AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 17383/90

                      by A.J.

                      against Norway

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 13 October 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 Mr.  K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 10 October 1990

by A.J. against Norway and registered on 31 October 1990 under file No.

17383/90;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 26 January 1993 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicant on 17 March and 26 March 1993;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, born in 1960. She resides

at Nørreballe, Denmark. Before the Commission she is represented by

Mrs. Signe Moland, a lawyer practising in Oslo.

A.    The particular facts of the case

      The applicant was born at Laksevåg near Bergen, Norway. She left

the parental home when she was sixteen. In 1977, when she was seventeen

years old, she gave birth to her son, C, and the following years she

and C became dependent on assistance from the social authorities. On

many occasions the social authorities assisted the applicant in the

upbringing of C but nevertheless considerable problems as well as

friction between the social authorities and the applicant arose. The

situation culminated in November 1989 when C, who was then twelve years

old, was taken into care pursuant to Section 11 of the Child Welfare

Act (Barnevernloven) as the circumstances of the case disclosed a

danger to his health and development. C subsequently received treatment

at the children's psychiatric department at Haugeland hospital.

      At that moment in time the applicant was pregnant and following

the implementation of the care order she left Bergen for Oslo and was

accommodated in a crisis centre. Due to her pregnancy the applicant was

referred to Ullevål hospital in Oslo. The doctors there considered her

physical and mental state of health to be very poor. On 7 December 1989

the applicant gave birth to her daughter, S. Due to the applicant's

difficult situation and the problems which had arisen with the

upbringing of C, the social authorities were contacted. A meeting took

place on 8 December 1989 between the applicant and her counsel and the

social authorities during which the applicant's and S's situation was

discussed. Following this the chairman of the Client and Patient

Committee of Røa, section 24 (klient- og pasientutvalget i bydel 24,

Røa), hereinafter the CPC, decided on 13 December 1989 as an interim

measure to take S into care pursuant to Section 11 of the Child Welfare

Act. Because of the applicant's physical and mental state of health she

was considered incapable of taking care of S, a view which was based

on information from the Ullevål hospital and from the social

authorities in Bergen as well as on the outcome of the meeting held on

8 December 1989. The applicant did not lodge any appeal against this

interim measure. On 19 December 1989 S was placed in a children's home

and the applicant was allowed to visit her twice a week. The applicant

did not challenge the arrangement concerning her access rights at that

moment in time.

      Following this interim measure the question of care was brought

before the CPC which on 29 December 1989 appointed an expert with the

mandate of evaluating the applicant's capability of taking care of S.

The expert opinion was submitted on 13 February 1990. It concluded as

follows :

(translation)

      "Faced with outside pressure and situations she considers she

      cannot handle, (the applicant) reacts, both according to the

      documents in the file, the other information and also according

      to herself, with depression, fear and confusion. Compared with

      how she has been described by inter alia Ullevål hospital I

      consider her to be functioning much better today. I assume that

      this is due to the fact that her situation is easier since she

      has received considerable human support, inter alia from her

      counsel. Her reactions are, however, unstable and very much

      dependent on outer circumstances.

      (The applicant) has since her youth periodically used

      intoxicating substances. However, this has not developed into an

      abuse although she has not been willing to accept control or

      treatment. In respect of the problems this case raises, however,

      her use of such substances is, as (I) see it, not of decisive

      importance.

      If (the applicant) were to regain the care of the child (the

      children) the answer to the question whether she is in need of

      treatment is definitely yes. (Her) destructive acts vis-à-vis

      (her son, C) ... are in principle due to her emotional problems.

      The problematic aspect in this connection is the fact that (the

      applicant) does not herself see this link and therefore neither

      wants treatment herself nor for (C), at least not as suggested

      by the authorities ... .

      ...

      ... Having regard to (the applicant's) history in respect of

      taking care of her child and due to her lack of knowledge

      of/denial of her own faults vis-à-vis her own and (C's) problems

      I regret that, as the expert in this case, I can hardly argue in

      favour of the positive hope as regards her future capabilities

      of taking care of her children, although she undoubtedly loves

      them and is attached to them. In addition to these points (I)

      must add that (the applicant) today expects a future as a mother

      on her own in Oslo where she lacks support from a social

      environment.

      The child in this case (S) is in a period of its life where the

      attachment to hopefully stable persons ought to develop. It is

      of decisive importance for her personal development that she now

      gets the opportunity to attach herself to persons whom she may

      consider through her adolescence as stable and secure parents."

      In addition to the above appointed expert the applicant herself

engaged another expert who submitted her opinion on 17 April 1990. It

concluded as follows :

(translation)

      "... I cannot find that there are sufficient reasons for taking

      away (the applicant's) custody rights over her children (C) and

      (S).

      In my view (the applicant) shows responsibility when it comes to

      considering the children's adolescence - and she is also a person

      who may learn from the mistakes she has made.

      It is, however, clear that (the applicant) will need certain

      practical assistance in the future. It is recommendable that both

      she and (C) receive therapy in order to manage the emotional gaps

      from the bad years - and I would consider it reasonable that the

      public authorities cover this. Furthermore, (the applicant) ought

      to receive support in order for her to get an education."

      On 2 May 1990 the CPC examined the question of care. The meeting

was chaired by a judge from the Oslo City Court. The applicant was

assisted by counsel and called three witnesses. The social authorities,

which had submitted their report of 30 March 1990 to the CPC, called

one witness. The appointed expert was heard, but not the expert engaged

by the applicant herself. Both expert opinions were available to the

CPC.

      On the basis of the information and evidence submitted the CPC

decided by four votes to two to take S into care, to deprive the

applicant of her parental rights, to place S in a foster home with a

view to adoption, to refuse access as from the moment S was placed in

the foster home and to keep the address secret. In its decision the CPC

stated :

(translation)

      "With reference to the reports which have been submitted and what

      has been submitted during this meeting the majority ... finds

      that (the applicant) has very little chance of acting

      satisfactorily in taking care of her daughter. The majority

      stresses that (the applicant) has been the sole custody holder

      for her son, born in 1977. This task she has not managed and the

      social authorities have taken this child into care. Since 1977

      (the applicant) has received special assistance and, since her

      son was ten years of age, she has lived of social security

      benefits. She has only worked for short periods of time. she has

      not lived together with the fathers of her two children but has

      lived for several years with another man who ill-treated her and

      her son, both physically and mentally. He is now in prison,

      serving a sentence for narcotics offences. She has herself used

      narcotics and alcohol and has had problems therefrom. It is

      unclear how big a problem this has been, but the CPC assumes that

      she has no problems for the time being. It is not quite clear,

      however, whether the problem has been solved also for the future.

      (The applicant) maintains now that she has broken off with her

      former friend and her previous life. She has moved to Oslo and

      now appears to have another basis than the one in Bergen. She has

      certain social contacts but these are contacts stemming from the

      present situation which cannot be of decisive importance. She has

      vague plans for the future although she submits a wish to get an

      education.

      However, the majority is of the opinion that the decisive aspects

      in this case must be that (the applicant), according to the

      appointed expert, has big and unsolved mental problems which

      burden her social function and her ability to take care (of

      children). Despite the fact that her son has had considerable

      mental problems she has not been able to cooperate with the

      authorities and has not understood the necessity of giving his

      needs priority over her own. She has not been able to understand

      that the boy needed help and has not been willing to accept

      assistance either. The majority fears that this attitude may lead

      to her daughter's needs not being met either if she remains with

      (the applicant). The majority finds that the daughter will live

      in such conditions that the requirements of section 16(a) of the

      Child Welfare Act are fulfilled.

      In connection with the taking of her son into care a number of

      measures have been tried, and the majority therefore finds that

      measures under section 18 would be without effect. The

      requirements for care under section 19 are accordingly fulfilled.

      The majority finds as well that the requirements pursuant to

      section 20 of the Child Welfare Act are fulfilled. (The

      applicant) is not particularly motivated for treatment and there

      is little reason to believe that this will change. The majority

      accordingly finds that it would be best for the child to be

      placed in a foster home with a view to adoption. The period to

      come is the basic years for the child where it is best that the

      child may rest assured that it will not be moved. It is of

      decisive importance for the girl that she can now be attached to

      stable persons whom she may consider as being stable and secure

      parents in her adolescence.

      This is of decisive importance for the development of her

      personality. Therefore she ought not to be exposed to a

      terminable foster home contract. She also ought to have few and

      close persons to relate to and therefore ought to remain at a

      secret address pursuant to section 19 of the Child Welfare Act,

      so that (the applicant) no longer has access to her daughter when

      she is placed with foster parents."

      As indicated above the applicant's son, C, was taken into care

in November 1989. On 4 May 1990 he ran away from the institution where

he was living in Bergen and moved to the applicant in Oslo. Following

the birth of her daughter the applicant had moved to an apartment in

Oslo. As C did not want to return to Bergen and as the applicant found

that the social authorities there did not do enough to help him, she

decided to let C stay in Oslo. The applicant managed to get him

admitted to a school there and she contacted a psychiatrist for

support. Following an evaluation of these circumstances the social

authorities in Bergen decided not to intervene and the care order was

lifted on 19 June 1990. This decision was subsequently confirmed by the

Hordaland County Governor (Fylkesmannen) on 13 March 1991. C has lived

with the applicant since May 1990.

      On 25 May 1990 counsel for the applicant received the minutes

from the meeting of 2 May 1990 during which the CPC decided to take the

applicant's daughter, S, into care. On 28 May 1990 the applicant lodged

an appeal against the decisions taken with the County Governor in so

far as they concerned the care order and the deprivation of parental

rights. She furthermore requested the County Governor to give the

appeal suspensive effect as far as the access rights were concerned as

access to S would otherwise be terminated as soon as S was placed in

a foster home.

      The applicant submitted that continuing access was of decisive

importance in order to maintain contact between mother and child during

the appeal proceedings. On 31 July 1990 the County Governor decided not

to give the appeal suspensive effect. In the decision he stated inter

alia :

(translation)

      "In accordance with section 42 of the Public Administration Act

      (Forvaltningsloven) the County Governor may decide that the

      implementation of a decision shall be suspended pending the

      outcome of the appeal. The starting point in the Child Welfare

      Act is that a decision is implemented immediately.

      When examining whether suspensive effect shall be granted the

      child's interests and the risk it runs in such circumstances

      shall be taken into consideration.

      The County Governor finds on the basis of the documents in the

      file ... that the girl's interests are best taken care of in that

      the decision of (2) May 1990 concerning termination of access

      between mother and child is implemented as from the moment the

      child is placed in the foster home.

      With reference to section 42 of the Public Administration Act the

      County Governor decides that the decision on access of (2) May

      1990 is maintained pending the outcome of the appeal to the

      effect that the access between mother and child is terminated

      when the child is transferred to the foster home. The request for

      giving the appeal suspensive effect is accordingly rejected."

      The applicant's daughter, S, was placed with foster parents on

30 May 1990. The applicant has not had access to or seen her daughter

since.

      Despite the above decision the applicant pursued her appeal. As

she was informed that her appeal to the County Governor of 28 May 1990

would be pending four to five months she instituted proceedings in the

Oslo City Court (byretten) requesting the Court to repeal the CPC's

decisions of 2 May 1990. She maintained inter alia that it was decisive

that the case was examined quickly due to the lack of access to her

daughter. On 24 October 1990 the City Court dismissed (avvise) the case

as such cases could only be instituted subsequent to a decision in the

matter by the County Governor. On 17 January 1991 the High Court

(Lagmannsretten) rejected the appeal since the County Governor had in

the meantime decided the case (see below) and there was therefore no

reason to deal with the appeal. A further appeal to the Supreme Court

(Høyesterett) was rejected on 7 March 1991.

      As indicated above the County Governor for Oslo and Akershus

decided in the case on 9 November 1990. The CPC's decisions concerning

care and parental rights were upheld. In the decision the County

Governor stated inter alia :

(translation)

      "The County Governor considers on the basis of (what he has

      established) and the case-file that (the applicant's) situation

      in life, her unstable mental situation and her lack of capacity

      to evaluate both her own and her son's situation might damage

      (her daughter's) development and physical/mental health if she

      would have stayed in her mother's care. The requirements of

      section 16 of the Child Welfare Act would accordingly appear to

      be fulfilled.

      As regards preventive measures pursuant to section 18 of the

      Child Welfare Act, the considerable number of offers from the

      Bergen social authorities show that (the applicant) has managed

      only to a limited extent to cooperate/use the offers she has

      received. From the talks with the County Governor, the report

      from the Aline Child Care Centre and the expert's evaluations it

      appears that (the applicant) has very little knowledge of and

      understanding for her own and her son's need for help. The County

      Governor considers that (the applicant) will not be able to

      cooperate with the authorities on their conditions as far as

      preventive measures for the benefit of the child are concerned.

      Preventive measures would in our opinion, and with reference to

      the above, be without effect in this case, cf. section 18 of the

      Child Welfare Act.

      ...

      Following the conversation with the applicant the County Governor

      considers (the applicant) to be a very sympathetic and well-

      intentioned person. She has an appealing behaviour and manners

      which lead to the wish of wanting to return friendliness with

      friendliness. However, we must state that we consider that (the

      applicant) lacks the necessary understanding as regards whether

      problems could appear upon a possible return (of S). (The

      applicant) did not show any understanding at all as regards the

      child's feelings and was unable to separate her own and the

      child's needs. In respect of the problems vis-à-vis her son and

      the planned marriage (the applicant) did not manage to see that

      various adjustment difficulties would occur. (The applicant)

      considered her son not to be in need of treatment despite the

      fact that psychologist (LV) has applied for his admission to Nic.

      Waal's Institute for a possible evaluation/treatment.

      Having regard to the above the County Governor finds that the

      decision of 2 May 1990 to take (the applicant's daughter) into

      care is in accordance with section 19 of the child Welfare Act,

      and correct.

      ...

      As regards the deprivation of parental rights the County Governor

      would state as follows :

      Section 20 of the Child Welfare Act permits a deprivation of the

      parental rights. From the Supreme Court judgment (Rt. 1982

      p. 1687) it appears that no specific requirements prevent the use

      of section 20 except that care must have been ordered pursuant

      to section 19. The child's interests from a general point of view

      must be the decisive factor. This means that it is not a

      requirement that for example the parents have unlawfully

      disturbed the care situation or that the contact between the

      child and its parents must be considered to be harmful. If a

      general evaluation shows that it is in the best interests of the

      child to take away the parental rights in order to prepare for

      an adoption, section 20 of the Child Welfare Act permits this.

      (The applicant's) prolonged mental problems weigh in favour of

      applying section 20. In continuing reports she is described as

      unstable, depressive. During her stay at Ullevål hospital concern

      was expressed that she could hurt herself or develop a psychosis.

      (The applicant) has previously meditated suicide. (The applicant)

      is according to the expert in need of treatment. The expert

      opinion stresses (the applicant's) lack of knowledge of her own

      and her son's problems; her ability to take care of her children

      has been put in question. Having regard to her lack of insight

      her accessibility to treatment is considered poor. Having regard

      to the above the County Governor finds it hardly realistic to

      expect results of importance in a foreseeable future. Since the

      stay at Aline's Child Care Centre the girl has been in a process

      of development which is adequate and good. She has already

      attached herself to her foster parents and feels at ease there.

      A separation from the foster parents would lead to emotional

      problems for the girl and it is to be expected that the good and

      normal development which she has today could be considerably

      disturbed. According to the County Governor's assessment the girl

      has all possibilities for an adequate normal development with

      good mental progress on the condition that she is allowed to

      remain with the foster parents.

      The County Governor finds that the best situation for the girl

      would be that she remains with the foster parents with a view to

      adoption, cf. section 17, second sentence."

      On 13 November 1990 the applicant instituted proceedings in the

Oslo City Court under Chapter 33 of the Civil Procedure Act. She

maintained that the care order should be lifted and her daughter

reunited with her. In the alternative she maintained that her parental

rights should be restored.

      On 20 December 1990 the defendant State represented by the Child

and Family Department (Staten v/Barne- og familiedepartementet)

submitted their observations in reply.

      In consultation with the parties the City Court appointed, on

1 February 1991, two experts who were asked to evaluate the applicant's

ability to take care of her daughter and the consequences of revoking

the care order and/or restoring the applicant's parental rights. The

experts were requested to submit their opinions by 15 March 1991, which

they did.

      On 8 February 1991 the parties were informed that the hearing of

the case would commence on 2 April 1991.

      The Oslo City Court examined the case from 2 to 5 April 1991. The

applicant, represented by counsel, was heard as well as a

representative of the defendant Child and Family Department.

Furthermore eleven witnesses and the two appointed experts were heard.

      On the basis of the evidence so obtained the City Court upheld

the care order as well as the decision to deprive the applicant of her

parental rights. In its judgment of 16 April 1991 the Court stated :

(translation)

      "The legal starting point according to the Child Welfare

      Act is that a child shall be with its natural parents. The

      interests of the child may, however, lead to a deviation

      from this main rule since it cannot be interpreted in a way

      which would subject the child to considerable harm.

      When examining a measure under the Child Welfare Act the

      starting point is that the courts must rely on the

      circumstances as they are when passing judgment. The

      possibly negative aspects for the child in respect of a

      return from the foster parents to the natural parents must

      be taken into consideration. Another basis must be that the

      child care committee and the County Governor may legally

      maintain a decision to take the child into care even if the

      circumstances which were the basis for the decision later

      have changed to such an extent that the requirements for

      measures pursuant to the Child Welfare Act are no longer at

      hand.

      After an evaluation of the evidence the Court finds that

      such general circumstances are at hand which would allow

      the applicant today to give her daughter, born on

      7 December 1989, an acceptable upbringing. There has in

      this respect been an improvement in the situation since the

      child care authorities took over the care of the daughter.

      She now appears to be well established in Oslo together

      with the father of her oldest child who also lives with

      her. It appears quite clear that the applicant is much

      concerned with the child who has been taken away from her.

      There can hardly be any doubt that it is her intention to

      arrange things, as far as she is able, in order to take

      care of the child in the best possible way if it is

      returned to her. When the factual circumstances are such

      the Court must evaluate whether there is a real danger that

      the child will be subjected to harm if it is returned  from

      the foster parents to her natural mother.

      We have in this case a situation where the care was taken

      away from the mother shortly after birth. The mother has

      had very little contact with the child since and in respect

      of the child the natural mother is now a stranger.

      The experts appointed by the Court are both in agreement

      that the child will be in a crisis in case of a possible

      return. Psychologist S states about this in the expert

      opinion:

           'She is today in the middle of an identity phase which

           is dependent on secure conditions and stable emotional

           continuity in order for her to develop without

           complications. On a short term basis it is clear that

           the child will react with sorrow and emotion if she

           should now be removed from her foster home. In the

           long run it is likely that if she is moved during this

           period of her development she will carry with her into

           her life an experience of insecurity towards other

           persons, including those who represent close and dear

           relations.'

      The experts stress that a return in these circumstances

      entails a particular risk. This is so because the child

      already twice in her short life has experienced a removal

      from her natural mother, just after birth and then at the

      age of seven months when she was moved from the child care

      home to her present foster parents. She is therefore

      particularly sensitive to new changes.

      The child now lives under secure and stimulating conditions

      with her foster family and as the situation appeared to the

      Court it is considered that the foster parents can give her

      a safer upbringing than she would receive from her natural

      mother. Furthermore, the Court considers that there is a

      real danger that the mother will not be able to handle a

      return situation with a child in a crisis in an adequate

      and relevant way. The mother's history and previous contact

      with the public support apparatus indicates that when she,

      in such a pressed and threatening situation, will need help

      from the public authorities, she will defend herself with

      fear and aggressiveness. In particular psychologist R

      refers to this. During his oral explanations in Court he

      has referred to his written expert opinion but has also in

      his oral explanations submitted further details concerning

      the mother's personality. He is of the opinion that the

      mother makes a protective identification. In this lies that

      her world is separated in two, in friends and enemies and

      that she shows towards those whom she recognises as friends

      a secure and nice side of herself whereas she reacts

      towards those whom she considers to be against her with

      deep suspicion, fear and aggression. Psychologist R is of

      the opinion that the mother in such a situation will

      consider the public health authorities to be against her

      and will meet them with a corresponding negative attitude.

      This will place further burdens on the child and harm her

      permanently in the form of a split character.

      The expert witnesses which the mother has presented have

      all had a very good impression of her. This goes for Doctor

      T, psychologist L, and psychologist RL. A common element

      for these persons is, however, that none of them have had

      a patient doctor relationship with the applicant. Those who

      have been appointed by the social authorities and the

      Court, psychologist KR, psychologist S and psychologist R,

      all experience the mother as more complex. The Court

      considers that the appointed experts, on the basis of their

      mandate and the contact with the applicant and others, have

      had the best background to evaluate her as a person. The

      Court has therefore considerable hesitations about

      deviating from the expert evaluation they have submitted.

      The Court has examined the experts' evaluation in the light

      of what has otherwise been submitted in the case and not

      least in the light of the basic principles of the Act as to

      when a lifting of the care order should take place.

      The Court finds that the experts have done a very thorough

      work. The conclusions are clear and appear well founded.

      Their statements confirm and elaborate the overall

      impression that the Court has of the case. The Court finds,

      therefore, that after considering the case as a whole it

      will rely on the experts' views as a basis for its

      decision. In the opinion of the Court there is nothing in

      the case which gives reason to deviate from the experts'

      evaluation.

      On the basis of the above the Court finds that the child,

      because of the reactions which she may be expected to

      develop if her environment is changed, would place a

      particularly heavy burden on the mother as regards her

      care. From what is known about her mother today and her

      history it is unlikely that she will be able to cooperate

      with the social assistance provided by society without

      friction. A general and concrete evaluation has accordingly

      made the Court conclude that the County Governor's, and

      thus also the child care authorities', decision to take the

      child into care should be maintained.

      The next question is whether the decision should be limited

      only to covering the taking into care and not the parental

      rights as well pursuant to the Child Welfare Act, section

      20. In this respect the Court points out that it is clear

      that section  20 has been applied with a view to adoption.

      The foster parents wish to adopt the child and according to

      the available information the Court assumes that an

      adoption will be the result unless the decision is limited

      only to concern the taking into care.

      The Court finds that in order to be able to use the Child

      Welfare Act, section 20, it must in all circumstances be

      required that this is necessary in order to secure a proper

      care situation for the child. What is required will depend

      on the aim of depriving the parents of the responsibility,

      and the situation in general. If the aim is to free the

      child for adoption very weighty considerations must be

      required. Only in very special circumstances can the Child

      Welfare Act, section 20, be used in order to proceed with

      an adoption. It must be a condition that the parents will

      be unable to give the child the appropriate care and that

      this would be a permanent situation. When the parental

      rights are taken over with a view to adoption the question

      arises whether the child and the natural parents should be

      prevented definitively from contact with each other with

      the consequences as regards reunification which follow from

      this.

      One of the requirements which in the opinion of the Court

      must be fulfilled for the parental rights to be transferred

      with a view to adoption is that it is obvious that the

      child within a foreseeable future cannot be reunited with

      the parents. In the present case both the appointed experts

      have recommended to the Court that the placement in the

      foster home be made permanent. One of the appointed

      experts, psychologist R, states in this respect:

           `When considering this question in the present case we

           have, in addition to the permanent general advantage

           for the child of adoption in such cases, concrete and

           real reasons which speak in favour of adoption.

           The applicant's problems are in my view old and in

           addition well established in her total character. They

           can be documented back to 1977 and have been

           relatively constantly present during the whole of her

           adult life. It follows from this that it is unlikely

           that she will solve them in a foreseeable future and

           that the situation therefore has a certain permanent

           character.

           In addition there is every probability that the

           applicant's access to the foster home will destroy the

           home's security and make it unfit for being a foster

           home for the child. This must be seen in the light of

           the crusade the applicant over the last years has led

           against the child care authorities and that she has

           said in a straightforward manner that her aim is to

           get her daughter back. When she earlier on, as well,

           has hidden her son from the child care authorities in

           Bergen and has been supported in this by her lawyers

           in Oslo this will on the whole give very little reason

           for optimism in respect of her future cooperation with

           the foster home.

           I have therefore reached the conclusion that it would

           be best for the daughter to remain in the foster home

           and that permission is granted to adopt her so that

           the foster parents also get the parental rights.

           With reference to my mandate my conclusion will

           accordingly be:

           A.    If the child is reunited with her natural mother

           there is a considerable danger that the child will not

           recover from her separation crisis which then will

           harm her permanently. There is also an objective

           reason to doubt the mother's capability of securing

           for the daughter the necessary medical and

           psychological assistance which the child will need.

           For these reasons I cannot recommend the Court to

           reunite the child with her natural mother.

           B.    I assume that the aim of letting the natural

           mother keep the parental rights over a child placed in

           a foster home is to let her get access to the home and

           participate in, or take, important decisions regarding

           the child. In such circumstances an access to the

           foster home or just the lifting of the secrecy of the

           home's address would destroy the security of the

           foster parents and make the home unfit as a foster

           home. This would both in the short and in the long run

           be detrimental to the child.

           C.    In my view the best solution from the child's

           point of view is that the mother is deprived of her

           parental rights and that the foster family receive

           permission to adopt the child. This will secure the

           child a stable and appropriate upbringing and it binds

           without reservation the child to its new family.'

      The other expert, psychologist S, states as follows in this

      respect:

           `If the child remains in the foster home and the

           foster parents continue as foster parents for the

           child I consider it impractical and probably

           complicating if a person other than the foster parents

           should have the parental rights. I consider this also

           from the point of view that a full formal and daily

           belonging to one place would be in the best interest

           of the child. In addition one cannot disregard that a

           split solution concerning care and custody may create

           insecurity and represent a potential source of

           conflict between the adults with the child in between.

           In certain circumstances it can also be difficult to

           manage the daily care in a satisfactory way if the

           custody is with someone else. If the Court

           nevertheless should decide to split the daily care and

           the custody this requires a good cooperation between

           the parties, something which at present cannot be

           considered to be the case having regard to the fact

           that the foster parents and the natural mother have

           not met each other. I recommend that the daily care

           and the parental rights be awarded to those who have

           the daily care for the child.'

      In their oral submissions to the Court both the experts

      have expressed that their standpoints have received further

      support in what has been submitted during the examination

      of the case.

      As regards the question whether the mother would not be

      able to give the child a proper care on a permanent basis

      psychologist R states that the mother today and in the

      foreseeable future will not have the necessary capacity to

      do so. Psychologist KR was of the same opinion when he

      submitted his report in connection with this case.

      Psychologist S on the other hand is of the opinion that the

      mother probably today, in favourable and clear

      circumstances, is capable of taking care of the child but

      the mother's situation is not clear. She suggests therefore

      that it would be best for the child to stay where it is.

      The Court has understood the experts so that it is obvious

      that the mother cannot give the child a proper care on a

      permanent basis. Also as regards the question of custody

      the Court intends to rely decisively on the evaluation made

      by the experts. The Court furthermore agrees with the

      experts that there is a real danger of a conflict arising

      between the foster parents and the natural mother if she

      receives access to the foster home. The Court refers in

      this connection to what has been said about the mother's

      ways of reacting. It lies in this that strong and real

      reasons speak for an adoption. The special views which

      could speak against an adoption in the present case cannot

      in the opinion of the Court carry decisive weight. The

      Court will here point out that the natural mother is a

      stranger vis-à-vis the child since she has not, as far as

      the Court has been informed, had any particular contact

      with the mother. After a general and concrete evaluation

      the Court has accordingly reached the conclusion that also

      the decision concerning the transfer of parental rights

      shall be maintained."

      On 28 May 1991 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme

Court (Høyesterett). The defendant State filed a reply on 19 June 1991.

On 23 August 1991 the applicant was requested to submit further

observations by 6 September 1991. Further observations were submitted

on 5 September 1991.

      On 19 September 1991 the Supreme Court Appeals Committee

(Høyesteretts Kjæremålsutvalg) refused leave to appeal.

      In the spring of 1991 the applicant moved to Nørreballe, Denmark.

She now lives there with her son C and C's father. The applicant gave

birth to a second daughter on 14 December 1991. According to the Danish

authorities this child has developed well.

B.    Domestic law and practice

      The legal basis for protective measures in relation to children

under the age of eighteen is set out in the Child Welfare Act of

17 July 1953. The principle underlying the Act is that it is, generally

speaking, in the best interest of a child that it be cared for by its

natural parents. Furthermore, where a child has been taken into care,

the best solution is, generally speaking, that the natural parents

remain in contact with it and retain the parental rights.

      According to section 16(a) of the Child Welfare Act protective

measures may be adopted if a child lives under such conditions that its

physical and mental health is liable to be impaired or is seriously

endangered. It follows from established case-law that such a measure

may also be taken where the child's health has not yet been endangered,

but where there is a clear risk of such harm. Consequently, a child

may, with reference to this provision, be taken into care immediately

after birth (e.g. Supreme Court case-law Rt. 1986 p. 1189 and Rt. 1987

p. 52).

      Section 18 of the Act provides for several preventive measures

(forebyggende tiltak), such as placing the child's home under

supervision, furnishing financial assistance, ensuring placement in a

kindergarten or a school, or providing care and treatment.

      If such preventive measures are considered to be without effect

or have proved to be of no avail, section 11 of the Act authorises the

Health and Social Board (helse- og sosialstyret), hereinafter "the

Board", or if necessary its chairman, to take a child into care on a

temporary basis. Where such a decision is taken, the case shall be

brought before the Board, often represented by its Client and Patient

Committee (the CPC), which may decide to take the child into care

(overta omsorgen) pursuant to section 19 of the Act provided the

requirements of section 16 are fulfilled. In practice the child is

usually transferred to a suitable children's care centre or a foster

family.

      The Child Welfare Act does not specifically regulate the question

of access if a child is taken into care but according to the undisputed

authoritative interpretation of section 19 of the Act the Board, or the

CPC, may also determine the extent of the parents' right of access and

whether or not the address of the foster family should be kept secret.

      Where the Board, or the CPC, decides to take the child into care

in accordance with the above rules it may also decide, pursuant to

section 20 of the Act, to deprive the natural parents of their parental

rights. Section 20 does not set out in what circumstances this may

happen, but according to Supreme Court case-law it has been emphasised

that there must be weighty reasons for such a decision. A decision to

deprive the natural parents of their parental rights cannot be taken

unless the long-term consequences of alternative arrangements have been

considered in each case. A decision under section 20 is often taken

with a view to adoption by the foster parents. A decision regarding

adoption is more definitive than other decisions under the Child

Welfare Act, because it represents a final break in the legal relations

between the child and its natural parents and other family.

      Measures under the Child Welfare Act shall be lifted when the

child is twenty-one years of age or when there are no longer reasons

to maintain the measures, cf. section 48. In case the natural parents

have pursued the avenues of appeal against the measures taken under the

Child Welfare Act as described below, they are not entitled to a review

of the case until one year after the prior decisions have become final,

cf. section 54 of the Act. However, if the child has been adopted in

the meantime the Child Welfare Act is no longer applicable since, as

mentioned above, the break between the child and its natural parents

is thereby final.

      Temporary decisions pursuant to section 11 of the Act may be

appealed against to the County Governor who has full competence to

review the matter. The parents may also institute proceedings in the

ordinary courts of law against such interim decisions in accordance

with Chapter 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure (tvistemålsloven).

      Everyone who is affected by a decision of the Health and Social

Board, or the CPC, as well as any member thereof, has the right to

lodge an appeal with the County Governor, cf. sections 52 and 54 of the

Child Welfare Act. Such an administrative complaint may be lodged inter

alia in relation to a decision to take a child into care, to deprive

the parents of their parental rights and questions concerning access

rights.

      According to section 55 the County Governor has full competence

to review the decision and may accordingly review not only the facts

of the case and the application of the law, but also the discretionary

aspects of the decision. The proceedings before the County Governor are

mainly in writing, even though there may often be informal meetings

with the parties and their lawyers.

      The County Governor's decisions relating to access rights may be

reviewed by the Children and Family Department which may review all

aspects of the decisions, including discretionary questions, cf.

section 53 of the Act. These administrative decisions are subject to

judicial review under Chapter 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e.

the court's competence of review follows from the general principles

of judicial supremacy which means that they may review the facts and

the application of the law and, to a certain extent, the discretionary

aspect of a decision).

      The County Governor's decisions relating to care orders and

parental rights are subject to a special judicial review under Chapter

33 of the Civil Procedure Act, cf. section 53 of the Child Welfare Act.

      There are no limitations of the courts' competence to review such

decisions. The control encompasses the facts of the case, the

application of the law and aspects of a discretionary nature, cf.

section 482 of the Civil Procedure Act. The decision will be taken on

the basis of the situation which exists at the time when judgment is

pronounced. According to section 485 an appeal against a judgment

delivered by the City or District Court shall be lodged directly with

the Supreme Court. The underlying reason is the need to give priority

to this kind of cases. Furthermore, section 478 provides that the case

shall be expedited.

      According to section 477 the courts may grant interlocutory

measures, i.e. decide that the implementation of the decision shall be

suspended.

      According to section 479, second subsection, the proceedings are

in camera.

      The review under Chapter 33 only applies to decisions made by the

County Governor. Consequently, this kind of judicial review in

principle presupposes a complaint to the County Governor and that he

has taken a decision.

COMPLAINTS

      The applicant complains, under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the

Convention, of a number of issues related to the fact that her

daughter, S, was taken into care and that she was deprived of her

parental rights and of access to her daughter.

      More specifically she complains that the care order of

19 December 1989, which was upheld on 2 May 1990 by the CPC and

confirmed by the City Court on 16 April 1991, was an unnecessary

interference with her right to respect for her family life.

      The applicant furthermore complains that the deprivation of her

parental rights and the termination of access to her daughter as from

30 May 1990 failed to fulfil the requirements of Article 8 of the

Convention.

      The applicant also complains that, having regard to the fact that

her daughter was taken from her immediately after birth and that access

was terminated on 30 May 1990, the care issues were not dealt with

within a reasonable time.  She submits that the child was taken into

public care on 19 December 1989 and the issues were finally decided

when leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 19 September

1991, i.e. one year and nine months later.

      Moreover, the applicant complains that without access during that

period her chances of being reunited with her child diminished to the

extent of being non-existent, which is exemplified by the fact that the

City Court used as an argument against her that she had not seen her

child for a long time.

      Finally the applicant complains that she did not get a fair

hearing when the questions of care, parental rights and access were

determined.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 10 October 1990 and registered

on 31 October 1990.

      On 10 July 1992 the President of the Commission decided not to

apply Rule 36 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure in order to secure

an adjournment of the adoption proceedings in Norway pending the

outcome of the proceedings before the Commission.

      On 14 October 1992 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to

invite the respondent Government to submit written observations on the

admissibility and merits of the application.

      The Government's observations were submitted on 26 January 1993

and the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 17 and 26

March 1993.

THE LAW

      The applicant submits a number of complaints relating to the

public care situation of her daughter. She invokes in this respect

Articles 6, 8 and 13 (Art. 6, 8, 13) of the Convention which inter alia

guarantee the right to respect for family life (Article 8) (Art. 8),

the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the determination

of civil rights and obligations (Article 6) (Art. 6) and the right to

an effective remedy to everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth

in the Convention are violated (Article 13) (Art. 13).

      The applicant complains of the fact that her daughter, S, was

taken into care and that she was deprived of her parental rights

without any possibility of contact with S. She maintains that although

she admittedly was in need of certain assistance at the time she gave

birth to S, it was not necessary to take S into care and to limit

access to twice a week. Furthermore, at the time the care order was

upheld by the CPC, i.e. on 2 May 1990, she had managed to establish a

stable existence in Oslo, having found an apartment and friends. Thus

the facts of the case did not at that moment in time disclose that she

was unable to take care of S.

      As regards the deprivation of parental rights and the termination

of access the applicant maintains that these measures were only

implemented due to the fact that it had been decided to place S for

adoption. The applicant contends that in particular the termination of

access was an arbitrary decision based on irrelevant arguments with the

sole purpose of making it next to impossible for her to successfully

pursue her attempt to be reunited with S.

      The applicant furthermore contends that, having regard to the

fact that access was refused, the disputes concerning the care order

and the parental rights were not determined within a reasonable time.

It follows from the nature of the case that such questions ought to

have been determined speedily in that the mere passing of time turned

out to be of a decisive importance in the case.

      The Government accept that the decisions relating to care,

parental rights and access interfered with the applicant's right to

respect for her family life, but they maintain that this interference

was in accordance with the requirements of Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention. They contend that the substantive

decisions were in accordance with law, had a legitimate aim, namely the

interests of S, and were necessary in a democratic society in that the

circumstances of the case disclosed relevant and sufficient reasons for

taking S into care, for depriving the applicant of her parental rights

and for terminating access.

      As regards the procedural issues of the case the Government

acknowledge that the time aspects are relevant not only in relation to

Article 6 (Art. 6) but also in relation to Article 8 of the Convention.

They contend, however, that the authorities and courts involved acted

with special diligence and that neither the administrative proceedings

nor the court proceedings were excessive in their length.

      The Commission has taken cognizance of both parties' submissions

and has made a preliminary examination of the applicant's complaints

in the light thereof. It has come to the conclusion that the

applicant's complaints raise serious issues as to the application and

interpretation of the Convention, and that these issues can only be

determined after an examination of their merits.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE

      without prejudging the merits of the case.

Secretary to the Second Chamber      President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)