AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 17678/91

                      by B.N. and S.N.

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 30 June 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 Mr.  K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 11 December 1990

by B.N. and S.N. against Sweden and registered on 16 January 1991 under

file No. 17678/91;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

FACTS

      The first and the second applicant are Swedish citizens, born in

1944 and 1954, respectively. They are husband and wife and have been

Christian missionaries in various countries. Together they have eight

children: A., B., C., D., E., F., G. and H. (born between 1976 and

1984). They reside in Kristianstad in the south of Sweden.

      The facts of the case as submitted by the applicants may be

summarised as follows.

The particular circumstances of the case

      When the applicants' children reached school age the applicants

requested to be authorised to educate the children at home. Such

authorisation was given regularly by the Municipal School Board

(skolstyrelsen) in Kristianstad for the school years 1983/84 to

1987/88. The School Board regularly controlled the education given by

the applicants and found it satisfactory.

      On 25 April 1988 the applicants anew requested to be authorised

to educate their children at home. By decision of 27 June 1988 the

School Board granted the request in respect of all children except A.,

who was to start the sixth form in the 9-year compulsory school

(grundskolan). In its decision the Board noted that the applicants had

given A. adequate social training and a thorough basis of knowledge.

It pointed out, however, that the last three forms of the compulsory

school (högstadiet) meant an increasing specialisation of the education

and an increasing emphasis on social training. In view hereof and

considering the need to give A. time to prepare for this last stage,

the Board only authorised the applicants to educate A. at home during

the autumn term 1988.

      The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) requesting an oral hearing. However, by decision of

26 September 1989 the Court refused the request finding no need for

such a hearing and gave the applicants two weeks to finalise their

submissions. After additional written submissions had been filed, the

Court decided, on 27 December 1989, to uphold the School Board's

decision.

      The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court

(regeringsrätten) and were granted leave to appeal. They reiterated

their request to be allowed to continue to educate A. in their home.

They did not, however, complain about the lower court's refusal to hold

an oral hearing. By judgment of 13 June 1990 the Court rejected the

appeal. It stated, inter alia:

      "It is obvious that home education by the custody holder requires

      much as regards the custodian's own knowledge, skills and

      capacity to transfer them to his/her child. These requirements

      are greater in higher than in lower grades. The fact that no

      criticism has been levelled against A.'s hitherto acquired

      knowledge does therefore not in itself mean that further home

      education is a real alternative to education dispensed in the

      last stage of the secondary school. In the present case there is

      only vague information as to the [applicants'] educational

      qualifications. [The first applicant] has stated that he has

      passed various courses with different correspondence institutes

      and that he has, as an adult, studied several of the subjects

      taught in the upper grades of the secondary school, with emphasis

      on mathematics (special course) and also certain upper secondary

      school subjects ('gymnasieämnen'). He has held religious offices

      in Christian congregations of various communities and he has in

      this connection taught different subjects to children of

      different ages. For eight years he has conducted theological

      studies in Swedish and English. [The second applicant] has stated

      that after her marriage with [the first applicant] she resumed

      her previously interrupted studies and took a number of upper

      secondary school courses of different orientations. In this way

      she considers that she has received a good insight in studies

      above secondary school level. She finds that her knowledge makes

      her well equipped to teach Swedish, different languages and all

      scheduled orientation subjects in the forms 7 - 9.

      When assessing the question of whether home education for A. can

      be an alternative to education in the seventh form of the

      secondary school it also has to be borne in mind that [the

      applicants] have eight children, of whom, besides A., four are

      of school age as from the school year 1989/90, that the family

      to a great extent is a self sufficient household and that the

      children help with various activities in the home. [Both

      applicants] also have certain economical activities, of limited

      scope, outside the home.

      The above mentioned circumstances make it highly doubtful that

      home education can, as far as the seventh form is concerned, give

      A. knowledge and skills corresponding to those provided in a

      primary and secondary school or in an authorised independent

      school.

      According to what has been stated in the preparatory works

      (Government Bill 1985/86:10, Part A, p. 126) a comparison between

      the education provided in the primary and secondary schools and

      an education otherwise provided, shall be made on the basis of

      all relevant circumstances. The fact that some element may be

      missing in the alternative education does not necessarily mean

      that the alternative is insufficient.

      When making such a comparison major importance has to be attached

      to social training which is one of the school's  main purposes -

      whether the education is provided in a primary or secondary

      school or in an independent school. It is especially important

      to promote the pupils' social development in the secondary

      school's higher grades. If this is to be achieved through home

      education it is necessary to make a number of special

      arrangements in order to promote social contacts in various ways.

      The information given by the applicants as regards their social

      contacts does not provide a sufficient basis for considering that

      continued home education can be estimated to meet the other

      requirements laid down by the School Act 1985.

      Home education of A.N. in the seventh form of the secondary

      school can in view of the above not be considered to be a real

      alternative to education in a secondary school or in an

      independent school."

      While their appeals were pending the applicants continued to

educate A. in their home.

      Subsequently the applicants requested the School Board to be

allowed to continue home education of all their children also for the

school year 1990/91.

      On 26 June 1990 the School Board decided to grant the applicants'

request in so far as the children F. (first form), E. (second form),

D. (third form) and C. (fifth form) were concerned. The Board rejected

the request as regards A. and her sister B. who was now also to start

the seventh form.

      The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal.

By judgment of 1 November 1990 the Court rejected the appeal as it

found that the case was similar to that already decided by the Supreme

Administrative Court.

      In the meantime, on 2 October 1990, the School Board decided to

order the applicants, at the peril of a money penalty (vite) of 3,000

Swedish kronor for which they were jointly responsible, to send A. and

B. to school. The applicants appealed this decision to the

Administrative Court of Appeal which, by judgment of 5 December 1990,

quashed the School Board's decision on the ground that the imposition

of joint liability for money penalties was unlawful.

      On 18 December 1990 the School Board decided to order the

applicants, at the peril of a money penalty of 1,500 kronor each, to

send their two daughters to school.

      As the applicants still refused to send B. and A. to school the

School Board applied on 30 April 1991 to the County Administrative

Court (länsrätten) to have the money penalty enforced.

      By judgment of 22 August 1991 the County Administrative Court

ordered the applicants to pay 1,500 kronor each in money penalties for

their refusal to abide by the School Board's order.

      The applicants have at all times continued to educate their

children in their home.

Relevant domestic law

      Chapter 1, section 1 of the 1985 School Act states that the State

provides education for children and young persons in the 9-year

compulsory school and in the upper secondary school. The purpose of the

education is stated in the second sub-paragraph:

      "The general purpose of the education is to give the pupils

      knowledge, to develop their skills and to help, in cooperation

      with the homes, their development into harmonious persons and

      into responsible and good members of society."

      Section 2 of the first chapter lays down the duty for children

to attend school unless otherwise provided in the subsequent chapters

8 - 10.

      Chapter 10, section 4 of the 1985 School Act provides:

      "A child of such age as to be under obligation to go to school

      shall be allowed to meet this obligation by other means than

      those prescribed by this law, if it appears that these other

      means constitute a valid alternative to the education otherwise

      put at the child's disposal in accordance with the provisions of

      this law. Inspection of the alternative activities must be

      ensured.

      An authorisation may be given for one year at the time. During

      its validity the results of the alternative activities shall be

      evaluated. The authorisation shall be withdrawn immediately if

      necessary inspections are not allowed or if it may be assumed on

      other grounds that the authorisation is no longer justified."

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicants maintain that the requirements of the 1985 School

Act and above all that of "social training" violate Article 2 of

Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The refusal of permission to educate

their children at home after the sixth form violates their right to

ensure an education for their children in conformity with their own

religious and philosophical convictions.

2.    The applicants also allege that the refusals to allow continued

home education after the sixth form violates Article 9 of the

Convention.

3.    Furthermore, they complain of a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention as a result of the Administrative Court of Appeal's

refusal to hold an oral hearing.

4.    Finally, they allege a breach of Article 17 of the Convention.

THE LAW

      The applicants allege that the requirements of the 1985 School

Act and above all that of "social training" violate Article 2 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention. The refusal of permission to

educate their children at home after the sixth form violates their

right to ensure an education for their children in conformity with

their own religious and philosophical convictions.

      Article 2 of Protocol No 1 (P1-2) provides that :

      "No person shall be denied the right to education.  In the

      exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to

      education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of

      parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with

      their own religious and philosophical convictions."

      The Commission notes that Sweden has made a reservation with

regard to the rights guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-2). It does not, however, feel called upon to consider this

reservation in the present case as it has in any event reached the

conclusion that the application is inadmissible on other grounds.

      The Commission first observes that the applicants' grievances

mainly relate to the second sentence of Article 2 (Art. 2). This

provision recognises the role of the State in education as well as the

rights of parents. It aims at safeguarding pluralism in education,

which is essential for the preservation of the "democratic  society"

as conceived by the Convention.  In view of the power of the modern

State, it is above all through State teaching that this aim must be

realised (see Eur. Court. H.R., Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen

judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, pp. 24-25, para. 50).

Even so, the said Article also guarantees the right to start and run

private schools (No. 11533/85, Dec. 6.3.87, D.R 51 p. 125).

      The second sentence of Article 2 (Art. 2) must however be read

together with the first which enshrines the right of everyone to

education. It is, as the Court stated in the above case (loc. cit.),

on to this fundamental right that is grafted the right of parents to

respect for their religious and philosophical convictions.

      The right to education by its very nature calls for regulation

by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to

the needs and resources of the community and of individuals (see Eur.

Court H.R., Belgian Linguistic judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A

no. 6, p. 32, para. 5). It is thus clear that the State has a right to

establish compulsory schooling, be it in State schools or private

tuition of satisfactory standard, and that verification and enforcement

of educational standards are an integral part of that right (see No

10233/83, Dec. 6.3.84, D.R. 37 p. 105).

      Furthermore, respect is only due to convictions on the part of

the parents which do not conflict with the fundamental right of the

child to education, the whole of Article 2 (Art. 2) being dominated by

its first sentence (Eur. Court H.R., Campbell and Cosans judgment of

25 February 1982, Series A no. 48, p. 16, para. 36). This means that

parents may not refuse the right to education of a child on the basis

of their convictions.

      The Court has held that the setting and planning of the

curriculum fall in principle within the competence of the Contracting

States (see the above mentioned Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Petersen

judgment, p. 26, para. 53).

      As regards the complaints raised by the applicants, the

Commission must limit its examination to the circumstances of the

present case; it cannot review the impugned Swedish legislation in the

abstract (see Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A, no. 130, p. 28, para. 54).

      The applicants submit that the refusals to allow continued home

education were unlawful as a matter of Swedish law. They also claim

that the authorities' assessment of their professional qualifications

and of their two eldest daughters' need of "social training" was

erroneous. In support of the last-mentioned allegations they maintain

that they have managed to continue to educate their children after the

sixth form with good results and that they do provide ample "social

training" for their daughters, albeit within the framework of the local

Christian community.

      The applicants furthermore maintain that the social training

required by the authorities is mainly aimed at destroying their

children's Christian faith as it must, as a matter of fact, be provided

by the ordinary secularised public schools. This is due to the very

limited number of independent and, in particular, Christian schools

which are allowed to function in Sweden. The closest Christian school

is presently some 100 km away from the applicants' home. The applicants

have applied to have their children admitted to this school but their

application has been refused as a result of the limited number of

places available. The applicants stress that the Swedish situation with

respect to private schools is radically different from the liberal

Danish situation which the Court, in its Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and

Pedersen judgment (op. cit.), found capable of offering viable private

school alternatives to parents not agreeing with the public schools'

approach to sexual education.

      The Commission first recalls that its power to review compliance

with domestic law is limited (see, inter alia, Eur. Court H.R.,

HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171,

p. 16, para. 47). In the present case it has found nothing to support

the applicants' allegations that the impugned decisions were contrary

to domestic law.

      As regards the requirement of social training the Commission

observes that this only implies an obligation to go to school with

other children in order to learn how to establish social contacts. The

Commission finds such an obligation inherent in any system of

compulsory schooling and considers that the present obligation does not

go outside what is common practice in the Contracting States.

      In addition, the Commission is satisfied that the Swedish

authorities acted within their margin of appreciation under Article 2

of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) when assessing the applicants' possibilities

of offering a valid alternative to the public schooling of A. and B.

and when finding that the applicants' professional qualifications were

open to doubt.

      The Commission considers that, in the circumstances of the

present case, A.'s and B.'s right to education must prevail over the

parents' right to respect for their religious and philosophical

convictions. It also finds that the means employed to attempt to compel

the applicants to abide by the decisions of the administrative courts

have not been disproportionate to the aim pursued.

      It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the

applicants' rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2).  This

complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicants also complain that the refusal to allow them to

educate their children in accordance with their religious and

philosophical convictions amounts to a violation of their own freedom

of thought, conscience and religion, as guaranteed by Article 9

(Art. 9) of the Convention.

      The Commission, even assuming that the decisions concerning the

school education of A. and B. interfered with the applicants' rights

under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, finds that such an

interference would for the reasons outlined under 1. above be justified

under Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) as being provided for by law and

necessary in a democratic society for the purpose of protecting the

children's right to education.

       Therefore, this part of the application is likewise manifestly

ill-founded.

3.    The applicants also allege a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention in that they were refused an oral hearing before the

Administrative Court of Appeal.

      The Commission notes, however, that the applicants did not

complain of this refusal to the Supreme Administrative Court. It

follows that the applicants have not exhausted domestic remedies on

this point as prescribed in Article 26 (Art. 26) and that this part of

the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

4.    The applicants finally allege a violation of Article 17

(Art. 17) of the Convention. However, the Commission finds no issue

under this Article.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)