FIRST CHAMBER

                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                       Application No. 19577/92

                           by T.A. and H.N.

                      against the United Kingdom

                              __________

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber), sitting

in private on 8 January 1993, the following members being present:

             MM.  J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber

                  F. ERMACORA

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

             Sir  Basil HALL

             Mr.  C.L. ROZAKIS

             Mrs. J. LIDDY

             MM.  M. PELLONPÄÄ

                  G.B. REFFI

             Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the First Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 17 December 1991

by T.A. and H.N. against the United Kingdom and registered on 4 March

1992 under file No. 19577/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the

Commission's Rules of Procedure;

      Having deliberated,

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant was born in Bangladesh in 1935.  He has been

living in the United Kingdom since 1962, becoming a British citizen in

1968.  The second applicant is his wife, also of Bangladeshi origin,

born in 1936.  They are represented before the Commission by Messrs

James & Co., Solicitors, Bradford.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants and which

may be decuded from documents submitted with the application, may be

summarised as follows:

      In 1973 the first applicant applied for entry clearance to the

United Kingdom for the second applicant, three of his sons and one

daughter.  All the children were at that time under 16 years of age.

      In 1976 the second applicant was given entry clearance along with

her daughter and her fourth son who had been born subsequent to the

original application to enter the United Kingdom.  A decision on entry

for the three sons was adjourned for further consideration.

      Following an interview on 4 November 1977 between the three sons

and the Entry Clearance Officer their application was refused on the

grounds that they were not believed to be related to the first

applicant as claimed.

      An appeal against the decision of the Entry Clearance Officer was

dismissed by an Adjudicator on 21 April 1980 on the grounds that the

sons had failed to discharge the burden placed upon them to prove that

they were related to the first applicant as claimed.

      On 11 March 1980 the sons made a further application for entry

clearance.  By this time, according to birth dates submitted by the

first applicant, they were aged 29, 25 and 23 respectively.  In April

1988 the Entry Clearance Officer again refused entry on the grounds

that he was not satisfied that they were the sons of the first

applicant, and because they were now all over the age of 18 and could

no longer be considered dependents.  An appeal against this decision

was dismissed by an Adjudicator in December 1989.

      A DNA blood test (report dated 13 April 1989) subsequently

established that the sons were related to the first applicant.

      On 14 June 1989 a Statement was delivered in Parliament by the

Secretary of State regarding those people who had been refused entry

clearance as children, because there had been no satisfactory evidence

as to the claimed family relationship, but who had subsequently been

able to prove the family link by DNA blood testing.  He made it clear

that the Immigration Rules only envisaged the entry of children and

dependents and that, as the earlier decisions had been taken in good

faith, a person over the age of 18 re-applying for entry to the United

Kingdom to join a family on the basis of new DNA evidence would only

be admitted in the following circumstances:

          "a.   that he was refused entry clearance as a child on

          relationship grounds;

          b.    that DNA evidence establishes that he was, after all,

          related as claimed;

          c.    that he is still wholly or mainly dependent on his

          sponsor in the United Kingdom; and

          d.    that there are compassionate circumstances in his

          case."

      On 23 June 1989 representations were made on behalf of the first

applicant, asking the Secretary of State to exercise his discretion and

permit the three sons to enter the United Kingdom.  As part of these

representations the first applicant pointed out that one of the sons

was now significantly mentally disturbed, and that the second applicant

had also spent a period of time as an in-patient in a mental hospital.

These developments he claimed were as a result of the family being

caused to live apart for such a long period of time.

      The Secretary of State replied to the applicants' solicitor on

7 August 1989 as follows:

      "I refer to your letter of 23 June on behalf of [SA, RA and AA],

      who have applied for settlement as the dependent sons of [TA].

      As you know, all three men were refused entry clearance most

      recently on 5 April 1988, on that occasion on the grounds that

      they were over 18 when their application was made and they were

      not living alone in the most exceptional compassionate

      circumstances.  An appeal is pending against this decision.

      As you are aware, the Home Secretary announced on 14 June that

      he was prepared to consider exercising his discretion outside the

      Immigration Rules in certain circumstances where a person

      previously refused entry clearance on relationship grounds is now

      able to establish relationship by means of DNA evidence, as is

      the case here.  The applications made by [the three men] have

      been reviewed in the light of the Home Secretary's statement.

      The Secretary of State has carefully considered all the

      circumstances of the case, including the representations made in

      your letter of 23 June.  He accepts that [AA] is mentally

      retarded; and he notes that one brother and one sister were

      granted entry clearance in 1976.  Two more children have

      subsequently been born in the United Kingdom.  However, he also

      notes that [SA, RA and AA] are now aged 32, 28 and 26

      respectively.  [SA] is married and earns an income from dealing

      with fertilisers which is used to support himself and other

      family members, in addition to the income from the family land.

      He further notes that the three brothers are living on the family

      compound with [TA's] mother and other relatives.  Finally, he

      notes that the sponsor, [TA], left Bangladesh in June 1974 and

      was joined by his wife and two children in June 1976.  [The

      applicants] returned to Bangladesh for the first time in March

      1986.  Consequently, by 1986 the three remaining sons had lived

      apart from their parents for a period of nearly 12 years and

      nearly 10 years respectively.

      The Secretary of State takes the view that these three applicants

      have each settled into independent adult life and cannot in any

      real sense be regarded as dependent on their United Kingdom

      sponsor.  Furthermore, although [AA's] mental condition is

      clearly a relevant factor, as it appears that he has for many

      years been living and working with his brothers rather than his

      parents, the Secretary of State does not regard this factor alone

      as decisive.  As regards [SA and RA], the Secretary of State is

      not satisfied that there are any compassionate factors which

      distinguish their case from the generality of overage

      reapplicants.

      Accordingly, having regard to the terms of his statement on

      14 June and having considered all the circumstances of this case,

      the Secretary of State is not prepared to exercise his discretion

      outside the Immigration Rules to authorise the issue of entry

      clearance to [SA, RA or AA]."

      The applicants' solicitors requested the Secretary of State to

exercise his power under section 21 of the Immigration Act 1971 to

refer the sons' case back to an Adjudicator for an advisory opinion.

On 3 September 1990 the Secretary of State refused to do so on the

general grounds that he will not "normally exercise his power under

section 21 of the 1971 Act in cases involving overage reapplicants

where he has already considered exercising his discretion under the

terms of his statement of 14 June (1989), but has decided not to do so

...  He has decided not to depart from his general approach in these

cases".

      The first applicant was refused leave to apply for judicial

review of the Secretary of State's decision on 18 August 1991.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants complain that they are victims of a violation of

Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention:

      "Article 8 has been violated in that the natural desire of the

      applicants to have a normal family life including in particular

      the care of their mentally handicapped son has been violated.

      Article 13 is violated in that there is in practice no manner in

      which the case can be brought before a court in the United

      Kingdom, and the only possible route which was a referral under

      section 21 of the Immigration Act 1971 was refused ...

      Article 14 has been violated in that the rule was formulated in

      the specific knowledge that the vast and overwhelming majority

      of those who were likely to be affected by the rule originated

      in the Indian Sub-Continent and were by race, colour, language

      and religion different to the general population of the United

      Kingdom and it is the belief of the applicants that if they were

      of the general race, colour, language and religion of the

      overwhelming majority of the population of the United Kingdom

      that either the rule would have been written differently or the

      discretion would have been exercised differently under the rule."

THE LAW

      The applicants complain of the refusal of entry clearance by the

British immigration authorities to allow their three sons to join them

in the United Kingdom.

1.    Whilst the Convention does not guarantee a right, as such, to

enter or remain in a particular country, the Commission has constantly

held that the exclusion of a person from a country where his close

relatives reside may raise an issue under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention, para. 1 of which guarantees inter alia, the right to

respect for family life (e.g. No. 7816/77, Dec. 19.5.77, D.R. 9 p. 219;

No. 9088/80, Dec. 6.3.82, D.R. 28 p. 160 and No. 9285/81, Dec. 5.7.82,

D.R. 29 p. 205).

      However, in examining cases of the present kind the Commission's

first task is to consider whether a sufficient link exists between the

relatives concerned as to give rise to the protection of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention (cf. No. 9492/81, Dec. 14.7.82, D.R. 30 p.

232).  Generally, the protection of family life under Article 8

(Art. 8) involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their

dependent, minor children.  Whether it extends to other relationships

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.  Relationships

between adults, parents and their sons, aged 35, 32 and 29 respectively

in the present case, would not necessarily attract the protection of

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention without evidence of further

elements of dependency, involving more than the normal, emotional ties

(No. 10375/83, Dec. 10.12.84, D.R. 40 p. 196).

      The Commission understands the applicants' frustration arising

from the initial refusal in 1976 to grant entry clearance before their

relationship with their sons could be proved by DNA blood testing.  If

they could have proved their relationship earlier the sons would have

been likely to have been granted entry to the United Kingdom.  However,

no allegation of bad faith on the part of the immigration authorities

has been made by the applicants.  In this connection the Commission

recalls its constant case-law that such verification procedures, as

existed in the United Kingdom in 1976 and which gave immigrants a fair

opportunity to present their family life claims, satisfied the

requirements of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (No. 8378/78,

Kamal v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 14.5.80, D.R. 20 p. 168).  The

Commission considers therefore that its examination of the case under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention must be limited to the applicants'

present day circumstances and the nature of their relationship with

their sons now.

      As regards the facts of the present case, the Commission notes

that the sons have strong ties with Bangladesh, where they have lived

all their lives.  The family apparently has land, from which they are

able to live and the eldest son is married and deals in fertilisers.

They all live on the family compound with their grandmother and other

relatives.  Although the mental health of one of the sons seems to be

deteriorating, he is being cared for by his brothers and other members

of his family.  It is by no means clear that a move to the United

Kingdom would necessarily improve his condition.  Furthermore, there

is no evidence in the case-file to substantiate the second applicant's

claim that she is suffering mentally and physically to a serious degree

because of the separation from her adult children.

      The Commission finds that no evidence has been provided which

indicates that there exists a sufficiently close link between the

applicants and their sons which could be deemed to require the

protection afforded by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention to family

life. It concludes, therefore, that the present case does not disclose

any appearance of a breach of the right to respect for family life,

within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.

Accordingly this part of the application must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicants next complain that the entry clearance rules

applied in their case amounted to discrimination contrary to Article

14 of the Convention, presumably read in conjunction with Article 8

(Art. 14+8) of the Convention, on alleged grounds of race, colour,

language and religion.  Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

prohibits discrimination in the securement of Convention rights.

      However, the Commission again finds no evidence in the present

case to substantiate the applicants' claim.  The immigration rules and

practices in question are applicable in general to all "non patrials"

wanting to enter or settle in that country.  They do not differentiate

between persons or groups on the ground of race or ethnic origin.  They

are applicable across the board to intending immigrants from all parts

of the world, irrespective of their national origin (cf. Eur. Court

H.R., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali judgment of 28 May 1985, Series

A No. 94, pp. 39-41, paras. 84-86).

      In these circumstances the Commission concludes that the present

case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 14 of

the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8).  It

follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded.

3.    Finally the applicants complain of a violation of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention which guarantees an effective domestic

remedy for breaches of the Convention.

      However, the case-law of the Commission establishes that Article

13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy in domestic law for all claims

alleging a violation of the Convention.  The grievance must be an

arguable one (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April

1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).  In light of the above

conclusions concerning the applicants' complaints under Articles 8 and

14 (Art. 8, 14) of the Convention, the Commission finds that the

applicants do not have an arguable claim of a breach of these

provisions which warrants a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13).  This

part of the application must also therefore be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                      (J.A. FROWEIN)