AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 21328/93

                      by Barbro JOHANSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 December 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 20 May 1992 by

Barbro JOHANSSON against Sweden and registered on 4 February 1993 under

file No. 21328/93;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1932. She is a nurse

resident at Mörlunda. Before the Commission she is represented by

Mr. Göran Ravnsborg, a lecturer at the University of Lund. She has

previously submitted complaints to the Commission which were registered

as Application No. 14006/88. That application was declared partly

admissible but was later subject to a friendly settlement.

      The facts of the case, as submitted on behalf of the applicant,

may be summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

      In 1971 the applicant's husband bought an agricultural property

called Brånstorp 1:6 in the municipality of Nässjö from Mrs. E.J.  His

subsequent request for a permit to acquire the property was rejected

by the County Agricultural Board (lantbruksnämnden) of the County of

Jönköping on the ground that the property was needed to promote the

establishment of functional farm holding units. The purchase was

therefore considered void.

      In 1982 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Eksjö found that Mrs.

E.J. was only the dummy-owner of the property and that the real owner

was the applicant's husband.

      In 1983 the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten) decided

that the property was to be sold at a compulsory sale by auction

(exekutiv auktion).

      In 1984 the property was sold to the applicant for 100,000 SEK

at such an auction, regarded as a compulsory one under the 1979 Land

Acquisition Act (jordförvärvslag 1979:230, hereinafter "the 1979 Act").

      In 1986 the County Agricultural Board reminded the applicant of

the conditions under the 1979 Act attaching to her purchase, namely her

obligation under Section 16 of the 1979 Act to obtain a permit to

retain the property within two years in order to avoid a compulsory

re-sale of the property. The applicant then submitted a request for

such a permit.

      In 1987 the County Agricultural Board rejected the applicant's

request, considering that the property was needed for the

rationalisation of agriculture and forestry.

      Her subsequent appeals to the National Board of Agriculture

(lantbruksstyrelsen) and the Government were rejected on 20 May and

10 September 1987 respectively.

       In 1988 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of the

County of Jönköping ordered that the property be sold compulsorily by

auction in accordance with Section 16 of the 1979 Act.

      The applicant's appeal to the Government was rejected on

8 September 1988.

      On 11 April 1990 the applicant requested inter alia that the

Government reconsider its decision of 8 September 1988 concerning the

sale of the property. She also requested that the Government order the

suspension of the sale.

      On 19 April 1990 the Government decided to take no further

action, as it had already taken a final position on the sale of the

property.

      The public auction took place on 27 April 1990 and the property

was sold to the County Agricultural Board for 300,000 SEK.

      The applicant appealed on 14 May 1990 against the auction to the

Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt), requesting inter alia that it set

aside the sale of the property and declare void the administrative

decisions resulting in the sale.

      On 21 May 1990 the applicant received the purchase-price.

      On 8 June 1990 the Court of Appeal decided that the case should

be considered on the basis of written submissions (föredragning).

      On 26 June 1990 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's

appeal, stating inter alia that it had no jurisdiction to review the

decisions of the administrative authorities concerning the retention

permit or the decisions ordering the compulsory sale of the property.

      On 3 December 1990 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) granted

leave to appeal. On 11 March 1991 it quashed the decisions by the Court

of Appeal of 8 and 26 June 1990 and referred the case back to that

court, considering inter alia that the applicant should have been

granted an oral hearing.  The Supreme Court stated inter alia:

      (translation)

      "[The applicant's] appeal raises the question to what

      extent an administrative decision taken on the basis of

      [the 1979 Act] can be reviewed or annulled in subsequent

      execution proceedings.

      This question is connected with the general question to

      what extent executable deeds can be annulled in execution

      proceedings. This problem has been noted both in the case-

      law and in the doctrine. It has been considered that the

      execution authorities - both the Enforcement Offices and

      the superior organs - have a right of review but that this

      right is very limited. However, according to what has been

      stated in one case, there may be good reasons to extend the

      review of executable deeds somewhat more than usual when

      the deeds are administrative decisions, in particular when

      these decisions cannot be appealed to an administrative

      court. ...

      It is also justified, in this context, to take into account

      the provisions of the 1950 European Convention on Human

      Rights as well as the case-law developed by the European

      Court of Human Rights. On 21 February 1990 the European

      Court decided a case against Sweden where - as in the

      present case - the issue concerned a compulsory sale of

      real property after a permit to acquire the property under

      [the 1979 Act] had been refused (the Håkansson and

      Sturesson case). In its judgment (Series A no. 171), the

      Court found that questions of permits to acquire property

      as well as questions of compulsory sales concerned the

      individual's 'civil rights and obligations' and that the

      individual who was affected had a right under the

      Convention to have the issue examined by a court.

      In order to satisfy fully the requirements of the European

      Convention, a court review would seem to be required which

      is different from that which can be effected as part of

      execution proceedings. In a proposal which has recently

      been submitted to the Law Council (lagrådet) it has

      therefore been suggested that, in cases under [the 1979

      Act], the decisions of the central agricultural authority

      shall be subject to appeal to the Administrative Court of

      Appeal (kammarrätten). Pending a reform of such kind the

      possibility for a court review which exists at the stage of

      the execution should be used as far as possible.

      It follows that a review should take place of the

      administrative decisions which resulted in the auction of

      27 April 1990.

      (The applicant) requested in the Court of Appeal that the

      case should be dealt with at a main hearing

      (huvudförhandling) and asked that at that hearing she

      herself as well as the Chairman and/or the Vice-Chairman of

      the County Agricultural Board should be heard as parties

      and that some named persons should be heard as witnesses.

      She has maintained this request in the Supreme Court and

      has also requested the hearing of one further person. If

      the case should not be referred back to the Court of Appeal

      for a new examination, (the applicant) has requested a

      hearing before the Supreme Court.

      From the provisions of Chapters 52 and 56 of the Code of

      Judicial Procedure it appears that proceedings in cases

      regarding appeals against procedural or executive decisions

      (besvärsmål) are in principle in writing both in the Court

      of Appeal and in the Supreme Court. However, according to

      Chapter 52, Section 10, first paragraph and Chapter 56,

      Section 12 a hearing (förhör) may be held where it is

      necessary for the investigation of the case that a party or

      someone else be heard orally.

      The wording of the statute shows that strong reasons are

      required for the holding of a hearing in a case based on an

      appeal against a decision. In practice it would also seem

      to be rare that such hearings are held (cf. Lars Welamson,

      Rättegång VI, 1978 p. 141).

      The reasons which (the applicant) has invoked for an oral

      procedure do no have such weight as is required under the

      provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure. However, the

      provisions of the European Convention and the judgments of

      the European Court (cf. as regards the question of a main

      hearing in criminal cases NJA 1988 p. 572 and Bill

      1988/89:95 p. 45 et seq.) should be taken into account also

      in this respect. In the aforementioned case of Håkansson

      and Sturesson the Court found that the parties concerned

      had been entitled to have an oral hearing in the

      proceedings before the Court of Appeal where the question

      of the conditions of the public auction were examined.

      In view of the said judgment by the European Court and

      since there is nothing in Swedish law which prevents such

      a procedure from being applied, the Supreme Court considers

      that an oral hearing should be held in this case."

      On 1 April 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's

request that the former Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the County

Agricultural Board and a real estate agent be heard as witnesses.

Referring to the Supreme Court's finding in its decision

of 11 March 1991 the Court found, however, that the applicant herself

should be heard as well as the official of the County Agricultural

Board who had been in charge of the applicant's case.

      On 4 August 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal struck the appeal out

of its list of cases, the applicant having withdrawn it in view of the

settlement reached between her and the County Administrative Board on

30 July 1992. Under the settlement the applicant was granted a right

to repurchase the property Brånstorp 1:6 under the condition that she

would withdraw her appeal.

Relevant domestic law

      The acquisition of agricultural real property is subject to the

regulations of the 1979 Act. The aim of the 1979 Act was to implement

new agricultural guidelines adopted by Parliament (Riksdagen) in 1977

and to further the policy goals of forestry and regional planning.

      On 1 July 1987 amendments to the 1979 Act entered into force, the

purpose of which was to make it easier to obtain a permit for the

purchase of agricultural holdings. The aim of the amended 1979 Act was

to support appropriate development of farm holdings in the general

interest and to form well-adapted holdings in conformity with the aims

of regional policy.

      On 1 July 1991 further amendments to the 1979 Act entered into

force. The provisions below of the 1979 Act refer to their wording up

to 1 July 1991.

      Under Sections 2 and 3 of the 1979 Act a permit is required for

the acquisition of an agricultural holding. No permit is required inter

alia if the property is acquired at a compulsory auction. A request for

a permit shall in principle be made within three months from the

purchase (Section 12). Under Section 4, first paragraph, a permit may

be refused inter alia if it is in the general interest that the

property be used for rationalisation of agriculture or forestry

(sub-section 1) or if it is obvious that the purchase price or other

compensation considerably exceeds the market value of the property

(sub-section 4).

      Under Section 16, first paragraph, a property acquired at a

compulsory auction - in circumstances which in the case of an ordinary

purchase would have required a permit - shall be re-sold within two

years, unless the said circumstances have by then ceased to exist or

the purchaser has obtained a permit from the County Agricultural Board

to retain the property. The granting of such a permit is subject inter

alia to the regulations in Sections 3 and 4, with the exception of

Section 4, subsection 4. The sale contract established after the

compulsory auction shall contain a note recalling the obligation laid

down in Section 16. A decision by the County Agricultural Board not to

grant permission to retain a property may be appealed to the National

Board of Agriculture and ultimately to the Government (Section 18).

      If, in a case where this is required under Section 16, the

property has not been resold within the prescribed time-limit, the

County Administrative Board shall, at the request of the County

Agricultural Board, order that the property be sold at a public auction

by the Enforcement Office. At such an auction the property may only be

sold to someone who has received an acquisition permit or who is, like

the County Agricultural Board, exempted from the permit requirement.

      Section 17 specifies that no sale at an auction under that

Section may take place unless the purchase price offered amounts at

least to the value to be attributed to the property in accordance with

the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Code of Enforcement (utsöknings-

balken). This value is to be fixed by the Enforcement Office or, if the

owner of the property makes a timely request for a special valuation,

by valuers appointed by the County Administrative Board. In both cases

the valuation shall be made in consultation with the County

Agricultural Board. If the property is not sold at the auction the

County Agricultural Board may, within a period of two years, request

the County Administrative Board to hold a new auction. If no such

request is made, or if no acceptable bid is made at the second auction,

the owner is no longer required to sell the property.

      The County Administrative Board's decision to order a public

auction may be appealed to the Government.

      The Enforcement Office's decisions in respect of an auction may,

according to Chapter 18 Section 1 of the Code of Enforcement, be

brought before a court of appeal and ultimately, with leave to appeal,

before the Supreme Court. However, according to Section 6 para. 2 of

the same Chapter, an appeal against a decision that is merely a

preparatory step for a final decision may, in general, be lodged only

in connection with an appeal against the latter. Appeals follow the

rules of the 1986 Administrative Act (förvaltningslagen) and those of

the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken), as far as the latter

are relevant.

      In the event that the purchase of agricultural property becomes

void as a result of a refusal of permission to acquire the property on

the ground that it is needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and

forestry, the State is, according to Section 14 of the 1979 Act,

obliged to redeem the property at the purchase price agreed upon in the

invalid sale, if so requested by the seller. However, no such

obligation exists where the purchase price considerably exceeds the

value of the property in view of its yield and other circumstances, or

if the terms are unreasonable in other respects. A request for

redemption should be made to the County Agricultural Board. An action

for redemption may be brought before the Real Estate Court

(fastighetsdomstolen). The decision of that court can be appealed to

a court of appeal and from there an appeal lies to the Supreme Court.

      Chapter 52, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure  - which

deals with appeals against procedural, executive and some other

decisions (besvär) - provides as follows:

      (Swedish)

      "Om det är nödvändigt för utredningen i målet att en part eller

      någon annan hörs muntligen, får hovrätten förordna om detta på

      lämpligt sätt.

      Vad som sägs i ... gäller även vid förhör entligt första stycket

      ..."

      (Translation)

      "Where it is necessary for the purposes of the investigation of

      a case that a party or other person be heard orally by the Court

      of Appeal, the Court of Appeal shall decide on such a hearing as

      it finds appropriate.

      The provisions in ... are also applicable to a hearing referred

      to in the first paragraph ..."

      According to Chapter 56, Section 12 of the Code these rules also

apply to the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains of the limitation in scope of the

examination by the Court of Appeal and the insufficiency of the oral

hearing before that court. She considers that the translation, which

appears in the Court's judgment in the HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson case

(Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171), is

not quite exact, since the Swedish word "förhör", which appears in the

original text, does not correspond to "hearing" but rather to

"interrogation" or "questioning". She invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains of the length of the proceedings.

She refers in particular to a statement by the respondent State before

the European Court of Human Rights in the above-mentioned case of

HÃ¥kansson and Sturesson to the effect that cases such as the present

one are being dealt with by priority by Swedish courts. Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention is again invoked.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains of the limitation in scope of the

examination by the Court of Appeal and the insufficiency of the oral

hearing before that court. She invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention, which reads, insofar as it is relevant to this

complaint as well as to her second complaint:

      " In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is

      entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time

      ..."

      The Commission considers that it can leave open the questions

whether the applicant can claim to be a "victim" in accordance with

Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention in view of the settlement

reached on 30 July 1992 or whether she can be considered to have

exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention despite the fact that she withdrew her appeal before the

Court of Appeal, since in any case the application is inadmissible for

the reasons indicated below.

      The Commission has first considered whether there was a dispute

over a "right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be

recognised under domestic law. Such a dispute must be a genuine and

serious one; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right

but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise, and the result

of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question.

Finally, the right must be of a "civil" character (cf. e.g. Eur. Court

H.R., Skärby judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 180-B, pp. 36 and

37, paras. 27 and 29).

      The Commission further recalls that the concept of "civil rights"

is not to be interpreted solely by reference to the respondent State's

domestic law and that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies irrespective

of the parties' status, be it public or private, and of the nature of

the legislation governing the manner in which the dispute is to be

determined. It is sufficient that the action was "pecuniary" in nature

and that the action was founded on an alleged infringement of rights

which were likewise pecuniary rights (Eur. Court H.R., Editions

Périscope judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-B, p. 72,

para. 40) or that the outcome of the proceedings would be "decisive for

private rights and obligations" (Eur. Court H.R., X v. France judgment

of 31 March 1992, Series A no. 234-C, p. 90, para. 30).

      In the present case the Commission observes that in her appeal

to the Court of Appeal the applicant challenged the public auction at

which her property had been forcibly sold. It considers that in this

respect there was a dispute of a genuine and serious character between

her and the authorities relating to a "right" of a "civil" character.

      It remains to be examined whether the applicant had at her

disposal a procedure satisfying the requirements of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention in regard to the dispute concerned.

      The Commission first notes in this respect that the question of

whether or not the applicant should get a permit to retain the property

had already been determined in previous proceedings which were the

subject of Application No. 14006/88. It observes that the proceedings

now at issue concerned the legality of the public auction which was

held on 27 April 1990 and at which the property was sold to the County

Agricultural Board for 300,000 SEK. The Court of Appeal had full

jurisdiction to determine this issue. Consequently, there is no

indication that the scope of review was too limited to satisfy the

requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6).

      However, the applicant also complains that the oral hearing which

could have been held would have been too restricted to satisfy the

procedural requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6). She points out in this

regard that the term used in the Swedish statute corresponds to

"interrogation" or "questioning" and not to "hearing".

      The Commission accepts that from a linguistic point of view the

term used may seem to have a fairly restrictive meaning. It notes,

however, that the Supreme Court, when referring to the applicant's case

back to the Court of Appeal, found that the applicant should have been

granted an oral hearing in the Court of Appeal in view, in particular,

of the requirements of the Convention. In these circumstances, there

is no reason to believe that the hearing which the Court of Appeal

would subsequently have held would have been too limited to satisfy the

requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. The Commission

also observes, in this regard, that the Court of Appeal decided on 1

April 1992 that the applicant herself as well as the official of the

County Agricultural Board who had been in charge of her case should be

heard before that court and that the reason why the hearing was

cancelled was the settlement of the case which was subsequently reached

between the applicant and the County Administrative Board.

      In these circumstances, the Commission finds no indication of a

violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as regards

the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains of the length of the proceedings

and again invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of each case and having regard to the criteria laid down

in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and

the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (e.g. Eur.

Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198,

pp. 12-13, para. 30).

      The Commission considers that the period to be considered

commenced on 14 May 1990, when the applicant lodged an appeal against

the public auction held on 27 April 1990, and terminated in the Court

of Appeal's decision of 4 August 1992 striking the case off its list.

      The Commission observes that during that period the case was

dealt with, first by the Court of Appeal, then by the Supreme Court,

and then again by the Court of Appeal. The initial proceedings before

the Court of Appeal lasted less than two months, while the examination

by the Supreme Court lasted about eight months. The subsequent

proceedings before the Court of Appeal lasted about one year and five

months.

      The Commission considers that, although there might have been

some avoidable delays, the proceedings were, taken as a whole, not so

lengthy as to be in violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Pretto and Others judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A no.

71, p. 16, para. 37).

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)