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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 21820/93

by K.B.

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 December 1993, the following members being present:

MM. A. WEITZEL, President

C.L. ROZAKIS

F. ERMACORA

E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

G.B. REFFI

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 27 January 1993

by K.B. against the United Kingdom and registered on 11 May 1993 under

file No. 21820/93;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1957 and resident in

Birmingham. Before the Commission he is represented by Messrs. Maurice

Andrews, solicitors practising in Birmingham.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant was involved in an incident 11 March 1990 in which

two men were injured. He was arrested on 3 July 1990 and, with a co-

accused, charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm and assault. He

was released on bail.

At his trial in February 1991, the applicant pleaded that he had

been going to the defence of his co-accused, who had pleaded self-

defence. He was convicted on 15 February 1991 of grievous bodily harm

and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.

The applicant applied for leave to appeal against conviction on

26 February 1991, alleging, inter alia, that the judge had misdirected

the jury as to the questions of self-defence and reasonable defence.

Leave to appeal was granted by a single judge of the Court of

Appeal on 16 June 1991. Bail was refused. On 24 November 1991, the

applicant contacted the Registrar of Criminal Appeals who on 3 December

1991 informed him that due to the limited availability of court time

the appeal was unlikely to be heard before Christmas.

On 18 February 1992, the Court of Appeal heard the appeal. It

found that the judge's direction to the jury as to self-defence had

been fundamentally wrong and that the conviction should therefore be

quashed.

On 13 March 1992, the applicant applied to the Secretary of State

for compensation for his detention. By letter dated 30 March 1992, the

Home Office stated that it would consider the application in the

context of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Home Secretary's

statement to the House of Commons of 29 November 1985 concerning

payment of compensation where a person has spent a period of custody

as a result of serious default on the part of a public authority. The

applicant's application was refused by letter dated 18 August 1992.

The applicant applied for judicial review of the Secretary of

State's refusal.

Leave was refused on 18 January 1993. The High Court judge found

that the Home Secretary had not erred in his application of the

statutory machinery for compensation and rejected the submissions of

the applicant's counsel that the delay in the hearing of the appeal

disclosed serious default on the part of a public authority.

COMPLAINTS

The applicant complains that no compensation was paid to him for

the year which he had spent in prison. He invokes Article 5 of the

Convention, and, without further specification, subsidiarily mentions

Articles 3, 6, and 13 of the Convention, also referring to the length

of proceedings.

THE LAW

1. To the extent that the applicant complains of the length of

proceedings in relation to his appeal against conviction, the

Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), so far as

relevant, provides in its first sentence:

"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time

by (a) ...tribunal established by law..."

Since the proceedings concerned the applicant's appeal against

conviction on a criminal charge, the above provision applies.

According to the constant case-law of the Court and the

Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be

assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having

regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the

the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the competent

authorities (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Kemmache judgment of

27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27, para. 60). Persons held in

detention are also entitled to special diligence (see, for example,

Eur. Court H.R., Tomasi judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A,

p. 35 para. 84).

In the present case, the period at issue is the time elapsing

between conviction on 15 February 1991 and the determination of the

appeal on 18 February 1992, a period of one year and three days.

The applicant applied for leave to appeal on 26 February 1991.

Leave to appeal was granted on 16 June 1991. The applicant was informed

by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals that due to the limited

availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard before

Christmas. There is therefore a period between 16 June 1991 and 18

February 1992, a period of 8 months during which nothing was apparently

done.

The Commission, having regard to the case as a whole however,

considers that the delay that occurred is not sufficient to justify the

conclusion that the total length of proceedings (i.e. 19 months from

the applicant`s initial arrest until the quashing of his sentence) was

excessive and thereby raises an issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant also complains, without further specification,

under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention. Article 5 (Art. 5)

provides, insofar as relevant:

"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of

person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in

the following cases and in accordance with a procedure

prescribed by law:

a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a

competent court...

5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or

detention in contravention of the provisions of this

Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation."

The Commission notes first of all that there is no indication

that the applicant's detention was unlawful within the meaning of

Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention. While the Court of

Appeal quashed his conviction on the basis of a misdirection of the

trial judge, this does not deprive his detention of the character of

"lawful" within the meaning of the Article 5 para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a)

of the Convention.

The Commission also notes that the applicant complains that he

was unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for his period of detention.

The right to compensation under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention presupposes that a violation of one of the other paragraphs

of Article 5 (Art. 5) has been established either by a domestic organ

or by the Convention organs (see eg. No. 7950/77, Dec. 4.3.80, D.R. 19,

p. 213). In the present case, however, the Commission has found above

that the applicant's complaints disclose no appearance of a violation

of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3. The applicant also invokes, again without further specification,

Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

Article 3 (Art. 3) provides:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment."

In the present case, the applicant does not even complain in

general terms of the degrading experience of being detained in prison.

He complains of no specific aspect and makes no reference to any

physical or mental ill-effects. In these circumstances, the Commission

finds that the applicant's experience, unpleasant though it may have

been, does not disclose treatment of such a nature or degree as to

render it either inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4. Finally, again without any further specification whatsoever, the

applicant invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

Article 13 (Art. 13) provides:

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights establishes,

however, that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy in

domestic law in respect of any supposed grievance under the Convention:

the grievance must be an arguable one in terms of the Convention (Eur.

Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131,

p. 23, para. 52). The Commission has considered that the applicant`s

complaints under Articles 3, 5 and 6 (Art. 3, 5, 6) of the Convention

are manifestly ill-founded. It finds that the applicant does not have

an arguable claim of a breach of these provisions for the purposes of

a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber

(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)

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K.B. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

K.B. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM