FIRST CHAMBER

                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 19546/92

                      by Nazrul MIAH, Jasmine MIAH,

                      Mahbub-ul-ISLAM and Mathab MIAH

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 31 March 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber

                 F. ERMACORA

                 G. SPERDUTI

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   M. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

           Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the First Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 14 February 1992

by Nazrul MIAH, Jasmine MIAH, Mahbub-ul-ISLAM and Mathab MIAH against

the United Kingdom and registered on 26 February 1992 under file

No. 19546/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh, born in 1959 and

resident in Bangladesh.  The second applicant, his wife, is a British

citizen of Bangladeshi origin, born in 1965 and resident in England.

The third applicant is their son, of British citizenship, born in 1987

and resident with his mother.  The fourth applicant is the first

applicant's father, a British citizen of Bangladeshi origin, born in

1931 and resident in England.

      They are represented before the Commission by Ms. Kate

Fitzpatrick of the North Islington Law Centre, London.

      The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicants and

which may be deduced from documents lodged with the application, may

be summarised as follows:

      The first applicant applied for entry clearance in the mid 1970's

to join his father in the United Kingdom where the latter had settled.

Entry clearance was refused as he was not believed to be related to his

father as claimed.  In October 1989 DNA blood analysis revealed that

they very probably were related, but entry clearance was this time

refused on 9 January 1992 because the first applicant was over 18 years

of age and was no longer considered to be his father's dependent.  The

first applicant has strong ties in Bangladesh where he lives and works

with his brother and paternal uncles on the family's 12 acre farm which

provides for the whole family's needs.

      The Secretary of State's policy in such cases is that entry

clearance will only be granted if, inter alia, the child, albeit an

adult, could establish significant dependency on the parent, as well

as compassionate circumstances to justify an exception to the 18 year

age limit.

      In a letter from the Home Office dated 15 January 1992, addressed

to the applicants' Member of Parliament, the Parliamentary Under

Secretary of State noted that in the present case there was no evidence

to support the first applicant's claim to be dependent on his father,

the fourth applicant.  The latter was 60 years old and had been in ill

health and living on public funds for some time.  It was further stated

that no remittance receipts had been produced to support the claim that

money was sent by the fourth applicant.  Given the income from the

family land and from a shop owned by the first applicant's uncle, any

dependency on money sent from the United Kingdom was of choice rather

than necessity.

      In the meantime the first applicant visited England in 1985 and

met the second applicant.  They married within a month of meeting.  A

separate entry clearance application was refused because the competent

officer was not satisfied that the primary purpose of the marriage had

not been to obtain admission to the United Kingdom.  Appeals were made

to an Adjudicator and Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the latter giving

its decision on 14 August 1989.  An application for judicial review was

refused by the High Court on 19 November 1990.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants complain that the refusal of entry clearance to

the first applicant constituted a violation of Article 8 of the

Convention, for which they have no remedy, contrary to Article 13 of

the Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants complain that the refusal of entry clearance for

the first applicant was in breach of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention, paragraph 1 of which guarantees, inter alia, the right to

respect for family life.  Whilst the Convention does not guarantee a

right, as such, to enter or remain in a particular country, the

Commission has constantly held that the exclusion of a person from a

country where his close relatives reside may raise an issue under this

provision (e.g. No. 7816/77, Dec. 19.5.77, D.R. 9 p. 219; No. 9088/80,

Dec. 6.3.82, D.R. 28 p. 160, and No. 9285/81, Dec. 6.7.82, D.R. 29 p.

205).

2.    The Commission will first deal with the applicants' complaint

about the refusal to allow the first applicant to join his father, the

fourth applicant, in the United Kingdom.

      In examining cases of the present kind the Commission's initial

task is to consider whether a sufficient link exists between the

relatives concerned as to give rise to the protection of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention (cf. No. 9492/81, Dec. 14.7.82, D.R. 30 p.

232).  Generally, the protection of family life under Article 8

(Art. 8) involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their

dependent, minor children.  Whether it extends to other relationships

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.  In immigration

cases, relationships between adults, a father and his 33 year old son

in the present case, would not necessarily attract the protection of

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention without evidence of further

elements of dependency, involving more than the normal, emotional ties

(No. 10375/83, Dec. 10.12.84, D.R. 40 p. 196).

      The Commission understands the applicants' frustration arising

from the initial refusal in the 1970s to grant entry clearance before

their relationship could be proved by DNA blood testing.  If they had

been able to prove their relationship earlier the first applicant would

have been likely to have been granted entry to the United Kingdom.

However, no allegation of bad faith on the part of the immigration

authorities has been made by the applicants.  In this connection the

Commission recalls its constant case-law that such verification

procedures, as existed in the United Kingdom in the 1970s and which

gave immigrants a fair opportunity to present their family life claims,

satisfied the requirements of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (No.

8378/78, Kamal v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 14.5.80, D.R. 20 p. 168).

The Commission considers therefore that its examination of the case

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention must be limited to the

applicants' present day circumstances and the nature of their

relationship now.

      As regards the facts of the present case, the Commission notes

that the first applicant has strong ties with Bangladesh, where he has

lived all his life.  He lives and works with his brother and paternal

uncles on the family farm which provides enough for the whole family's

needs.  The claim that the first applicant is financially dependent on

the fourth applicant has not been substantiated.  In these

circumstances the Commission finds that it has not been shown that

there exists a sufficiently close link between these two applicants

which could be deemed to require the protection afforded by Article 8

(Art. 8) to family life.  It concludes therefore that the present case

does not disclose any appearance of a breach of the right to respect

for family life, within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of

the Convention.  Accordingly this part of the application must be

rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article

27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The second limb of the applicants' complaint under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention concerns the refusal to allow the first

applicant to join his wife and child, the second and third applicants,

in the United Kingdom.  However the Commission is unable to deal with

this aspect of the complaint as the applicants have failed to observe

the six months' rule laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention.  The final decision on this matter was taken by the High

Court refusing judicial review on 19 November 1990, but the complaint

was not lodged with the Commission before 14 February 1992.  It follows

that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Articles

26 and 27 para. 3 (Art. 26, 27-3) of the Convention.

4.    The applicants next complain that they did not have an effective

remedy for their Article 8 (Art. 8) claims.  Article 13 (Art. 13) of

the Convention guarantees effective domestic remedies to everyone whose

Convention rights and freedoms have been violated.

      The Commission has considered this aspect of the applicants' case

in two parts: first as regards the refusal of entry clearance for the

father/son reunification, secondly as regards the refusal of entry

clearance for the husband/wife reunification.

      Concerning the first part, the Commission recalls that Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not require a remedy under domestic

law in respect of every alleged violation of the Convention.  It only

applies if the individual can be said to have an "arguable claim" of

a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment

of 27 April 1988, Series A No. 131, p. 23, para. 52).  In the light of

the reasons established above for rejecting the father/son complaint

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission finds that

the applicants cannot be said to have an "arguable claim" of a

violation of their Convention rights necessitating a remedy under

Article 13 (Art. 13).  It follows that this part of the complaint under

Article 13 of the Convention must be rejected as being manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

5.    Concerning the second part, the Commission notes that the

applicants did have channels of appeal at their disposal in the form

of the Adjudicator, Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the High Court by

way of judicial review.  They tried these remedies, albeit without

success.  However, the word "remedy" in Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention does not mean a remedy bound to succeed, but simply an

accessible remedy before an authority competent to examine the merits

of a complaint.  In immigration matters of the present kind, the

Commission recognises that at least the Adjudicator and Immigration

Appeal Tribunal offer this kind of effective remedy.  The Commission

concludes, therefore, that the applicants had effective remedies under

English law for this aspect of their complaint, remedies which

satisfied the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is also to be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

       (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                      (J.A. FROWEIN)