WHEELER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Doc ref: 21175/93 • ECHR ID: 001-1616
Document date: June 30, 1993
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 21175/93
by Patricia WHEELER
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 30 June 1993, the following members being present:
MM. F. ERMACORA, Acting President of the First Chamber
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Sir Basil HALL
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the First Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 26 June 1992 by
Patricia Wheeler against the United Kingdom and registered on
20 January 1993 under file No. 21175/93;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British and Irish citizen born in 1941 and
resident in London.
The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as
follows.
The applicant and her husband adopted a seven year old daughter
M.(born 3.10.75) who had a history of suspected sexual abuse by her
natural father.
The applicant alleges that M. exhibited problems of fantasising
in respect of which they consulted an educational psychologist. During
1990, behavioural problems became evident (eg lying, stealing, poor
school record) and an appointment was made for M. at the Bloomfield
Clinic. The applicant notified the family's social worker that M. had
alleged that A. the teenage son of the family had sexually abused her.
The applicant disbelieved these allegations. M. continued to repeat
these allegations. The social worker considered them credible and child
protection procedures were commenced.
A. was arrested by the police and interviewed. No charges were
brought and A. was released. The social services of the local authority
were concerned at the difficult situation developing between M. and the
applicant (the applicant had allegedly told M. at one point that she
could not return home unless she made a written statement for her) and
in particular the need for M. to receive counselling.
The applicant who had informed the social services that she no
longer intended to co-operate with them instituted wardship proceedings
on 9 November 1990 on the basis that M. required protection from the
local authority who were threatening to remove her from her parents'
care for further unnecessary enquiries which could possibly damage her.
On 5 December 1990 M. was made a ward of court.
On 26 February 1991, the High Court committed M. to the care of
the local authority who had leave to place her in residential
accommodation. This ex parte application was made in response to M.
placing herself voluntarily in the care of the local authority and
refusing to go home. M. was placed initially in a residential
children's home. The applicant was granted reasonable access to be
supervised if M. wished.
The applicant was concerned that M. was in moral danger in the
home due to lack of proper supervision and made statements to the local
press. On 7 March 1991 the High Court on ex parte application by the
local authority issued an injunction to restrain anyone from publishing
or broadcasting information identifying M., her address, educational
establishment etc. An article later appeared in the press referring to
the case of an unnamed minor and to the allegations of a lack of proper
supervision.
In November 1991 the applicant applied for the wardship to be
discharged. The social services applied for a care order in respect
of M.
During this period and until March 1992, the applicant was not
informed of the address of the foster carers of M. though she was given
the telephone number and able to correspond through the social services
department.
The matter came before the High Court on 11 February 1992. The
applicant was present but not represented by counsel. The Official
Solicitor acting as guardian ad litem for M. had made a report to the
court in which he found it difficult to envisage M. returning home in
view of her troubled relationship with the applicant. The attached
psychiatric report doubted that M. had accepted her adoptive parents
as parent substitutes. The judge expressed doubts whether the local
authority had proved its case for a care order and commented that they
could not have a care order merely because the parents were impossible.
He adjourned the case briefly. Following the adjournment the social
services announced that they abandoned the application for a care
order and reached agreement with the applicant on a draft consent
order. The judge proceeded to order by consent that M. remain a ward
of court, that she continue to reside with her foster mother, that the
applicant have reasonable access subject to M.'s wishes, that M. be at
liberty if she wished to return home for staying access or for a trial
period and that M. receive such counselling as might be arranged by the
social services in consultation with the Official Solicitor.
The matter came back before the judge on 27 March following a
dispute by the applicant as to the meaning of the consent order and her
complaint that the social services were counselling M. not to go to see
her parents. The judge clarified that he had not given care and control
to the applicant though she continued to have parental responsibility
within the meaning of the Children Act 1989. He referred to letters
written to the Official Solicitor by M. in which she asked him to stop
her parents' behaving as they do and stating that they never listened
to her and that she refused to go to their house since they always
twisted her words round. To put the matter beyond doubt the judge gave
interim care and control to the local authority.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention of the
unjustifiable removal of M. from their home, the prevention of private
access and correspondence with her, the arrest of A., the invasions of
family privacy resulting from the involvement of the social services
and police and the compulsory psychiatric examinations of M.
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that
she did not attend the ex parte hearing of 26 February 1991 when M.'s
removal into care was ordered and also that M. did not attend.
The applicant complains under Article 10 of the Convention of the
injunction issued by the Court which prevented all information
concerning the case from reaching the public domain.
The applicant further complains that she has no effective remedy
in respect of her complaints.
THE LAW
1. The applicant has complained in the context of Articles 8 and
6 (Art. 8, 6) of the Convention that M. was unjustifiably removed into
care in an ex parte procedure at which she and M. were not present.
The Commission however is not required to decide whether or not
the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a
violation of this provision as under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of
international law.
In the present case the applicant did not appeal against the ex
parte order or apply to the High Court for the order to be set aside
and therefore has not exhausted the remedies available to her under
English law. Moreover an examination of the case as it has been
submitted does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances
which might have absolved the applicant, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law, from exhausting the remedies at
her disposal.
It follows that the applicant has not complied with the condition
as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and these complaints must in
this respect be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant has also complained under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention about the intrusions into her family life occasioned by the
actions of the police and social services, refusal of private access
and correspondence and the compulsory psychiatric examinations of M.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
The Commission recalls that the involvement of the police and the
social services resulted from very serious allegations made by M. of
sexual abuse from a member of the family. Insofar as the subsequent
child protection procedures can be said to constitute an interference
with the applicant's right to respect for her family life, the
Commission finds on the facts of the case that such interference was
"in accordance with the law" and "necessary in a democratic society"
for protecting the health and rights of M. The Commission further notes
that the applicant has not been refused access but that the social
services and the courts have given priority to M.'s wishes. The
Commission considers that the policy of respecting the expressed wishes
of a minor over the age of fifteen has not been shown in the
circumstances of this case to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant complains of the injunction issued by the High
Court prohibiting the publication of all the facts of the case. She
invokes Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which provides as
follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary."
The Commission recalls that the applicant was unable to have the
full facts of M.'s case published in the press as a result of the court
injunction. It finds that this discloses an interference with her
rights under the first paragraph above and has therefore examined
whether the requirements of the second paragraph have been complied
with.
The Commission recalls that the injunction was issued by the High
Court in the exercise of its wardship jurisdiction and that it
prohibited the publication of any material which would lead to the
identification of M. It did not prohibit the publication of the other
facts and details of the case, in particular, the applicant's concern
over the lack of proper supervision in the children's home. The
Commission concludes that the interference in this case was prescribed
by law and justified as necessary in a democratic society for the
protection of M.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. Finally, the applicant complains of the absence of an effective
remedy in violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention which
provides:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not
require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation
of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to
have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court
H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p.23,
para. 52).
The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light
of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of her
Convention rights.
It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber Acting President
of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (F. ERMACORA)