AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 11533/85

by the Ingrid Jordebo FOUNDATION of Christian Schools

and Ingrid JORDEBO

against Sweden

        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private

on 6 March 1987, the following members being present:

              MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President

                  G. SPERDUTI

                  J. A. FROWEIN

                  F. ERMACORA

                  E. BUSUTTIL

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  G. TENEKIDES

                  S. TRECHSEL

                  B. KIERNAN

                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J. C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

                  G. BATLINER

                  J. CAMPINOS

                  H. VANDENBERGHE

             Mrs.  G. H. THUNE

             Sir  Basil HALL

             Mr.  F. MARTINEZ

              Mr.  H. C. KRUGER, Secretary to the Commission

        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

        Having regard to the application introduced on 2 May 1985

by the Ingrid Jordebo Foundation of Christian Schools and Ingrid

Jordebo against Sweden and registered on 7 May 1985 under file

No. 11533/85;

        Having regard to

-       the first report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

        Procedure of the Commission;

-       the Commission's decision of 4 December 1985 to invite the

        Government to present written observations on the

        admissibility and merits of the application;

-       the Government's observations dated 13 May 1986 and the

        applicants' reply dated 6 August 1986;

-       the Commission's decision of 18 May 1986 to grant legal aid

        to Mrs. Jordebo;

-       the second report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of

        Procedure;

        Having deliberated;

        Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

        The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

        The applicants are the Ingrid Jordebo Foundation of Christian

Schools and Ingrid Jordebo, a Swedish citizen born in 1930 and

resident at Jönköping.  Mrs Jordebo is the headmistress of the Anna

School which she runs through the Foundation.  Mrs Jordebo represents

the Foundation before the Commission.

        The Anna School was started in 1976.  It is the only

non-public school for pupils of compulsory school age (7 - 16 years)

at Jönköping.  The State-municipal public school is run by the School

Board (skolstyrelsen) of Jönköping.

        In the school year 1982/83 there were classes 1 to 6 (low and

middle stage) at the Anna School.  In addition, class 7 was run on a

trial basis after the approval of the School Board.

        In the school year 1983/84, the Foundation applied for

permission to run classes 1 to 6 and 7 to 9 (upper stage).

        On 21 June 1983 the School Board of Jönköping granted

permission for classes 1 to 6 and refused permission for classes 7 to

9.  The Foundation then made a new application for classes 7 to 9,

which was rejected by the School Board on 23 August 1983.  It appears

from the decision that it was calculated that three pupils would

attend the seventh form, and two pupils the eighth form.  None of the

proposed teachers had formal competence to teach in the seventh and

eighth forms, and only Mrs Jordebo had formal competence as a

teacher, but only for the middle stage.

        The Foundation appealed to the National School Board

(skolöverstyrelsen) which on 18 April 1984 rejected the appeal for

the following reasons:

        "According to Section 34 of the School Act (skollagen) an

        independent school should be approved for fulfilment of the

        school duty provided that the education at the school gives

        knowledge and skill which as regards their nature and level

        essentially correspond to the knowledge and skill given by

        the public school, and the school otherwise corresponds to

        the general objectives of the public school.

        The approval should be revoked when the school no longer

        satisfies these conditions and the deficiencies cannot be

        removed after contact with the principal.

        The Anna School does not have State regulated posts and

        formal competence of the teachers cannot therefore be

        required.  Of course, this does not mean that one could

        disregard the requirement as to the quality of the education.

        Both the School Board and the County School Council

        (länsskolnämnden) have found that the upper stage

        education which is run at the Anna School does not give

        knowledge and skill of a nature and level which essentially

        correspond to the knowledge and skill given by a public

        school.

        The National School Board rejects the appeal."

        The Foundation appealed to the Government (the Ministry of

Education), which on 13 December 1984 rejected the appeal.

        While the case was pending before the Government, the

Foundation carried out teaching for classes 7 and 8 of the school year

1983/84.

        Mrs Jordebo has a daughter born in 1969, who if possible would

have attended the eighth form.

COMPLAINTS

1.      The applicants submit that only by taking part in the

teaching of the seventh and eighth forms at the Anna School would it

be possible for Mrs Jordebo's daughter to receive teaching in

conformity with Mrs Jordebo's religious belief.  Accordingly, the

applicants allege a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

2.      The applicants submit that it is a "civil right" to run school

activities in accordance with Section 34 of the School Act.  It is

alleged that Article 6 of the Convention has been violated since this

"right" could not be examined by a court.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

        The application was introduced on 2 May 1985 and registered

on 7 May 1985.

        On 4 December 1985 the Commission decided to invite the

Government to present written observations on the admissibility and

merits of the application, in particular the complaint under Article 6

of the Convention.

        The Government's observations were received by a letter dated

13 May 1986 and the applicant's observations in reply were received by

a letter of 6 August 1986.

        Legal aid was granted to Mrs Jordebo on 18 May 1986.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

A.      The Government

1.      Swedish Legislation Concerning Compulsory School Education

        The Swedish school system is regulated by the 1962 School Act

and the 1971 School Decree (skolförordningen).  The Act and the Decree

are supplemented by the 1980 Compulsory School Curriculum (läroplan

för grundskolan), issued by the Government on the basis of guidelines

laid down by the Riksdag.

        The basic education, aimed at children of an approximate age

of 7 - 16 years, is according to Section 30 of the Act compulsory.

This compulsory, basic education is a significant element in meeting

the overriding responsibility of the society of educating and teaching

children and young people.  As summarised in a recent Government Bill,

the goals of this part of the children's education are to give them

the basic knowledge and skills in a broad sense which are necessary

for their participation in the life of the community and, thus, to

prepare them for entering the working life or higher education

(Government Bill 1982/83:1, p. 14).

        According to Sections 23 and 28 of the Act, every child has a

right to receive, free of charge, this basic education at a public

school.  The following two excerpts from the introductory part of the

Compulsory School Curriculum give a basic idea of the general goals of

public sector school education and also indicate some of the

particular issues, a basic knowledge and understanding of which are

deemed essential to each individual in an enlightened and democratic

society (pages 13 and 15):

"Compulsory school is part of society.  The curriculum

reflects a democratic view of society and its members, the

implication being that human beings are active and creative

and that they both can and must assume responsibility and

seek knowledge in order to co-operate with others in

understanding and improving their own living conditions and

those of other people.  The content and working methods of

schools must be designed in such a way as to be conducive to

this attitude towards people and society.  It is the duty of

schools to give their pupils increased responsibility and

powers of co-determination as they grow older and become

increasingly mature.

...

Compulsory schools do not provide any instruction focusing

on particular occupations.  The fields of knowledge which

are to be dealt with must be fundamentally important to

everybody, irrespective of their future activities.  This

means, for example, that schools must familiarise their

pupils with questions of belief, with major issues

concerning human relations and survival, with international

affairs, with science of technology, with resource

conservation, with environmental questions, with economic

questions, with questions concerning working life and the

labour market, with cultural questions, with family

questions, with sexual matters, with immigrant affairs, with

law and justice, with questions concerning road traffic, and

with the hazards involved in alcohol, drugs and tobacco.

All pupils must acquire a knowledge of at least one foreign

language.  A prominent place must be given to knowledge with

an important bearing on everyday life."

        Although the vast majority of Swedish children fulfil the

compulsory part of their education within the public school system,

the School Act offers a possibility of attending private schools.

However, in view of the public interest in giving to each individual

certain basic knowledge and skills, and also the society's overriding

responsibility towards the children in respect of the quality of any

form of compulsory education offered, it has been deemed necessary to

subject this possibility to certain conditions.

        According to Section 33a of the Act, the compulsory education

may be conducted at a private school provided that the school is

formally approved for this purpose.  According to Section 34, such an

approval shall be granted provided that "the education at the school

gives knowledge and skills which as regards their nature and level

essentially correspond to the knowledge and skills supplied by the

public school and the school also otherwise essentially corresponds to

the general goals of the public school".  The same section provides

that the approval be revoked in case the school "no longer satisfies

the requirements for approval and the deficiencies could not be

redressed upon reference to the principal".

        The travaux préparatoires clearly reflect that the solution

regarding private schools outlined above is the result of a

well-balanced compromise between two possibly conflicting interests.

On the one hand, it was recognised that the principle of the freedom

of individuals, forming one of the corner-stones of the Swedish

society, requires the existence of a possibility to run and to attend

private schools (Government Bill 1982/83:1, p. 15).  On the other

hand, it was emphasised that one should not give up the requirements

of ensuring to each individual the minimum amount of knowledge and

skills necessary for his or her participation in the life of the

society by allowing the compulsory school attendance to be fulfilled

at private schools offering insufficient education (idem).

        In commenting on the solution chosen, it was stated that the

requirement to be met by private schools in the interest of both

society and the children would be to ensure that their pupils would

not miss any essential part of the education that they could have

acquired within the public school system (Government Bill 1982/83:1,

p. 18).  Moreover, it was emphasised that this would afford the

private schools considerable leeway in respect of the manner of

teaching as well as the substance of the education (idem at pp.

18-20).  In particular, it was pointed out that it should be possible

at a private school to give certain topics a more, and others a less,

prominent position than that given in public schools and that the

activity in a private school should be allowed "within very wide

ranges to bear the stamp of different views and values" (idem at

pp. 19-20).

        According to Section 10 of the Act, a decision to approve a

private school or to revoke such an approval is to be taken by the

Local School Board.  Its decision may, according to Sections 53 and

54a of the Act, be appealed to the National School Board and

ultimately to the Government.

        Under Sections 50b and 50c of the Act, private schools are

subject to supervision by the school authorities in respect of that

part of their educational programmes which concerns children subject

to compulsory school attendance.  This should be viewed against the

society's overriding responsibility for the basic education and

teaching of such children and, in particular, the provisions outlined

above.

2.      The Facts

        As a matter of clarity, the Government make the following

remarks:

        The only object of the disputed decision of the School Board

of Jönköping was to determine whether, by subjecting themselves to the

education in question, children would be able to complete the

compulsory school education laid down in the School Act.

Consequently, the legal implications of the decision in the negative

was not that the school was prevented from offering education on a

private basis or that Mrs Jordebo was prevented from having her

daughter educated outside the public school system, but only that the

education intended to be offered at the school would not satisfy the

requirements of compulsory school education.

        The decision of the School Board of Jönköping not to grant

approval as regards the classes 7-9 was exclusively based on the

finding that the education offered on this level did not satisfy the

minimum quality requirements laid down in Section 34 of the School

Act.  As appears from particularly the Board's decision of 21 June

1983, the opinion as regards the quality was based on, among other

things, observations made during a number of visits to the school and

also an evaluation of the proficiency tests taken by the pupils of

class 7 during the school year of 1982/83.

3.      The Admissibility

        The Government have no objection to make as far as the

domestic remedies' rule and the six months' rule in Article 26 is

concerned.

        However, the Government submit, with reference to what is said

below, that the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention should be

rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention

for falling outside the scope of the Convention and that the complaint

under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 should be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention for falling outside

the scope of that provision or, alternatively, for being manifestly

ill-founded.

4.      The Merits

4.1     Article 6 of the Convention

        The Government contend that it comes within the exclusive

power of a State to decide whether or not to subject its citizens to

compulsory school education.  It is also for the State to determine

the substance of such education as well as the manner in which it is

to be given.  Even though a State's power in this respect may be

subject to various limitations as a result of, for instance, treaty

obligations, the exercise of such power could not, in the Government's

opinion, be viewed as anything else than the performance of public

functions exclusively vested in the State.  From this follows that no

individual or institution is in a position to claim any right in the

sense that the State would be obliged to designate any particular

school or category of schools for the purpose of administering

compulsory school education.

        It goes without saying that the State is free to entrust

parts of its functions of administering compulsory school education to

private individuals or institutions.  However, in the Government's

view this does not in any way alter the public character of the

function.  Consequently, the State is still at liberty not only to

decide whether to entrust public schools with this kind of education,

but also unilaterally to lay down the conditions for doing so and to

judge whether in a certain case these conditions are met.

        In view of this, and since the only implication of the

disputed decision of the School Board was that the education in

question would not be recognised as satisfying the requirements of

compulsory school education, the Government submit that the present

case could not possibly involve any "rights" that might be

characterised as "civil" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of

the Convention.  Consequently, the Government maintain that the

complaint falls outside the scope of the Convention.

        In case the Commission does not share this view, the

Government add the following:

        It could be argued that a school offering education on a

private basis may engage in activities of an essentially private law

character, and that these activities in turn may give rise to rights

which could be characterised as "civil" within the meaning of

Article 6.  Furthermore, the possibility of exercising such rights

might well, in practice, be affected by a decision not to recognise

the school for the purpose of administering compulsory school

education.

        The question may be asked, therefore, whether the possible

existence of such rights is sufficient to bring a case like the

present one within the scope of Article 6 para. 1.  The question is

particularly justified in view of the position taken by the European

Court of Human Rights in a number of recent cases involving

professional and commercial activities primarily aimed at offering

products or services to presumptive consumers (see e.g., Eur.  Court

H.R., König judgment of 23 April 1977, Series A no. 27, Le Compte,

Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43

and Benthem judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97).  Despite

the outcome of these cases, the Government submit, for the following

reasons, that the question has to be answered in the negative in

the present case.

        From the wording of Article 6 follows that, for proceedings

concerning civil rights to come within the scope of the Article, the

object of the proceedings has to be the "determination" of such

rights.  In a case like the present one, the only possible rights that

could be involved are those alluded to above.  As regards education of

children of compulsory school age, however, such rights could only

accrue subsequent to a decision to recognise the school for such

education.  As regards the education referred to in the complaint, no

such recognition was ever granted.  Consequently, and unlike the

situation in the previous cases mentioned above, the disputed decision

of the School Board in the present case did not concern, nor did it

affect, any such rights.  Applying Article 6 para. 1 to the present

case, therefore, would in the Government's opinion clearly be to

disregard the natural and ordinary meaning of the text and to read

into the Convention something that is not there.

        In support of this reasoning, the Government invoke the

judgment of the Court in the case of Le Compte, Van Leuven and De

Meyere.  Observing that proceedings, in order to come within the scope

of Article 6 para. 1, had to be "decisive" for a civil right, the

Court construed this to mean that the right had to be "the object - or

one of the objects - of" the dispute and that "the result of the

proceedings (had to) be directly decisive for such a right" (para. 47).

        Furthermore, there are other significant differences that

clearly distinguish the present case from those referred to above.

Thus, the activities involved in the latter cases have been of a quite

different character than the one now in question.  The reason for the

State interest in the activities involved in the previous cases has

been, not the significance of the activities as such, but health

hazards or similar concerns related to them.  Such concerns apparently

have constituted the entire supervision in one form or another, and

the activities as such have preserved their essentially private

character.  Those entering into contractual or other relationships

with the persons or entities carrying on the activities have done

so exclusively with a view to the presumptive benefits directly

flowing from these relationships.  The proceedings have resulted in a

prohibition to carry on the activities concerned and, consequently,

also been directly and immediately decisive in respect of the rights

involved.

        As regards the education now in question, on the other hand,

the State interest is focused on the very activity as such.  In view

of its importance to society, children have been, without exceptions,

placed under an unconditional obligation to attend school.  A child of

compulsory school age attending a duly recognised private school,

therefore, would not only be engaged in a relation with the school,

the nature of which arguably might be characterised as private, but it

would also be simultaneously fulfilling an obligation imposed on it by

society.  Moreover, the disputed decision did not directly affect the

arguable private aspects of the activities, i.e. the possible civil

rights involved, but its only implication was that the education

intended to be offered would not be recognised as satisfying the

requirements of compulsory school education.

        Given these characteristics of the present case, the

Government maintain that the case could not come within the scope of

Article 6 even assuming that the disputed decision might have had some

effects on the possibilities of exercising the rights of a civil

character.  Suffice it to say that such possible effects would clearly

have been merely indirect and, besides, in the Government's view too

remotely related to the object and purpose of the proceedings.  In

this context, the Government would again like to draw attention to the

judgment of the Court in the Case of Le Compte, Van Leuven and De

Meyere.  In considering in general the relation between a dispute and

a civil right involved, the Court stated that "a tenuous connection or

remote consequences" would not suffice to entail the application of

Article 6, but indeed that the right need to be "the object - or one

of the objects - of" the dispute and "the result of the proceedings

must be directly decisive" for the right (p. 21, para. 47).

        To sum up, in the Government's view, the proceedings

complained of did not involve the determination of any civil rights of

the applicants.  Consequently, the Government submit that the

complaint falls outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention.

        In case the Commission does not share this view, the

Government admit that there was no access to a tribunal satisfying

the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

4.2.    Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

        According to the first sentence of Article 2, no person shall

be denied the right to education.  Clearly, this provision, using a

negative rather than positive formula, places no positive obligation

on the Contracting Parties in the sense that they would have to take

effective steps such as establishing, subsidising or formally

recognising educational establishments.  This has also been

consistently emphasised by the Court, which for instance in the

Belgian Linguistic Case (Eur.  Court H.R., Belgian Linguistic judgment

of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6) construed the provision as

guaranteeing to persons "the right, in principle, to avail themselves

of the means of instruction existing at any given time", but as laying

down "no specific obligations concerning the extent of these means and

the manner of their organisation or subsidisation" (p. 31).

        It is equally clear from the wording that also the second

sentence exclusively concerns a State's system of education existing

at any given time and that, therefore, it does not require a State to

take any positive actions such as establishing or formally recognising

any particular category of schools or education.  Furthermore, when

organising, developing and administering a system of education, the

second sentence obviously places no other restraints on the State than

an obligation to respect the religious and philosophical convictions

of parents.  There is clearly nothing, therefore, that prevents a

State from laying down and applying certain minimum standards, related

solely to the quality of the education offered, in determining whether

to formally recognise education offered at a certain school as

satisfying the requirements of compulsory school education.

        In the present case there is no allegation of a denial of the

right to education within the existing school system.  Furthermore,

there is nothing in the complaint to indicate that the education

offered within this system would not meet the requirements contained

in the second sentence of Article 2.

        As has been pointed out above, the effect of the disputed

decision was not that the applicant was prevented from offering

private education or having her child educated outside the existing

educational system, but only that the education intended to be offered

at her school would not be recognised as satisfying the requirements

of compulsory school education.  The Government submit that Article 2

does not guarantee any right to such a recognition and that,

therefore, the complaint falls outside the scope of this provision.

In addition, the disputed decision was based exclusively on an

evaluation of the quality of the education intended to be offered.

Therefore, the Government alternatively maintain that the complaint is

manifestly ill-founded.

5.      Conclusion

        The position of the Government is

-       that the application should be declared inadmissible for

falling outside the scope of the Convention and Protocol No. 1 or, as

regards the complaint under Protocol No. 1, alternatively for being

manifestly ill-founded, and

-       that, in any event, there has been no violation of the

Convention or Protocol No. 1.

B.      The Applicant

1.      Article 6 of the Convention

        The Government's observations may be briefly summarised as

        follows:

        Article 6 is not applicable, there being no civil right at

stake.  If there is a civil right at stake, the decision complained of

was not a "determination" of, nor "concerned" or "affected" such a

right.  The Government admit that there was no access to a tribunal

satisfying the requirements of Article 6 para. 1.

        The applicants note that the Government have not given an

answer to the question whether there was any "dispute", except

possibly by inference by stating that there could be no valid claim.

This however is a material question upon which a tribunal should

decide.

        The applicants submit that the mere existence of the decisions

of the School Board, the National School Board and the Government

prove the existence of a "dispute" between the applicants and the

authorities.

        The situation concerning Article 6 is not uncomplicated.

Mrs Jordebo is concerned in two quite different respects:

a.      as conducting a private school, in competition with the

schools kept by the municipal instances,

b.      as a parent of her daughter, whose education she wishes

to have performed in a certain way in conformity with her religious

and philosophical convictions.

        As regards a., it should be remembered that Mrs Jordebo makes

a meagre living from the school.  Her position as regards the families

who send their children to the school is a contractual situation,

manifestly of a civil character.  The school has already taught the

classes 1-6, and whether the children may stay on for three more years

is evidently a question of a commercial situation, although

Mrs Jordebo hates to look at her situation that way, the idealistic

motive being entirely predominant.  But man also lives of bread.  The

right to run a school is obviously a civil right.

        Thus, the existence of the school as a complete school is at

stake, and there is a question of civil rights and obligations

involved.  The Government seem to regard the right to keep a school as

something entirely within "le fait du Prince".  But this is clearly

different from the mainstream in the countries of the High Contracting

Parties, necessitating an autonomous way of judgment.

        As regards b., it seems evident that the education of one's

children is a private matter, and a question of civil rights and

obligations.  There is undeniably an obligation for parents to educate

or have educated their children, and there is a right for the State to

see to it that this is properly done.  However, this is wholly

compatible with the said obligation being a civil one.  The Government

seem to look at schooling the same way as at military service, where

of course no competing "private regiments" could be tolerated.

        Article 6 para. 1 obviously cannot give Mrs Jordebo any right

to keep a school.  Nevertheless, a tribunal would be able to judge in

an independent manner whether the school is satisfactory and gives the

pupils a tolerably good education, which is evidently the question to

be resolved, and which has been resolved in a negative way, by three

instances not satisfying the requirements of Article 6 para. 1.

        It would seem that not more than one such inferior instance is

allowed (Ettl and others v.  Austria, Comm.  Report 3.7.85), before a

tribunal satisfying the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 should be

available.  The Government say that the applicants have not been

denied the right to run a school.  That is true.  The decision of the

Government is not formally to deny the right to run the school.  But

the decision of the Government means that the school is not allowed to

receive pupils.  This decision has the same importance as a formal

decision to stop the school.  If the school is not allowed to receive

pupils it means that the school is prevented from functioning.  If

this is done through a formal decision to stop the school or through a

decision that no pupils are allowed to go to the school is of no

importance for the interpretation of the concept of "civil right" in

Article 6 of the Convention.

2.      Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

        The Government's observations may be summarised as follows:

        No denial of the right to education has taken place.  Nothing

indicates that the education offered in the "existing school system"

would not meet the requirements of the second sentence in Article 2.

        As to the interpretation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 the

following is stated.

        The first sentence concerns the obligation for the State not

to refuse anyone elementary teaching ("instruction").  The applicants

have not alleged any violation in this sense.

        The second sentence concerns voluntary functions assumed by

the State ("dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'il assumera").

        What functions has the Swedish State assumed?

        If the State had permitted only one unitary school, the

applicants' case had been much worse than it is.  In fact, the State

has not only tolerated private schools but has even given considerable

financial means to some of them.  For example, it has given much money

to the so-called Waldorf schools which work on the principles of the

anthroposophic movement created by Rudolf Steiner.  It is notorious

that the said Waldorf schools are extremely different from the normal

municipal school.  It is not for the applicants to dispute the value

of their pedagogic methods.  However, it is an example of the kind of

functions assumed by the State as regards some schools in order to

ensure education and teaching in conformity with parents'

philosophical convictions.  The State has obviously assumed the

function to assure a certain standard of the teaching of the children.

In controlling this standard the State must respect the

parents' philosophical convictions, which may differ from one school

to another.

        The applicants' school was founded with the aim of preserving

the tradition of the Christian school in Sweden before the

secularisation of the municipal schools.  There is thus nothing odd or

strange in these general ideas, although this kind of school no longer

fits in the general system of a secularised school and State.  Thus,

in the applicants' school, the teaching of religion, although

oecumenical and not pertaining to any particular Christian sect or

movement, is confessional and founded on Christian belief.  There are

morning prayers and prayers before and after meals, such as was common

in all schools 30 years ago.

        It is Mrs Jordebo's opinion, both in her quality as a parent

and as a school headmistress that these are reasonable things for a

Christian person and form a respectable demand.

        Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 gives Mrs Jordebo, as a parent,

the right to ensure such education and teaching all the more so since

it falls within the scope of the functions which the State has in fact

assumed.

3.      Summary and final remark

        The State has the right to have the applicants' school

inspected, but the judgment over the school and its quality should be

made in an independent way, avoiding all harassment, by inspectors

free of bias.  The school has not been treated in such a way, and

Mrs Jordebo's right, as a parent, has thereby been violated, as

also by decisions of the instances which are bound to be biased by

their coupling to the State and the municipal school system.

        Mrs Jordebo's conclusion is that her rights have been

violated, both in her quality as a school leader and together with her

school, which has legal personality in Swedish law, and in her quality

as a mother of a child, pupil of her school.

        Finally, as general information the following is mentioned.

Sweden is nearly unique among countries belonging to the Council of

Europe as far as the school policy is concerned.  In Sweden it is a

basic political idea, which has governed the political leaders for a

long time, that the State and the local municipal authorities must

control the education: what the children have to learn and in which

ways they have to receive the education must in every instance be

decided by the political majority of the country.  For this reason

private schools, although formally allowed, are in practice stopped

with all means.  The children should be kept within the

State-municipal public schools in order to prevent any other influence

on the education than such as has been accepted by the political

majority.  A formal decision has been made that not more than 0.3 % of

the children of compulsory school age may be allowed to visit private

schools, three out of 1000 children.  The whole Swedish school system

is very close to violating Article 9 of the Convention when it says

that everyone is guaranteed the right to think freely.  The idea is

that the Swedish school children are in principle led to think only

in the directions that are decided by the political majority of the

Parliament.  When this majority has decided that the public education

should be non-confessional, it means that this majority can allow only

three children out of 1000 to have a confessional education.  To

maintain a democratic outlook, private schools cannot be totally

forbidden but instead economic rules have been adopted to stop private

schools in Sweden in reality.  These measures are very efficient.  The

Anna school has, in spite of all these difficulties of a financial

kind, been successful and created an alternative in Jönköping.  Then

other ways have been used in order to stop its development.  In this

respect it is easy to say that the education offered at the

Anna school is not good enough.  In the applicants' opinion the

education offered to the children was good enough for reasons which it

is not necessary to explain here.

THE LAW

1.      The applicants have complained of the fact that it has not

been possible for Mrs Jordebo's daughter to attend the seventh and

eighth forms at the Anna School.  They have alleged that this is a

breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2).

        Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) reads as follows:

        "No person shall be denied the right to education.  In the

        exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to

        education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right

        of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity

        with their own religious and philosophical convictions."

        The Government submit that this complaint is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and Protocol

No. 1, (P1) alternatively manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

        The Commission considers that the applicants' complaint can

only be examined by the Commission in so far as it is brought by

Mrs Jordebo.  The Foundation cannot claim to be a "victim" of a breach of

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) within the meaning of Article 25

(Art. 25) of the Convention.  Insofar as this complaint is brought by the

Foundation it follows that the complaint is incompatible ratione personae with

the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

        The fact on which the alleged breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-2) is based, is the fact that the Foundation has not been permitted to

run the seventh and eighth forms of the compulsory school.  The question which

arises is whether Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) could be interpreted

as granting a right to start and run a private school, and whether, when a

private school is as such approved, the school should have a right to run

classes at all stages of the compulsory school.

        Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) is dominated by its first

sentence, which enshrines the right of the child to education, while

the second sentence, being an adjunct to the first sentence, enshrines

the right of the parents to ensure to their child such education and

teaching as conforms with the parents' religious and philosophical

convictions (see Eur.  Court H.R., Campbell and Cosans judgment

of 25 February 1982, Series A No. 48, para. 40).

        Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) does not require the States to

establish any specific educational system.  It guarantees, however,

that persons subject to the jurisdiction of a Contracting State should

have the right to avail themselves of the educational institutions

existing at a given time.  The Convention organs have recognised that

the right to education calls for regulation by the State, "regulation

which may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources

of the community and of individuals" (cf.  Eur.  Court H.R., Belgian

Linguistic judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A, 1968, pp. 31-32).  In

the Belgian Linguistic Case, the Court found that the refusal of the

Belgian State to establish or subsidise, in the Dutch unilingual

region, primary school education in which French was employed as the

language of instruction was not incompatible with the requirements of

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) (op cit, p. 42).

        The Commission considers that it follows from the judgment of the

European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and

Pedersen (judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, pp. 24-25, para. 50)

that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) guarantees the right to start and

run a private school.  However, such a right cannot be a right without

conditions.  It must be subject to regulation by the State in order to ensure a

proper educational system as a whole.  The Commission recalls that the decision

not to grant approval as regards classes 7-9 was based exclusively on the

finding that the education offered at this level did not meet the condition as

to the quality provided for in Section 34 of the School Act.  Having examined

the present case, in particular the reasons for refusing the Foundation

permission to run the upper stage of the compulsory school, the Commission

finds the refusal compatible with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2).

        Moreover, the applicants have not substantiated that other

schools which were available to Mrs Jordebo's daughter provided teaching

which was in conflict with Mrs Jordebo's religious and philosophical

convictions, even assuming that no other Christian school was available

in the area.

        In these circumstances, the Commission finds no indication of

a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2). It follows that, in this

respect, the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.      The applicants also complain that they have not had the

benefit of a court determination of their "civil right" to conduct

school activities pursuant to Section 34 of the School Act.  They

allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which in

its first sentence provides that:

        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or

        of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to

        a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

        independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

        The Commission first notes that the Foundation has been

authorised to run a private school corresponding to the lower and

middle stages (classes 1 to 6) of the public school.  In this respect

there is thus no dispute ("contestation") between the applicants and

the authorities and, accordingly, a "determination" by a "tribunal"

within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not required.

        The Government submit that this complaint is incompatible

ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.  They contend that a "civil

right" of the applicants was not determined when the School Board refused to

accept that the proposed teaching at the Anna School for the seventh to the

ninth form could be counted as fulfilment of the school obligation.  The

Government also submit that there was no "determination" of any possible civil

rights.  The Government point out that the disputed decision did not prevent

the Anna School from offering education on a private basis and did not prevent

Mrs Jordebo from having her daughter educated outside the public school system.

It only meant that the proposed education at the school would not satisfy the

conditions for compulsory school education.

        The Commission notes that the administrative proceedings

concerned have been brought by the Foundation, and not by Mrs Jordebo

in her personal capacity.  It follows that only the Foundation can,

within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, claim to be a

"victim" of a breach of Article 6 (Art. 6).

        Accordingly, insofar as this complaint is brought by

Mrs Jordebo herself it is incompatible ratione personae with the

provisions of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

        The issues to be determined are whether any serious dispute

arose between the Foundation and the authorities with regard to the

decision under Section 34 of the School Act not to approve the

proposed upper stage education at the Anna School for fulfilment of the

school obligation and whether this decision was a "determination" of a

"civil right" of the Foundation.

        If these questions were answered in the affirmative, Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention would require access to a "tribunal"

satisfying the conditions of Article 6 (Art. 6) for the determination of any

such dispute.  In this respect the Government admit that no such

access to a "tribunal" existed for the Foundation.

        The Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of

the question of the applicability of Article 6 para 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.  It considers that this question raises such important

issues of fact and law that its determination should depend upon an

examination of the merits.  This aspect of the application must

therefore be declared admissible, no other ground for declaring it

inadmissible having been established.

        For these reasons, the Commission

        DECLARES ADMISSIBLE

        without prejudging the merits, the complaint that the

        Foundation did not have access to a tribunal satisfying

        the conditions of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention for

        the determination of whether the Anna School should be

        approved for running the seventh to ninth forms of the

        compulsory school.

        DECLARES INADMISSIBLE

        the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

    (H. C. KRÜGER)                      (C. A. NØRGAARD)