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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 22640/93

by Raymond HALL

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 1

December 1993, the following members being present:

MM. A. WEITZEL, President

C.L. ROZAKIS

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

G.B. REFFI

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber,

assisted by Mrs. K. REID.

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 11 March 1993 by

Raymond HALL against the United Kingdom and registered on 16 September

1993 under file No. 22640/93;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1953 and resident in

Southampton. The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised

as follows.

The applicant was involved in an incident 11 March 1990 in which

two men were injured. He was arrested on 19 April 1990 and charged with

inflicting grievous bodily harm and assault. He was released on bail.

At his trial in February 1991, the applicant pleaded self-

defence. He was convicted on 15 February 1991 on one count of grievous

bodily harm and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.

The applicant applied for leave to appeal against conviction on

14 March 1991, alleging, inter alia, that the judge had misdirected the

jury as to the defence of self-defence.

Leave to appeal was granted by a single judge of the Court of

Appeal on 16 June 1991. The applicant was informed of this by letter

from his solicitor of 17 July 1991 and told to contact counsel for

further information. He appears to have experienced some difficulty in

contacting counsel. On 14 October 1991, he contacted the Registrar of

Criminal Appeals who on 25 October 1991 informed him that due to the

limited availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard

before Christmas.

On 18 February 1992, the Court of Appeal heard the applicant's

appeal. It found that the judge's direction to the jury as to self-

defence had been fundamentally wrong and that the conviction should

therefore be quashed.

On 12 May 1992, the applicant applied to the Secretary of State

under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for compensation for

the period of time which he had spent, in his view, wrongfully

imprisoned pending his appeal. By letter dated 27 May 1992, the Home

Office stated that it would consider the application in the context of

the 1988 Act and the Home Secretary's statement to the House of Commons

dated 29 November 1985 concerning payment of compensation where a

person has spent a period of custody as a result of serious default on

the part of a public authority. The applicant's application was refused

by letter dated 18 August 1992.

The applicant applied for judicial review of the Secretary of

State's refusal.

Leave was refused on 29 November 1992. His renewed application

was refused on 18 January 1993. The High Court judge found that the

Home Secretary had not erred in his application of the statutory

machinery for compensation and rejected the submissions of the

applicant's counsel that the delay in the hearing of the appeal

disclosed serious default on the part of a public authority.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that he had to wait an unreasonable time

before his appeal contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

He also invokes Article 5 paras. 1, 4 and 5 in relation to the

delay in his appeal and the lack of compensation. He further complains

under Article 3 of the degrading experience of being imprisoned.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains of the length of proceedings in relation

to his appeal against conviction.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), as relevant, provides in its first

sentence:

"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge

against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within

a reasonable time by (a) ...tribunal established by law..."

Since the proceedings concerned the applicant's appeal against

conviction on a criminal charge, the above provision applies.

According to the constant case-law of the Court and the

Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be

assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having

regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the

case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the competent

authorities (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Kemmache judgment of

27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27, para. 60). Persons held in

detention are also entitled to special diligence (see, for example,

Eur. Court H.R., Tomasi judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A,

p. 35 para. 84).

In the present case, the period complained of is the time

elapsing between conviction on 15 February 1991 and the determination

of the appeal on 18 February 1992, a period of one year and three days.

The applicant did not however lodge his appeal for leave until

14 March 1991. Leave was then granted on 16 June 1991. The applicant

appears to have experienced some difficulty in contacting counsel and

was informed by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals that due to the

limited availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard

before Christmas. There is therefore a period between June 1991 and

February 1992, a period of 8 months, during which nothing was

apparently done.

The Commission, having regard to the case as a whole however,

considers that the delay that occurred is not sufficient to justify the

conclusion that the total length of proceedings (i.e. 22 months for two

instances) was excessive and thereby raise an issue under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant also complains under Article 5 paras. 1, 4 and 5

(Art. 5-1, 5-4, 5-5) of the Convention. These provide insofar as

relevant:

"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of

person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in

the following cases and in accordance with a procedure

prescribed by law:

a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a

competent court...

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which

the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily

by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not

lawful.

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or

detention in contravention of the provisions of this

Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation."

The Commission notes first of all that there is no indication

that the applicant's detention was unlawful within the meaning of

Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention. While the Court of

Appeal quashed his conviction on the basis of a misdirection of the

trial judge, this does not deprive his detention of the character of

"lawful" within the meaning of the Article 5 para. 1 (a)

(Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention.

As regards the delay between conviction and appeal, this does not

raise any issue under Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.

That provision applies to proceedings concerning the lawfulness of

detention and not to the original trial and appeal which, as concerning

the determination of a "criminal charge", fall to be examined under the

requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

The Commission lastly notes that the applicant complains that he

was unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for his period of detention

and invokes Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5). The right to compensation

under this provision presupposes that a violation of one of the other

paragraphs of Article 5 (Art. 5) has been established either by a

domestic organ or by the Convention organs (see eg. No. 7950/77, Dec.

4.3.80, D.R. 19, p. 213). In the present case however, the Commission

has found above that the applicant's complaints disclose no appearance

of a violation of Article 5 paras. 1 and 4 (Art. 5-1, 5-4) of the

Convention.

It follows that these complaints must be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3. The applicant also invokes Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention

in respect of the treatment he suffered from being detained in prison.

Article 3 (Art. 3) provides:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment."

The case-law of the Convention organs establishes that

ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall

within the scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The

assessment of that minimum is relative and depends on all the

circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and

its physical or mental effects (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R.

Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series a no.

25, p. 65, para. 162).

In the present case, the applicant complains in general terms of

the degrading experience of being detained in prison. He complains of

no specific aspect and makes no reference to any physical or mental

ill-effects. In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the

applicant's experience, unpleasant though it undoubtedly was, does not

disclose treatment of such a nature or degree as to render it either

inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber

(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)

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HALL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

HALL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI