AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 20490/92

                      by ISKCON and 8 Others

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 8 March 1994, the following members being present:

           MM.   A. WEITZEL, President

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 F. ERMACORA

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 24 April 1992 by

ISKCON and 8 Others against the United Kingdom and registered on

13 August 1992 under file No. 20490/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to :

-     reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the

      Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government

      on 3 June 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the

      applicant on 13 September 1993;

-     the further information submitted by the applicants on

      16 February and 7 March 1994;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicants are the International Society for Krishna

Consciousness Ltd. ("ISKCON") and eight individuals who are members

and, in part, officers of ISKCON. The applicants are represented by Mr.

S. Ruparell, solicitor, of Messrs. Singh and Ruparell, solicitors,

London.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      ISKCON acquired a 19th century manor in 1973.  The local

authority had confirmed, by letter of 27 March 1973, that "on the

information available the last use of the premises, namely a nurses'

residential college, falls squarely within the same use class as a

residential theological college in connection with the promotion of the

religion of Krishna Consciousness.  In the circumstances, planning

permission is not required.  Although the previous use was largely

residential, I gather that it was also partly educational and this

appears to be the situation with the use now proposed".

      On 25 January 1983 ISKCON entered into an agreement ("the

Section 52 Agreement") with the local authority that, inter alia,

ISKCON would not permit more than 1,000 persons to visit the manor on

any one day except with the consent of the council;  the council

granted consent for more than 1,000 persons to be present on six days

in the year (festival days), subject to various conditions.  The

agreement referred to a previous enforcement notice which had been

served in 1981 and against which ISKCON had appealed, and was expressed

to be without prejudice to the council's rights to serve further

enforcement notices.  The council withdrew the existing enforcement

notice, and ISKCON agreed not to make any claim for costs in the

appeal.

      On 8 January 1987 the local authority served an enforcement

notice on ISKCON alleging that, by using the land for "the purposes of

a residential educational college and a religious community and public

worship and public entertainment in connection with religious

festivals" ISKCON had materially changed the use of the land, and that

this material change of use amounted to a breach of planning control.

In the annex to the enforcement notice the local authority referred to

the Section 52 Agreement, and alleged that, following repeated

complaints from the local residents, the local authority had been made

aware that the number of persons attending on non-festival days was

increasing and had exceeded the 1,000 person limit.

      An Inspector held an inquiry into appeals by ISKCON against the

enforcement notice (and related matters).  The inquiry was held on

9 November 1987, 21 November 1988, 29 November to 2 December,

6 to 9 December, 14 and 19 to 21 December 1988.  In the 136 page report

of the inquiry the Inspector found, as matters of fact, as follows:

      "B.  Religious and Social

      1.  The Krishna Consciousness movement, a traditionalist branch

      of the Hindu faith, was founded by Srila Prabhupada, a sanskrit

      scholar who emigrated to New York from India, in 1966.  Its aim

      is to stimulate interest and convert people world-wide to the

      spiritual principles of the Vedic culture of India as expounded

      in the scriptures of the Bhagavad Gita (The Bible of India).

      There are now 200 ISKCON centres throughout the world.

      2.  Devotees of Krishna Consciousness regard it not just as a

      religion, but as a whole way of life, constantly developing their

      love of god by rendering devotional service ("Shakti-Yoga").

      This includes the purification of the consciousness by constant

      chanting of the Holy Names of God.  (The Hare Krishna Mantra).

      3.  Other forms of devotion regularly practised are the study of

      the scriptures, guided by priests and teachers, the performance

      of "puja" or acts of devotion to the deities at a shrine or at

      home, the offering of sanctified food to the deity before eating,

      "prasad", and pilgrimages to a shrine or "tirtha" on holy days

      and festivals.

      4.  On these occasions it is customary to take "Darshan" or

      audience of the deities and offer silent private prayers as well

      as participating in the services performed by the priest,

      "Arati", and taking part in congregational chanting.

      5.  Any Hindu shrine contains deities which are regarded as gods

      themselves in the form of wood or stone.  The deities at the

      Manor are of marble statues, worthy of the highest veneration.

      6.  Hindu tradition demands that they be moved only to achieve

      significantly better facilities for worship within their existing

      "dharma" or area over which they have exercised their influence.

      Any other move would be an act of desecration.

      7.  The first ISKCON shrine was set up in London in 1969 in a

      rented flat in Bury Place, and deities were installed there.  In

      1979, following enforcement proceedings and subsequent

      litigation, that temple and the deities were moved to premises

      in Soho Street, London, where ISKCON still have a temple with

      deities and resident priests, and a similar type of worship to

      that at the Manor.

      8.  Devotees of Krishna Consciousness are required to observe the

      "regulative principles", strict rules as to diet and temperance.

      Single persons live a monastic existence.  The movement has a

      strong social conscience and tradition of counselling the

      distressed and afflicted.

      9.  The current Hindu population of Britain is estimated at

      750,000 with between 120,000 and 200,000 in North London, 55,000

      of these being within Brent and Harrow and forming the main

      catchment area for the temple congregations.

      10.  There are few Hindu temples in London, compared with

      Birmingham, which has 4 to serve a population of 40,000.  Those

      in north-west London serve mainly the Swaminarayan faith, whose

      followers do not worship Radha and Krishna.

      C.  The Function of the Manor

      1.  The Manor is said to be the only "Math", or training college

      for Hindu priests in the United Kingdom.  It welcomed as students

      anyone who wished to devote all or part of their lives to the

      understanding of the faith and devotion to Krishna.

      ...

      4.  It is a "Tirtha" or place of pilgrimage.  Coachloads come

      from Birmingham to worship at the Manor.

      ...

      6.  The shrine is essential to the teaching of priests,

      regardless of any public worship.

      ...

      8.  The following are the principal activities at the Manor:

           a.  A residence (Ashram) for between 40 and 50 single

           devotees, priests and novices.

           b.  A centre for the training of full time Hindu priests

           and missionaries.

           ...

           i.  Devotional services in the temple between 0430 and 2115

           hrs. daily, with extended programmes on Sundays, to which

           all members of the public are free to come.

           ...

           l.  The conduct of one or two day festivals on the 3 most

           important festivals in the Hindu calendar, namely Ramnavani

           (April), Janmasthnmi (July-September), Diwali (October-

           November), and other minor festivals on less important holy

           days."

      In Section D of his Report the Inspector set out the history of

the events leading up to the service of the enforcement notice, the

material part of which may be summarised as follows:

(1)   In 1974 a neighbouring resident complained about large numbers

of people living at the Manor, and services being advertised.  A

newspaper article in the summer of 1974 referred to 1,000 people

celebrating Krishna's birthday at the Manor.  A weekend festival in

August 1975 attracted 5,000 visitors on each day and further festivals

in November 1975 and August 1976 attracted not more than 2,500 people

in any one day.  Parking on neighbouring fields ameliorated adverse

effects on he village.

(2)  On 30 May 1978 planning permission was granted for the

construction of a car park with 127 spaces.  The application had been

made at the request of the planning authority.  The work was completed

in 1979 at a cost of £20,000.

(3)  A newspaper article in August 1979 reported a forecasted

attendance of 10,000 people for the Janmasthami festival.  A resident

reported 600-800 cars parked in the fields and 11 coaches being parked

in lay-byes in the area on Sunday 12 August.

(4)  The 1980 Janmasthami festival was held on Saturday/Sunday

31 August after notification had been given that it would be on the

Sunday and Monday.  It was estimated that 14,000 people had attended

each day and 15,000 attended a separate evening festival on Tuesday

1980 the Manor had become generally known as "The Temple".  Counts

carried out by Mr Jeffers in September 1980 indicated that on 3

successive Sundays between 498 and 760 vehicles entered the Manor with

a flow of through traffic through the village of between 841 and 1,161

vehicles. in the same period.  At the same time between 1,127 and 1,502

persons were counted into the Manor.  Further counts on 4 Sundays in

October 1980 showed between 587 and 1,119 persons entering the Manor.

(5)  In July 1984 ISKCON sold their Worcestershire property, Croome

Court, for economic reasons.

(6)  A handbill inviting visitors to the Janmasthami Festival on

8 September 1985 stated that coach parties should write to the Manor

in advance.  It also said that every Sunday a special Festival

programme was held from 4 pm to 9 pm featuring dramas, video shows,

lectures, children's classes.  Full Prasad, Bhajans (congregational

chanting) and Arati (temple services)).  It was estimated that 13,000

people attended, over 2 days.

(7)  Counts carried out from September 1985 to September 1988 showed

that there have regularly been more than 1,000 visitors to the Manor

on non-festival Sundays, the average attendance being in the region of

1,500.  The 1986 Janmasthami Festival attracted 1,184 vehicles on

Sunday 24 August,  682 on Monday 25 August and 1,955 on Wednesday

27 August, with visitors counted at 4,631, 2,339 and 8,781 on those 3

days.  A nearby resident described the Festival as seeming to go on all

the week and having only 21/2 hours sleep on one night.

(8)  Previous proposals for a residential farm community in the

Midlands and community halls in areas where the Hindu population were

concentrated, such as Brent, Southall and East London had not

materialised.  Following the initial adjournment of the Inquiry into

the Enforcement Notice appeal a search was made for an alternative

temple site and that at Dagger Lane was identified.  ISKCON indicated

they required a site 3 times the site of that at the Manor, and the

buildings proposed would cover about 21/2 times the floor area.  The

deities would be moved to the new temple and the Manor would become

primarily a place of spiritual retreat with a shrine for the benefit

mainly of residents who would number up to 50.

      In Section E of his Report the Inspector found that the main

house was a Grade II listed building (having been added to the list in

1985) and the buildings and most of the grounds were within the

Letchmore Heath Conservation Area, designated in 1969.  The site was

within an extensive area of the Metropolitan Green Belt and this

notation had not changed since 1954.

      Whilst stating that the legal implications of these facts were

matters for the Secretary of State, the Inspector set out in detail the

conclusions which he had drawn from the above facts.  The Inspector

noted that it was quite clear that the notice was aimed at

discontinuing all festivals, and that there was no intention to include

any saving for the 6 days mentioned in the Section 52 Agreement.  The

Inspector did not consider there was any necessity for it to do this.

He concluded that the enforcement notice was valid and that the appeal

failed on each of the grounds relied on by ISKCON.

      As to Ground (c) (the appeal on the ground that the breach of

planning control had not taken place), the Inspector found on the

evidence that residents at the Manor lived as a community, in a regime

somewhat similar to a monastery, devoted single mindedly to the service

and promotion of their religion.  The bond between all the occupants

of the Manor was the religion of Krishna Consciousness, and they worked

and ate together, and shared the house and its grounds, each resident

having only a part of a shared bedroom for his or her sole occupation.

That is communal living as the reasonable man would understand it.

      As to public worship, the public were permitted to attend

services at all times.  The Manor was proud to keep open house, and the

gates were locked only for a few hours during part of the night.  No

visitor had to ask for any permission to enter.  The services in the

temple were conducted on exactly the same basis as in an Anglican or

any other church, although there was no parish roll or register of

communicants.  Members of the public were invited to celebrate

weddings, with a religious ceremony after the civil one, and this also

could be described as an element of public worship.

      As to public entertainment in connection with religious

festivals, the publicity given in the past, and attractions promised

at the festivals, with references to firework displays, vegetarian

feasting, spectacular pandal performances, dances, drama and music and

video shows indicated that the visitors did indeed come not just to

worship in the temple or offer silent prayers to the deities, but also

to be entertained, albeit against a religious background.  The

festivals had many of the attractions of a fête, and more besides.

      As to Ground (b) (the appeal on the ground that the matters

alleged did not breach planning control), the Inspector concluded that

the primary use of the Manor was fundamentally different in many ways

from a residential theological college and that there had been a

material change of use.

      It was the practice at the Manor to extend open doors to all

comers at almost all hours of the day and night in a way which no

college would do, and which would not be found at any church, even a

major cathedral in a city.  It was, as one resident wrote "rather like

having Canterbury Cathedral in the middle of a small English village".

      The Inspector expressly considered ISKCON's argument that the

effect of the Section 52 Agreement was to found an estoppel.  He noted

that it was an agreement under seal voluntarily entered into and as

such the law of contract applied.  Furthermore the recital (viii)

clearly implied that the parties envisaged that some further

enforcement notice might be served if it was deemed expedient.  It was

in any event clear from the authority cited that a planning authority

could not by virtue of a Section 52 Agreement fetter its discretion to

carry out its statutory function to serve another enforcement notice

in the future.  The rights and duties of the parties conferred by the

Section 52 Agreement should be determined by the law of contract, the

enforcement notice according to the statutory provisions.  The

existence of the Section 52 Agreement did not estop the planning

authority from serving the enforcement notice and the Section 52

Agreement had no bearing on the Ground b. appeal, which failed.

      As to Ground (a) (the ground of appeal that planning permission

ought to be granted), the Inspector summarised the primary issues,

which were in his view all of equal relevance in setting out the

conflicting priorities.  These included:

      "vi. Does the importance of the Manor as a shrine and the need

      to provide places of worship for the Hindu population:-

           a.  constitute those very special circumstances which

           justify development in the Green Belt in any event;

           b.  outweigh any specific and convincing planning

           objections on any of the grounds noted above and justify an

           exception to Green Belt and other Development Plan

           policies?

      vii. Whether, given the long history, the presumption in favour

      of development and the previous decisions by the planning

      authority, any injury to amenity can be met by suitable and

      enforceable conditions."

      The Inspector's conclusions on these issues were as follows:

      "37.13  I turn next to issue (vi), very special circumstances.

      I accept that the Manor has become a special place of worship and

      pilgrimage for the Hindu community in this country, and that

      there appear to be very few Hindu places of worship in North

      London and nearby counties.  The Manor is of special importance

      as the home in Britain of ISKCON's founder.  I do not doubt that

      the traditional religious rites and ceremonies, in sylvan

      surroundings, bring inspiration and spiritual comfort to many who

      visit.  No one could ignore the national and international

      concern, and the social issue posed by the possibility of

      restricting participation in the worship at the Manor and the

      celebration of the Hindu festivals.  Whilst I have not adopted

      verbatim the findings of fact suggested by Counsel for the

      appellants in respect of the planning authority's attitude of

      partial acceptance over the years, I accept the basic thesis

      behind them, and indeed they are largely borne out by the

      planning authority's own evidence.

      37.14  The appeal of Krishna Consciousness and the Hindu

      population have both increased substantially in the past 15

      years.  It is very clear from the voluminous documents that

      regular attendances at the Manor over and above those at festival

      times have also increased significantly in recent years.  The

      Manor has become an important place of worship and pilgrimage.

      This is unfortunate in view of the fact that it is situated in

      one of the most vulnerable areas of Green Belt, so very close to

      London, in a village of high profile public activities.  The sale

      of Croome Court and concentration of activities at the Manor

      seems to have flown in the face of those constraints which should

      have been obvious in view of the history of concern by the

      planning authority through the 1970s.

      37.15  I take due note that the Manor has been allowed to be used

      for public worship and public entertainment at festivals for many

      years.  I do not consider however that this implies toleration

      of the status quo, but rather that the planning authority have

      been doing everything they can to avoid the confrontation which

      the present enforcement notice has provoked.  I note that some

      residents accept that they have had less to complain about from

      noise and disturbance in recent years, but it is in the nature

      of things that uses which have caused conflict are toned down

      when there are enforcement proceedings pending.  When I bear in

      mind the numbers of people and vehicles involved, and the type

      of activities, such as weddings and feasts which have been

      publicised in the past, I have to take into account that a

      planning permission for a use which is geared to attracting

      people is very likely to result in an upsurge of activity.

      37.16  The appellants maintain that because the earlier

      enforcement notice and the Section 52 Agreement provided for a

      tolerance of up to 1000 visitors on non-festival days, this

      figure at any rate should be regarded as acceptable in planning

      terms.  By the same token they imply that the 6 Festivals should

      be accepted.  I do not consider this should necessarily be so.

      A figure of 1000 visitors, particularly if it is to be regarded

      as 1000 visitors in addition to the staff and students whose

      attendance is part and parcel of the determined use of a

      theological college, is to my view too large a crowd to bring

      into the village in any event on a Sunday.  Taking Mr Campbell's

      occupancy of 3.85 occupants per car, which seems surprisingly

      high, it will still generate some 260 in and out vehicle

      movements, which will certainly have a considerable effect on the

      Sunday evening peace and quiet for the nearest residents.  I

      conclude therefore that there is no justification for taking 1000

      visitors as an acceptable norm.

      37.17  I am in no doubt that any church of any faith or

      denomination in a small village or indeed in any closely built

      residential area, which regularly attracted 1000-1500 people for

      late evening services on Sundays, and crowds of up to 12000 for

      festivals 3 times a year, would encounter objections from the

      host community.  The intimate small scale closely built character

      of a home counties village simply cannot accommodate the crowds

      attracted to a tirtha in the Indian sub-continent, especially

      when most of the worshippers or pilgrims have to come in their

      own private transport or in coaches.  When religious meetings on

      this scale are held in the United Kingdom such as those by Billy

      Graham and other evangelists, Earls Court or Wembley Stadium are

      booked.  I note that Mr Sharman proposes to hold the next Hindu

      youth festival in such place, acknowledging that the temple

      premises in Wandsworth are not large enough.

      37.18  It also seems to me that the fact that the tenets of

      Krishna Consciousness prescribe that there must be devotions

      virtually 24 hours a day, with comings and goings very late at

      night, are particularly intrusive in a small village.  The

      appellants are not prepared to even consider curbing their night

      time activities and maintain that it would be contrary to their

      faith to do so.  I understand what they say, but this inevitably

      makes the use very difficult to fit into a residential village

      where most people travel some distance to work, and come home

      expecting a measure of peace and quiet, essentially at weekends

      when the use of the Manor is at its most active.

      37.19  I take due note of the very large number of letters and

      petitions, addressed to HM the Queen, the Prime Minister and

      members of HM Government, Members of Parliament, the planning

      authority and myself relating to this matter.  Unfortunately many

      of these are based on the premise that there is some antipathy

      to the Hindu religion, which is not the case.  Inevitably many

      of these letters come from people far away from Letchmore Heath

      who are not aware of the full circumstances and the problems

      posed by the attraction of crowds into a small English village.

      I take particular note however that there are also some letters

      from local residents supporting the appellants, and there was

      some support for the alternative access, if that had proved a

      practical proposition.

      37.20  In his submissions counsel for the appellants expressly

      withdrew any allegations of religious or racial prejudice which

      had been made against the planning authority.  In this, as in

      very many other planning decisions it is necessary to weigh the

      needs of one group or interest against others, and the needs of

      religious or ethnic minorities, however important, cannot

      necessarily be allowed to override those constraints which have

      to apply to everyone, in planning as in other matters, in the

      interests of a tolerant and free society in a small and crowded

      country.

      37.21  The appellants appear to have recognised that the

      attraction provided by the Manor has outgrown the capacity of

      Letchmore Heath to accommodate those it attracts, with the risk

      that the very basis of that attraction, a shrine in a peaceful

      village in the country, could be destroyed.  The aims of the

      proposal for an alternative temple indicates the growth in

      popularity which is anticipated and the number of worshippers

      which might have to be catered for.  No further consideration

      seems to have been given however to acquiring a country mansion

      in a more remote spot, or a redundant ecclesiastical or

      educational building closer to the centres of the Hindu

      population.  I appreciate that a very high standard of Puja has

      been developed at the Manor, which is appreciated by a large

      congregation, but I am not convinced that the Manor is the only

      place where this can be carried on, and it appears that as

      recently as 8 years ago a Math could readily be set up at Croome

      Court and quickly given up when economic conditions so dictated.

      37.22  It was suggested that need justified an exception to, or

      setting aside Green Belt policy altogether in this particular

      case.  However, when I weigh on one side the needs of the

      appellants and their congregation and on the other not just for

      the Green Belt policy, but the actual disquiet and inconvenience

      to residents, and add to that the positive duty which

      Conservation Area status imposes on the decision maker, not just

      to preserve but also to enhance the character of Letchmore Heath,

      I consider that the interests of the village and its residents

      should prevail, and that there is insufficient justification for

      setting aside that weight of policy as well as other specific and

      convincing planning objections.

      37.23  The decision on the merits should in my view also take

      into account the decision in respect of the Dagger Lane site.

      If planning permission is granted for a new temple, then my

      conclusions on the merits in respect of the enforcement notice

      have that much more force, because an alternative site has been

      provided, in accordance with the advice in Annex B of Circular

      22/80.  However if there is to be no new temple, it still seems

      to me that the combination of policy and clearly identifiable

      physical disadvantages to the use at Letchmore Heath constitute

      spcific and convincing planning objections of such force that

      they amply outweigh and displace the arguments on the grounds of

      need, even though those arguments then become that much stronger.

      37.24  I turn finally to conditions.  Every encouragement is

      given by Circulars 22/80 and PPG Note 1 to temper enforcement

      action by granting planning permission subject to suitable

      conditions.  In this case the planning authority have shown

      themselves willing for at least 10 years to devise some machinery

      whereby the religious aspirations of the appellants and their

      devotees can be equated with the interests of the residents.

      Whilst it is not for me to disagree with the legal interpretation

      of the Section 52 Agreement, it does seem to me that the

      appellants have chosen to disregard the spirit if not the letter

      of it, and I can only conclude that they are unwilling on

      principle to restrict the number of people attending their

      premises in the interests of the neighbouring residents.

      37.25  It seems to me that a condition limiting numbers would be

      the only basis on which the damage to amenity caused by the scale

      of the public worship and public entertainment activities could

      be remedied.  Given the past history however I have the gravest

      doubts as to whether such a condition could be enforced, and the

      very fact that such a condition is necessary points to the

      fundamental unsuitability of the premises for activities of this

      kind on anything but a purely local scale.  I have to agree with

      the planning authority that restrictions on numbers have already

      been proved not to work.  I can think of no other form of

      condition which would remedy the damage to the amenities of the

      village caused by the present activities, and I do not consider

      therefore that a conditional permission is appropriate  ..."

      On 20 March 1990 the Secretary of State, bearing in mind the

Inspector's report, largely confirmed the enforcement notice (including

his conclusions as to estoppel), with the variation that ISKCON had two

years rather than six months to cease the prohibited use, and a minor

amendment was made to the use to which the Manor and land could be put.

      ISKCON exercised their statutory right of appeal under Section

246(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (now Section 289 of

the Town and Planning Act 1990).  Their Notice of Motion included as

a ground of appeal that ISKCON were prepared to enter into a new

Section 52 Agreement, but did not repeat the estoppel argument.  Mr.

Justice Kennedy, giving the judgment of the High Court on

31 October 1991, noted that it was no longer challenged by the

applicants that there had been a material change of use of the Manor.

Instead, the applicants argued, inter alia, (i) that the Inspector and

the Secretary of State had failed to have proper regard to the

willingness of the applicants to enter into a new Section 52 Agreement

and (ii) that the Secretary of State had been wrong to accept the

Inspector's conclusion that the planning objections outweighed the

arguments of the applicants on the ground of need.

      As to the former submission, the Court held that, as was clear

from the Inspector's report, negotiations for a further Section 52

Agreement had broken down.  There had been an earlier agreement, but

for present purposes it was not material.  So, even accepting that the

appellants were willing to enter into an agreement on their own terms,

the position was, as Counsel for the Secretary of State graphically

described it, like one hand clapping.  There was nothing for the

Inspector of the Secretary of State to take into account.

      On the latter point, ISKCON criticised the Secretary of State's

acceptance of the Inspector's conclusion in paragraph 37.23 of his

report that even if planning permission were not granted in respect of

the Dagger Lane site,

           '...the combination of policy and clearly identifiable

           physical disadvantages to the use at Letchmore Heath

           constitute specific and convincing planning objections of

           such force that they amply outweigh and displace the

           arguments on the grounds of need, even though those

           arguments then become that much stronger.'

      It was argued by ISKCON that the Inspector's conclusion was

founded at least in part on misapprehensions.  For example, he was

wrong to suggest, without any evidential basis, that if a new temple

were to be built there would be increased activity at the Manor due to

fund raising, or that the appellants might be unable to complete a new

temple project within the time scale allowed.  The Court rejected

ISKCON's submissions on the grounds that the matters on which the

Inspector really relied were matters of substance, which permeated his

report.  This approach was indicated in paragraph 37.22 of the Report

(see above).

      The Secretary of State was entitled to regard the Inspector's

conclusions as firmly founded, and there was no substance in any of the

points which had been argued in support of the appeal.

      ISKCON applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal to the

Court of Appeal.  On 16 March 1992 Lord Justice Glidewell agreed

largely with the decision of Mr Justice Kennedy of 31 October 1991.

Leave to appeal was refused.

      With the refusal of leave to appeal, the two year period for

compliance with the enforcement notice began to run.

      Relevant domestic law

      Section 174 (2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990

provides for the following grounds for appeal to the Secretary of State

against an enforcement notice:

      "(a) that planning permission ought to be granted for the

      development to which the notice relates or, as the case may be,

      that a condition or limitation alleged in the enforcement notice

      not to have been complied with ought to be discharged:

      (b) that the matters alleged in the notice do not constitute a

      breach of planning control;

      (c) that the breach of planning control alleged in the notice has

      not taken place;

      ...

      (g) that the steps required by the notice to be taken exceed what

      is necessary to remedy any breach of planning control or to

      achieve a purpose specified in Section 173 (4);

      (h) that the period specified in the notice as the period within

      which any step is to be taken falls short of what should

      reasonably be allowed."

      An appeal against the Secretary of State may be made to the High

Court "on a point of law" (Section 289 (1) of the Town and Country

Planning Act 1990).

COMPLAINTS

      The complaints made by ISKCON.

      ISKCON allege a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.  ISKCON

accept that the enforcement notice appears to satisfy the requirements

of lawfulness and legitimate purpose in Article 9 para. 2, but consider

that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society".  In

particular, they consider that the enforcement notice, subsequent

proceedings and the attitude shown by the authorities were

unnecessarily harsh and failed to give sufficient weight to the

importance of the Manor as a place of worship and inspiration for

Hindus.  In this respect they also point to a letter of

17 September 1992 from a minister at the Department of the Environment

that "[r]eligious aspects of the Society's activities at Bhaktivedanta

Manor were not relevant" to the enforcement and planning appeals, and

to further letters to the same effect of 26 August and 22 December 1993

from an official and a minister at the Department of the Environment

respectively.

      They consider that, in an increasingly ethnically diverse Europe,

the Commission should not hesitate, in an appropriate case, to adopt

a narrow margin of appreciation under Article 9.  ISKCON regard the

Section 52 Agreement of 25 January 1983 as evidence of what the council

then accepted as reasonable, and that without giving good reasons for

changing their mind, the council's subsequent enforcement notice and

proceedings were disproportionate.

      ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,

taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.

ISKCON consider that because of the link with religious freedom, a

narrower approach should be made to Article 1 of the First Protocol

than is normally the case, and they argue that Muslims, Catholics and

Protestants have been given permission to use premises for public

worship within Green Belt areas where they have not been so permitted.

      ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention in that they were entitled to access to a court with the

full guarantees of Article 6 in respect neither of their property

rights, nor in respect of their right to freedom of religion.  They

point out that the proceedings before the Planning Inspector were non-

judicial, recommendatory in character and subject to alteration or

confirmation at the Secretary of State's discretion, and that the scope

of review of the appeal to the High Court (and subsequent application

for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal) was not sufficient to

comply with Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

      ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 13 of the Convention

to the extent that Article 6 para. 1 may be found not to be applicable.

      The complaints made by the 8 individual applicants

      The individual applicants have each submitted a statement to the

Commission indicating how seriously he or she will  be affected if the

enforcement notice takes effect.  They ask the Commission to construe

Article 9 of the Convention according to international standards and

developments, with particular reference to the United Nations

Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of intolerance and

discrimination based on religion or belief, 1981.  Those applicants who

are parents also rely on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in that they are

not able to ensure education and teaching in conformity with their

religious convictions, and that they are no longer able to ensure this

because of the enforcement notice served on ISKCON.  The individual

applicants also allege violations of Articles 6 and 13 of the

Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 24 April 1992 and registered

on 13 August 1992.

      On 10 February 1993 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government for written observations on

its admissibility and merits.  The Government's observations were

submitted on 3 June 1993, and the applicant's observations in reply on

13 September 1993.

      On 16 February 1994 the applicants' representatives informed the

Commission that the third named individual applicant had died, and that

they wished to withdraw the application in respect of that applicant.

THE LAW

1.    The Commission notes first that the third named individual

applicant has died in the course of the proceedings before the

Commission, and that the applicants' representatives have expressed the

wish to withdraw the application to the extent that it concerns him.

      The Commission finds that, to the extent that the application

relates to the third named individual applicant, the conditions of

Article 30 para. 1 (a) (Art. 30-1-a) of the Convention have been

fulfilled, and that respect for Human Rights as defined in the

Convention does not require continuation of the examination of the

petition.

2.    ISKCON allege a violation of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention

in that the enforcement proceedings in respect of Bhaktivedanta Manor

interfered in an unjustified way with their freedom of religion.

Article 9 (Art. 9) provides as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience

      and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion

      or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others

      and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief,

      in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

      2.   Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be

      subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are

      necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public

      safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or

      for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

      The Government submit that the interest and importance of

ISKCON's rights under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention were fully

taken into account by the Inspector's report and the Secretary of

State's decision.

      The Commission notes at the outset that ISKCON do not allege that

the mere existence of planning legislation violated their rights under

the Convention.  Indeed, the Convention organs have found on several

occasions that contracting States enjoy a wide discretion in regulating

planning matters (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lonnröth judgment

of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 26 para. 69, and, in the

context of the United Kingdom legislation, Chater v, the United

Kingdom, No. 11723/85, Dec. 7.5.87, D.R. 52 p. 250, 256).  It is

against this background that the Commission must assess the compliance

with Article 9 para. 2 (Art. 9-2) of any interference with ISKCON's

right under Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention.

      ISKCON Ltd. is a registered charity in the United Kingdom.  It

is part of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, which

is the world-wide promoter of Vayishnavism, the worship of Krishna.

ISKCON's use of Bhaktivedanta Manor began in 1973 when the Manor was

acquired, and developed as the Manor became more successful and better

known.  The Commission is prepared to assume that the issue of the

enforcement notices to limit use of the manor to that which was

permitted when ISKCON acquired the manor amounts to an interference

with ISKCON's freedom of religion, including the freedom to manifest

that religion in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

      The Commission finds that the limitation on ISKCON's freedom to

manifest its religion was prescribed by law in that the domestic town

and country planning legislation was applied.  It has not been

suggested that that legislation was insufficiently clear or otherwise

in conflict with the requirement that it be "prescribed by law".

      It has, however, been submitted by ISKCON that the interference

was not "necessary in a democratic society" although they accept that

the aim of the interference was to protect the rights of others, namely

the residents of the nearby village.  The Commission in addition finds

an element of protection of public order or health in the aim of the

interference, in that planning legislation is generally accepted as

necessary in modern society to prevent uncontrolled development.

      The adjective "necessary" in the second paragraph of Articles 8

to 11 (Art. 8, 9, 10, 11) of the Convention implies the existence of

a "pressing social need".  Contracting States have a certain margin of

appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists but it goes hand

in hand with European supervision, embracing both the law and the

decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts.  The

task of the Convention organs is not to substitute their view for that

of the competent national authorities, but rather to review under the

Article at issue the decisions delivered pursuant to their power of

appreciation.  This does not mean that supervision is limited to

ascertaining whether the respondent State exercises its discretion

reasonably, carefully and in good faith;  what the Convention organs

have to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light

of the case as a whole and determine whether it was "proportionate to

the legitimate aim pursued" and whether the reasons adduced by the

national authorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient" (cf.,

in the context of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, Eur. Court

H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p.

29 para. 50, with further reference).

      Applying these principles to the present case, the Commission

notes that ISKCON do not in substance contend that the planning law was

wrongly applied.  Rather, they consider that as the local authority had

initially entered into a Section 52 Agreement with ISKCON, the

requirement of proportionality would have been better met by imposing

additional conditions on the use of the Manor than by serving an

enforcement notice prohibiting the established use of the Manor.  They

also point out that the effect of the enforcement notice was to deprive

them of their rights under the Section 52 Agreement to admit up to

1,000 people per day to the Manor. They also lay emphasis on the fact

that inadequate weight was given to their freedom of religion in the

proceedings.

      As to the Section 52 Agreement, the Commission notes that the

agreement in the present case was part of continuing attempts by the

local authority and ISKCON to resolve their planning differences, in

this case by entering into a contract relating to the use of the land.

Moreover, as pointed out by the Inspector, it was not only implicit in

the Agreement that further enforcement notices might be served if it

were deemed expedient, but negotiations for a further Section 52

Agreement had broken down.  Even assuming that conditions acceptable

to the local authority had been proposed for inclusion in the existing,

or in a new, Section 52 Agreement, the Commission does not consider

that the decision of the local authority to control the use of the

property by recourse to the statutory enforcement powers, rather than

by means of contractual provisions, was in the circumstances

disproportionate to the legitimate aim.  Similarly the decision was not

in the Commission's view rendered disproportionate by the fact that on

planning grounds, the local authority were no longer prepared to

contemplate visits to the Manor by up to 1,000 persons per day.

      With regard to the weight given to ISKCON's right to religion in

the enforcement proceedings, the Commission notes that although the

courts were limited in their review of the Secretary of State's

decision to confirm the enforcement notices, the Inspector who held an

inquiry into the enforcement notices gave detailed consideration to the

special circumstances of the case.  Although he came to the conclusion

that the special circumstances were not sufficient to outweigh the

general planning considerations, the Commission finds that sufficient

weight was given to the position of ISKCON and the difficulties faced

if the user of Bhaktivedanta Manor was limited to that which was

permitted in 1973.  In particular, the Commission does not consider

that Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention can be used to circumvent

existing planning legislation, provided that in the proceedings under

that legislation, adequate weight is given to freedom of religion.  In

contending that inadequate weight was given to ISKCON's freedom of

religion, the applicants rely on statements in letters sent by

Ministers and an official of the Department of the Environment to the

effect that the decision on ISKCON's appeal against the enforcement

notice was based on the relevant land-use planning grounds and that

"the religious aspects of the Society's activities at Bhaktivedanta

Manor were not relevant".  The Commission does not interpret these

statements as suggesting that the religious importance of the Manor to

the members of ISKCON was not fully taken into account and weighed

against the general planning considerations, but rather as making clear

that the refusal of planning permisison was based on proper planning

grounds and not on any objections to the religious aspects of the

activities of ISKCON.  It is in any event clear from the terms of the

Inspector's Report and the decision letter of the Secretary of State

that considerable weight was attached to the religious needs and

interests of the members of ISKCON and to the importance of the Manor

in relation to the religious activities of the members.

      Accordingly, the Commission finds that the interference with

ISKCON's right to freedom of religion under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the

Convention can be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society".

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1) to the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article

14 (P1-1+14) of the Convention.

      Given that the aim of the enforcement notice served on ISKCON was

to limit the use of the property to that which was permitted when

ISKCON acquired it, the Commission finds that there is some doubt as

to whether there has been any interference with ISKCON's right to

peaceful enjoyment of its possessions.  In particular, the Commission

considers that, as a general principle, the protection of property

rights ensured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) cannot be used as

a ground for claiming planning permission to extend permitted use of

property.  However, assuming that there is such an interference, any

limitation on use requires justification in the public interest if it

amounts to deprivation of possessions, or in the general interest if

it constitutes the control of property.

      Although the effect of the enforcement notices is radically to

alter the use to which Bhaktivedanta Manor has been put in recent

years, the Commission finds that it does not amount to a deprivation

of possessions, but a control of the use of property.  Accordingly, the

Commission must supervise the lawfulness, purpose and proportionality

of the restrictions.  The Commission must determine whether, whilst

recognising the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States in

planning matters, a fair balance was struck between the general

interest of the community and the protection of the individual's

fundamental rights (cf. No. 11723/85, Dec. 7.5.87, D.R. 52 p. 250, 256

with further references).

      The Commission finds that planning controls are necessary and

desirable in modern society in order to preserve and improve town and

country landscapes (cf. the above-mentioned Chater decision, D.R. 52

p. 256).

      As to proportionality, the Commission notes that the Inspector

who held the inquiry into the enforcement notices found that the Manor

had caused a certain amount of disturbance to neighbouring residents,

and that at times it gave rise to considerable traffic problems.  If

the Inspector and/or the Secretary of State had taken into account

irrelevant matters, or if they had failed to take into account matters

which were relevant, these matters could have been raised on the appeal

against the Secretary of State's decision.  The Commission finds no

indication in the Inspector's report, and the subsequent decision by

the Minister, that the various interests involved were not duly taken

into consideration.

      In the light of these considerations, the Commission finds that

a proper balance has been struck between ISKCON's interests and the

general interest.

      In connection with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, the

Commission notes that ISKCON withdrew allegations of racial or

religious prejudice in the the planning inquiry, as there was no

evidence of bad faith of the part of the local authority in relation

to the adoption on the enforcement notice.  In such circumstances,

alleged prejudice and hostility from individuals cannot be of relevance

to the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      The Commission finds that the control of the use of ISKCON's

property, which prevents ISKCON from using Bhaktivedanta Manor for

purposes, broadly, beyond what was permitted in 1973, is, therefore,

in accordance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1), and does not raise any issues under Article 14 (P1-1+14) of the

Convention in connection with that provision.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    ISKCON also allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

of the Convention on the ground that they were entitled to, but did not

have, the benefit of a court decision to determine the interference

with their freedom of religion.  They link this with a complaint that

the global review of the High Court was limited to questions of law.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides as

follows:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

      established by law..."

      The Government do not accept that ISKCON had a "civil right" to

freedom of religion, although they point out that there are no

restrictions, civil or criminal, which limit a person's freedom to

practice his religion as such.  They consider that the alleged civil

right in issue was whether or not ISKCON's religious interests and need

outweighed the evident planning concerns in the case.  In this respect,

they submit that the proceedings before the Inspector complied with the

requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, but that in any

event the appeal to the High Court, and the possibility of judicial

review of the Secretary of State's decision, satisfied the requirement

of "full jurisdiction" inherent in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

      To the extent that ISKCON complain of a denial of access to court

in respect of the enforcement orders on their freedom of religion, or

in respect of their freedom of religion as such, the Commission recalls

that it is not the function of Article 6 (Art. 6) to regulate the

content of civil "rights and obligations" (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,W.

judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 32 para. 73).  The

Commission notes, as ISKCON submit, that freedom of religion has no

formal status as a right which is guaranteed in United Kingdom domestic

law.  Accordingly, disputes over freedom of religion of the type

involved in the present case do not determine "civil rights" within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      There remains, however, the complaint that the High Court could

only consider points of law in connection with the determination of the

civil rights which were at issue, that is, the "pure" planning issues.

The Government contend that the proceedings before the Inspector

complied with Article 6 (Art. 6), in which case the Commission is not

required to consider the proceedings at the High Court with such close

scrutiny.  However, the Commission is not required to make a finding

as to this question, as this part of the application is in any event

inadmissible for the following reasons.

      The Commission recalls that appeals against the decisions of

administrative bodies, which themselves do not comply with Article 6

(Art. 6), will only be consistent with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of

the Convention if they are conducted before "judicial bodies that have

full jurisdiction" (Eur. Court H.R., Albert and Le Compte judgment of

10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 16, para. 29).  It is true that

Section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides that

appeals to the High Court against enforcement notices may only be made

"on a point of law".

      The local authority did not, however, have a complete discretion

in taking enforcement proceedings.  In particular, it could only take

proceedings in circumstances within the limits defined by Section 174

of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (which sets out the grounds

of appeal to the Secretary of State), and in accordance with its own

structure plans and the policy guidance laid down in various documents

by the Secretary of State.  ISKCON were then able to have a

determination from the High Court of whether the legal aspects (that

is, "points of law",) of these requirements had been met.

      The Commission recalls that the High Court dealt with each of

ISKCON's grounds of appeal on its merits, point by point, without ever

having to decline jurisdiction.  Moreover, it was open to ISKCON to

contend in the High Court that findings of fact by the Inspector and/or

the Secretary of State were unsupported by evidence, as they could have

argued that the administrative authorities failed to take into account

an actual fact or did take into account an immaterial fact.  Finally,

the High Court could have interfered with the administrative

authorities' decisions if those decisions had been irrational having

regard to the facts established by the authorities.

      It is not the role of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention to

give access to a level of jurisdiction which can substitute its opinion

for that of the administrative authorities on questions of expediency

and where the courts do not refuse to examine any of the points raised:

Article 6 (Art. 6) gives a right to a court that has "full

jurisdiction" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Zumtobel judgment of 21 September

1993, Series A no.268-A, para. 32).

      In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the review by

the High Court fulfilled the requirements of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

5.    ISKCON finally allege a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention in that no domestic remedy was available to them to make

their complaints under, principally, Article 9 (Art. 9) of the

Convention.  However, the guarantees of Article 13 (Art. 13) apply only

to a grievance which can be regarded as "arguable" (cf. Eur. Court

H.R., Powell and Rayner judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172,

p. 14 para. 31, with further references).  In the present case, the

Commission has rejected the substantive claims as disclosing no

appearance of a violation of the Convention.  For similar reasons, it

cannot be regarded as "arguable".

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.    The eight individual applicants each allege violations of

Articles 9, 6 and 13 (Art. 9, 6, 13) of the Convention on the same

grounds as ISKCON, save that they do not make the allegations relating

to property rights.  Those applicants who are parents also contend that

they are not able to ensure that their children are taught in

accordance with their convictions as Bhaktivedanta Manor will no longer

be fully operational.  They see a violation of Article 2 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention in this respect.

      The Commission has had regard to the statements submitted by the

individual applicants and accepts that each of them is sufficiently

affected by the decisions of the domestic authorities to be able to

claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of the Convention within

the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

        However, the reasons for the Commission's findings in the

paragraphs above in relation to ISKCON apply, mutatis mutandis, to the

individual applicants.  In the same way as ISKCON cannot derive from

the Convention a right to exemption from the ordinary planning controls

(provided due attention is paid to their interests), the individual

applicants must accept that the enforcement of those planning controls

affects the modalities of their worship and, so far as relevant, the

education of their children.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission

      unanimously DECIDES TO STRIKE THE APPLICATION OUT OF ITS LIST OF

      CASES to the extent that it relates to the third named individual

      applicant, and

      by a majority DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION

      INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

      (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                            (A. WEITZEL)