FISCHER v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 19365/92 • ECHR ID: 001-1547
Document date: March 31, 1993
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 19365/92
by Wilhelm FISCHER
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 31
March 1993, the following members being present:
MM. J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the First Chamber,
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 29 October 1991
by Wilhelm FISCHER against Austria and registered on 17 January 1992
under file No. 19365/92;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1940 and living in
Vienna. He is represented by Mr. G. Pointner, a lawyer practising in
Tulln.
It follows from the applicant's statements and the documents
submitted that on 28 November 1988 the applicant was refused permission
to erect a tool shed on agricultural property belonging to him,
situated in the community of Königstetten. His appeal against this
decision of the competent local authorities (Bezirkshauptmannschaft)
was rejected by the office of the Regional Government of Lower Austria
(Amt der NÖ Landesregierung) on 10 January 1989.
The refusal was based on sections 6 and 5 of the Nature
Conservation Act (Naturschutzgesetz) according to which constructions
are prohibited if they affect the beauty or particular environment of
the site in question and if such negative effects could not be avoided,
otherwise than by a prohibition.
According to the findings of the authorities, the applicant's
premises are in a zone which falls under environmental protection
(Landschaftsschutzgebiet).
The authorities based their decision on a nature conservation
expert opinion according to which the applicant and his wife intended
to use the property in question as hobby gardeners and as beekeepers
but for these purposes did not necessarily need the tool shed. In
accordance with the expert opinion, the authorities considered that in
view of its size and shape the shed resembled a weekend house and
affected the beauty of the landscape which offered a harmonious view
of meadows mingled with woods. As there were no other huts in the
immediate vicinity, the shed in question disturbed this harmony and
this could not be avoided by less stringent measures than the
interdiction of the construction.
The authorities also referred to the opinion of an agrarian
expert who denied that the applicant used the premises in question for
agricultural purposes.
The applicant's constitutional complaint was not admitted by the
Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) which on 2 October 1989
referred the matter to the Administrative Court
(Verwaltungsgerichtshof).
On 22 March 1991 the Administrative Court rejected the
applicant's appeal (Beschwerde) against the aforementioned decisions
of the administrative authorities as being unfounded.
The Administrative Court stated that the agrarian expert's
opinion was insufficient but considered however that the denial to
approve the construction of the tool shed was justified for nature
conservation reasons as demonstrated by the nature conservation expert.
This expert had refuted the necessity of a tool shed for the purpose
of beekeeping and thus for agricultural purposes and in accordance with
his opinion the authorities had correctly decided that the shed in
question would affect the beauty of the landscape.
As the applicant had constructed the shed before applying for an
authorization, he was repeatedly ordered to remove the construction.
On 20 September 1991 the office of the Regional Government of Lower
Austria ordered the applicant to pay the sum of AS 43,696 for the
purpose of having the construction removed. An appeal against this
order is apparently still pending.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that the refusal to grant him
authorization for the toolshed violates his right to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. He also complains that his civil right of whether or not he was
entitled to construct and use a tool shed on his premises was decided
by administrative authorities and not by an impartial tribunal in
proceedings respecting the guarantees contained in Article 6 of the
Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant has mainly complained that his right to the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of
Protocol no. 1 (P1-1), was violated, alleging that the shed which he
is not allowed to maintain is necessary for agricultural purposes and
therefore the authorities order to remove it constituted a
disproportionate burden given that huts constructed on other premises
were tolerated by the authorities.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) provides:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
The Commission considers that the measure in question concerns
a regulation of the use of the applicant's property. It first notes
that the applicant has not contested that the measure in question was
taken on the basis of domestic law. The Commission further considers
that nature conservation is in the general interest. Finally, as far
as the question of a fair balance between the general interest of the
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights is concerned (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and
Lönnroth judgment of 24 September 1982, Series A No. 52, p. 26, para.
69), the Commission notes that in the applicant's case the decisions
complained of were reached at on the basis of an expert opinion which
both denied the necessity of the shed in question as well as its
compatibility with the purpose of the relevant legislation, namely
nature conservation.
It can in these circumstances not be found that the competent
authorities exceeded their margin of appreciation and imposed an
intolerable, excessive burden on the applicant.
It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected
as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicant has further invoked Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention arguing that he did not have access to an independent
tribunal which could have examined both the factual as well as the
legal issues in the dispute relating to the expropriation matter.
The Commission notes that before the Administrative Court the
applicant tried to show that contrary to the view expressed by a nature
conservation expert and adopted by the authorities in his case he
needed the shed for agricultural purposes and that the construction
would not negatively affect the beauty of the landscape. However, the
Commission notes that the Administrative Court discussed in detail the
expert evidence and even considered the agrarian expert's opinion to
be insufficient while on the other hand it found that the decision
complained of was justified for nature conservation reasons as had been
demonstrated by the nature conservation expert. In these particular
circumstances there is nothing to show that the Administrative Court
was in any way limited in its competence to examine the complaints
raised by the applicant. It follows that the dispute on the question
of whether or not the use of the applicant's property was lawfully
restricted was eventually decided by an impartial tribunal.
Consequently there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6
(Art. 6) and to this extent the application has therefore likewise to
be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.
For these reasons the Commission, unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (J.A. FROWEIN)