AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 18562/91

                      by Maria KARPPINEN, Jari KARPPINEN,

                         Thomas KARPPINEN, Carl KARPPINEN,

                         Ulla JOHANSSON and Mikael JOHANSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 1 December 1993, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 2 July 1991 by

Maria KARPPINEN and Others against Sweden and registered on 19 July

1991 under file No. 18562/91;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

      The first and second applicants are a married couple, both of

Swedish nationality.  They were born in 1958 and 1965 respectively and

reside at Trollhättan.  The third and fourth applicants are their two

sons, T and C, born in 1986 and 1989.  The fifth and sixth applicants

are the first applicant's mother and brother.  Before the Commission

all applicants are represented by Mrs Siv Westerberg, a lawyer

practising in Gothenburg.  The application relates to the taking into

care of the third and fourth applicants and their placement in a foster

home.

A.    The care orders

      At the age of six the first applicant developed epilepsy and was

admitted to a home for underdeveloped children where she remained until

the age of sixteen.  Following four years at another home she returned

to her parents at the age of twenty.  She receives an early retirement

pension (förtidspension) as from 1974.  She can neither read nor write.

      The second applicant has been on the list of children entitled

to special assistance from the Board for Help and Assistance to the

Mentally Retarded (Omsorgsstyrelsen) from the age of twelve.

      In 1984 the first and second applicants met and moved to

Trollhättan.  The second applicant subsequently discontinued his

educational training.  Since 1989 he has been unemployed.

      The first and second applicants married in 1986, the year in

which T was born.  Approximately three weeks after his birth, T was

taken into care on a provisional basis and on 26 November 1986 the

County Administrative Court (länsrätten) decided to take him into care.

On 24 June 1987, however, the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) lifted the care order.  Although the Court found that

the parents had problems with providing the necessary intellectual

support for T, it found that this shortcoming could be overcome with

appropriate assistance from the social authorities.  The social

authorities' request for leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme

Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) on 28 September 1987.

Accordingly, T was returned to his parents.

      On 27 November 1989 C was born, and on 14 March 1990 the social

authorities decided to take both children into care on a provisional

basis.  The question of provisional care was brought before the County

Administrative Court which decided, on 2 April 1990, following an oral

hearing held on 30 March 1990, to lift the provisional care order as

regards T and to maintain it in respect of C.  On 14 May 1990 the

Administrative Court of Appeal also lifted the provisional care order

in respect of C as it found it established that adequate care could be

provided for with the necessary assistance from the social authorities.

      Whereas the children were accordingly returned to their parents,

the social authorities nevertheless pursued the question of care and

submitted, on 9 April 1990 and 19 June 1990, an application to the

County Administrative Court requesting that T and C be taken into care

pursuant to the provisions of the 1980 Act containing Special

Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen 1980:621 med särskilda

bestämmelser om vård av unga - "the 1980 Act").

      Following an oral hearing, held on 2 July 1990, the Court

decided, by judgment of 13 July 1990, that T and C should be taken into

care.

      On 16 July 1990 the social authorities accordingly decided to

place T and C in the children's home Lyckhem, a decision which was

upheld by the County Administrative Court on 23 October 1990.

      The first and second applicants appealed to the Administrative

Court of Appeal against the care order and the placement at Lyckhem,

both on their own behalf and also on behalf of their children.

Hearings were held in court on 9 and 16 October 1990 during which the

parents, represented by counsel, as well as a number of witnesses, were

heard.  During these proceedings the children were represented by their

own court appointed counsel.

      By judgment of 4 December 1990 the Administrative Court of Appeal

upheld the care order and the decision to place T and C at Lyckhem.

In its judgment the Court stated inter alia:

(translation)

      "The extensive material in the case does not give an unequivocal

      picture of how the situation developed while the children stayed

      with their parents.  On the one hand the material submitted by

      the social authorities shows a picture of a very difficult

      environment for the children.  On the other hand the statements

      of relatives and friends of the parents leave the impression

      throughout that the case concerns a quite normal family in which

      the parents provide the children with a good and loving care.

      The material referred to by the social authorities leaves a very

      convincing impression.  The reports with different persons'

      observations as to how the parents acted vis-à-vis their children

      contain no contradictions but are very consistent.  The

      correctness of the material has not been challenged by counsel

      for the children either.

      Generally speaking the parents have not submitted anything which

      directly could give reason to doubt the correctness of the

      observations contained in this material.  Neither has the oral

      hearing, during which the parents were present, disclosed such

      doubts.  Instead the parents have maintained that the social

      authorities' allegations in the case express revenge, combined

      with lies and sabotage.  However, the Court has not found any

      basis for these accusations.

      Accordingly, the Court considers that the environment in which

      the children lived was essentially as described by the social

      authorities.

      ...

      According to the report of 13 June 1990 from the child

      psychiatric clinic at the Norra Älvsborg hospital the (parents')

      treatment of their children, as observed by the social

      authorities, must be characterised as aggravated mental

      ill-treatment.  In the report it is further stated that an

      environment of this kind without doubt endangers the children's

      mental health and development.  The examiners at the clinic ...

      unequivocally conclude that the lack of care and the

      circumstances in the parental home constitute a great danger to

      the children's mental health and development.

      The Court does not find any reason to question the report and

      accordingly concludes that the environment which (the parents)

      offer their children is such as to constitute a serious danger

      to their mental health and development.  The examination of the

      case further shows that the circumstances prevailing in the

      parental home constitutes a risk to the children, also from a

      physical point of view.

      ...

      Previously the courts have found that the social authorities

      ought to be able to solve the problems in the parental home.

      However, the present case shows that this was not a realistic

      view.

      ...

      The difficulties in assisting the parents adequately in their

      role as parents are, in the Court's view, to a great extent due

      to Siv Westerberg's way of handling the case.  Both in the

      written submissions and during the oral hearing she has expressed

      strong critical views as regards society's activities for the

      protection of children.  Through this she rejects the views which

      constitute the basis for the applicable legislation in this

      field.  Her inclination to characterise the social authorities'

      activities as revenge, sabotage and lies must be considered as

      a result of her views.  The same applies as regards her demands

      that contacts between the social authorities and the parents must

      go through her and take place in her presence.  She has also

      insisted on being present when the children and the parents were

      examined at the child psychiatric clinic.  This has not only led

      to a delay in the examination but also constituted the reason for

      the fact that it could not be carried out in all its aspects in

      a meaningful manner. ...

      ...

      In conclusion the Court finds that today, at least as long as

      (the parents) rely on Siv Westerberg as counsel, there is no

      reason to believe that a decisive improvement of the environment

      in the parental home can be expected with the assistance of the

      social authorities.

      ...

      The children have been placed at Lyckhem awaiting placement in

      a family home.

      The parents (submit) that the children are subjected to

      continuing physical and mental damage due to the placement at the

      children's home.  Staff there ill-treat the children, both

      physically and mentally, and are emotionally indifferent towards

      them.  In addition the placement at the home aims at preparing

      for a lasting separation between parents and children.

      What the parents have alleged concerning the treatment in the

      children's home is not supported by the other investigations made

      in this case.  Admittedly there is in the file information

      indicating that the children have been scratched by other

      children and that they have cried, but there is no reason to

      believe that what has happened is anything but every day

      incidents which have nothing to do with the conditions in the

      children's home.

      Counsel for the children has submitted that he has not found

      support for the parents' allegations during his visits to the

      home and during his conversations with the staff.

      The Court accordingly finds that the parents' allegations

      concerning the conditions at Lyckhem are unsubstantiated.  Their

      request for another placement is therefore rejected."

      The first and second applicants applied on their own behalf and

on behalf of their children for leave to appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court.  Leave was refused by the Court on

8 February 1991.

B.    Question of access while at Lyckhem

      Following the care order the social authorities established a

programme of access.  The parents and other family members had the

possibility to visit the children every day at Lyckhem and, together

with staff from Lyckhem, the children visited their parents and

grandmother, the fifth applicant.  As regards Christmas 1990 and the

following New Year holiday the social authorities, partially granting

a request by the applicants, decided to allow the children to be with

their parents at their home on 24, 25 and 26 December during the day

and on 31 December and 1 January also during the day.

      All six applicants appealed against this decision to the County

Administrative Court which, on 28 January 1991, decided not to deal

with it, partly as the appeal had been submitted too late and, as

regards the fifth and sixth applicants (the children's grandmother and

uncle), since they had no right of appeal as the access decision did

not concern them.

      These decisions were subsequently upheld by the Administrative

Court of Appeal on 19 February 1991 and leave to appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court was refused on 14 June 1991.

C.    Placement in the foster home

      Following the placement at Lyckhem the social authorities

commenced their investigation as to whether or not the children, T and

C, could be placed in a foster home (familjehemsplacering).  On

28 March 1991 the social authorities decided, in accordance with

sections 11 and 14 of the 1980 Act, as amended in 1990, to place both

children in the same foster home and to allow the parents access once

a week and the grandmother and uncle once a month.

      All six applicants appealed against this decision to the County

Administrative Court and further requested that the appeal be given

suspensive effect.  On 17 April 1991 the Court rejected the appeal in

so far as it concerned the grandmother and the uncle as they had no

right of appeal.  As regards the other applicants the request for

suspensive effect was granted.  Legal aid was also granted, but

Siv Westerberg was not accepted by the Court as court appointed

counsel.  These decisions were upheld by the Administrative Court of

Appeal on 29 April 1991.  Leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme

Administrative Court on 25 June 1991.

                              __________

      In the meantime the social authorities had decided, on

11 April 1991, to reject the applicants' counsel, Siv Westerberg, as

their privately engaged counsel as far as the administrative

proceedings were concerned.  This issue was brought separately before

the County Administrative Court which, on 31 May 1991, upheld the

decision.  The Court stated inter alia:

(translation)

      "From section 9, subsection 2, of the Code of Public

      Administration (förvaltningslagen) the following appears.  If

      counsel appears to be unqualified, shows incompetence or if he

      appears inappropriate in any other way, the administrative

      authority may reject him as counsel in the case.

      The social authorities have in their submissions to the Court

      stated the following.  Mrs F.W. reported to the social

      authorities on a meeting between her, (the parents),

      Siv Westerberg and (the foster parents) of 1 March 1991.  During

      this meeting Siv Westerberg informed (the foster parents) among

      other things that, if they were to become the foster family, they

      would not have any private life.  Siv Westerberg also stated that

      she would contact (the foster family's) employers and their

      daughter's school teacher and the parents of their daughter's

      classmates.  Mrs O. has informed the social authorities that (the

      foster mother) on 5 April 1991 submitted that the dean of her

      daughter's school had contacted her and told her that somebody

      had requested a copy of the list of pupils in the daughter's

      class.  The school complied with the request.  A letter, signed

      by (the first and second applicants), has been sent to the

      parents (of the children) in (the daughter's) school.

      Cooperation with (the first and second applicants) is impossible

      as long as Siv Westerberg remains counsel, which again has

      negative consequences for the children.  Meetings and talks

      between (the first and second applicants) and (the foster

      parents) and between (the first and second applicants) and the

      staff of the social authorities must take place when Siv

      Westerberg has the time to be present.  (The first and second

      applicants) do not get the opportunity to speak spontaneously

      when Siv Westerberg is present.  Her use of tape recorders during

      the talks does not create spontaneity.  Siv Westerberg submits

      unsubstantiated allegations against the foster family.  Siv

      Westerberg expresses strong critical views on society's

      activities for the protection of children and on the efforts of

      the foster parents.  Siv Westerberg's proclamation to (the foster

      parents) that their daughter, her classmates and their parents

      would become involved, has proved to be correct.

      The Court decides as follows.

      The act of sending letters to classmates and their parents with

      the obvious aim of influencing (the foster parents' daughter) to

      the extent that she would influence her parents to refrain from

      accepting T and C in the home is not only particularly peculiar

      but also inappropriate.  Siv Westerberg has not denied that she

      is behind this.  Her statements to the Court on the contrary

      confirm the social authorities' allegations in this respect.

      Furthermore, the Court believes the social authorities' other

      allegations as regards Siv Westerberg's actions in this case.

      All in all the Court finds that Siv Westerberg has disclosed such

      lack of competence and such lack of suitability that the social

      authorities had reason to decide to reject her as counsel."

      Siv Westerberg continued to act as privately engaged counsel as

far as the court proceedings were concerned.  On 3 June 1991, however,

the County Administrative Court also rejected her as counsel in the

court proceedings pursuant to section 48, subsection 2, of the Code of

Administrative Courts Procedure (förvaltningsprocesslagen) for similar

reasons as stated above.  The Court appointed another lawyer as counsel

for the first and second applicants.

      On 12 June 1991 the County Administrative Court decided to lift

the suspensive effect in force since 17 April 1991.  This decision was

upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 18 June 1991.

Accordingly, T and C were transferred from Lyckhem to the foster home.

                              __________

      On 27 June 1991 the County Administrative Court examined the

first, second, third and fourth applicants' appeal against the social

authorities' above-mentioned decision of 28 March 1991 regarding

placement in the foster home and access.  Whereas the first and second

applicants contended that the foster home in question was unacceptable

and that the foster parents were only interested in the financial

aspects of such an arrangement and thus maintained that the children

should not be placed in the foster home, the court appointed counsel

for the third and fourth applicants requested that the appeal be

rejected.

      Following an evaluation of the relevant material the Court

concluded that the foster home in question was best qualified for

taking proper care of the children.  Furthermore, the Court quashed the

social authorities' decision on access in so far as it concerned the

grandmother and the uncle since the applicable legislation did not

allow the authorities to regulate such access as these persons were not

holders of parental rights.  As regards the first and second

applicants, who were the holders of the parental rights, the Court

considered the access arrangements made to be appropriate in the

circumstances of the case.  In this respect the Court stated:

(translation)

      "Due to the way in which the parents' previous counsel has

      handled the case, the situation is now such that time is needed

      for establishing a well-functioning relationship between the

      foster home and the children and in particular between the foster

      home and the parents.  The children also need calm and quiet in

      order to adapt to the foster home situation.  The restrictions

      the social authorities have set for the access therefore appear

      to be well-founded.  The appeal is accordingly rejected in this

      respect."

      The above decisions were upheld by the Administrative Court of

Appeal on 6 September 1991.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court was refused on 18 October 1991.  The children

still live in the foster home.

COMPLAINTS

      All applicants complain that the decision to take T and C into

care violated their right to respect for their family life in that the

case did not disclose circumstances which would make such a measure

necessary in a democratic society.  They invoke Article 8 of the

Convention.

      The applicants also complain that the decision first to place the

children at Lyckhem and subsequently in a foster home amounts to an

additional violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

      Under the same provision the applicants further complain that

their access rights have been reduced to an unacceptable minimum.

      As regards the care proceedings the applicants complain that they

did not get a fair hearing since the courts only relied on evidence

hostile to them and disregarded the witnesses' statements which spoke

in their favour.  They invoke in this respect Article 6 of the

Convention.

      They furthermore complain that in the proceedings concerning

placement in the foster home, during which Siv Westerberg was refused

permission to act as their counsel, they did not, for this reason, get

a fair hearing.  They also maintain that the reasons for rejecting

their counsel amounted to an unjustified interference with the right

to freedom of expression.  They invoke in this respect Articles 6 and

10 of the Convention.

      The fifth and sixth applicants complain that they were refused

access to an effective remedy as guaranteed to them under Article 13

of the Convention when the courts rejected their appeal against the

social authorities' decision on access.

      As regards the conditions at Lyckhem the applicants complain that

these were comparable to a children's prison, where the children were

subjected to treatment which violated Articles 3 and 4 of the

Convention.

      The applicants further maintain that the authorities interfered

with the right to education, to freedom of religion and freedom to

found a family.  They refer in these respects to Article 2 of Protocol

No. 1 to the Convention and Articles 9 and 12 of the Convention.

      Finally, the applicants complain that the conditions in the

foster home are such that the child T risks dying there.  They invoke

Article 2 of the Convention in this respect.

THE LAW

      The applicants complain of a variety of violations of the

Convention and of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the

decisions taken concerning the children T's and C's care.

      Therefore the Commission recalls that it is clear from Article 25

para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention that the Commission can receive

an application from a person, non-governmental organisation or group

of individuals only if such person, non-governmental organisation or

group of individuals can claim to be a victim of a violation by one of

the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention.

Moreover, the Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of

domestic legislation with the Convention only with respect to its

application in a concrete case, while it is not competent to examine

in abstracto its compatibility with the Convention (cf. for example

No. 11045/84, Dec. 8.3.85, D.R. 42 p. 247).

      Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present case the

Commission has not found it necessary to determine, in respect of the

different complaints submitted, whether all applicants may claim to be

victims, but will, for the purposes of this case, leave this question

open unless it is otherwise expressly indicated.

1.    The applicants complain that the decision to take T and C into

care violated Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention in so far as it

guarantees the right to respect for family life.  This provision reads

as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life, his home and his correspondence.

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with

      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others."

      The Commission assumes that the taking into care of T and C

interfered with the applicants' right to respect for their family life

as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.  It has

therefore examined whether this interference was justified under the

terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).  In this respect the Commission

recalls that three conditions must be fulfilled: the interference must

be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the

legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2) and it

must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those

legitimate aims.

      As regards the first condition, the Commission finds that the

relevant provisions in Swedish law satisfy the requirements as to the

quality of the law (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of

24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 30-31, paras. 60-63).

Furthermore, the issue of care was examined by the competent

administrative courts up to the Supreme Administrative Court which

refused to grant leave to appeal, and there is nothing to suggest that

the decisions taken by the courts in the present case were contrary to

Swedish law.

      The Commission also finds that the interference had a legitimate

aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests of the

children, which in this case fall under the expression "for the

protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights

and freedoms of others (cf. also above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p.

31, paras. 64-65).

      It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the children.

      According to the established case-law of the Commission and the

European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in

particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic

society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a

margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (cf.

above-mentioned Olsson judgment, pp. 31-32, para. 67).  That does not

mean, however, that the Commission's review is limited to ascertaining

whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably,

carefully and in good faith.  Furthermore, it cannot confine itself to

considering the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them

in the light of the case as a whole.  It must determine whether the

reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and

sufficient" (cf. Olsson judgment, p. 32, para. 68).

      In the present case, the Commission recalls that the applicants

allege that the care order was based on irrelevant and insufficient

circumstances.

      Before considering the substance of this issue, the Commission

recalls that both the County Administrative Court and the

Administrative Court of Appeal held oral hearings during which the

possibility existed of presenting all the views which could be decisive

for the outcome of the case.  Having regard to these facts, the

Commission finds that, in so far as certain procedural requirements are

implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8), these requirements were satisfied since

the applicants were involved in the decision-making process to a degree

sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their

interests.

      As regards the actual care order, the Commission recalls in

particular the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal of

4 December 1990.  The Court found no reason to question a report in

which it had been found that the parental home environment to which T

and C were subjected could be characterised as aggravated mental

ill-treatment constituting a danger to the children's mental health and

development.  Furthermore, the Court concluded that the circumstances

prevailing in the parental home also constituted a risk to the

children's physical well-being.

      Such conditions are clearly relevant to a decision to take a

child into care.  Furthermore, the Commission recalls that prior to the

taking into care of the children the social authorities had been

involved for a considerable length of time in supporting their parents.

It cannot therefore be said that the authorities intervened without

adequate knowledge of the background.

      In the light of this the Commission finds that the decision to

take T and C into care was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons

and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish

authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary to

take the children into care.  Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that this decision can be regarded as "necessary in a democratic

society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention in the interest of the children.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicants also complain of the way in which the care order

was implemented.  More specifically they maintain that the placement

at Lyckhem, and the restriction imposed on their access rights during

that period of time, was in violation of Article 8 (Art. ) of the

Convention.  Furthermore, they maintain that the conditions at Lyckhem

were such that they could be compared with a children's prison where

the children were subjected to treatment which violated Articles 3 and

4 (Art. 3, 4) of the Convention.  The applicants also complain about

the restrictions on access after the children's transfer to the foster

home and finally allege, as regards the implementation of the care

order, that the conditions in the foster home were such as to endanger

T's life.

      As a starting-point the Commission finds that it has not been

substantiated that the conditions at Lyckhem and in the foster home,

and the quality of the care given to the children there, were not and

are not satisfactory.  The applicants' complaints under Articles 2, 3

and 4 (Art. 2, 3, 4) of the Convention therefore disclose no appearance

of a violation of these articles.

      As for the remaining aspects of the implementation of the care

order the Commission notes that there appears to be no question of the

children being adopted, and the parents have not been deprived of their

parental rights.  Nevertheless the restriction on access was an

interference with the right to respect for family life within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention for which

reason the Commission must examine whether this interference complied

with para. 2 of this provision.

      The Commission finds that the interference was in accordance with

law and had a legitimate aim (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Margareta and Roger

Andersson judgment of 25 February 1992, Series A no. 226-A, pp. 25-28,

paras. 74-87).  What remains is accordingly to consider whether it was

"necessary".  In this respect the Commission recalls that T and C were

placed together at Lyckhem and their parents and other family members

had the possibility of visiting them daily.  Moreover the social

authorities arranged for the children to visit their parents and

grandmother.  The Commission has in this respect not overlooked that

the social authorities did not fully comply with certain requests for

access, for example at Christmas 1990.  However, the implementation of

the care order at Lyckhem was nevertheless such that easy and regular

access was provided for and thus the access regulation did not, in the

Commission's view, exceed what could be regarded as "necessary" within

the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

      As regards the possibilities of access after the children's

placement in the foster home, the Commission recalls that this was

limited to once a week as far as the parents were concerned and to once

a month as far as other family members were concerned.  Although the

appeal against this limitation was unsuccessful, nothing has been

submitted which shows that such a regular access was not in fact

established.  Furthermore, the Commission recalls the reasons given by

the courts, in particular by the County Administrative Court in its

judgment of 27 June 1991, for partially accepting the access

arrangements fixed by the social authorities.  In the particular

circumstances of this case the Commission finds that these reasons were

both relevant and sufficient.

      In conclusion the Commission thus finds that the measures taken

in implementation of the care order were supported by reasons

justifying them as proportionate to the aim pursued (cf. also Eur.

Court H.R., Olsson (No. 2) judgment of 27 November 1992, Series A

no. 250, pp. 35-37, paras. 89-92).

      It follows that the applicants' complaints relating to the

implementation of the care order as submitted under Articles 2, 3, 4

and 8 (Art. 2, 3, 4, 8) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    Under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the applicants

complain of a number of alleged procedural shortcomings in respect of

the court hearings involved.  Article 6 para. 1, first sentence

(Art. 6-1-1), which is of relevance in this report, reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

      established by law."

a)    First the applicants complain that the hearings, in which the

questions of care were determined, were unfair in that the courts only

relied on evidence hostile to them.

      With regard to this particular complaint the Commission recalls

that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its

only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by

the Parties in the Convention.  In particular, it is not competent to

deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been

committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such

errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights

and freedoms set out in the Convention.  The Commission refers, on this

point, to its established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60,

Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43

pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).

      In the care proceedings the Commission has not, however, found

any appearance of such possible violations of the Convention.

b)    The applicants also complain that they did not get a fair hearing

in the proceedings concerning the issue of placement in the foster

home, due to the fact that the courts rejected Siv Westerberg as their

counsel.

      Although Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not

expressly guarantee the right to legal assistance of one's own

choosing, the Commission will not exclude that situations could arise

whereby an arbitrary or unreasonable rejection of counsel could raise

issues under this provision.  However, in the present case the

Commission does not consider that the rejection of Siv Westerberg as

counsel for the applicants was arbitrary or unreasonable.  Furthermore,

the Commission recalls that the Court appointed another counsel to

assist the applicants and the Commission has found no substantiated

evidence which shows that this counsel did not fulfil his tasks in an

acceptable way.

      In these circumstances the Commission finds no evidence to

support the conclusion that the hearing concerning the placement in the

foster home was unfair or that the Swedish courts otherwise failed to

comply with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      It follows that the applicants' complaints, as submitted under

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, are manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.    The fifth and sixth applicants (the children's grandmother and

uncle) complain of the lack of a remedy in respect of their complaints

of lack of access to the children.  They refer in this respect to

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) has been

interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as requiring a remedy

in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as

"arguable" in terms of the Convention (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R.,

Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23,

para. 52).

      Having regard to its above conclusions in respect of the

Convention complaints submitted, the Commission considers that the

applicants do not have any "arguable claims" of a violation of the

provisions invoked for these complaints.  In these circumstances it

finds no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    Finally, the Commission has examined the applicants' complaints

under Articles 9, 10 and 12 (Art. 9, 10, 12) of the Convention and

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention, as submitted by

them.  However, this examination has not disclosed any appearance of

a violation of these provisions and it follows that this part of the

application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)