AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 16031/90

                      by Monika and Peter TENNENBAUM

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

3 May 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Sir   Basil HALL

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 M.A. NOWICKI

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 3 December 1989

by Monika and Peter Tennenbaum against Sweden and registered on

22 January 1990 under file No. 16031/90;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 21 June 1991, the observations in reply submitted  by the

applicants on 20 September and 21 October 1991 and the documents

submitted by the respondent Government on 28 January 1993;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as they appear from the parties'

submissions and the documentary evidence at the Commission's disposal,

may be summarised as follows.

      The applicants are Swedish citizens, born in 1945 and 1948

respectively. They reside at Malmö.

A.    The particular facts of the case

      The first applicant was born in Sweden. As from 1984 she received

financial support from the social authorities due to illness

(sjukbidrag). In 1988 this was changed into an early retirement pension

(förtidspension). It appears that she has certain problems which have

been described as a strong disturbance in her personality (kraftig

personlighetsstörning) - a borderline type of condition which cannot

be rehabilitated. Since her birth she belonged to the Swedish State

Church, but apparently converted to catholicism in 1980. The applicants

submit that she has now converted to judaism.

      The second applicant is of Polish origin. He emigrated from

Poland to Israel in 1967 and acquired Israeli citizenship. He came to

Sweden in 1974 and acquired Swedish citizenship in 1983. Except for

approximately 3 1/2 months in 1975 the second applicant has been

unemployed since he came to Sweden. Like the first applicant he also

receives an early retirement pension due to mental problems and has

been admitted to mental hospitals both in Israel and in Sweden.

According to medical certificates the second applicant cannot be

rehabilitated either, due to his particular mental problems. He has

been described as having extreme difficulties in co-operating with

other people and a tendency to become aggressive (persona patologica

explosiva).

      As regards the mental problems the applicants submit that the

conclusions reached are partly based on very old examinations and

partly due to the fact that they knowingly deceived the doctors who had

to decide on whether or not to grant them an early retirement pension

for which reason they actually receive such pensions on incorrect

grounds.

      The second applicant's father was a catholic and his mother was

jewish. He was baptised in a catholic church and belonged to it until

he emigrated to Israel. The second applicant submits that due to the

fact that his mother was jewish he has been jewish since birth. When

he came to Sweden in 1974 he referred to his catholic certificate of

baptism, but he belonged to the Mosaic congregation in Malmö from 1976

to 1978 when he reverted to the catholic congregation. The applicants

submit that they officially lived as catholics as a security measure

against anti-semitism. Since August 1987 the second applicant belongs

again to the Mosaic congregation in Malmö.

      The applicants met in 1980 and were married the same year. Their

two daughters were born on 5 February 1985 and 18 July 1986

respectively. They christened their children Mary Christine and Ann

Therese in a catholic church in Malmö, also, they submit, as a security

measure against anti-semitism. In 1987, i.e. after their daughters had

been taken into care, the applicants changed their children's first

names into the corresponding jewish names, Miriam and Hannah.

      When the applicants married in 1980 it appears that they lived

at Halmstad. It also appears that they had considerable housing

problems and that the social authorities made several attempts to solve

them. The offers made by the authorities were, however, unacceptable

to the applicants who apparently then stayed in different hotels.

      In April 1985, following the birth of their daughter Miriam, the

applicants moved to Malmö. As from the end of 1985 they lived in a flat

in Malmö, paid for by the social authorities, but they were forced to

leave in May 1986 which, according to the documents submitted, was

because the second applicant had caused disturbances in the house which

"clearly overstepped the limits for what other occupants ought to

tolerate in a building meant for several families". The applicants were

then offered a house at Bunkeflostrand near Malmö, an offer which,

however, they turned down for which reason they apparently continued

to live in various hotels.

      In particular due to the family's living conditions and the

applicants' attitude in this respect the Social District Council of

Malmö (Malmö kommun, sociala distriktsnämnden) on 15 April 1986

initiated an investigation as to Miriam's development. For the same

reasons an investigation was initiated concerning Hannah following her

birth on 18 July 1986. The applicants submit that these investigations

were a form of blackmail, aimed at forcing them to accept the social

authorities' proposals concerning residence.

      The housing dispute appears to have culminated on 2 July 1986,

i.e. 16 days before the birth of Hannah, when the applicants asked the

social authorities to take care of Miriam, who was taken into custody

the same day by decision of the Social District Council of Malmö. On

10 July 1986 the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County

of Malmö quashed the decision and the care was terminated.

      On 18 July 1986, when Hannah was born, the applicants lived in

a hotel room and they submit that on 3 August 1986 they had to take her

to hospital due to their living conditions combined with an infection

she developed.

      On 5 August 1986, the applicants received copies of the reports

prepared on the basis of the social authorities' investigation into the

developments of their daughters and the same day they took Miriam to

the offices of the social authorities. After an exchange of views the

chairman of the Social District Council decided to take both Miriam and

Hannah, who was in hospital, into care on a provisional basis, pursuant

to Section 1, para. 2, sub-section 1 and Section 6 of the 1980 Act with

Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda

bestämmelser om vård av unga), hereinafter "the 1980 Act". This

decision was brought before the County Administrative Court and counsel

was appointed for the applicants on 11 August 1986. On 15 August 1986

the County Administrative Court confirmed the care decision and it was

subsequently upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) of Gothenburg on 25 September 1986. In the meantime, on

15 August 1986, the applicants had left Sweden and moved to Israel. The

children remained in Sweden. Miriam was placed in a children's home

whereas Hannah was placed in a foster home.

      On 20 August 1986 the Social District Council decided that the

children's address should not be disclosed to the applicants (Section

16, sub-section 2, of the 1980 Act). Furthermore the Social District

Council applied to the County Administrative Court for the taking into

care of the applicants' two daughters pursuant to Section 1, para. 2,

sub-section 1 of the 1980 Act.

      While the case was pending before the County Administrative Court

the applicants submitted requests, either directly or through their

appointed counsel, that the children be placed with a jewish family,

if possible English-speaking, stressing their wish to have the children

brought up in accordance with jewish traditions.

      On 6 October 1986, the Social District Council decided to contact

the jewish congregation in Malmö to investigate the possibilities of

meeting the parents' wishes regarding placement of the children.

Contact was made with the Rabbi who considered, however, that it would

be extremely difficult to find a jewish family which would be willing

to bring up the children.

      On 27 November 1986, the Rabbi informed the authorities that he

considered it impossible to find a jewish family in southern Sweden who

would be able to bring up the children in the jewish faith. He also

noted that there was a more orthodox attitude in southern Sweden than

in other parts of the country. He proposed, however, that the Institute

for Jewish Education and Culture in Lund should be contacted.

      In the meantime, on 7 November 1986, the applicants had returned

from Israel and were accordingly able to participate in the hearing

held in the County Administrative Court on 11, 12 and 16 December 1986

concerning the question of public care. The Social District Council

maintained its position but stated in respect of Miriam that, as her

address had become known to the applicants, there was no longer any

need for a decision to keep it secret. The applicants, who were present

at the hearing and assisted by officially appointed counsel under the

1972 Legal Aid Act (rättshjälpslagen), inter alia alleged that the

investigation was incorrect and false, and that there was no relevant

ground for taking the children into care. The children were represented

by officially appointed counsel under the Legal Aid Act.

      During the proceedings, which were held in camera, the Court had

at its disposal several written statements. The Chief Doctor Ö.J., the

Deputy Chief Doctor P.V. and the manageress of Enebackens Children's

Home B.A. were heard. Furthermore, the applicants were heard as well

as two doctors and 14 witnesses, among others trained nurses and social

welfare officers called by the applicants. The applicants requested

that further witnesses be heard and more written statements be brought

before the Court. Their request was rejected by the Court, which

considered this to be superfluous and no further investigation to be

necessary in order to decide the case.

      In its judgment of 27 January 1987 the Court stated inter alia

the following:

      (translation)

      "No remarks have been made in the case in respect of the

      personal physical care of [Miriam]. According to the

      statements of the witnesses, Monika Tennenbaum has shown an

      understanding of the needs of children.  However,

      concerning the conditions of [Miriam], it appears that the

      parents have let interests other than the care of her

      dominate the life of the family. The family has moved

      frequently during the last years. The Social Councils of

      Halmstad and Malmö have made several attempts to solve the

      housing problems of the family, without any success.  Peter

      Tennenbaum has emphasised his methods of deceiving and

      manipulating different authorities in order to obtain above

      all financial but also other advantages. It appears that

      this has not improved the social situation of the family,

      or prevented the family from getting into social and

      financial distress. Regularly, the parents have spent all

      their money and repeatedly they have put themselves in

      situations of need in their daily way of life. At the same

      time they have, with the financial aid from relatives, made

      trips abroad which, according to Peter Tennenbaum, have

      cost tens of thousands of Swedish crowns. It must be

      considered that the spouses Tennenbaum were evicted because

      of their behaviour as tenants in spite of strong social

      reasons to prolong their lease, and that, by maintaining

      their own claims, they have not been able to accept the

      proposals of the Social Councils for assistance to find

      suitable housing. In view of what has been established it

      must be considered that the spouses through their own

      behaviour caused the family's homelessness.

      From P.V.'s written and oral statements at the hearing and

      B.A.'s testimony it must be concluded that [Miriam] shows

      signs of damage in respect of her mental and social

      progress. P.V. has expressly stated that the insecure

      housing conditions and the separation from the parents

      following the taking into care on a provisional basis

      between 2 and 10 July 1986 as well as the taking into care

      now to be considered, are not a sufficient explanation for

      her condition.

      The statements of the witnesses and the investigation show

      that the reasons for [Miriam's] behaviour should be found

      in her parents' emotional relationship to her and not, as

      stated by her parents, in her physical environment. Even if

      Monika Tennenbaum has shown a certain understanding of the

      children's needs, she has not been able to defend her views

      against Peter Tennenbaum and to influence the family's

      situation.

      It is clear in this case that the spouses Tennenbaum lacked

      the will and capacity to provide for [Miriam's] primary

      needs of a permanent place to live, emotional contact,

      security and care and that this has impaired [Miriam's]

      development. The birth of [Hannah] has not brought about

      any changes in the parents' attitude to the needs of

      children in this respect. Therefore, it must be considered

      that the conditions of the parents also endanger [Hannah's]

      development."

      As regards keeping the children's address secret to the

applicants the Court stated inter alia:

      (translation)

      " The Social District Council has emphasised that it is

      desirable that the parents meet both children and has also

      made offers to this effect. However, the parents have

      rejected this for reasons of principle. According to the

      Court's assessment, there are reasons to presume that Peter

      Tennenbaum would interfere in the care of [Hannah] so that

      the foster parents would be prevented from giving [Hannah]

      the care she needs. In this matter Monika Tennenbaum is not

      regarded as capable of influencing the behaviour of Peter

      Tennenbaum. It must therefore be considered that the Social

      District Council had relevant reasons for its decision."

      The County Administrative Court decided that Miriam and Hannah

be taken into care under Section 1, para. 1 and para. 2, sub-section

1, of the 1980 Act and that the decision should have immediate effect.

It also upheld the decision to keep Hannah's address secret whereas it

was not found necessary to decide on the question of secrecy in respect

of Miriam's address, as it was known to the applicants.

      Following the County Administrative Court's above judgment of

27 January 1987, the social authorities approached the Institute for

Jewish Education and Culture in Lund, which had contacts with families

where one member of the family was of jewish origin. It turned out,

however, that while there were indeed families who might possibly be

interested in adoption, none could be found who would be willing to

accept a foster home arrangement.

      The Social District Council then decided that a meeting should

be arranged between the responsible personnel and the Rabbi in order

to discuss the matter further. This meeting took place on 13 February

1987, following which the Social District Council considered that there

was no justification for continuing to look for a jewish foster home,

since such a home was apparently very hard to find. Continuing the

search would thus mean that the placement of the children would be

considerably delayed and, furthermore, if the search would prove to be

successful, the children might have to be placed far away from the

parents.

      On 21 April 1987, the result of the Social District Council's

investigation regarding the children's placement was formally

communicated to the applicants, who were invited to submit orally to

the Council their views on the investigation. Following that, the

Council decided on 6 May 1987 to place Miriam and Hannah together in

a protestant foster home and to keep the children's new address secret

from the applicants for the time being. On 1 June 1987 they appealed

against this to the County Administrative Court which upheld the

decision in a judgment of 10 July 1987.

      On 2 February and 27 July 1987 respectively, the applicants

appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal against the judgments

of the County Administrative Court of 27 January 1987 (question of

taking into care) and of 10 July 1987 (question of placement).

      As indicated above, the applicants returned from Israel on

7 November 1986. They were provided with a one-room flat but submit

that this was part of the social authorities' policy towards them in

order to make them divorce. They also submit that the social

authorities made them understand that by divorcing the first applicant

had a chance of getting the children back.

      In 1987 the applicants divorced. Whereas the second applicant

stayed in the one-room flat, the first applicant was provided with

another flat. They submit, however, that the social authorities did not

accept this pro forma divorce for which reason the second applicant in

August 1988 married a woman from Poland thereby enabling her to come

to Sweden. A son was born out of this marriage in 1989.

      In the meantime the proceedings in the Administrative Court of

Appeal continued. As regards the taking into care of the applicants'

two daughters the social authorities were requested, on 17 February

1987, to submit their observations on the appeal. These observations

were submitted on 23 March 1987. Certain problems as to the applicants'

representation arose. Eventually on 26 May 1987 the Court appointed a

new counsel for the applicants. However, on 9 June 1987 the first

applicant requested to have her own counsel who was then appointed on

29 June 1987. On 12 August 1987, the Court suggested 19-21 October 1987

as preliminary dates for the hearing, dates which were subsequently

vacated as the first applicant's counsel was unable to appear. Further

problems with the applicants' representation appeared, but whereas the

Court refused to replace the first applicant's counsel the Court

appointed a new counsel for the second applicant on 19 February 1988.

On 1 July 1988 the second applicant's counsel requested that the

hearing be postponed until January 1989. On 20 September 1988 the Court

accordingly notified the parties that the hearing would take place from

17 to 19 January 1989.

      As regards the proceedings concerning the placement in the foster

home the social authorities were requested, on 29 July 1987, to submit

their observations on the appeal. These observations were submitted on

14 August 1987. From 17 August until 11 September 1987 the file

remained with the Parliamentary Ombudsman. From 23 March until

2 September 1988 a number of written submissions were exchanged between

the parties through the Court. On 28 October 1988, the Court decided

to include the placement question for consideration during the hearing

concerning the public care issue scheduled for 17-19 January 1989.

      Accordingly the Administrative Court of Appeal held a public

hearing on both issues from 17 to 19 January 1989.

      The applicants were present and both were assisted by officially

appointed counsel under the Legal Aid Act. The children were

represented by counsel as in the lower court. The Administrative Court

of Appeal had at its disposal the case-file including written

statements of Chief Doctor K.S., Authorised Psychologist G.S., Deputy

Chief Doctor P.V. and Psychologist S.S.  A total of 12 witnesses were

heard, including K.S., P.V. and S.S. It appears that the Court decided

not to hear a number of other witnesses requested by the second

applicant.

      In its judgment of 13 February 1989 the Administrative Court of

Appeal stated inter alia:

      (translation)

      "All in all the Court finds that at the time of the care

      order in August 1986 Monika Tennenbaum and Peter Tennenbaum

      lacked the ability to take care of Miriam and Hannah to

      such an extent that the children's health and development

      were in danger.

      However, the Court must determine whether such a danger

      still exists. It is to be noted that Monika Tennenbaum and

      Peter Tennenbaum are now divorced and that their housing

      problems have found a reasonably acceptable solution. They

      have declared that the children would live with Monika, in

      her flat containing two rooms and a kitchen, and that she

      would take care of them with considerable assistance from

      Peter. They intend to emigrate to Israel as soon as

      possible.

      As established by the investigation, Monika Tennenbaum's

      and Peter Tennenbaum's inability to provide safe and

      harmonious conditions for their children while they are

      growing up constitutes a great danger to the children's

      health and development. The determining factor in this

      respect is hardly how the housing problems are solved, but

      rather the general attitude, shown by the parents, in

      questions concerning their children. The investigation in

      this matter does not indicate any changes worth mentioning

      on the part of Monika Tennenbaum and Peter Tennenbaum. On

      the contrary, it is remarkable that they have not had any

      contact at all with their children since the taking into

      care, even considering the fact that a meeting must be

      arranged on the conditions of the social authorities. The

      conclusion of the Court is therefore that there still is a

      need to provide care for the children outside their home.

      Clearly, the conditions to provide the necessary care

      voluntarily are not at hand.

      Consequently, the Court finds, like the County

      Administrative Court, that Miriam and Hannah must be

      provided care pursuant to the 1980 Act of Special

      Provisions on the Care of Young Persons.

      ...

      Monika Tennenbaum and Peter Tennenbaum have submitted

      several letters to the Court concerning ethical, cultural

      and religious questions, which are all of importance in the

      matter of choosing a suitable foster home. In the light of

      the fact that on the side of the father, the children are

      to be regarded as jewesses, that the father has a Polish-

      jewish culture and belongs to the jewish church at Malmö

      and that the mother is converting to judaism, it is their

      clear opinion that the foster home should be jewish with

      Polish as its home language. Monika Tennenbaum and Peter

      Tennenbaum have further alleged that the Social District

      Council has not done enough to find a suitable foster home.

      ...

      The Social District Council has in this matter pointed out

      the following. The foster home for Miriam and Hannah has

      been selected according to current routines at the family

      care section (familjevårdssektionen). This means

      advertising, meetings with foster parents and co-operation

      with other Social District Councils. At the beginning

      purposeful attempts were made to find a jewish home

      according to the parents' wish. The Social District Council

      inter alia contacted the Rabbi in Malmö. In his opinion the

      children are not jewish, because their mother is not a

      jewess. The parents' religious affiliation can be described

      as confusing ... The request for a Polish-speaking foster

      home was lodged for the first time after the children had

      been placed in the foster home. The search was limited to

      the southern part of Sweden in order to give the parents a

      realistic possibility of meeting the children, in

      accordance with the so-called principle of nearness

      (närhetsprincipen).

      ...

      The plan for the care includes placing the children in a

      foster home. Thus, it has been the Social District

      Council's duty to find one suitable foster home for both of

      them, without any unnecessary waste of time. The Social

      District Council made some efforts to find a foster home

      corresponding to Monika Tennenbaum's and Peter Tennenbaum's

      wishes. Considering what was known about the children's

      needs at the time, the Court finds that no well-founded

      criticism can be made of the Social District Council's

      decision of 6 May 1987 to place the children in the foster

      home in question.

      ...

      According to the Social District Council the main reason

      for keeping the address of the children secret is that

      otherwise Monika Tennenbaum and Peter Tennenbaum would

      interfere with the care in a way which would make it

      impossible for the foster home to give the children the

      necessary care. The Court shares the opinion of the Social

      District Council that the children's address should not be

      disclosed to the parents. In this regard there is reason to

      emphasise that such a decision does not deprive the parents

      of the possibility of meeting their children."

      On 20 February 1989, the applicants appealed against this

judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) which,

by decision of 30 June 1989, refused to grant leave to appeal.

      As indicated above, the first applicant was at that moment living

alone whereas the second applicant had married another woman with whom

he had a child. In the summer of 1990, however, he divorced her and

returned to the first applicant. They submit that they were

subsequently, on 26 September 1990, evicted from their apartment and

considered themselves homeless in Sweden from that date onwards.

      Later in the autumn of 1990 they decided to move to Berlin where,

however, they could only live as tourists, three months at a time. In

December 1990 they therefore moved to Poland and considered staying

there. However, the conditions in Poland were such that the first

applicant could not adapt to them for which reason they returned to

Malmö in April 1991. On 4 May 1991 they re-married. It appears that

they lived in various hotels in Malmö and, subsequently, in Copenhagen.

On 1 December 1992 the applicants returned to Malmö where the social

authorities have provided them with an apartment. They have only met

their children once since 1986, as a matter of principle, they refuse

to meet the children in "a neutral place" outside the foster home.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      A.   Care decisions

      The basic rules on public responsibility for young persons are

laid down in the Social Services Act 1980 (socialtjänstlagen 1980:620).

This Act contains provisions regarding supportive and preventive

measures taken with the approval of the individuals concerned. At the

relevant time of the present case, where parents did not give their

consent to the necessary measures, compulsory care could be ordered

under the 1980 Act containing Special Provisions on the Care of Young

Persons. The 1980 Act was replaced by new legislation in 1990.

      Section 1 of the 1980 Act read:

      (translation):

      "Care is to be provided pursuant to this Act for persons under

      eighteen years of age if it may be presumed that the necessary

      care cannot be given to the young person with the consent of the

      person or persons having custody of him and, in the case of a

      young person aged fifteen or more, with the consent of the young

      person.

      Care is to be provided for a young person if

      1.   lack of care for him or any other condition in the home

      entails a danger to his health or development, or

      2.   the young person is seriously endangering his health or

      development by abuse of habit-forming substances, criminal

      activity or any other comparable behaviour. ..."

      It is primarily the responsibility of municipalities to promote

a positive development for the young. For this purpose each

municipality has a Social Council, composed of lay members assisted by

a staff of professional social workers, which operates under the

supervision and control of the County Administrative Board

(länsstyrelsen) and the National Board of Health and Welfare

(socialstyrelsen).

      The 1980 Act specified that, if the Social Council deemed it

necessary to take a child into care, the Council had to apply to the

County Administrative Court for a decision to this effect (Section 2).

      B.   Implementation of care decisions

      Once a decision on public care has been taken, the Social Council

executes the decision, takes care of the practical details regarding

the placement of the child and decides what education and other

treatment he should be given etc. (sections 11-16).

      Pursuant to section 11 of the 1980 Act,

      (translation):

      "... the Social Council shall decide how care is to be arranged

      for the young person concerned and where he is to reside during

      the period of care.

      The Social Council may consent to the young person residing in

      his own home if this may be presumed to be the most appropriate

      way of arranging care, but care pursuant to this Act is always

      to commence away from the young person's home.

      The Social Council or the person charged with care of the young

      person by the Council shall keep the young person under

      surveillance and make such decisions concerning his personal

      conditions as are necessary for the discharge of care."

      With regard to the nature of the functions entrusted to the

Social Council under the 1980 Act, the following is stated in the

preparatory work to this Act, as reproduced in the Government Bill

(1979/80: 1, Part A, pp. 596-597):

      "After a decision on public care has been taken the Social

      Council exercises parental responsibility alongside with the

      parents or in their place. It should assume such parental

      authority and responsibility as is necessary to implement the

      care measures. Thus, like the parents, the Council may take the

      necessary measures to prevent the young person from harming

      himself or others ... [or] from running away [and] ... may also

      take decisions ... concerning [his] private affairs. This may

      include matters relating to medical care or treatment, permission

      for the young person to travel or to take up employment.

      According to the principles which govern the cooperation between

      the social welfare authorities and the individuals [concerned]

      on the implementation of public care measures, the Council should

      consult the parents in such matters, if the circumstances so

      allow. Therefore, the fact that the Council has taken over the

      responsibility for the care of the young person must not result

      in the parents being deprived of all influence. The parents and

      the young person himself should as far as possible take part in

      making the care arrangements. Thus, it is only in so far as it

      is necessary for the implementation of public care measures that

      the Council, through the decision of the County Administrative

      Court, takes over the parental responsibility of the person."

      C.   Provisions related to the length of proceedings

      Basic provisions concerning the proceedings to be followed in,

inter alia, county administrative courts, administrative courts of

appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court are contained in the 1971

Act on Administrative Procedure (förvaltningsprocesslag 1971:291).

There is no provision in the Act laying down time-limits within which

cases brought before the courts are to be decided.

      It is generally considered to be the courts' duty to ensure that

adequate progress is made in cases pending before them, an obligation

which, on 1 January 1988, was explicitly laid down for the ordinary

courts through an amendment to the Code of Judicial Procedure

(rättegångsbalken).

      The proceedings complained of in the present case concerned the

taking into care of children under the 1980 Act and issues related to

the taking into care. Section 9 of that Act read at the relevant time

as follows:

      (translation):

      "Cases concerning care pursuant to this Act are to be dealt with

      promptly.

      If the young person is in custody, the County Administrative

      Court is to hold hearings in the case within two weeks of the day

      on which the application for care was received. The Court may

      prolong this period if such prolongation is necessitated by

      further investigation or any other special circumstance."

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants complain of the fact that their children were

taken into care. They maintain that there was no pertinent reason for

taking such a step and consider this to be in violation of their right

to respect for their family life. They invoke in this respect Articles

3 and 8 of the Convention.

      The applicants also complain that the placement of their children

in a protestant foster home violates their rights under Article 9 of

the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in

that their right to ensure their children's education and teaching in

conformity with their own religion and philosophical conviction has

been disregarded.

      Under Articles 12 and 14 of the Convention the applicants

complain that the taking into care of their children prevented them

from founding a family and from living in accordance with their

religion and philosophy.

      They furthermore complain, under Article 6 of the Convention,

that their case was not heard by an impartial tribunal, that the court

hearings were not public, that the witnesses proposed by them were not

heard, that the Administrative Court of Appeal did not investigate the

case promptly and that the case was not determined within a reasonable

time.

      Finally, they complain, under Article 13 of the Convention, of

the lack of an effective remedy.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 3 December 1989 and registered

on 22 January 1990.

      On 8 April 1991 the Commission decided to bring the application

to the notice of the respondent Government inviting them to submit

written observations on admissibility and merits of certain parts of

the application.

      The Government's observations were submitted on 27 June 1991 and

the applicants' observations in reply were submitted on 20 September

and 21 October 1991.

      Legal aid was granted to the applicants on 12 July 1991.

      On 8 July 1992 the Commission decided to adjourn the case in

order to obtain further documentary evidence.

      On 28 January 1993 the Government submitted such documentary

evidence.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants complain that their right to respect for their

family life has been interfered with in a manner unjustifiable under

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. In particular they have

pointed out that the social authorities' handling of their case was

improper and that the care order concerning their daughters was issued

without it having been established that there was a need to do so. The

applicants refer in this respect also to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

      The Commission finds it appropriate first to examine the

applicants' complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which

reads:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life, his home and his correspondence.

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others."

      The Commission finds that the taking into care of the applicants'

children interfered with their right to respect for their family life

as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention. It must

therefore be examined whether this interference was justified under the

terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2). In this respect the Commission

recalls that three conditions must be satisfied: the interference must

be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the

legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2) and it

must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those

legitimate aims.

      As regards the first condition, the Commission finds that the

relevant provisions in Swedish law satisfy the requirements as to the

quality of the law (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March

1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 30-31, paras. 60-63). Furthermore, the

issue of care was examined by the competent administrative courts up

to the Supreme Administrative Court which refused to grant leave to

appeal, and there is nothing to suggest that the decisions taken by the

courts in the present case were contrary to Swedish law.

      The Commission also finds that the interference had a legitimate

aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests of the

children, which in this case fall under the expression "for the

protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights

and freedoms of others" (cf. also above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p.

31, paras. 64-65).

      It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the children.

      According to the established case-law of the Commission and the

European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in

particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In

determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic

society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a

margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (cf. above-

mentioned Olsson judgment, pp. 31-32, para. 67). That does not mean,

however, that the Commission's review is limited to ascertaining

whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably,

carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, it cannot confine itself to

considering the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them

in the light of the case as a whole. It must determine whether the

reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and

sufficient" (cf. Olsson judgment, p. 32, para. 68).

      In the present case, the Commission recalls that the applicants

allege that the care order was based on irrelevant circumstances.

      Before considering the substance of this issue, the Commission

recalls that both the County Administrative Court and the

Administrative Court of Appeal held oral hearings. The applicants were

present at both hearings and were assisted by counsel. Before these

courts, the applicants had the possibility of presenting the views

which in their opinion would be decisive for the outcome of the case.

Having regard to these facts, the Commission finds that, in so far as

certain procedural requirements are implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8),

these requirements were satisfied since the applicants were involved

in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide them

with the requisite protection of their interests.

      As regards the actual care order, the Commission recalls the

judgments of the County Administrative Court and the Administrative

Court of Appeal of 27 January 1987 and 13 February 1989 respectively.

The courts established that the family's social and financial distress

was self-inflicted, that Miriam showed signs of damage in respect of

her mental and social progress and that her parents impaired her

development due to their lack of will and capacity to provide for her

primary needs of a permanent place to live, emotional contact, security

and care. Such conditions were also found to endanger Hannah's

development.

      These conditions are clearly relevant to a decision to take a

child into care. Furthermore, the Commission recalls that prior to the

taking into care of the children the social authorities had been

involved for a considerable length of time in supporting the applicants

and had initiated an investigation as to Miriam's development after her

birth. It cannot therefore be said that the authorities intervened

without adequate knowledge of the background.

      The Commission also recalls that the judgment of the

Administrative Court of Appeal not only considered whether relevant and

sufficient reasons were at hand when the children were taken into care,

but also found that the subsequent developments and investigations

showed that such reasons still existed when judgment was pronounced.

      In the light of this the Commission finds that the decision to

take the applicants' daughters into care was supported by relevant and

sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their margin of

appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think

that is was necessary to take the children into care. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that this decision can be regarded as "necessary

in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention in the interest of the children.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    In so far as the applicants rely on Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention in respect of the taking into care of their children the

Commission finds that the examination of the case does not disclose any

appearance of a violation of this provision. It follows that this part

of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicants complain next that the placement of their children

in a protestant foster home violates their right to ensure their

children's education and teaching in conformity with their own religion

and philosophical conviction. They invoke Article 9 (Art. 9) of the

Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that, although the right of the parents

to ensure their children's education and teaching in conformity with

their own convictions, is not removed as a result of a care order, such

an order temporarily transfers certain parental rights to the

authorities for which reason it is inevitable that the contents of the

parents' rights must be reduced. However, the authorities must have due

regard to the parents' wishes and, although these do not have an

absolute right, the authorities were obliged, in the present case, to

take the applicants' wish to have their children placed in a jewish

foster home into account (cf. Olsson v. Sweden, Comm. Report 2.12.86,

para. 183, Eur. Court H.R., ibid. p. 63).

      In the present case certain questions have been raised by the

respondent Government as to the religious convictions of the

applicants. The Commission does not find it necessary to examine this

issue because the applicants' complaints are in any event manifestly

ill-founded for the following reasons.

      The Commission recalls that under Swedish law the authorities

exercise parental responsibility alongside the parents, or in their

place, and parents should be consulted in matters concerning the child.

In the present case the Commission finds it established that the social

authorities took note of the applicants' wish for a jewish foster home

and contacted various organisations and persons in order to comply with

it and to find a suitable solution. The applicants were kept informed

of the investigations and were invited to submit their views thereon.

Accordingly, the social authorities clearly explored the possibilities

of placing the children in a jewish foster home but their endeavours

failed because of other considerations, such as the difficulty to find,

without any unnecessary waste of time, a home not so far from the

parents as to prevent their having a realistic possibility of meeting

their children. In respect of the latter the Commission also notes that

the applicants have apparently not found it necessary to take an active

part in ensuring that their children's education would be in conformity

with their own convictions as they have refused to accept the access

offers made by the authorities.

      In these circumstances the Commission finds that the examination

of the complaint concerning the placement in a protestant foster home

does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9)

of the Convention or of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the

Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    Finally, in respect of the consequences of the taking into care

of their children, the applicants invoke Articles 12 and 14

(Art. 12, 14) of the Convention complaining that this prevented them

from founding a family and from living in accordance with their

religion and philosophy.

      The Commission has already found above that the interference with

the applicants' family life was justified under paragraph 2 of Article

8 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. Even assuming that this interference

affected their right to found a family within the meaning of Article

12 (Art. 12) of the Convention, this complaint is inadmissible for the

same reasons as stated above. Furthermore, the application, as

submitted, does not disclose any substantiated allegations which could

justify a further examination of the complaint submitted under Article

14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

      This part of the application is accordingly also manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.a.  Under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the applicants

complain of a number of procedural shortcomings in respect of the court

hearings involved. They maintain that the case was not heard in public

by an impartial tribunal, that all the witnesses proposed by them were

not heard, that the Administrative Court of Appeal did not investigate

the case properly and that the case was not determined within a

reasonable time.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of

      any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair

      and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and

      impartial tribunal established by law.  Judgment shall be

      pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from

      all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order

      or national security in a democratic society, where the interests

      of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties

      so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion

      of the court in special circumstances where publicity would

      prejudice the interests of justice."

      The Commission notes that the care issue was determined first,

on a preliminary basis, by two different courts and subsequently by

three different courts. In these proceedings the applicants were

assisted by counsel. As already stated above, the Commission finds that

the applicants were involved in the decision-making process to a degree

sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their

interests. The Commission has found no substantiation of the allegation

that the case was not determined by an impartial tribunal but, whereas

the hearing in the Administrative Court of Appeal was public, it is

true that the hearing in the County Administrative Court was closed to

the public. However, having regard to the subject matter of the case

as it was before the domestic courts, the Commission finds that this

was in accordance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), second sentence,

which inter alia allows for the exclusion of the public where the

interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the

parties so require.

      It is also true that the courts refused to hear certain witnesses

suggested by the applicants. However, Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention does not guarantee parties to the proceedings in question

an unlimited right to have witnesses heard. Article 6 (Art. 6) permits

the courts to reject proposed evidence which they consider to be

irrelevant or unnecessary. This is what happened in the present case

and the Commission has not found any indication which could lead it to

concluding that this was done in an unfair or arbitrary manner.

      Having regard to this and considering the domestic judicial

proceedings as a whole, the Commission finds no material to support the

conclusion that they were not fair or that the Swedish courts failed

to make due and proper enquiries.

5.b.  In respect of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the applicants

also complain that their case was not determined within a reasonable

time. The Commission recalls that the applicants' children were taken

into care on 5 August 1986 by the social authorities and an application

for public care under the 1980 Act was lodged with the County

Administrative Court on 20 August 1986. On 30 June 1989 the Supreme

Administrative Court refused leave to appeal. It follows that these

proceedings lasted approximately two years and eleven months. The

proceedings concerning the foster home placement commenced on 6 May

1987 and ended with the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court

on 30 June 1989, lasting approximately two years and two months.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria:

the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct

of the authorities dealing with the case (see Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo

judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).

      The Government submit, which is contested by the applicants, that

the proceedings were somewhat complex and that, in assessing the

reasonableness of their length, emphasis should be placed on the

importance of what was at stake. They furthermore maintain that any

delay was attributable to the applicants.

      The Commission recalls that the proceedings in the County

Administrative Court lasted from 20 August 1986 to 27 January 1987

(care) and from 1 June to 10 July 1987 (placement). The proceedings in

the Administrative Court of Appeal lasted from 2 February 1987 to

13 February 1989 (care) and from 27 July 1987 to 13 February 1989

(placement). Finally, the proceedings in the Supreme Administrative

Court lasted from 20 February to 30 June 1989 (both issues). The

Commission considers that the duration of the proceedings in the County

Administrative Court and in the Supreme Administrative Court do not

give rise to any objection.

      The proceedings in the Administrative Court of Appeal lasted

approximately two years as regards the issue of care and it was joined

with the issue of placement. The Commission is of the opinion that the

issues at stake in the present case required by their very nature to

be dealt with expeditiously. However, it recalls that during the period

in question the applicants asked on several occasions for a replacement

of their court appointed counsel which, as it turned out, caused

considerable delays. Not only was the hearing, scheduled as early as

October 1987, vacated but it was furthermore on counsel's request that

the hearing was subsequently postponed from July 1988 to January 1989.

In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicants

prolonged the proceedings in the Administrative Court of Appeal.

      The Commission furthermore notes that, as indicated above, the

Administrative Court of Appeal not only examined the appropriateness

of the care and placement of the applicants' children at the time when

these measures were implemented but also examined whether, at the time

of the judgment pronounced, such measures were still necessary on the

basis of the continuing developments in the case. Having regard to all

these circumstances and to the fact that the proceedings comprised

three court levels, the Commission finds that the total period of time

was not so long as to warrant the conclusion that it was excessive.

      It follows that the applicants' complaints, as submitted under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, are manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.    Finally, the applicants complain of the lack of a remedy in

respect of the complaints submitted. They refer in this respect to

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) has been

interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as requiring a remedy

in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as

"arguable" in terms of the Convention (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R.,

Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23,

para. 52).

      However, having regard to its above conclusions in respect of the

Convention complaints submitted, the Commission also considers that the

applicants do not have any "arguable claims" of a violation of the

provisions invoked for these complaints. Furthermore, the Commission

recalls that the domestic courts considered all complaints which the

applicants have submitted to the Commission. In these circumstances it

finds no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Commission                 President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                                (C.A. NØRGAARD)