Lexploria - Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Lexploria beta Legal research enhanced by smart algorithms
Menu
Browsing history:

A.K. v. SWITZERLAND

Doc ref: 19189/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1709

Document date: October 13, 1993

  • Inbound citations: 0
  • Cited paragraphs: 0
  • Outbound citations: 0

A.K. v. SWITZERLAND

Doc ref: 19189/91 • ECHR ID: 001-1709

Document date: October 13, 1993

Cited paragraphs only



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 19189/91

                      by A.K.

                      against Switzerland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 13 October 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   A. WEITZEL, President

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 F. ERMACORA

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 17 October 1991

by A.K. against Switzerland and registered on 12 December 1991 under

file No. 19189/91;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows:

      The applicant is a retired Swiss citizen born in 1925.  Before

the Commission he is represented by Mr. M. Ziegler, a lawyer practising

at Lachen in Switzerland.

Particular circumstances of the case

      From November 1983 until June 1984 the applicant paid the

salaries of the K. company of which he was the board president.

Thereby he deducted from the salary contributions for the Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance (Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung).

However, even after various admonitions the applicant did not transfer

the amounts deducted to the compensation office.

      Charges were then brought against the applicant on the grounds

of Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance

Act (Bundesgesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung; see

below, Relevant domestic law and practice).

      On 13 February 1989 the March District Court (Bezirksgericht)

convicted the applicant of the offence of alienating contributions of

employees within the meaning of Section 87 para. 3.  The applicant was

sentenced to a fine of 200 SFr.  Upon appeal, the Cantonal Court of the

Canton of Schwyz on 18 January 1990 raised the fine to 500 SFr.

      The applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde)

with the Federal Court in which he complained inter alia that contrary

to Section 37 para. 2 of the Ordinance (Verordnung) on the Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance (see below, Relevant domestic law and practice)

the admonitions which he had received had not indicated the penal

consequences if the amounts due were not transferred.  The applicant

also stated that when he had been admonished as employer to pay the

amounts due on 28 September and 11 December 1984 he did not have any

means at his disposal to pay the amounts due.

      On 10 April 1991 the Federal Court dismissed the applicant's plea

of nullity, the decision being served on 26 April 1991.

      In its decision the Federal Court first dealt with the

applicant's complaint that the admonitions had not indicated the penal

consequences.  The Court found that an indication concerning criminal

liability was only necessary if the law required it;  however, no

necessity for such an indication transpired from the Federal Old Age

and Survivors' Insurance Act.

      The Federal Court then dealt with the conditions for the

applicant's conviction.

      The Court considered that it could no longer maintain its earlier

case-law concerning Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance Act according to which it was irrelevant whether

the employer actually had the means at his disposal to pay the amounts

due (see below, Relevant domestic law and practice).  The Court noted

here inter alia that Section 87 para. 3, rather than referring to a

failure to pay, employed the formulation "alienates (the amounts) from

the foreseen purpose".

      Thus, in the Court's view the mere failure to pay could not

constitute an alienation within the meaning of Section 87 para. 3, as

long as the employer had the means to pay the amounts;  rather, an

alienation within the meaning of this provision required, in addition,

that the employer used the required means for other purposes.  The

Court continued:

           "The basic consideration underlying Section 87 para. 3 of

      the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act is the obligation to

      maintain the assets.  It does not concern actual embezzlement.

      There are different moments in time when the amount is deducted

      from the salary and when there is a duty to pay;  hence, the

      employer must be permitted to deal with the assets in such a way

      that from an objective point of view it can be assumed that he

      can comply with the duty to pay at the last possible moment;

      thus, compliance with the duty to pay is even then still possible

      if one assumes that with reasonable management the necessary

      credits thereto would be granted at this moment".

           "Der Grundgedanke von Art. 87 Abs. 3 AHVG ist eine

      Substraterhaltungspflicht.  Da es sich jedoch nicht um einen

      eigentlichen Veruntreuungstatbestand handelt, sondern der

      Zeitpunkt des Lohnabzugs und der Zeitpunkt der Zahlungspflicht

      auseinanderfallen, muss es dem Arbeitgeber erlaubt sein, mit dem

      Substrat so zu wirtschaften, dass bei objektiver

      Betrachtungsweise davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass er seiner

      Zahlungspflicht im letztmöglichen Zeitpunkt werde nachkommen

      können, denn die Erfüllung der Zahlungspflicht ist ja auch dann

      noch möglich, wenn man annehmen darf, bei vernünftigem

      Wirtschaften würden auf diesen Zeitpunkt die dafür erforderlichen

      Kredite gewährt".

      The Court noted that in June 1984 he had had 45,552 SFr at his

disposal to pay the amounts due.  The judgment continues:

           "It follows that at least at the end of June 1984 the

      applicant had the means to pay the amounts of employees deducted

      in the period of January - June 1984.  By disposing otherwise of

      the amounts concerned rather than transferring them to the

      compensation office the applicant fulfilled the requirements of

      the offence at least in respect of the contributions of the

      employees for the months January - June;  contrary to the

      applicant's view, it does not depend on whether he disposed of

      the necessary  means at the moment when the relevant admonitions

      were issued (28 September and 11 December)".

           "Daraus ergibt sich, dass der Beschwerdeführer jedenfalls

      per Ende Juni 1984 über die Mittel zur Bezahlung der in der Zeit

      vom Januar - Juni 1984 abgezogenen Arbeitnehmerbeiträge verfügte.

      Indem er die entsprechenden Beträge nicht an die Ausgleichskasse

      weiterleitete, sondern anderweitig darüber verfügte, erfüllte er

      den Tatbestand jedenfalls in bezug auf die Arbeitnehmerbeiträge

      der Monate Januar - Juni;  denn entgegen der Auffassung des

      Beschwerdeführers kommt es nicht darauf an, ob er zum Zeitpunkt

      der massgeblichen Mahnungen (28. September und 11. Dezember) über

      die entsprechenden Mittel verfügte".

Relevant domestic law and practice

      Under the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act (Bundesge-

setz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung) the employer who

deducts amounts from the employee's salary for the purpose of the old

age and survivors' insurance must transfer the amounts to the

Compensation Office (Ausgleichskasse). If the employer does not pay the

amounts within a particular time-limit, an admonition is issued and a

new time-limit is set.

      Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and Survivors'

Insurance Act envisages a punishment of imprisonment or a fine if a

person "as an employer deducts from an employee amounts from the

salary, yet alienates them from the foreseen purpose" ("wer als

Arbeitgeber einem Arbeitnehmer Beiträge vom Lohn abzieht, sie indessen

dem vorgesehenen Zwecke entfremdet").

      Section 37 para. 2 of the Ordinance (Verordnung) on the Old Age

and Survivors' Insurance provides that, if the employer does not duly

pay the amounts, an admonition will be served which must also contain

an indication as to the consequences if the admonition is disregarded.

      According to the Federal Court's earlier case-law, the employer

met the objective conditions of Section 87 para. 3, and therefore

became punishable, if the amounts which he had actually deducted from

the salary of the employee were not transferred to the compensation

office within the time-limit stated in the admonition.  According to

this case-law it was irrelevant whether the employer actually had the

means at his disposal to transfer the amounts, and whether third

persons could put these amounts at the employer's disposal (see Arrêts

du Tribunal Fédéral 107 IV 205).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 7 para. 1 of the Convention

that in the admonitions issued there was no indication as to the penal

consequences if he failed to pay.  The applicant refers here to Section

37 para. 2 of the Ordinance on the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance.

It is in the applicant's opinion incomprehensible that, according to

the Federal Court, such an indication must be given only for purposes

of the execution of the amounts due (Betreibungsfolgen) and not in

respect of criminal offences.

      Also under Article 7 para. 1 of the Convention the applicant

complains that neither Section 87 para. 3 of the Old Age and Survivors'

Insurance Act nor the subsequent interpretation by the Federal Court

make it clear which conduct is punishable.  The applicant queries

whether it should merely be the failure to pay the amount, or whether

it is sufficient if the employer at any time disposes of the amounts

due.  It is in particular unclear at what moment the employer must

dispose of the amounts due.

2.    The applicant complains that the Federal Court gave Section 87

para. 3 of the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act a completely new

meaning.  Originally the mere failure to pay was punished; according

to the new case-law an alienation occurs if the assets are used for

other purposes.

      The applicant submits that he could not expect such a change of

case-law.  His defence had concentrated on the moment of the failure

to pay;  it had been irrelevant, if earlier on the employer had in fact

disposed of certain amounts.  Thus, the applicant was confronted with

an accusation of which he had previously not been informed.  In such

circumstances he should have had the opportunity before the Federal

Court to defend himself.

      In respect of this complaint the applicant relies on Article 6

paras. 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that Section 87 of the Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance Act does not make it clear which conduct is

punishable and that in the admonitions issued there was no indication

as to the penal consequences if he failed to pay.  The applicant relies

on Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention which states:

           "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on

      account of any act or omission which did not constitute a

      criminal offence under national or international law at the time

      when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed

      than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence

      was committed."

      The Commission has first examined the applicant's complaint that

Section 87 para. 3 of the Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act does not

make it clear which conduct is punishable.

      The Commission recalls that Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the

Convention is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application

of the criminal law to an accused's disadvantage.  It also embodies,

more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and

prescribe a penalty, and the principle that the criminal law must not

be extensively construed to an accused's detriment, for instance by

analogy.  It follows from this that an offence must be clearly defined

in law.  This condition is satisfied where the individual can know from

the wording of the relevant provision what acts and omissions will make

him liable (see Eur. Court H.R., Kokkinakis judgment of 25 May 1993,

Series A no. 260 A, para. 52).

      Furthermore, a broad interpretation of a criminal statute

resulting in a change of case-law may raise an issue under Article 7

para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention.   It is not acceptable that by

means of interpretation an act which up to then had not been punishable

is made a criminal offence or that the definition of existing offences

is extended in such a way as to include facts which have so far not

constituted a criminal offence.  On the other hand, domestic courts may

clarify an offence or adapt the requirements to new circumstances

reasonably covered by the original concept of the offence (see No.

10505/83, dec. 4.3.85, D.R. 41 p. 178, at p. 185).

      In the present case Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance Act envisages a punishment of imprisonment or a

fine if a person "as an employer deducts from an employee amounts from

the salary, yet alienates them from the foreseen purpose".

      The wording of this provision thus clearly states which acts and

omissions are liable.

      In its decision of 10 April 1991 the Federal Court found that it

no longer sufficed under Section 87 para. 3 that the amounts were not

paid;  it was necessary, in addition, that the employer had used the

amounts for other purposes.

      Moreover, as regards the moment when the amounts had to be paid,

the Federal Court found that the employer had to be permitted to deal

with the assets in such a way that he could comply with "the duty to

pay at the last possible moment".

      Thus, rather than making facts punishable which had so far not

constituted a criminal offence, the Federal Court clarified the offence

which, in the Commission's opinion, remains reasonably covered by the

original concept of the offence.

      The applicant further complains that in the admonitions issued

there was no indication as to the penal consequences if he failed to

pay.  Assuming that this complaint raises an issue under Article 7

para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the Convention, the Commission notes that

according to the Federal Court's decision of 10 April 1991 an

indication concerning criminal liability is only necessary if required

by Swiss law;  however, no necessity for such an indication transpired

from the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act.

      In any event, the Commission considers that the applicant as an

employer had a particular knowledge of the Federal Old Age and

Survivors' Insurance Act.  Thus, he would have reasonably been informed

of the penal consequences of the failure as an employer to pay the

amounts due.

      This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains that the Federal Court gave

Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act

a completely new meaning.  Originally the mere failure to pay was

punished; according to the new case-law an alienation occurs if the

assets are used for other purposes.  As he could not expect such a

change of case-law he should have had the opportunity before the

Federal Court to defend himself.  The applicant relies on Article 6

paras. 1 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-b) of the Convention which state,

insofar as relevant:

      "1.  In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

      him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...

      ...

      3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

      minimum rights:

      ...

      b.   to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of

      his defence ..."

      It is true that, as the applicant submits, the Federal Court in

its decision of 10 April 1991 found that in order to be punished under

Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act

it no longer sufficed if the amounts were not paid;  it was necessary,

in addition, that the employer had used the amounts for other purposes.

      However, the Commission need not examine whether Article 6 paras.

1 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-b) enshrine in principle the right to be

granted an opportunity to comment in court proceedings on a possible

change of case-law, since this part of the application is in any event

inadmissible for the following reason.

      The Commission notes that the applicant was charged with a breach

of Section 87 para. 3, namely that as an employer he had deducted

amounts from the salaries of the employees;  and that he had alienated

these amounts from the foreseen purpose.  In various admonitions the

applicant had been set time-limits to pay the amounts due.

      In respect of this accusation the applicant was able fully to

prepare his defence before the Swiss courts.  He was free to explain

inter alia the reasons why he had not paid in the amounts due.  He was

moreover free to do so in respect of any moment after the amounts had

been deducted from the employees' salaries, and until the last possible

moment set in the time-limit for payment.

      Thus, the applicant's defence was able to cover all issues

relating to the amounts concerned during the entire period of time when

they were due.

      The applicant has not shown in what respect this possible scope

and depth of the defence available to him nevertheless proved to be

insufficient in view of the clarification of the Federal Court of

Section 87 para. 3 of the Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance Act.

      It follows that the remainder of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

       (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (A. WEITZEL)

© European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu, 1998 - 2026

LEXI

Lexploria AI Legal Assistant

Active Products: EUCJ + ECHR Data Package + Citation Analytics • Documents in DB: 401132 • Paragraphs parsed: 45279850 • Citations processed 3468846