H.B. v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 20063/92 • ECHR ID: 001-1907
Document date: August 31, 1994
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 20063/92
by H. B.
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
31 August 1994, the following members being present:
MM. A. WEITZEL, President
C.L. ROZAKIS
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 8 May 1992 by
H. B. against Austria and registered on 1 June 1992 under file
No. 20063/92;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1955. He is a
medical doctor by profession and resides at Wölfnitz, Austria. Before
the Commission he is represented by Dr. Ernst Maiditsch, a lawyer
practising at Klagenfurt.
On 21 May 1989 the applicant was called to the site of a car
accident in which a person had been seriously injured. The applicant
immediately commenced certain emergency treatment, inter alia inserting
a tube through which artificial respiration could be administered. The
patient was thereafter taken by helicopter to the nearest hospital.
During the flight, however, the patient suffered a cardiac arrest and
eventually died.
Following the investigations into the above incident the
applicant was, by indictment of 11 October 1989, charged with having
negligently caused the death of the above patient in that he had
negligently placed the respiration tube in the gullet instead of the
windpipe, causing a brain oedema and subsequently the death of the
patient.
The case was examined by the Regional Court (Landesgericht) of
Klagenfurt. Court sessions were held on 4 December 1989, 2 May, 19 July
and 12 December 1990 during which the Court obtained the evidence from
two court appointed experts, an expert witness as well as a number of
other witnesses. Furthermore, the Court had at its disposal the expert
opinion submitted by the court appointed experts as well as other
written material, inter alia the autopsy report and the results of a
brain scan. During the proceedings the applicant submitted a number of
requests for additional evidence (Beweisanträge) the majority of which
were rejected by the Court. In particular, the Court rejected a request
to obtain a second expert opinion, to hear another expert witness, to
obtain certain documents and to reconstruct the circumstances
surrounding the patient's removal from the helicopter upon arrival at
the hospital. The Court found that this evidence would not, having
regard to the evidence already available, add anything of relevance to
the case.
On the basis of the evaluation of the evidence submitted the
Regional Court, by judgment of 12 December 1990, found the applicant
guilty of the charge brought against him and sentenced him to pay a
fine totalling 40,000 Austrian Schillings. The payment of half of the
fine was suspended.
The applicant, as well as the prosecutor, appealed against the
judgment to the Graz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht). The
prosecutor requested a higher fine whereas the applicant, in support
of his request for acquittal, relied on the fact that the first
instance court had refused his requests for further evidence. In this
respect the appeal was based on the Regional Court's refusal to obtain
a further expert opinion, to hear a further expert witness, to obtain
certain written evidence and to reconstruct the removal of the patient
from the helicopter.
The case was heard in the Court of Appeal on 8 November 1991. In
reply to the applicant's above complaints the Court stated that another
expert opinion would be superfluous having regard to the expert opinion
already available, the autopsy report and the results from the brain
scan. The Court furthermore found the reconstruction request not only
superfluous but also inadmissible (unzulässig) in the circumstances of
the case. Finally, the Court found the remaining requests for
supporting evidence to concern matters which already followed from the
other evidence submitted. In the light of this the Court concluded that
the applicant had not suffered any injustice in his procedural rights
and that the first instance court had correctly concluded that all
relevant questions had been sufficiently clarified by the available
evidence.
By judgment of 8 November 1991 the Court accordingly rejected the
applicant's appeal as unsubstantiated (unbegründet). As requested by
the prosecutor the Court increased the fine to 100,000 Austrian
Schillings, the payment of which was suspended.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial. He
maintains in particular that he was not presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law and, furthermore, complains of the fact that
the courts rejected his request for supplementary evidence. He invokes
Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial, that
he was not presumed innocent and that the courts rejected his requests
for supplementary evidence. He invokes Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (d)
(Art. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3-d) of the Convention which reads as far as
relevant:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an ...
impartial ... tribunal ...
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
...
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him."
The Commission first recalls that with regard to the judicial
decisions involved in the present case, its only task is to ensure, in
accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, the observance
of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In
particular, the Commission is not competent to deal with an application
alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic
courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved
a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention. It refers, on this point, to its established case-law,
(see, e.g. No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).
It is true that in this case the applicant also complains that
he did not have a fair trial, that he was not presumed innocent and
that the courts rejected his requests for supplementary evidence.
a. In respect of the complaint that the applicant was not presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law the Commission recalls
that the national courts examined the statements of several experts and
witnesses as well as numerous documents and is of the opinion that the
judgment was based on an evaluation of these statements and documents.
Especially, there is nothing indicating that the courts in fulfilling
their functions started from the conviction or assumption that the
applicant had committed the acts of which he was charged. An
examination of this complaint therefore fails to disclose any
appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the
Convention.
b. As regards the remaining complaints submitted under Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention the Commission notes that as the guarantees
in para. 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-3) are specific aspects of the right
to a fair trial set forth in para. 1, it will consider the applicant's
complaints under the two provisions taken together.
In this connection the Commission refers to its consistently held
view that the conformity of a trial with the rules laid down in Article
6 (Art. 6) of the Convention should be examined in the light of the
entire trial. It is true that one particular aspect or incident could
have been influential or assumed such importance as to constitute a
decisive factor in a general appraisal of the trial as a whole. But it
is important to note in this regard that, even in such an event, it is
on the basis of an appraisal of the whole trial that the question of
whether the case was given a fair hearing should be decided (cf. for
example No. 9000/80, Dec. 11.3.82, D.R. 28 p. 127).
As regards the hearing of witnesses the Commission recalls that
one of the purposes of Article 6 para. 3 (d) (Art. 6-3-d) is to ensure
equality between the defence and the prosecution as regards the
summoning and examination of witnesses but it does not grant the
accused an unlimited right to secure the appearance of witnesses in
court. Furthermore, it is in the trial court's discretion to refuse to
take evidence which is considered irrelevant or unobtainable (cf.
No. 8417/78, Dec. 4.5.79, D.R. 16 p. 200 and Eur. Court H.R., Engel and
Others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, para. 91, pp. 38-39).
In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant's
case was heard in public in the Regional Court where he was present and
assisted by counsel. The Court heard a number of witnesses and two
experts whereas it rejected the requests to obtain supplementary
evidence since this evidence would not, in the Court's view, be
necessary for the evaluation of the substance of the case which it had
to consider. Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the case was
heard again in public in the Court of Appeal which confirmed the
refusal to obtain supplementary evidence.
The Commission has found no elements which would indicate that
the courts went beyond their discretion to refuse to take evidence in
the circumstances of the present case. Furthermore, the Commission has
not found other elements which could lead it to conclude that the right
to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention was not respected. Accordingly, an examination of the case,
as submitted, does not disclose to the Commission, on the basis of an
appraisal of the entire trial, any appearance of a violation of Article
6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)
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