WESTERBERG v. SWEDEN
Doc ref: 21682/93 • ECHR ID: 001-1626
Document date: June 30, 1993
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 21682/93
by Siv and Per WESTERBERG
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 30 June 1993, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 3 April 1993 by
Siv and Per WESTERGERG against Sweden and registered on 19 April 1993
under file No. 21682/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first applicant, Per Westerberg, born in 1917, is a medical
practitioner. The second applicant, Siv Westerberg, his wife, born in
1932, is a lawyer. They are both Swedish citizens and reside in
Gothenburg. The first applicant is represented before the Commission
by the second applicant.
The applicants have described the background to their present
complaint in the following terms :
Per Westerberg has been practising medicine for many years. Siv
Westerberg also practised medicine until 1979 when, as a result of a
conflict with the Social Insurance Board (Försäkringskassan) of
Gothenburg, her licence to practise medicine was withdrawn. She then
studied law and, after having obtained a law degree, started practising
as a lawyer.
As a lawyer, Siv Westerberg dealt in particular with cases of
abuse of power against individuals, including cases of forced taking
into care of children which sometimes ended up before the Convention
organs in Strasbourg. Siv Westerberg's activities were disliked by the
Swedish authorities which in different ways tried to cause difficulties
for her. When they were not very successful in these attempts, they
found that the best way would be to harm her husband, Per Westerberg.
Many of Per Westerberg's patients had been engaged in heavy
industrial work which had caused physical injuries, and Per Westerberg
therefore, in many such cases, ordered sick leave in order for them to
recover. This caused a conflict with the Social Insurance Board of
Gothenburg which was reluctant to pay sickness benefits to his patients
and took contact with the National Board of Health and Welfare
(Socialstyrelsen) in order to complain of the liberal way in which Per
Westerberg considered his patients entitled to sick leave.
In December 1987 two doctors were sent by the National Board of
Health and Welfare to inspect Per Westerberg's medical practice and to
have copies made of certain medical files which could be further
studied. Some of these files were then analysed by a doctor who had
less competence than Per Westerberg and who, without visiting Per
Westerberg and seeing any of the patients concerned, formulated general
criticism of his work.
Ten months later the National Board of Health and Welfare
referred the matter to the Disciplinary Board for Medical Staff (Hälso-
och sjukvårdens ansvarsnämnd). Before this, Per Westerberg had not been
given the opportunity of reading and commenting on the findings in the
National Board of Health and Welfare's Report.
The Disciplinary Board communicated the relevant documents to Per
Westerberg, who in his observations to the Board contested that he was
guilty of any irregularities in the way he dealt with his patients.
The Disciplinary Board then asked another doctor to submit his
comments on the case. That doctor was married to the former Director
General of the National Board of Health and Welfare and could
therefore, in the applicants' opinion, not be considered impartial. On
the basis of that doctor's report the Disciplinary Board decided, on
3 April 1991, to impose on Per Westerberg the disciplinary sanction of
a warning.
Per Westerberg appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal
(kammarrätten) of Stockholm which, on 11 December 1991, rejected the
appeal. The Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) refused
leave to appeal on 23 November 1992.
COMPLAINTS
The first applicant, Per Westerberg, complains of violations of
(a) Article 4 para. 2 of the Convention in that the State tries to
force him to be the "State's representative" in his relations with his
patients and thereby to perform compulsory labour on behalf of the
State,
(b) Article 6 of the Convention in that his right to exercise his
profession in a correct and ethical manner, and thereby his civil
rights, has been violated,
(c) Article 6 of the Convention in that he has not had an impartial
trial, in that he has been innocently convicted contrary to Swedish
law, and in that he has not had a trial within a reasonable time,
(d) Article 6 of the Convention in that he was not given the
opportunity to comment on the charges brought against him by the
National Board of Health and Welfare before that Board referred his
case to the Disciplinary Board and in that the decision to refer his
case to that Board was not communicated to him,
(e) Article 6 of the Convention in that the real reason for the
charges against him was the desire of the authorities to harm his wife
Siv Westerberg,
(f) Article 9 of the Convention in that the State tries to force Per
Westerberg to take care of the State's interests instead of the
interests of his patients, this being a violation of his right to
freedom of conscience,
(g) Article 10 of the Convention in that Per Westerberg has been
convicted because of his opinions about how certain patients shall be
treated, and
(h) Article 1 of the First Protocol in that, as a result of the
State's action, he has only been able to practise medicine on a limited
scale, which has resulted in loss of income.
The second applicant, Siv Westerberg, complains of violations of
(a) Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in that the State's action
against her husband is in reality aimed at preventing her from
exercising her right to freedom of expression in Sweden and at
discouraging her from conducting cases against Sweden in Strasbourg,
and
(b) Article 25 of the Convention in that the action aimed at
discouraging her from conducting cases before the Convention organs is
a serious violation of the right of individual petition.
Both applicants complain of violations of Article 10 of the
Convention in that their right to freedom of expression and opinion and
their right to convey information have been violated.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain of various violations of Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention in the disciplinary proceedings which
resulted in the disciplinary sanction of a warning being imposed on the
first applicant, Per Westerberg.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides, in its
relevant parts, as follows :
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."
The first question which arises is therefore whether Article 6
(Art. 6) is applicable to the proceedings at issue or, in other words,
whether these proceedings concern the determination of civil rights and
obligations or of a criminal charge.
While it appears from the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights (see, for instance, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment
of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43) that the right to practise medicine
can be regarded as a civil right, the Commission notes that in the
proceedings against Per Westerberg only the sanction of a warning was
imposed. These proceedings cannot therefore be considered to have
concerned Per Westerberg's right to practise medicine or any other
civil right or obligation.
As regards the notion of "criminal charge", the European Court
of Human Rights has established certain criteria in order to determine
whether, in the application of Article 6 (Art. 6) a charge is to be
regarded as a criminal charge. These criteria are the classification
of the offence in domestic law, the nature of the offence and the
nature and severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked
incurring (see Eur. Court H.R., Özturk judgment of 21 February 1984,
Series A No. 73, p. 18, para. 51).
In the present case, the Commission notes that in Swedish law the
proceedings at issue concerned a disciplinary offence. Moreover, the
offence was such that it could only be committed by medical doctors or
other medical personnel. The sanction was a warning, which is a typical
disciplinary sanction. There is no indication that the applicant risked
incurring a more severe sanction.
In view of these various elements, the Commission considers that
the proceedings did not concern a criminal charge within the meaning
of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
It follows that the applicants' complaint of violations of
Article 6 (Art. 6) must be rejected as being incompatible ratione
materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27
para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
2. Insofar as the applicants complain of violations of Articles 4,
9, 10 and 13 (Art. 4, 9, 10, 13) of the Convention and Article 1 of the
First Protocol (P1-1), the Commission finds no appearance of any
violation. The Commission notes, in particular, that it has in no way
been shown that the disciplinary action against Per Westerberg was
aimed at causing harm to Siv Westerberg by reason of her opinions or
of her involvement in cases brought before the Convention organs.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. Insofar as the second applicant, Siv Westerberg, invokes Article
25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, the Commission finds no evidence that
she has been hindered in the exercise of her right to bring individual
petitions to the Commission. No action is therefore called for in this
respect.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
1. DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE;
2. DECIDES TO TAKE NO ACTION IN REGARD TO ARTICLE 25 (Art. 25) OF
THE CONVENTION.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
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