AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 15997/90

                      by O.B. and Others

                      against Norway

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 8 January 1993, the following members being present:

             MM.  S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H.G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

             Mrs. G.H. THUNE

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  L. LOUCAIDES

                  J.-C. GEUS

                Mr. K.ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 9 November 1989

by O.B. and Others against Norway and registered on 15 January 1990

under file No. 15997/90;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 27 April 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicants on 20 July 1992;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicants, whose names are annexed to this decision, are of

Skolte sámi origin, an ethnic group that differs from other sámi

groups. They live at Neiden in the eastern part of Finnmark, the

northernmost county (fylke) of Norway. Before the Commission the

applicants are represented by Mr. Knut Rognlien, a lawyer practising

in Oslo.

A. The particular facts of the case

      Through centuries the Skolte sámis inhabited the border districts

of Norway, Russia and Finland. They were mainly nomads living off a

combination of keeping reindeer, fishing and hunting. The importance

of these activities varied throughout history due to variations in

resources and other peoples' activities in their domain.

      People of Finnish and Norwegian origin subsequently settled in

the district inhabited by the Skolte sámis which led to disputes

concerning land and reindeer herding and grazing rights. In particular

in this century such disputes were brought before various authorities

and in the 1950s and 1960s several agreements were reached between the

Skolte sámis and other sámi groups but they did not solve the problems

satisfactorily from the applicants' point of view.

      On 10 May 1977 and again on 22 September 1978 the Skolte sámis

requested the County Governor (fylkesmannen) to grant them an exclusive

right to reindeer husbandry in their old area (siida) and to expel

other sámi groups from that area. Their request was based on the Act

of 12 May 1933 (hereinafter the 1933 Act) relating to reindeer

husbandry which was then in force and according to which the County

Governor could allocate districts to persons engaged in reindeer

husbandry (section 4) and refer them and their herds to other districts

(section 12). On 7 March 1979 another sámi group in the area whose

means of livelihood was reindeer husbandry submitted their

observations.

      On 31 May 1979 the County Governor rejected the Skolte sámis'

request. He stated that he was not empowered by the 1933 Act to accord

exclusive rights to any group in the area in question, which covered

several districts. Moreover, the area was vast and the Skolte sámis had

no reindeer herd there at that time, and it was not realistic to expect

that they would, in the near future, raise a herd which would need such

a large area of land. On the other hand, it was stressed that according

to the 1933 Act, the Skolte sámis - like other sámi groups - had a

right to engage in reindeer husbandry in the area in question. The

County Governor also stated that it was a matter for the courts to

decide whether the Skolte sámis could claim an exclusive right to

reindeer husbandry on the basis of immemorial usage (alders tids bruk).

      The 1933 Act was replaced by the Act of 9 June 1978 relating to

reindeer husbandry, entering into force on 1 July 1979 (hereinafter the

1978 Act). Under Sections 6 and 7 of that Act new bodies - the Reindeer

Husbandry Board (Reindriftstyret) and the Local Board (områdestyret) -

are empowered to make decisions in relation to reindeer husbandry.

      On 22 June 1979 the Skolte sámis, including the applicants,

lodged a complaint with the Ministry of Agriculture against the County

Governor's decision. They requested that a decision be taken in  the

case according to the 1978 Act. Other sámis engaged in reindeer

husbandry in the area submitted their comments on 14 September 1979.

The Ministry referred the question whether the Skolte sámis should have

a right to engage in reindeer husbandry to the Reindeer Husbandry

Board. On 2 - 3 February 1981, following further correspondence between

the Skolte sámis and the authorities concerning the history of the

current disputes in the area, the Board decided that the Skolte sámis

had a right to engage in reindeer husbandry under section 3 of the

1978 Act.

      The Ministry of Agriculture then made several attempts to reach

a friendly settlement between the opposing sámi groups as to the

exercise of this right, but to no avail. On 26 May 1983 the Skolte

sámis asked the Ministry to decide the matter. On 29 July 1983 the

Ministry of Agriculture dismissed the complaint because neither the

provisions under the 1933 Act nor the 1978 Act, in its opinion,

provided for the possibility of giving a specific group an exclusive

right to reindeer husbandry. The Ministry furthermore advised the

complainants to proceed as envisaged in the 1978 Act, i.e. to request

a decision from the Local Board and, if necessary, to appeal to the

Reindeer Husbandry Board.

      On 18 and 24 August 1983 the Skolte sámis complained to the King

in Council (Kongen i statsråd). The Ministry's decision was, however,

upheld by Royal Decree of 28 October 1983. The Decree stated inter alia

that the administrative authorities were not empowered to grant

exclusive herding areas as reindeer husbandry was a collective right

for everybody in the areas. It was a matter for the courts to decide

whether the Skolte sámis could, on the basis of principles of private

law, claim an exclusive right to the area.

Proceedings before the District Court (Herredsrett) of Tana and

Varanger

      It does not appear from the applicants' submissions whether they

followed the advice of the Ministry of Agriculture and proceeded as

envisaged in the 1978 Act. However, by a submission dated

23 November 1984 they instituted proceedings in the District Court of

Tana and Varanger. The suit was directed against another sámi group

currently engaged in reindeer husbandry in the area and against the

Government, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture.

      On the basis of the principles of immemorial usage, the

applicants claimed an exclusive right to grazing land in their old area

and requested that other sámis herding reindeer leave that area. In

relation to the Government the applicants demanded that any decisions

of the authorities permitting others to herd reindeer in the area be

annulled. According to the applicants their exclusive right to grazing

land could not be set aside by decisions pursuant to ordinary

legislation.

      On 4 December 1984 the Court ordered the defendants to submit

their reply within 21 days after receiving the summons.

      On 20 December 1984 the other sámi group, which was engaged in

reindeer husbandry in the area, filed their reply, in which they

disputed the exclusive right of the applicants. Their brief submission

stated inter alia that further research was required. The Court

requested observations from the applicants and the Government by

25 January 1985.

      On 3 January 1985 the applicants supplemented their first

submission and produced historical material from 1517 to 1969.

      The Government which had been granted an extension of the time-

limit filed their reply on 15 February 1985. They argued inter alia

that the applicants had no exclusive right to the area. On

18 February 1985 the Court requested observations from the other two

parties by 6 March 1985.

      On 4 March 1985 the applicants requested an extension, and the

Court fixed 20 March 1985 as a new time-limit.

      On 6 March 1985 the other sámi group submitted their observations

and also filed historical material. They did not accept the description

of the extent to which the applicants had been engaged in reindeer

husbandry in a historical perspective. The applicants were requested

to define the exact borders of the old Skolte sámi area as compared

with their current claim and to submit certain old documents. On

8 March 1985 the Court requested observations from the applicants by

12 April 1985.

      On 28 March 1985 the Court informed the parties that the main

hearing would commence on 5 November 1985 and that one week had been

reserved for that purpose.

      On 14 August 1985 the other sámi group complained that the

applicants had still not complied with their requests for further

information. On 14 August 1985 the Court asked the applicants to submit

the requested information immediately. They did so on 30 August 1985.

      On 2 September 1985 the Court raised the question whether it was

necessary that the Court also be composed of two lay judges. The

parties were asked to submit their comments by 12 September 1985. On

that date the Government stated that in their view lay judges were not

required.

      On 11 September 1985 the other sámi group submitted additional

documentation and argued that part of the evidence adduced by the

applicants was inadmissible. On 16 September 1985 the Court requested

the applicants to comment on this matter as soon as possible. They

submitted their observations on 23 October 1985 and filed a list of

nine witnesses. As two of the witnesses spoke only Finnish, it was

suggested that an interpreter be engaged.

      On 28 October 1985 the other sámi group maintained their

contention that part of the evidence was inadmissible.

      The main hearing before the District Court took place from 5 to

8 November 1985. Six representatives of the parties and nine witnesses

were heard.

      Judgment was pronounced on 18 November 1985. On the basis of a

study of the historical sources and after an evaluation of the other

evidence submitted, the District Court found that the applicants had

not established an exclusive right to reindeer husbandry in their old

area.

Proceedings before HÃ¥logaland High Court (Lagmannsrett)

      On 23 January 1986 the applicants lodged an appeal with the

HÃ¥logaland High Court. They stated that there was a need to examine the

archives of one of the witnesses, and reserved their right to submit

additional historical material.

      The appeal was received on 27 January 1986, and on the same day

the Court requested the other parties to submit their observations in

reply within 14 days.

      The other sámi group submitted their reply as early as

28 January 1986. On 27 February 1986 the Government submitted their

observations, which were received by the District Court on

3 March 1986. The same day the Court forwarded the case to the

HÃ¥logaland High Court which received it on 7 March 1986.

      On 20 March 1986 the High Court asked the applicants to file, by

21 April 1986, a complete list of evidence and to provide the

information necessary for the preparation of the case. On that date the

Government requested to be given until 20 May 1986 to consider whether

additional evidence was necessary. On 24 April 1986 the applicants

requested an extension of the time-limit as it had not been possible

for the parties to examine the documents of one of the witnesses. They

asked the High Court not to fix a time-limit for the submission of a

complete list of evidence. Moreover, the applicants requested a special

hearing in order to hear six persons who should, for reasons of age or

health, be questioned as soon as possible. At the same time the

applicants asked the High Court to fix dates for the main hearing.

      On 28 April 1986 the High Court requested the other sámi group

and the Government to file, by 20 May 1986, complete lists of evidence

and to provide the information necessary for the preparation of the

case. It asked the applicants for further information concerning the

subject matter to be dealt with by the six persons to be questioned,

and wished to know when the applicants would be in a position to

examine the archives of the witness mentioned in the appeal. The dates

of the main hearing would be fixed when the High Court's time-table so

permitted.

      The Government submitted their observations on 20 May 1986. On

27 May 1986 the other sámi group asked the Court not to fix a time-

limit for the submission of a complete list of evidence. Moreover, they

stated that they also wished to question witnesses during the hearing

for the taking of evidence, and would name these witnesses at a later

stage. Furthermore, the names of two new witnesses were mentioned, and

there was also a question of summoning a third witness in addition to

those heard before the District Court. The other sámi group indicated

that January or February 1987 might be possible dates for the main

hearing.

      On 6 June 1986 the High Court requested the applicants and the

other sámi group to produce the remaining evidence without undue delay.

The High Court asked for complete lists of witnesses and for more

information as to why the taking of evidence was necessary.

      On 18 September 1986 the High Court ordered the parties to file

complete lists of evidence by 10 October 1986. On 1 October 1986 the

applicants informed the High Court that the lawyers had still not

received the documents from the witnesses mentioned in their appeal.

Consequently, it was impossible to file a complete list of evidence by

10 October 1986.

      On 6 October 1986 the High Court extended the time-limit for a

complete list of evidence to 3 November 1986. If the documents were not

made available by 10 October, the applicants and the other sámi group

were urged to request that a hearing for the taking of evidence be held

immediately.

      On 17 November 1986 the applicants submitted 16 new documents,

mainly historical material relating to reindeer husbandry in the area.

They upheld their request for a special hearing of six persons unless

a main hearing could be scheduled before the summer of 1987.

      On 25 November 1986 the High Court requested final submissions

from the parties by 17 December 1986, and the applicants were ordered

to prepare excerpts from the documents necessary for the High Court's

consideration of the case by 19 January 1987. The High Court found that

there were not sufficient reasons for a special hearing for the taking

of evidence prior to the main hearing on the grounds maintained, except

for one of the applicants' witnesses, provided the main hearing would

take place after the summer of 1987.

      On 1 December 1986 Counsel for the other sámi group filed 19 new

documents, mainly historical material providing further information

concerning reindeer husbandry in the area in question. Moreover, he

informed the High Court that some pages of an old protocol had been

removed. If his further attempts to find them should prove

unsuccessful, he mentioned the possibility of calling witnesses to give

evidence on the question.

      On 17 December 1986 the applicants reserved their right to call

a new witness and to submit more documents, including the missing pages

from the protocol.

      The above-mentioned excerpts from relevant documents which the

applicants' lawyer had been ordered to prepare were received by the

High Court on 25 May 1987.

      The High Court then consulted the lawyers in order to set a date

for the main hearing, which was expected to last one week. It is not

clear when these consultations took place, but at any rate it is clear

that there was agreement on the dates in early November 1987 when it

was decided that the main hearing should start on 1 February 1988. On

16 December 1987 the parties were formally requested by the High Court

to meet on that date.

      In December 1987 and January 1988 there was considerable

correspondence between the High Court and the parties concerning the

15 witnesses to be heard (problems concerning availability, need for

interpreter, etc.) and other practical arrangements. Additional

documents were also filed.

      In a statement of 13 January 1988, the applicants declared that

they wished to have a new counsel. Consequently, on 15 January 1988,

the applicants' lawyer informed the High Court that he could no longer

represent them and requested that the main hearing be postponed. Other

reasons for this request were that two of the witnesses had declared

that they were unable to attend the main hearing due to illness, and

that one of the witnesses, who had undertaken to carry out a study on

the history of the Skolte sámis, had not completed his work.

      The High Court tried to avoid postponing the main hearing.

However, on 22 January 1988, the High Court found that it had to accept

the request for a postponement, since the counsel for the other two

parties had supported the request. At the same time the High Court

recommended that the applicants designate a new counsel as soon as

possible and fixed 3-7 October 1988 as new dates for the main hearing.

      As the High Court had not received any notification from the

applicants regarding a new counsel, it informed them on 23 June 1988

that they could not expect the Court to grant another postponement. On

7 July 1988 a new counsel informed the High Court that he was now

representing the applicants and that he would file a final list of

evidence after his meeting with the applicants. On 8 July he requested

the appointment of an expert (sakkyndig) in the case.

      On 13 July 1988 the High Court asked for observations on the need

for appointing experts in the case, drawing the attention of the

parties to the fact that the expert requested was already on the list

of ordinary witnesses. On 2 August 1988 the other two parties stated

that they saw no need for experts in the case, and on 22 August 1988

the High Court decided not to appoint an expert. At the same time the

High Court informed the applicants' lawyer that the time-limit for the

submission of final observations had expired on 17 December 1987, but

set 13 September 1988 as a new time-limit.

      On 13 September 1988 the applicant's lawyer informed the High

Court that because of age, two of his clients were not able to give

evidence, but suggested that the tape of a radio interview in 1974 with

one of them be played. He also requested that interpreters be provided

and that two new witnesses be heard during the main hearing.

      Considerable correspondence between the High Court and the

parties followed in September and October 1988 concerning these and

other practical issues in connection with the preparation of the main

hearing, which took place from 10 to 13 October 1988. Nine witnesses

and two persons nominated by the parties were heard.

      By judgment of 11 November 1988 the High Court upheld the

judgment of the District Court.

Proceedings before the Supreme Court (Høyesterett)

      On 23 January 1989 the applicants lodged an appeal with the

Supreme Court. Observations in reply were submitted by the other

parties on 14 and 15 February 1989, and the High Court forwarded the

case to the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court

(Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) on 20 February 1989.

      On 9 March 1989 the Appeals Selection Committee informed the

parties that it was considering not to grant leave to appeal and asked

the applicant to submit observations on this issue by 30 March 1989.

On that date the applicants submitted their comments.

      On 19 April 1989 the Appeals Selection Committee decided not to

grant leave to appeal since the appeal had no prospects of success.

This decision was sent to the parties on 5 May 1989.

B. Relevant domestic law

      According to section 1 of the Act of 12 May 1933 relating to

reindeer husbandry, nomadic sámis (flyttlapper) who were Norwegian

nationals had the right to engage in reindeer husbandry in accordance

with the provisions of the Act. Section 84 accorded the same right to

other inhabitants of the area, including owners of reindeer having

permanent residence there (fastboende). Consequently, the Skolte sámis

were also entitled to engage in reindeer husbandry.

      Section 2 of the Act provided that reindeer husbandry had to take

place in certain parts of Norway, which were divided into districts.

According to section 4 the County Governor could regulate the grazing

land within each district and allocate it to persons engaged in

reindeer husbandry. Section 12 of the Act empowered a local authority

(lappefogden) to expel a person and his herd to other districts if this

was required in order to improve grazing conditions or was considered

advisable for other reasons. However, according to subsection 2 of that

provision, persons having used the grazing land for the longest period

of time should be given preference.

      According to section 3, subsection 1, of the Act of 9 June 1978

relating to reindeer husbandry, which replaced the 1933 Act, Norwegian

nationals of sámi origin have the right to engage in reindeer

husbandry. If this was not their main occupation when the Act entered

into force, it is a condition that it had been the primary means of

livelihood of their parents or grandparents. However, the right to

engage in reindeer husbandry may be given to other persons in

accordance with section 3, subsection 3, of the Act. The Reindeer

Husbandry Board has been given authority to decide on the issue.

      According to section 2 the Board is also responsible for dividing

the various parts of Norway into districts and for deciding upon the

number of reindeer to be allowed in each district. It is the

responsibility of the Local Board to decide whether a person is allowed

to take up reindeer husbandry as his means of livelihood.

      The right to reindeer husbandry is a right of use (bruksrett)

irrespective of the ownership of the land. The legislation is based on

the traditional understanding that it is a collective right of the sámi

people as a group.

      The principles of immemorial usage are unwritten principles of

private law according to which certain rights to land may be acquired

if the use has been accepted for a long period of time. As the use is

supposed to create a right, it is a further condition that the user

cannot base it on other rights, for instance a collective right.

      According to section 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure of

13 August 1915 (Tvistemålsloven), an administrative authority may

provide that legal proceedings concerning the validity of a decision

may only be instituted if the person concerned has lodged a complaint

with a superior administrative authority and after this authority has

decided upon the matter. No such regulation had, or has, been issued

in respect of the 1933 and 1978 Acts.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants complain that they did not receive a fair hearing

by an independent and impartial tribunal within a reasonable time. They

invoke in this respect Article 6 of the Convention.

      Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention the

applicants complain that their right to keep reindeer in the Neiden

district is not respected by the Norwegian authorities. They complain

that others now have the right to keep reindeer in the area where they

have had an exclusive right over centuries.

      Furthermore, the applicants complain that they have been

discriminated against and invoke in this respect Article 14 of the

Convention in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention and Article

1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

      In their letter of 9 October 1991 the applicants finally complain

that the restrictions on their right to keep reindeer violate Article 8

of the Convention as reindeer husbandry is closely connected with their

culture and way of living.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 9 November 1989 and registered

on 15 January 1990.

      On 13 February 1992 the Commission decided to bring the

application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite

them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of

the application.

      The Government submitted their observations on admissibility and

merits on 27 April 1992. The applicants' observations in reply were

submitted on 20 July 1992.

THE LAW

1.a.  Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the

applicants complain that they did not get a fair hearing by an

independent and impartial tribunal within a reasonable time when the

dispute concerning their reindeer herding right was determined. The

provision invoked by the applicants reads in its relevant part as

follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a

      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

      ... ."

      In respect of the questions of fairness, independence and

impartiality the applicants submit that the Norwegian courts are

established on the basis of Norwegian culture, values and way of life

and thinking. Therefore they are not impartial when determining the

rights of a national minority belonging to another culture and having

another way of thinking and determining natural rights. Furthermore,

they submit that the courts' independence is open to doubt, in

particular when the Norwegian State is party to a conflict with a

national minority.

      The Commission recalls that the question whether a hearing

conforms with the standard laid down by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

of the Convention must be decided on the basis of the court proceedings

as a whole and after they have been concluded. Furthermore the

Commission recalls that the evaluation of evidence is a matter within

the appreciation of the national courts which cannot be reviewed by the

Commission unless there is an indication that the courts have drawn

grossly unfair or arbitrary conclusions from the facts before them.

This is not the case here. Indeed it appears that the Norwegian courts

in their judgments made a thorough examination of the issue before them

and that they reached their conclusions on the basis of what they

considered to be domestic law and practice. The Commission finds that

the reasons on which the courts based their judgments are sufficient

to exclude the assumption that the evaluation of the evidence was

unfair or arbitrary.

      In determining whether a body can be considered to be an

independent tribunal, i.e. independent in particular of the executive

and of the parties to the case, regard must be had to the manner of

appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office,

the existence of regulations governing their removal or guarantee for

their irremovability, laws prohibiting their being given instructions

by the executive in their role as adjudicators, the existence of legal

guarantees against outside pressures, the question whether the body

presents an appearance of independence and the participation of members

of the judiciary in the proceedings (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R.,

Campbell and Fell judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, pp. 39-41,

paras. 78-81 with further references).

      As regards the question of impartiality the Commission recalls

that the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be determined according to a subjective test,

that is on the basis of the personal conviction of a particular judge

in a given case, and also according to an objective test, that is

ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude

any legitimate doubt in this respect (see, for example, Eur. Court

H.R., Piersack judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A no. 53, p. 14,

para. 30).

      When considering these elements in the circumstances of the

present case, and in the light of the applicants' submissions, the

Commission has not found any substantiated allegations which would

merit a further examination of these aspects of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      The Commission therefore concludes that the applicants'

allegations of a violation of the principles of fairness, independence

and impartiality in this case are manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b.    Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the

applicants also complain that their case was not determined within a

reasonable time. They maintain that the proceedings commenced on 10 May

1977 when they submitted a request to the County Governor, asking him

to grant them the right to reindeer herding in a specific area. These

proceedings came to an end on 5 May 1989 when they were informed that

the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court had refused leave

to appeal. In particular the applicants submit that the period from 22

June 1979, when they lodged their complaint with the Ministry of

Agriculture, until 29 July 1983, when the Ministry decided on the

matter, is unreasonable and in violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      The Government do not dispute that "civil rights" within the

meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are at issue, but they

maintain that the period to be assessed runs from 23 November 1984 when

proceedings were instituted in the District Court until 19 April 1989

when leave to appeal was refused. They contend in particular that the

prior decisions of the administrative authorities did not relate to the

issue put before the courts for determination and it would not have

been necessary to await the outcome of the administrative proceedings

before bringing the present case before the courts.

      The Commission recalls that the period to which Article 6

(Art. 6) is applicable in civil cases normally starts to run with the

issuing of the writ commencing proceedings before the court to which

the plaintiff submits the dispute. However, where such proceedings may

only be instituted after a determination of the same dispute by an

administrative authority the concept of "reasonable time" must be

applied so as to include both the administrative and the court

proceedings (cf. Eur. Court H.R., König judgment of 28 June 1978,

Series A no. 27, p. 33, para. 98).

      In the present case the Commission recalls that disputes between

different sámi groups concerning reindeer herding and grazing rights

had been pending before various authorities for decades. Eventually the

question arose whether the Skolte sámis had an exclusive right to

reindeer husbandry in a specific area, and the Commission finds it

established that this was not a matter the administrative authorities

had competence to decide upon. Indeed the County Governor referred the

Skolte sámis to the courts already on 31 May 1979 and the view was

subsequently upheld by the Ministry of Agriculture and the King in

Council. The Commission furthermore finds that under domestic law the

applicants were not prevented from instituting court proceedings

concerning the exclusive right to reindeer husbandry while other issues

in this respect were pending before the administrative authorities.

      In these circumstance the Commission finds that the period to the

taken into consideration starts to run from 23 November 1984 when the

applicants instituted proceedings in the District Court of Tana and

Varanger. It ended on 5 May 1989 when the applicants were informed that

the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court had refused leave

to appeal. Accordingly, the proceedings lasted approximately 4 years

and 6 months.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria:

the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct

of the authorities dealing with the case (see Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo

judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).

      As regards the complexity of the case the Government submit that

the issue in question had never been determined by a Norwegian court

before and involved the application of the principle of immemorial

usage which necessitated a study of historical and legal sources dating

as far back as 1517. The applicants have not expressed themselves on

this point.

      The Commission recalls that various issues concerning reindeer

husbandry in northern Norway had for years caused difficulties and many

attempts to solve them had failed. The Commission considers that the

particular issue before the courts was not less difficult and therefore

accepts that it was of a complex nature.

      As regards the conduct of the parties the Government submit that

the length of the proceedings was mainly attributable to the

applicants. These have not, however, expressed themselves on this

point.

      The Commission recalls that the proceedings in the District Court

lasted from 23 November 1984 to 18 November 1985, i.e. approximately

one year. The applicants did not during this period contribute to

prolonging the proceedings.

      The proceedings in the High Court lasted two years, nine months

and eighteen days. The Commission recalls that during this period the

applicants asked on several occasions for extensions of the time-limits

for the submission of documents and failed to comply with others.

Furthermore, they asked for a postponement of the main hearing two

weeks before the date it was scheduled in order to change counsel. In

these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicants prolonged

the proceedings in the High Court.

      As regards the conduct of the judicial authorities the Government

maintain that the proceedings do not disclose negligence or

dilatoriness on the part of the courts. The applicants have not

expressed themselves on this point.

      The Commission has not overlooked that the District Court fixed

the date for the hearing more than seven months in advance, and that

the High Court spent from May to November 1987 on arranging a date for

the hearing. However, although the Convention emphasises the importance

of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its

effectiveness and credibility, the Commission is aware of the

difficulties which sometimes delay the hearing of cases by national

courts and which are due to a variety of factors which do not transpire

from the documents of a case. Furthermore, the Commission notes that

the judicial authorities, in particular the High Court, actively

pursued the case by setting time-limits and by warning the parties as

to the possibility of obtaining further postponements.

      Having regard to this and to the fact that the proceedings

comprised three court levels, the Commission finds that the total

period of time was not so long as to warrant the conclusion that it was

excessive. Consequently, this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicants also complain that their right guaranteed to them

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention has been

violated. This provision reads as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      In so far as the applicants complain that they have been deprived

of their exclusive right to reindeer husbandry in the area in question

the Commission recalls that the courts found that they had no such

right. Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the applicants do

indeed have a right - although not an exclusive one - to reindeer

husbandry and it does not appear that this right has been interfered

with or controlled in a way not acceptable under Article 1 para. 2

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2) to the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    Under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention the applicants

complain that they have been discriminated against in the enjoyment of

their rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and Article 1

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention. They submit that they "are

discriminated [against] in relation to other Laps and to the Norwegian

population both because of their association with a national minority

and because of their special traditional form of property".

      The Commission has not, in its examination of this particular

complaint, found any substantiation in the applicants' allegations

which would merit their further consideration. They do not disclose any

appearance of a violation of the Convention or its Protocols. It

follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    Finally, the applicants complain, in their letter of 9 October

1991, that the restrictions on their right to keep reindeer violate

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention as reindeer husbandry is closely

connected with their culture and way of living.

      The Commission is not, however, required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a

violation of this provision, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within

a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was

taken".

      In the present case the decision of the Appeals Selection

Committee of the Supreme Court, which was the final decision regarding

the subject of this particular complaint, was sent to the applicants

on 5 May 1989, whereas the complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention was submitted to the Commission on 9 October 1991, that is,

more than six months later. Furthermore, an examination of the case

does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which

might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.

      It follows that this part of the application has been introduced

out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3)

of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber      President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)