She

also requested that the Government order the suspension of the sale.

On 19 April 1990 the Government decided to take no further action, as

it had already taken a final position concerning the retention permit

and the auction.

      The public auction took place on 27 April 1990 and the property

was sold to the County Agricultural Board for 300,000 SEK.

      The applicant appealed against the auction to the Göta Court of

Appeal (Göta hovrätt), requesting inter alia that it set aside the sale

of the property and declare void the administrative decisions resulting

in the sale.

      On 21 May 1990 the applicant received the purchase-price.

      On 8 June 1990 the Göta Court of Appeal decided that the case

should be considered on the basis of written submissions

(föredragning).

      On 26 June 1990 it rejected the appeal, stating that it had no

jurisdiction to review the decisions of the administrative authorities

concerning the retention permit or the decisions ordering the

compulsory sale of the property.

      On 3 December 1990 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) granted

leave to appeal. On 11 March 1991 it quashed the decisions by the Göta

Court of Appeal of 8 and 26 June 1990 and referred the case back to

that court, considering inter alia that the applicant should have been

granted an oral hearing.

      The Supreme Court further stated in its judgment:

      "[The applicant's] appeal raises the question to what

      extent an administrative decision taken on the basis of

      [the 1979 Act] can be reviewed or annulled in subsequent

      execution proceedings.

      This question is connected with the general question to

      what extent executable deeds can be annulled in execution

      proceedings. This problem has been noted both in the case-

      law and in the doctrine. It has been considered that the

      execution authorities - both the Enforcement Offices and

      the superior organs - have a right of review but that this

      right is very limited. However, according to what has been

      stated in one case, there may be good reasons to extend the

      review of executable deeds somewhat more than usual when

      the deeds are administrative decisions, in particular when

      these decisions cannot be appealed to an administrative

      court. ...

      It is also justified, in this context, to take into account

      the provisions of the 1950 European Convention on Human

      Rights as well as the case-law developed by the European

      Court of Human Rights. On 21 February 1990 the European

      Court decided a case against Sweden where - as in the

      present case - the issue concerned a compulsory sale of

      real property after a permit to acquire the property under

      [the 1979 Act] had been refused (the Håkansson and

      Sturesson case). In its judgment (Series A no. 171), the

      Court found that questions of permits to acquire property

      as well as questions of compulsory sales concerned the

      individual's "civil rights and obligations" and that the

      individual who was affected had a right under the

      Convention to have the issue examined by a court.

      In order to satisfy fully the requirements of the European

      Convention, a court review would seem to be required which

      is different from that which can be effected as part of

      execution proceedings. In a proposal which has recently

      been submitted to the Law Council (lagrådet) it has

      therefore been suggested that, in cases under [the 1979

      Act], the decisions of the central agricultural authority

      shall be subject to appeal to the Administrative Court of

      Appeal (kammarrätten). Pending a reform of such kind the

      possibility for a court review which exists at the stage of

      the execution should be used as far as possible.

      It follows that a review should take place of the

      administrative decisions which resulted in the auction of

      27 April 1990".

      On 1 April 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's

request that the former Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the County

Agricultural Board and a real estate agent be heard as witnesses.

Referring to the Supreme Court's finding in its decision

of 11 March 1991 the Court found, however, that the applicant herself

should be heard as well as the official of the County Agricultural

Board who had been in charge of the applicant's case.

      On 4 August 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal struck the appeal out

off its list of cases, the applicant having withdrawn it in view of the

settlement reached between her and the County Administrative Board on

30 July 1992. Under the settlement the applicant was granted a right

to repurchase the property Brånstorp 1:6 under the condition that she

would withdraw her appeal.

Relevant domestic law

      The acquisition of agricultural real property is subject to the

regulations of the 1979 Act. The aim of the 1979 Act was to implement

new agricultural guidelines adopted by Parliament (Riksdagen) in 1977

and to further the policy goals of forestry and regional planning.

      On 1 July 1987 amendments to the 1979 Act entered into force, the

purpose of which was to make it easier to obtain a permit for the

purchase of agricultural holdings. The aim of the amended 1979 Act was

to support appropriate development of farm holdings in the general

interest and to form well-adapted holdings in conformity with the aims

of regional policy.

      On 1 July 1991 further amendments to the 1979 Act entered into

force. The provisions below of the 1979 Act refer to their wording up

to 1 July 1991.

      Under Sections 2 and 3 of the 1979 Act a permit is required for

the acquisition of an agricultural holding. No permit is required inter

alia if the property is acquired at a compulsory auction. A request for

a permit shall in principle be made within three months from the

purchase (Section 12). Under Section 4, first paragraph, a permit may

be refused inter alia if it is in the general interest that the

property be used for rationalisation of agriculture or forestry

(sub-section 1) or if it is obvious that the purchase price or other

compensation considerably exceeds the market value of the property

(sub-section 4).

      Under Section 16, first paragraph, a property acquired at a

compulsory auction - in circumstances which in the case of an ordinary

purchase would have required a permit - shall be re-sold within two

years, unless the said circumstances have by then ceased to exist or

the purchaser has obtained a permit from the County Agricultural Board

to retain the property. The granting of such a permit is subject inter

alia to the regulations in Sections 3 and 4, with the exception of

Section 4, sub-section 4. The sale contract established after the

compulsory auction shall contain a note recalling the obligation laid

down in Section 16. A decision by the County Agricultural Board not to

grant permission to retain a property may be appealed to the National

Board of Agriculture and ultimately to the Government (Section 18).

      If, in a case where this is required under Section 16, the

property has not been resold within the prescribed time-limit, the

County Administrative Board shall, at the request of the Country

Agricultural Board, order that the property be sold at a public auction

by the Enforcement Office. At such an auction the property may only be

sold to someone who has received an acquisition permit or who is, like

the County Agricultural Board, exempted from the permit requirement.

      Section 17 specifies that no sale at an auction under that

Section may take place unless the purchase price offered amounts at

least to the value to be attributed to the property in accordance with

the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Code of Enforcement (utsöknings-

balken). This value is to be fixed by the Enforcement Office or, if the

owner of the property makes a timely request for a special valuation,

by valuers appointed by the County Administrative Board. In both cases

the valuation shall be made in consultation with the County

Agricultural Board. If the property is not sold at the auction the

County Agricultural Board may, within a period of two years, request

the County Administrative Board to hold a new auction. If no such

request is made, or if no acceptable bid is made at the second auction,

the owner is no longer required to sell the property.

      The County Administrative Board's decision to order a public

auction may be appealed to the Government.

      The Enforcement Office's decisions in respect of an auction may,

according to Chapter 18 Section 1 of the Code of Enforcement, be

brought before a court of appeal and ultimately, with leave to appeal,

before the Supreme Court. However, according to Section 6 para. 2 of

the same Chapter, an appeal against a decision that is merely a

preparatory step for a final decision may, in general, be lodged only

in connection with an appeal against the latter. Appeals follow the

rules of the 1986 Administrative Act (förvaltningslagen) and those of

the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken), as far as the latter

are relevant.

      In the event that the purchase of agricultural property becomes

void as a result of a refusal of permission to acquire the property on

the ground that it is needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and

forestry, the State is, according to Section 14 of the 1979 Act,

obliged to redeem the property at the purchase price agreed upon in the

invalid sale, if so requested by the seller. However, no such

obligation exists where the purchase price considerably exceeds the

value of the property in view of its yield and other circumstances, or

if the terms are unreasonable in other respects. A request for

redemption should be made to the County Agricultural Board. An action

for redemption may be brought before the Real Estate Court

(fastighetsdomstolen). The decision of that court can be appealed to

a court of appeal and from there an appeal lies to the Supreme Court.

      Under Chapter 52, Section 10, para. 1 of the Code of Judicial

Procedure the Court of Appeal shall, where it is necessary for the

purposes of the investigation of a case that a party or other person

be heard orally, decide on such a hearing as it finds appropriate.

According to Chapter 56, Section 12 the same provision applies in

respect of proceedings before the Supreme Court.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that there is no court remedy against the

decision to refuse her a permit to retain her property. She alleges

that the absence of such a remedy constitutes violations of Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention.

2.    She also complains that the refusal of a retention permit

violated her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the

Convention. In her submissions of 2 January 1991 she further complained

of the 1990 compulsory sale of Brånstorp 1:6.

3.    She finally complains of violations of Article 14 of the

Convention, separately as well as in conjunction with Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and of Articles 18 and 60 of the

Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 5 March 1988 and registered on

8 July 1988.

      On 14 December 1988 the Commission decided in accordance with

Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the

application to the respondent Government but not to invite them at that

stage to submit written observations. The Commission also decided to

adjourn further examination of the application pending the outcome of

the case of HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson before the European Court of Human

Rights.

      On 21 February 1990 the Court delivered judgment in that case

(Eur. Court H.R., HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990,

Series A. no. 171).

      On 2 July 1990 the Commission decided to invite the respondent

Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and

merits of the application, limited to the complaints under Article 6

of the Convention and Article 1 of Procotol No. 1 to the Convention.

      The Government submitted observations on 11 October 1990 and the

applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 2 January 1991.

Additional observations were submitted by the Government on

24 April 1991 and by the applicant on 15 April and 29 July 1991 and

20 May, 22 June, 1 October and 15 November 1992.

      On 8 July 1992 the Commission rejected the applicant's request

for disqualification of some members of the Commission in the further

examination of the case.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that there is no court remedy against the

decision to refuse her a permit to retain her property. She alleges

violations of Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the

Convention.

(a)   Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in its

relevant parts, as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and

      obligations..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ...

      by an independent and impartial tribunal..."

      The Government first submit that the complaint is inadmissible

because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Following the Supreme

Court's decision of 11 March 1991 it is now possible for the applicant

to have both the question of her right to a retention permit and the

subsequent auction proceedings re-examined by the Göta Court of Appeal.

      The Government secondly submit that the complaint is inadmissible

as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention. They refer

to the case of HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson (loc.cit., p. 19, para. 60) in

which the Court found that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the

Convention was applicable, as it was

      "quite clear that the applicants considered themselves

      entitled, under the relevant statutory provisions, to the

      grant of the necessary permit. In the light of the Court's

      established case-law, 'civil rights and obligations' were

      at stake in the ensuing dispute before the administrative

      authorities on the permit issue and before the ... Court of

      Appeal on the lawfulness of the terms of the ... auction

      ... In addition, nothing suggests that the applicants had

      waived their right to a court, even assuming that this

      would have been permissible."

      The Government submit that the situation in the present case is

considerably different from that in the HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson case,

as the applicant's husband had earlier been refused a permit to acquire

the same property on the grounds that it was needed to promote the

establishment of functional farm holding units. The applicant must have

been aware of this fact and also of the fact that, subsequently,

Mrs. E.J.'s ownership was considered by the District Court to have been

of a dummy-owner character. When the applicant bought the property she

had no reason to believe that the position of the administrative

authorities in her case would differ from that in her husband's case.

Her chances of being granted a retention permit being very slim, the

applicant had no arguable case when applying for a permit. Moreover,

the fact that the applicant failed to apply for a permit within the

prescribed time-limit also indicates that she was well aware of the

fact that she would not be able to keep the property. Thus, there was

no serious and genuine dispute before the administrative authorities

in respect of the applicant's alleged right to a retention permit.

      If Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention were to be

found applicable, the Government admit a violation in that the

applicant had no access to a court for the determination of that

dispute.

      The applicant contends that only after the auction the

authorities stressed the "public interest" in the consolidation of the

neighbouring property, this leading to a genuine and serious dispute

between the applicant and the authorities regarding the ownership of

her property.

      The Commission has first examined whether the applicant's

complaint is inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic

remedies. It considers, however, that the objection raised by the

Government in this regard, which relates to the possibilities of having

the right to a retention permit re-examined in subsequent auction

proceedings, does not concern the exhaustion of domestic remedies but

the substance of the issue under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

      The Commission has made a preliminary examination of the

complaint relating to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in the light of the

parties' submissions. It considers that the issues raise questions of

fact and law which are of such a nature as to require an examination

on the merits. The complaint cannot therefore be declared inadmissible

as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. As no other ground for declaring it

inadmissible has been established the application is in this regard

admissible.

(b)   The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      The Commission considers that the complaint under Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention is closely linked to the complaint under

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which the Commission has

found above to be admissible.  This complaint is therefore also

admissible.

2.    The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which reads:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      The Government first submit that this complaint is also

inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in view

of the Supreme Court's judgment of 11 March 1991.

      Should the Commission find that the applicant has exhausted

domestic remedies the Government admit an interference with the

applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions in that

she was refused a retention permit for the property. This interference

amounted to a control of use of her property aiming at a subsequent

deprivation of the property, provided the applicant did not choose to

sell it herself. The refusal of the retention permit was aimed at

promoting a structural rationalisation of agriculture and forestry,

this being a legitimate aim in the general interest. It was based on

the 1979 Act and was thus lawful. In view of the applicant's

neighbour's interest in purchasing the property, the need for

rationalisation of his farm holding clearly outweighed the applicant's

interest in keeping the property. Furthermore, the applicant was aware

of her obligation to sell the property if she was not granted a

retention permit. As her husband had previously not been granted such

a permit for the same property, the refusal of her own request cannot

have taken her by surprise. Thus, the refusal of the retention permit

was a measure proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.

      Should the Commission consider the refusal of the retention

permit as a deprivation of the applicant's property, the Government

submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They refer to the

case of HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson, in which the Court found that the

promotion of the rationalisation of agriculture constituted a

legitimate public interest for the purposes of the second sentence of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), even to the extent that it may

imply the compulsory transfer of property from one individual to

another. The Court, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed

by the national authorities under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1), furthermore found that the applicants had not been made to

carry an individual and excessive burden, notwithstanding the fact that

as a result of the public auction they received a sum considerably less

than the purchase price they had paid (loc.cit., p. 15, para. 44, and

p. 18, paras. 54-55). In the present case the applicant bought the

property for 100.000 SEK, while she received 300.000 SEK for the

property as a result of the public auction. Thus, the refusal of the

retention permit had a legitimate aim, was not disproportionate to that

aim and was lawful for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1).

      The applicant contends that she has been deprived of her property

by means of both the administrative decisions leading to the 1990

auction as such and that auction. Furthermore, she considers the

purchase price of 300.000 SEK to be unacceptable, the market value

being much higher. Moreover, no legitimate "public interest" as defined

exhaustively in the 1979 Act could justify depriving her of her

ownership in favour of Mr. H.A. Both the County Agricultural Board and

Mr. H.A. could, once in 1971 and twice in 1984, have satisfied that

interest without subsequently intruding upon the applicant's property

rights. Mr. H.A. indicated already in 1971 that he was not interested

in acquiring the property Brånstorp 1:6. However, subsequently he

announced his interest in acquiring the property to the County

Agricultural Board. He seems to have been present at both auctions in

1984, without bidding, this also revealing his private interest in

acquiring the property at a substantially lower price than would have

been possible in a sale on the open market. This is further supported

by an opinion of the County Agricultural Board of 29 October 1990 to

the Supreme Court, in which it was admitted that, at the time of the

1990 auction, a neighbour was still interested in buying the

applicant's property but was not prepared to pay the price of

300.000 SEK paid by the Board. It further appears from the opinion that

the Board, after having contacted the neighbour, decided that it would

use means from the Land Fund (jordfonden) to achieve the

rationalisation. Thus, Mr. H.A. was the predestinated owner of the

property.

      The Commission observes that the applicant's initial complaint

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) only pertained to the refusal

of the retention permit. In her observations of 2 January 1991 the

applicant expanded her complaint to include also the 1990 auction in

order to facilitate the drawing of a comprehensive picture of all

measures with the common aim to deprive her of the property.

      The question may be raised whether the applicant, by not pursuing

the proceedings before the Göta Court of Appeal, has failed to exhaust

the domestic remedies and whether she can still, in view of the

settlement, be regarded as a victim of the alleged violation of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The Commission does not find it

necessary to examine these issues in detail, since the complaint

regarding Article 1 (Art. 1) is in any case inadmissible for the

following reasons.

      It is not in dispute that the refusal of the retention permit

constituted an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful

enjoyment of her possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1).

      The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine

separately whether the refusal of the retention permit as such violated

the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), as the

property at issue was subsequently sold compulsorily at the 1990

auction. This sale constituted a deprivation of the applicant's

property which should be examined under the second sentence of the

first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      The Commission must thus decide whether this deprivation was "in

the public interest" and "subject to the conditions provided for by

law" and "by the general principles of international law".

      As regards the general principles of international law the

Commission recalls that this condition does not apply to the taking by

a State of the property of its own nationals (Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow

and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 50, para.

119). Consequently, this condition is not applicable in the present

case since the applicant, who was deprived of her property by S

is of Swedish nationality. It remains to be examined whether the

interference satisfied the other two conditions.

      As regards the question whether the deprivation was carried out

in the "public interest" the Commission observes that the purpose of

the deprivation, as stated in the 1979 Act, was to promote the

rationalisation of agriculture, this being a legitimate "public

interest" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), even

to the extent that it may imply the compulsory transfer of property

from one individual to another (above-mentioned HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson

judgment, p. 15, para. 44, with further references). The finding that

the deprivation was carried out in the public interest is not affected

by the fact that the applicant has subsequently been allowed, as part

of the settlement of a dispute, to repurchase the property.

      As regards the lawfulness of the interference the Commission

recalls that its power to review compliance with domestic law is

limited (e.g. above-mentioned HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson judgment, p. 16,

para. 47). It finds no evidence in support of the applicant's

allegation that the authorities' real concern was not to rationalise

agriculture by merging the applicant's property with Mr. H.A.'s farm

holding, in accordance with the 1979 Act.

      Accordingly, the interference with the applicant's rights under

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) pursued a legitimate aim and was

lawful for the purposes of that provision.

      Finally, as regards the proportionality of the interference,

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) requires a reasonable relationship

of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. This

implies that the individual shall not have to bear "an individual and

excessive burden" (above-mentioned HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson judgment,

p. 17, para. 51, with further references).

      The Commission finds that the applicant, at least when concluding

the purchase, must have been aware of her obligation to re-sell the

property if she could not obtain a retention permit. Having also regard

to the previous refusal of a similar permit for the applicant's husband

to retain the property, the applicant deliberately took a risk of

having to re-sell the property. Furthermore, as a result of the 1990

auction, the applicant received 300.000 SEK for her property, while the

price paid by her in 1984 was 100.000 SEK. It has not been shown that

the applicant did not regain the money invested by her in the property.

Having regard to the Court's finding in the case of HÃ¥kansson and

Sturesson (loc.cit., p. 18, para. 54) the price received by the

applicant must be considered reasonable in relation to the value of her

estate.

      In these circumstances, and having regard to the wide margin of

appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission concludes that the applicant has

not been made to carry an individual and excessive burden.

      Consequently, the interference with the applicant's right to the

peaceful enjoyment of her possessions was justified under the terms of

the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 14 of

the Convention separately as well as in conjunction with Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1). She finally complains of violations of

Articles 18 and 60 (Art. 18, 60) of the Convention.

      The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 14

of the Convention, either separately or in conjunction with Article 1

of Protocol No. 1. (Art. 14+P1-1) Furthermore, there is no appearance

of any violation of Articles 18 or 60 (Art. 18, 60) of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,

      the complaint relating to the absence of a court remedy against

      the refusal of a retention permit;

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

   Secretary to the Commission      President of the Commission

         (H.C. KRÜGER)                    (C.A. NØRGAARD)