AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 18778/91

                      by S.

                      against Austria

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

1 December 1993, the following members being present:

      MM.  S. TRECHSEL, President

           H. DANELIUS

           G. JÖRUNDSSON

           J.-C. SOYER

           H.G. SCHERMERS

      Mrs. G.H. THUNE

      MM.  F. MARTINEZ

           L. LOUCAIDES

           J.-C. GEUS

           M.A. NOWICKI

           I. CABRAL BARRETO

      Mr.  K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 22 August 1991 by

S. against Austria and registered on 9 September 1991 under file No.

18778/91;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a banking institute established as co-operative

(Genossenschaft) in the area of Salzburg. Before the Commission, the

applicant is represented by Mr. H. Liebscher, a lawyer practising in

Salzburg.

      The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

applicant, may be summarised as follows.

A.    Background

      In Application No. 12593/86, the applicant, together with another

Salzburg banking institute, complained under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention about the length of two sets of proceedings concerning one

of their clients, namely criminal proceedings in which jewellery

pledged to them was seized with a view to its forfeiture, and customs

proceedings in which the seizure was maintained with a view to

satisfying the State's customs claims against their client. Application

No. 12593/86 was declared admissible on 10 October 1990, and is

currently pending before the Committee of Ministers.

      The applicant's complaints raised in the present application are

related to the above-mentioned customs proceedings.

B.    The particular circumstances of the case

      On 10 April 1982 officers of the Salzburg Customs Office

(Zollamt) seized (Beschlagnahme) jewellery which had been pledged to

the applicant by Mr. K., one of its clients, as security for loans. The

seizures were made for the purpose of securing evidence in connection

with investigations against Mr. K. on the suspicion of having committed

tax offences.

      As from November 1982 the pledged jewellery continued to be

seized on the basis of a court order issued in the course of the

criminal proceedings against Mr. K. When the competent court lifted the

seizure in July 1987 as regards part of the jewellery, and in March

1991 as regards the remainder, it conferred the power to dispose of the

jewellery concerned to the Customs Office which had claimed it as

security for unsatisfied customs claims against Mr. K.

      On 13 August 1987 the Salzburg Customs Office, referring to

S. 178 of the Customs and Excise Act (Zollgesetz), seized various

pieces of jewellery (one sapphire, fifty-eight rubies, forty-one

emeralds, two golden rings with emeralds and diamonds) and claimed its

tax liability in rem (Sachhaftung) for Mr. K.'s customs duties relating

to these pieces of jewellery.

      On 9 March 1988 the Customs Office, in a preliminary decision

(Berufungsvorentscheidung), dismissed the applicant's appeal against

its decision of 13 August 1978. It corrected the sum of customs duties

concerned, fixing it at AS 2,621,699. The Customs Office found in

particular that S. 178 applied to import turnover tax. Moreover, the

Office, having regard to its discretionary powers, considered that the

public interests in claiming the tax liability in rem regarding the

pledged jewellery outweighed the applicant's interests. In the public

interest, it had to ensure a quick and secure recovery of the

outstanding taxes. Furthermore, in the circumstances of the present

case, it did not appear unfair to request the applicant, in the context

of the tax liability in rem, to pay the taxes due.

      The applicant maintained its appeal before the higher tax

authority.

      On 25 October 1989 the Salzburg Regional Directorate of Finance

(Finanzlandesdirektion), fixing the amount of tax liability in rem at

AS 2,621,699, dismissed the applicant's appeal.

      In its decision, the Regional Directorate noted that on

13 September 1979 the applicant had accepted the sapphire and further

pieces of jewellery (estimated value about AS 8.7 million) as security

for a loan of AS 3.5 million granted to Mr. K.  On 19 September 1979

the applicant had granted Mr. K. a further loan of AS 4 million and

taken fifty-eight rubies, forty-one emeralds, two golden rings with

emeralds and diamonds and further pieces of jewellery (estimated value

about AS 8.7 million) as security.

      The Directorate confirmed that the conditions for claiming the

tax liability in rem of the jewellery were met. This liability extended

to import turnover tax, the decision prescribing the import duties had

become final and Mr. K. had meanwhile gone abroad. Other means to

recover the taxes due had remained unsuccessful. The Directorate,

referring to S. 20 of the Federal Taxation Act (Bundesabgabenordnung),

further found that the Customs Office had correctly applied its

discretionary powers in claiming the tax liability in rem. Weighing the

interests of the party and the public interest in the payment of taxes,

the Directorate found in particular that the applicant had failed to

verify the origin of the jewellery. The applicant had meanwhile given

back to Mr. K. pledges valued at almost AS 4 million without having

explained the reasons for this reduction of its securities. In any

case, the fact that the value of the pledged objects exceeded by far

the amount of the loans suggested that the applicant anticipated

difficulties in the realisation of its right of pledge. There was no

offer of proof as to the applicant's allegation that regarding most of

the pieces of jewellery concerned the import duties had been paid, and,

anyway, it was refuted by the final decision in the tax assessment

proceedings against Mr. K.

      On 28 March 1990 the Salzburg Customs Office ordered the seizure

of some further pieces of jewellery (three emeralds and one diamond;

estimated value more than AS 1.6 million), and claimed its tax

liability in rem in respect of further import duties (AS 495,359)

imposed upon Mr. K. in respect of these pieces of jewellery. The

Office, referring to S. 178 of the Customs and Excise Act and S. 20 of

the Federal Taxation Act, found that the public interest in recovering

the taxes in a quick and secure manner outweighed the applicant's

interests.

      On 3 September 1990 the Salzburg Customs Office, in a preliminary

decision, dismissed the applicant's appeal against its decision of

28 March 1990. It corrected the sum of customs duties concerned, fixing

it at AS 381,598. Moreover, the Office exercising its discretionary

powers considered that the applicant, when accepting the jewellery

concerned as pledges, had not verified their origin and whether customs

duties had been paid. Thus the applicant had no interest meriting

protection.

      On 25 September 1990 the Constitutional Court (Verfassungs-

gerichtshof) refused to deal with the applicant's constitutional

complaint about the decision of the Regional Directorate of Finance

dated 25 October 1989, and referred the matter to the Administrative

Court (Verfwaltungsgerichtshof).

      The applicant maintained its appeal against the Customs Office's

decision of 28 March 1990 before the higher tax authority. On

14 December 1990, the Regional Directorate of Finance dismissed the

appeal.

      The Regional Directorate noted that on 13 September 1979 the

applicant had accepted three emeralds, a diamond and further pieces of

jewellery (estimated value about AS 8.7 million) as security for a loan

of AS 3.5 million granted to Mr. K. The Directorate found that the

applicant had failed to inquire about the origin of the pieces of

jewellery concerned as well as about the question of customs duties;

as regards one piece of jewellery, it was obvious that it had been

imported. The Directorate also rejected the applicant's argument that

Mr. K. had been known as a respectable client. The Directorate

considered that, taking into account this lack of diligence, the claim

for tax liability in rem did not appear unfair.

      On 14 February 1991 the Administrative Court dismissed the

applicant's complaint about the decision of the Regional Directorate

of Finance of 25 October 1989.

      The Administrative Court, having regard to the relevant

provisions of the Customs and Excise Act and the Federal Taxation Act,

considered in particular that the Salzburg Customs Office had been

competent to claim the tax liability in rem of the jewellery in

question in respect of Mr. K.'s outstanding customs duties. Moreover,

both customs duties in general as well as the import turnover tax were

essentially linked to the object concerned which therefore continued

to be a security for such duties irrespective of the rights of third

persons. The tax liability in rem accorded the tax authorities a

position in respect of a particular object which preceded any other

rights in respect of this object, including property, in view of the

more important public interest in securing the payment of customs

duties. According to the Turnover Tax Act (Umsatzsteuergesetz), the

provisions of the Customs and Excise Act had to be applied mutatis

mutandis; this included the tax liability in rem in respect of import

turnover tax. As regards the applicant's objections to the amounts of

customs duties due, the Administrative Court referred to the final tax

assessments.

      Furthermore, the Administrative Court considered that the

Directorate of Finance had properly exercised its discretion when

finding that the public interest in recovering Mr. K.'s outstanding

taxes outweighed the applicant's interest in keeping the pledged

jewellery. In this respect, the Administrative Court noted that the

applicant had not objected to the findings of the Regional Directorate

of Finance as to its negligence in verifying the origin of the pledges

concerned as well as the question whether customs duties had been paid.

      The decision was served on 3 April 1991.

      On 26 February 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with

the applicant's constitutional complaint about the decision of the

Regional Directorate of Finance dated 14 December 1990, and referred

the matter to the Administrative Court.

      On 24 May 1991 the Administrative Court also dismissed the

applicant's complaint about the decision of the Regional Directorate

of Finance dated 14 December 1990. The Administrative Court noted that

the relevant issues were identical to those decided on

14 February 1991; moreover, the submissions of the applicant, who was

again represented by the same counsel, were almost literally identical.

The Administrative Court, therefore, mainly referred to its reasoning

of 14 February 1991.

      In September 1991 the Customs Office dismissed the applicant's

requests for a reopening of the customs proceedings, which had been

based on a new and lower estimation as to the value of the pledged

jewellery. Appeal proceedings in this respect are apparently pending.

The jewellery is still seized by the Customs Office.

C.    Relevant domestic law

1.    Tax liability in rem in respect of customs duties

      S. 178 para. 1 of the Customs and Excise Act (Zollgesetz) reads

as follows:

      "Items in respect of which customs duty is or may be payable

      shall be liable for such duty regardless of the rights of third

      parties and may accordingly be seized by the customs authorities

      in pursuance of S. 20 of the Federal Taxation Act. The liability

      shall begin when the duty falls payable and shall end when the

      duty is extinguished."

      S. 20 of the Federal Taxation Act (Bundesabgabenordnung) reads

as follows:

      "Decisions which the tax authorities have to take according to

      their discretion (discretionary decisions) must remain within the

      limits of discretion circumscribed by the law.  Within these

      limits, the discretionary decisions have to be made on the basis

      of fairness and expediency taking into account all circumstances

      which might be relevant."

      The reference in S. 178 para. 1 of the Customs and Excise Act to

S. 20 of the Federal Taxation Act was inserted by an amendment in 1978

in order to make clear that, notwithstanding the fact that tax

liability in rem arises directly under the law, the customs authorities

have a discretionary power to claim or not to claim tax liability in

rem in respect of particular items.

2.    Jurisdiction of the Austrian Constitutional Court and

      Administrative Court

      S. 144 of the Austrian Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungs-

gesetz) provides in particular that a complaint can be filed with the

Constitutional Court in which the applicant can allege a violation of

his constitutional rights.

      According to S. 130 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution the

Administrative Court will review allegations of unlawfulness of an

administrative decision.  According to S. 130 para. 2, no unlawfulness

exists where legislation refrains from establishing a binding rule on

an administrative authority's conduct, leaving the determination of

such conduct to the authority itself, and the authority has made use

of this discretion in the spirit of the law.

      S. 41 para. 1 of the Administrative Court Act provides, in so far

as relevant:

      "In so far as the Administrative Court does not find unlawfulness

      on account of a lack of jurisdiction of the authority against

      which the appeal is directed or on account of a violation of

      procedural provisions (S. 42 para. 2 [2] and [3]) ..., the Court

      must examine the contested decision on the basis of the facts as

      accepted by the authority against which the appeal is directed

      within the framework of the alleged complaint ...  If it is of

      the opinion that reasons would be relevant for the decision on

      the unlawfulness of the contested decision ... which were so far

      not known to a party, it must hear the parties thereupon and, if

      necessary, adjourn the proceedings."

      As regards the decisions of the Administrative Court, S. 42

para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act provides, in so far as

relevant:

      "The contested decision must be quashed

      1.   on account of the unlawfulness of its content,

      2.   on account of unlawfulness due to the lack of jurisdiction

           of the authority against which the appeal is directed,

      3.   on account of unlawfulness due to a violation of procedural

           provisions in particular because

           a)    the authority against which the appeal directed has

                 determined the facts on an important point contrary to

                 the case-file, or

           b)    the facts require to be supplemented on an important

                 point, or

           c)    procedural provisions have been disregarded which, if

                 taken into consideration by the authority against

                 which the appeal is directed, could have led to a

                 different decision of the authority."

      The proceedings before the Administrative Court consist of an

exchange of written observations between the parties (S. 36) and an

oral hearing of their legal arguments (SS. 39 and 40).  The parties

have a right to request a hearing (S. 39 para. 1 [1]).

      Where the Administrative Court has granted an appeal and has

quashed the decision of the administrative authority, S. 63 para. 1 of

the Administrative Court Act provides that the administrative

authorities are obliged in the case concerned with the legal means at

their disposal promptly to restore the legal situation corresponding

to the legal opinion expressed by the Administrative Court.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that the decisions of the Austrian tax

authorities to seize jewellery pledged to it and claim tax liability

in rem under the relevant provisions of the Customs and Excise Act

amount to a violation of their right to property within the meaning of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They submit in

particular that the proceeds of a public sale by the tax authorities

might not suffice to satisfy also its claims. Moreover, in exercising

their right to claim tax liability in rem, the tax authorities had not

duly taken the applicant's interests into account.

2.    The applicant further complains that no "independent and

impartial tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention decided upon its dispute with the tax authorities regarding

the seizure of the pledged jewellery and the claims of tax liability

in rem.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention about the decisions of the Austrian tax

authorities to seize jewellery pledged to it and claim tax liability

in rem under the relevant provisions of the Customs and Excise Act.

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) provides as follows:

      "(1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his

      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the

      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of

      international law.

      (2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems

      necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the

      general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other

      contributions or penalties."

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in substance guarantees the

right of property and comprises "three distinct rules": the first rule,

set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general

nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of

property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the

first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to

certain conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph,

recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst others,

to control the use of property by such laws as they deem necessary in

the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes. However, the

three rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the

second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of

interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and

should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle

enunciated in the first rule (cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R.,

Agosi judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 17, para. 48;

Tre Traktörer AB judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 159, pp. 22-23,

para. 54).

      The Commission finds that the decisions of the Customs Office

dated 13 August 1987 and 28 March 1990, respectively, namely seizure

of various pieces of jewellery and claim of tax liability in rem

regarding outstanding taxes, did not, as such, deprive the applicant

of its pledges. The interference at issue accordingly does not

constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of Article 1

para. 1, second sentence (Art. 1-1-2). The decisions rather aimed at

securing the payment of taxes and therefore have to be considered in

the light of Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2).

      The Commission notes that the decisions complained of, as

confirmed by the Salzburg Regional Directorate of Finance and the

Austrian Administrative Court, were in particular based on S. 178 of

the Customs and Excise Act and S. 20 of the Federal Taxation Act. As

confirmed by the Austrian Administrative Court, these provisions of tax

law aimed at securing the payment of customs duties in general as well

as the import turnover tax. There is no indication that the measures

complained of were unlawful or did not pursue the said general

interest.

      The Commission has next examined whether the measure of

interference struck a "fair balance" between the demands of the public

interest and the requirements of the protection of the individual's

fundamental rights, i.e. whether there was a reasonable relationship

of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be

realised (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Agosi judgment, loc. cit., p. 18,

para. 52; Tre Traktörer AB judgment, loc. cit., p. 23, para. 59). In

determining whether a fair balance exists, the State enjoys a wide

margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of

enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement

are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the

object of the law in question (cf. Agosi judgment, loc. cit.).

      The Commission recalls that, in the area of the confiscation of

smuggled goods, the striking of a fair balance depends inter alia on

the behaviour of the owner of the property, including the degree of

fault or care, which he has displayed.  The applicable procedures must

be such as to enable, amongst other things, reasonable account to be

taken as to the degree of fault or care, or at least the relationship

between the owner's conduct and the breach of the law, and also to

determine whether the procedures in question afforded the owner a

reasonable opportunity of putting his case to the responsible

authorities (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Agosi judgment, loc. cit., p. 19,

paras. 54-55).

      Applying analogous considerations to the present case concerning

property rights deriving from a pledge, the Commission notes that the

Customs Office, when deciding to seize the imported jewellery pledged

to the applicant and to claim tax liability in rem regarding in

particular outstanding customs duties, had regard to the fact that the

applicant was not itself liable for the taxes in question. In

accordance with S. 178 of the Customs and Excise Act and S. 20 of the

Federal Taxation Act, the Austrian tax authorities exercised their

lawful discretion, and thereby balanced the public interests in

securing the payment of taxes against the applicant's legitimate

interests.

      The questions of seizure and claiming tax liability in rem were

dealt with at three instances: the Customs Office, the Regional

Directorate of Finance and the Austrian Administrative Court. The

Salzburg Customs Office found that the public interest in recovering

the taxes in a quick and secure manner outweighed the applicant's

interests. The Regional Directorate of Finance, weighing the

applicant's interests and the public interest in the payment of taxes,

noted a lack of diligence on the part of the applicant which had failed

to verify the origin of the jewellery concerned, had itself previously

reduced its securities and had apparently itself anticipated

difficulties in the realisation of its right of pledge. The

Administrative Court observed in particular that the tax liability in

rem accorded the tax authorities a position in respect of a particular

object which preceded any other rights in view of the more important

public interest in securing the payment of customs duties. The

Administrative Court also confirmed the exercise of discretion by the

lower instances; it noted in this respect that the applicant had not

objected to the findings of the Regional Directorate of Finance as to

its negligence.

      In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

applicant's arguments in its position as the beneficiary of a pledge

regarding the jewellery concerned were duly taken into account in the

context of proceedings including a judicial review, which is sufficient

to satisfy the requirements of Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1-2).

      It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). Consequently, this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the questions of seizure and claiming

tax liability in rem as regards the jewellery pledged to it were not

decided by an "independent and impartial tribunal".

      Article 6 para. 1, first sentence (Art. 6-1-1), so far as

relevant, provides:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

      everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by an independent and

      impartial tribunal established by law."

      The Commission recalls that tax proceedings are normally outside

the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (cf. e.g.

No. 8903/80, X. v. Austria, Dec. 8.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 246; No. 9908/82,

X. v. France, Dec. 4.5.83, D.R. 32 p. 266).

      However, the present case does not concern tax obligations of the

applicant, but the decisions taken by the Customs Office to seize and

claim tax liability in rem in respect of objects which provided a

security to the State's tax claims against a third party. As these

objects had been pledged to the applicant, the decisions in question

conflicted with the applicant's civil right of pledge. In accordance

with S. 178 of the Customs and Excise Act and S. 20 of the Federal

Taxation Act, the customs authorities exercised a discretionary power

in claiming tax liability in rem, and, in this context, were required

to consider civil rights of third parties who for this purpose were

recognised as parties to the proceedings. In these circumstances, the

customs proceedings in question involved a determination of the

question whether and to what extent the applicant could actually make

use of its civil right of pledge.  Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) was applicable to these proceedings.

      As to the applicant's complaint of lack of access to an

independent and impartial tribunal, the Commission recalls that

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) does not require that the procedure which

determines civil rights and obligations be conducted at each of its

stages before tribunals meeting the requirements of this provision. An

administrative procedure may thus precede the determination of civil

rights by the tribunal envisaged in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention (see Ettl and Others v. Austria, Comm. Report, 3.7.85, Eur.

Court H.R., Series A no. 117, p. 23, paras. 77 et seq.). The scope of

review by this tribunal must cover questions of fact just as much as

questions of law, it must have full jurisdiction and provide the

guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (Eur. Court H.R. Le Compte,

Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p.

23, para. 51, sub-paragraph ; Albert and Le Compte judgment of 10

February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 16, para. 29; Zumtobel judgment of

21 September 1993, Series A

no. 268-A, para. 29 ).

      In the present case, the Salzburg Customs Office deciding to

seize the jewellery pledged to the applicant and to claim its tax

liability in rem, as well as the Salzburg Regional Directorate of

Finance deciding upon the applicant's appeal, did not constitute

tribunals within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      The Constitutional Court could inquire into the contested

proceedings only from the constitutional point of view, and not examine

all the relevant facts. It did not therefore have full jurisdiction

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Zumtobel judgment, loc. cit., para. 30).

      Finally, the Administrative Court decided on the applicant's

complaints about the seizures and claims of tax liability in rem

regarding the pledged jewellery. The questions raised were mainly of

a legal nature, namely in particular whether the requirements of S. 178

of the Customs and Excise Act had been complied with and whether, in

exercising the discretionary powers under S. 20 of the Federal Taxation

Act, the tax authorities had taken the applicant's interests as the

beneficiary of a pledge into due account.

      The Commission finds that the Administrative Court was not bound

by the administrative decisions under S. 178 of the Customs and Excise

Act. The Administrative Court, in its decisions of 14 February and

24 May 1991, carefully examined the arguments put forward by the

applicant. Thus, it confirmed the competence of the Salzburg Customs

Office, and also dealt with the question whether S. 178 of the Customs

and Excise Act also applied to import turnover tax, and it examined the

question whether the conditions of this provision were fulfilled.

Furthermore, the Administrative Court, in reviewing the exercise of

discretion by the Regional Directorate of Finance, considered in detail

the applicant's position and confirmed that the public interest in

recovering Mr. K.'s outstanding taxes outweighed the applicant's

interest in keeping the pledged jewellery. In this context, the

Administrative Court noted that the applicant had not objected to the

findings of the Regional Directorate of Finance as to the applicant's

negligence when accepting the jewellery as pledges.

      In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the review

of the Administrative Court fulfilled the requirements of Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court

H.R., Zumtobel case, loc. cit., paras. 31-32).

      Consequently, there is no appearance of a violation of the

applicant's right of access to a tribunal within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). This part of the application is,

therefore, also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)