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ROBINSON v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 20858/92 • ECHR ID: 001-1595

Document date: May 5, 1993

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  • Cited paragraphs: 0
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ROBINSON v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Doc ref: 20858/92 • ECHR ID: 001-1595

Document date: May 5, 1993

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 20858/92

                      by Graham ROBINSON

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 5 May 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL, Acting President of the First Chamber

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

           Sir   Basil HALL

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

           Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the First Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 8 July 1992 by

Graham ROBINSON against the United Kingdom and registered on 28 October

1992 under file No. 20858/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1961 and presently

detained, serving a sentence of life imprisonment, at HM Prison

Gartree, Leicester.  He is represented before the Commission by Messrs.

Lawrences, Solicitors, Wellingborough, Northhamptonshire.

      The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicant and

which may be deduced from documents submitted with the application, may

be summarised as follows :

      On 17 December 1988, after an angry altercation with some people

after pub closing time, the applicant fetched a bayonet from his car

and stabbed three of the people with whom he was arguing.  One of them

was killed, the other two were seriously injured.  These facts are not

disputed by the applicant.

      The applicant was tried for murder and attempted murder.  In

respect of the first charge his defence was that he was not guilty of

murder but was guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished

responsibility, based on the evidence of three psychiatrists.  The

trial judge directed the jury that the burden of proving that the

applicant was suffering from abnormality of mind which substantially

diminished his mental responsibility for his actions was on the

defence, pursuant to section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.  He also

directed the jury that they did not have to accept the psychiatric

evidence.

      The applicant was convicted of murder and attempted murder and

sentenced to life imprisonment.

      On appeal against conviction it was submitted on his behalf that

the judge misdirected the jury and that the verdict was against the

weight of the psychiatric evidence.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the

applicant's appeal on 18 January 1992.  Counsel advised against seeking

leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains that the obligation on the defence to

prove his diminished responsibility was contrary to Article 6 para. 2

of the Convention.

THE LAW

      The applicant complains that the obligation placed upon him by

section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 to prove his mental impairment at

his trial was contrary to Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the

Convention which  provides as follows :

      "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

      innocent until proved guilty according to law."

      The applicant's attention has been drawn to a seemingly

comparable complaint concerning the defence of insanity in

No. 15023/89, H v. the United Kingdom (Dec. 4.4.90, unpublished).

Nevertheless he contends that the facts of that earlier case wer

unusual and distinguishable from his application.  In particular he

submits that the previous application was concerned with the common law

presumption of sanity and not with the statutory requirement that a

defendant like him show his diminished responsibility in order to

negate his liability for the offence of murder with its attendant life

sentence.

      However the Commission is not convinced by the applicant's

submissions.  Both cases presume the accused's ability to understand

what he was doing at the time of the crime unless he can show there was

some serious mental impairment of a permanent or transient kind.

      The Commission notes that the statutory provision of which the

applicant complains does not concern the presumption of innocence, as

such, but an inherent presumption of mental normality.  In this context

the Commission refers to the judgment of the Court in the Salabiaku

case :

      "Presumptions of fact or of law operate in every legal system.

      Clearly, the Convention does not prohibit such presumptions in

      principle.  It does, however, require the Contracting States to

      remain within certain limits in this respect as regards criminal

      law ...

      Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) does not ... regard presumptions of

      fact or of law provided for in the criminal law with

      indifference.  It requires States to confine them within

      reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what

      is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence."

      (Eur. Court H.R., Salabiaku judgment of 7 October 1988, Series

      A no. 141, pp. 15-16, para. 28)

      The Commission observes that in English law the burden of proof

remains with the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the

accused did act as charged.  The Commission does not consider that

requiring the defence to present evidence concerning the accused's

mental state at the time of the alleged offence, constitutes in the

present case an infringement of the presumption of innocence.  Such a

requirement cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary.  It finds,

therefore, no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 2

(Art. 6-2) of the Convention in the present case.

      It follows that the application must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber    Acting President of the First Chamber

      (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                      (E. BUSUTTIL)

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