AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 19853/92

                      by Henning SJÖSTRÖM

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 12 October 1994, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

           Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 15 January 1991

by Henning Sjöström against Sweden and registered on 15 April 1992

under file No. 19853/92;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1922 and resident in

Stockholm. He is a lawyer by profession. Before the Commission he is

represented by Mr. Peter Westdahl, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, are as

follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

      In 1953 the applicant was enrolled in the Swedish Bar Association

(Sveriges advokatsamfund). On 30 November 1990 the Disciplinary Board

(disciplinnämnden) of the Bar decided to exclude him from the Bar with

immediate effect. The disciplinary proceedings had been instituted in

August 1990 following a report by a Special Prosecutor essentially

indicating the following. The applicant had been the court-appointed

official counsel ("offentlig försvarare") for G., who had been

suspected of aggravated dishonesty with creditors, alternatively of

complicity in such an offence ("grov oredlighet mot borgenärer

alternativt medhjälp därtill"). G. had been detained from March to

October 1989 during which period his right to send and receive

correspondence had been restricted in accordance with Section 9,

subsection 2 of the 1976 Act on the Treatment of Detained and Arrested

Persons (lag 1976:371 om behandlingen av häktade och anhållna m.fl.).

Further instructions had been given by the Prosecutor to the effect

that G. had been prohibited from sending and receiving letters without

their prior inspection by the Prosecutor. In June and July 1989,

however, G. had managed to send and receive certain letters without

their having been inspected. The letters concerned large financial

transactions which G. had requested a bank abroad to carry out, inter

alia a transaction of 1.1 million USD. All correspondence to and from

G. had taken place with the help of a telefax device on the premises

of the law firm where the applicant had been working.

      On 4 October 1990 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm

withdrew its appointment of the applicant as G.'s official counsel and

refused to accept him as G.'s legal representative.

      The Disciplinary Board heard the parties orally on

14 November 1990. In his written and oral submissions to the

Disciplinary Board the applicant denied having conveyed letters to and

from G., or having assisted in any such conveyance, in contravention

of the rules in force. The applicant stated that letters had mistakenly

been sent from the telefax of the law firm. He further admitted that

G. had received information from the applicant's secretary pertaining

to letters addressed to him and which had been received by the telefax

of the law firm.

      In its decision to exclude the applicant from the Bar the

Disciplinary Board found it established that G. had been able to send

and receive letters in contravention of the rules imposed by the

Special Prosecutor by using the assistance of the law firm where the

applicant was working. The circumstances under which the correspondence

had taken place had been such that the pre-trial investigation of the

economic offences of which G. had been suspected could have been

jeopardised. While it had not been shown that the applicant had been

aware of the correspondence prior to 19 June 1989, it had been

established that he had not given his secretary sufficiently precise

instructions in regard to the rules imposed by the prosecution. Taking

also into account the public confidence attached to a lawyer appointed

as official counsel, the Board considered that the applicant had to be

regarded as responsible for the breaches of those rules. The Board

further found that even subsequent to a discussion with his secretary

on 15 June 1989 the applicant had neither himself verified the contents

of the correspondence nor given any instructions preventing further

correspondence from taking place in breach of the rules of the

prosecution. Taking into account the applicant's considerable

experience as a defence lawyer, the Board considered that he had

grossly neglected his duties as a member of the Bar and that the

circumstances of the case were extremely aggravating.

      Two of the nine members of the Disciplinary Board dissented,

considering that it had not been shown that the applicant had actively

participated in the correspondence to and from G.. These members

therefore voted for a warning and a pecuniary penalty. A third member

voted for excluding not only the applicant from the Bar, but also one

of his lawyer colleagues of the same law firm.

      On 13 May 1991 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) rejected the

applicant's appeal following a hearing, where the applicant was again

heard. The applicant was assisted by two members of the Bar. At the

Disciplinary Board's request the Special Prosecutor was heard as a

witness. At the applicant's request two members of the Bar as well as

his secretary and G. were also heard. Both the applicant and the

Disciplinary Board also submitted evidence in writing.

      Before the Supreme Court the applicant explained, inter alia,

that he had refused to answer certain questions put to him during the

hearing before the Disciplinary Board, referring to his wish to

safeguard G.'s interests and to the fact that the Special Prosecutor

had been allowed to attend the hearing.

      The Supreme Court could not find it established that the

applicant had deliberately committed a wrongdoing or otherwise acted

in a dishonest manner ("uppsåtligen gjort orätt eller annars förfarit

oredligt") within the meaning of Chapter 8, Section 7 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken). It, nevertheless, found that in

his capacity as G.'s official counsel the applicant had assisted G. in

such a manner that he had seriously neglected his duties as a member

of the Bar. The Supreme Court further noted, inter alia, that G. had

previously been found to have committed criminal offences and had been

suspected of unusually significant and serious economic crime. In those

circumstances the applicant had grossly failed to comply with the

ethical rules of the members of the Bar ("god advokatsed"), and this

warranted his exclusion from the Bar. As a further aggravating

circumstance the Supreme Court observed that the applicant had failed

to create guarantees that staff of the law firm would thoroughly

investigate the contents of the correspondence to and from G. Two of

the five justices of the Supreme Court dissented, voting for a warning

and a pecuniary penalty.

      The applicant submits that "for different reasons" the complaints

now made to the Commission could not be made to the Supreme Court.

Relevant domestic law and statutes

1.    Duties of the members of the Bar

      A member of the Bar shall honestly and diligently carry out his

commissions and shall comply with the ethical standards of the Bar

(Chapter 8, Section 4, subsection 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure).

2.    Exclusion from the Bar

      The members of the Bar are supervised by its Board. The

Chancellor of Justice (justitiekanslern) may request that the Board,

or another body of the Bar as prescribed by its statutes, take measures

against a member who neglects his duties (Chapter 8, Section 6 and

Sections 40-44a of the statutes of the Bar, the last-mentioned Section

having been added subsequent to the period of relevance in this case).

      A member may be excluded from the Bar if in his activities he has

deliberately committed a wrongdoing or otherwise acted in a dishonest

manner. If mitigating circumstances exist, a warning may be issued. A

member may also be excluded if he otherwise neglects his duties as a

member of the Bar and provided the circumstances are aggravating. If

they are not aggravating he may be warned or be given a formal

notification. If he receives a warning he may, for special reasons,

also be ordered to pay a penalty to the Bar. The above questions shall

be decided by the Board of the Bar or by the Disciplinary Board. The

exclusion of a member may be ordered to be immediately enforced

(Chapter 8, Section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure and Sections

40-44a of the statutes of the Bar).

3.    Composition of the Disciplinary Board

      Seven members of the nine-member Disciplinary Board are elected

by the General Assembly of the Bar, while two members are appointed by

the Government. A member of the Board of the Bar shall not at the same

time be a member of the Disciplinary Board (Section 12 of the statutes

of the Bar). There is no obligation that any of the members should be

a professional judge.

4.    Appeal proceedings

      A member of the Bar can appeal against his exclusion in

proceedings before the Supreme Court. Unless there are particular

reasons the appellant shall be orally heard. The Disciplinary Board of

the Bar shall be given an opportunity to submit written observations

and, if an oral hearing takes place, also to submit its opinion orally

(Chapter 8, Section 8 and Chapter 56, Section 14).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant considers that the disciplinary proceedings against

him "must be placed at an equal footing with a criminal charge within

the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention" in view of the

severity of the sanction imposed on him. He complains that he did not

receive a fair trial and that he was not presumed innocent until proven

guilty according to the law. At any rate, the proceedings concerned his

"civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6.

      More specifically, the applicant challenges both the composition

of the Disciplinary Board and its procedure as well as the procedure

before the Supreme Court all of which in his view failed to meet the

requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. He alleges, in particular,

that there was no equality of arms between the parties. For instance,

the Special Prosecutor had an ambivalent role in the proceedings,

initially appearing as the conductor of the pre-trial investigation in

the case relating to G., then as an "assistant" to the Disciplinary

Board in the case relating to the applicant's exclusion from the Bar

and subsequently as a "witness" before the Supreme Court in the last-

mentioned case. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court the

applicant was thus faced with two "opponents", namely both the Special

Prosecutor and the Disciplinary Board. The role of the Secretary-

General of the Bar Association in the proceedings before the

Disciplinary Board is also alleged to have been detrimental to the

applicant. Moreover, given that the majority of the members of the

Disciplinary Board were themselves members of the Bar, they were biased

in the consideration of the applicant's case. In this respect

particular reference is made to the applicant's longlasting criticism

of the Bar. In addition, the proceedings before both the Disciplinary

Board and the Supreme Court were allegedly not sufficiently based on

foreseeable procedural rules. Finally, neither the Disciplinary Board

nor the Supreme Court gave sufficient reasons for the applicant's

exclusion from the Bar.

      The applicant asserts that at least if all above-mentioned

elements are considered together his right to a fair trial has been

violated.

2.    Under Article 6 of the Convention the applicant also complains

that the proceedings before the Disciplinary Board were excessively

lengthy.

3.    The applicant further complains that he has been held guilty of

a criminal offence which did not constitute such an offence under

national or international law at the time when it was committed. He

submits that the consequences of his behaviour in respect of the

correspondence to and from G. were not foreseeable due to the absence

of any guiding case-law. He invokes Article 7 para. 1 of the

Convention.

4.    The applicant also complains that he has been denied the right

to have his "conviction" reviewed by a higher tribunal. He invokes

Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.

5.    The applicant finally complains that he has been deprived of an

effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention

against the alleged violations of his Convention rights. He refers, in

particular, to the fact that his exclusion from the Bar was immediately

enforceable.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant essentially complains that he did not receive a

fair trial before the Disciplinary Board of the Swedish Bar Association

and before the Supreme Court. He refers to a number of elements in the

proceedings which in his view, at any rate if taken together, led to

his being denied the guarantees afforded by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

      The relevant part of Article 6 (Art. 6) reads as follows:

      "1.  In the determination of his civil rights or of any

      criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair

      ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal

      established by law. ..."

       The Commission recalls that disciplinary sanctions are generally

designed to ensure that members of particular groups comply with the

specific rules governing their conduct (Eur. Court H.R., Weber judgment

of 22 May 1990, Series A no. 177, p. 18, para. 33). It finds that the

proceedings instituted against the applicant were only of a

disciplinary character and therefore did not concern the determination

of a "criminal charge".

      The Commission observes, however, that the proceedings complained

of related to a dispute over the applicant's right to continue to

practise his profession as a member of the Bar. This right could

arguably be said to be recognised under domestic law and was clearly

of a "civil" character. The dispute was furthermore genuine and serious

and its outcome was directly decisive for the right in question

(cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., H. v. Belgium judgment of 30 November

1987, Series A no. 127-B, p. 31 et seq., para. 37 et seq.). It follows

that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable in its civil aspect.

      The Commission recalls that the principles enshrined in Article 6

paras. 2 and 3 (Art. 6-2, 6-3) relate to criminal charges and are

therefore not relevant in the present case.

      The Commission further recalls that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) does not oblige States to submit disputes over civil rights

to a judicial procedure which at each stage conforms to the said

provision. It may be sufficient that, for instance, a professional body

determines the dispute at first instance, provided that its decision

is subject to review by a court under a judicial procedure satisfying

the conditions of Article 6 (Art. 6) (e.g. Eur. Court H.R. Öztürk

judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A no. 73, pp. 21-22, para. 56).

Accordingly, the Commission will limit itself to examining whether the

proceedings before the Supreme Court complied with Article 6 (Art. 6).

      Even assuming that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies

as required by Article 26 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the Commission

further recalls that it is normally not competent to deal with a

complaint alleging that errors of law and fact have been committed by

domestic courts. An exception could be made where the Commission

considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of

any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or one of its

Protocols, for instance in that a judgment has no legal justification

and thereby violates a party's right to receive a fair trial (cf.

Eur. Court H.R., De Moor judgment of 23 June 1994, Series A no. 292-A,

para. 55). As a general rule, however, it is for the domestic courts

to assess the evidence before them, in particular since they have the

benefit of hearing witnesses and assessing their credibility (e.g. Eur.

Court H.R., Lüdi judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 20,

para. 43; Klaas judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269-A,

pp. 17-18, paras. 29-30). The task of the Convention organs is to

ascertain whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, including the

way in which evidence was taken and submitted, were fair (cf., e.g.,

the above-mentioned Lüdi judgment, loc.cit.).

      In regard to the fairness of the proceedings before the Supreme

Court the Commission observes that they were governed by the Code of

Judicial Procedure. The examination of the applicant's appeal included

an oral hearing of the applicant concerning both the facts and the law

of the case. While it is true that the Special Prosecutor was heard as

a witness at the request of the Disciplinary Board, two members of the

Bar as well as the applicant's secretary and G. were all heard at the

applicant's request. Moreover, the further written evidence submitted

by the Disciplinary Board was countered by the applicant, who also

submitted such further evidence.

      The Commission further finds that, although the applicant

objected to the presence of the Special Prosecutor when he was heard

before the Disciplinary Board, there is no indication that he found it

necessary to raise any similar objection in the proceedings before the

Supreme Court. Nor has it been shown that the applicant objected to the

hearing of the Special Prosecutor as a witness.

      Finally, in regard to the merits of the Supreme Court's decision

the Commission cannot find that its reasoning was in any way arbitrary

or otherwise lacked a legal justification (cf., a contrario, the

above-mentioned De Moor judgment, loc.cit.).

      Having assessed all elements of the proceedings before the

Supreme Court, the Commission concludes that the applicant was afforded

a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6). Accordingly,

there is no appearance of a violation of that provision.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    Under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the applicant also

complains that the proceedings before the Disciplinary Board were

excessively lengthy.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each

case and having regard to the following criteria: the complexity of the

case, the conduct of the parties and that of the authorities dealing

with the case (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of

20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).

      The disciplinary proceedings against the applicant were

instituted before the Disciplinary Board in August 1990 and terminated

before that body in November 1990. The overall proceedings were

concluded in May 1991 with the Supreme Court's judgment. The total

length of the proceedings thus amounted to less than a year. In the

light of the criteria laid down in the Court's case-law the Commission

cannot find that this length exceeded a "reasonable time". Accordingly,

there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) in this

respect either.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant further complains that he has been held guilty of

a "criminal offence" which did not constitute such an offence under

national or international law at the time when it was committed. He

submits that the consequences of his behaviour in respect of the

correspondence to and from G. were not foreseeable due to the absence

of any guiding case-law. He invokes Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the

Convention.

      Referring to its conclusion under no. 1 above as regards

"criminal charge", the Commission considers that the applicant's

exclusion from the Bar did not constitute a conviction on account of

a "criminal offence" within the meaning of Article 7 para. 1

(Art. 7-1). Article 7 (Art. 7) is therefore not applicable.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

4.    The applicant also complains that he has been denied the right

to have his "conviction" of a "criminal offence" reviewed by a higher

tribunal. He invokes Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the

Convention.

      Referring to its conclusion under no. 3 above, the Commission

considers that Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) does not apply in the

instant case.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

5.    The applicant finally complains that he has been deprived of an

effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention.

      Article 13 (Art. 13) reads as follows:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      In view of its conclusions under nos. 1-2 above the Commission

considers that in respect of those complaints the applicant has no

"arguable claim" of a breach of a violation of this provision which

would warrant a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) (see Eur. Court H.R.,

Powell and Rayner judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172,

p. 20, para. 46).

      In view of its conclusions under nos. 3-4 above the Commission

considers that in respect of those complaints the applicant's complaint

under Article 13 (Art. 13) must also be considered incompatible ratione

materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

      It follows that the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) must be

rejected in accordance with meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention partly as being manifestly ill-founded

and partly as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions

of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)