AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 23169/94

                      by Georgios ANOMERITIS

                      against Greece

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 11 January 1995, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY,  Acting President

           MM.   C.L. ROZAKIS

                 F. ERMACORA

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 10 December 1993

by Georgios ANOMERITIS against Greece and registered on 4 January 1994

under file No. 23169/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Greek citizen born in 1935, residing in Athens

and a Member of Parliament. Before the Commission he is represented by

Messrs. P. Bitsaxis and I. Stamoulis, attorneys-at-law practising in

Athens.

     The facts of the case as they have been submitted by the

applicant may be summarised as follows.

     In 1987 the applicant was appointed by a socialist government

Governor of the National Real Estate Bank of Greece (Ethniki Ktimatiki

Trapeza tis Ellados - hereafter "the Bank"). On 11 January 1988 the

Board of Directors of the Bank, under the chairmanship of the

applicant, approved the terms of settlement of a loan which the Bank

had granted to the "Akti Plepi" hotel company.

     On 18 May 1989, some days before the elections of June 1989 in

which the applicant was a candidate, two Members of Parliament of the

opposition party lodged a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor

of the First Instance Criminal Court of Athens against the members of

the Board of Directors of the Bank, claiming that, by agreeing to the

above-mentioned settlement, the latter had acted against the interests

of the Bank.

     In November 1989, some days before a new parliamentary election

in which the applicant was again a candidate, a magistrate

(ptaismatodikis) examined witnesses in the context of a preliminary

enquiry into the "Akti Plepi" affair.

     Further examinations were carried out by the Public Prosecutor

of the First Instance Criminal Court of Athens just before the

parliamentary elections of 8 April 1990. Having decided to institute

criminal proceedings against the applicant and the other members of the

Board of Directors of the Bank, the Public Prosecutor sent the case-

file to the Special Investigating Judge of Athens. The latter summoned

the applicant to present himself before him on 24 April 1990. Having

failed to serve the summons on the applicant personally, the court

bailiff pinned them on the door of the applicant's office in Athens.

The applicant, who was campaigning in his electoral district at the

time, claims not to have found the summons when he returned to Athens

after the elections.

     Having been informed about the institution of the criminal

proceedings by other members of the Board of Directors of the Bank, the

applicant's lawyer visited the investigating judge on 17 April 1990 to

find out that his client had been charged with an aggravated form of

malpractice and that he would be notified of the contents of the case-

file when he appeared for examination on 24 April 1990. According to

the applicant, the prosecutor told his lawyer that the examination of

the applicant would be postponed to enable him to prepare his defence.

     When the applicant appeared in the morning of 24 April 1990

before the investigating judge, the latter ordered his arrest "in order

to be brought before the investigating judge for examination". The

applicant applied for the arrest warrant to be revoked, inviting the

investigating judge to introduce this request before the Indictments

Chamber of the First Instance Criminal Court (Dikastiko Symvoulio

Plimmeleiodikon) of Athens. The investigating judge rejected his

request.

     On 25 April 1990 the applicant was notified of the contents of

the case-file. On 26 April 1990 he appeared again before the

investigating judge. Having examined the applicant, the investigating

judge issued an order remanding him in custody.

     The applicant challenged the investigating judge's order before

the Indictments Chamber of the First Instance Criminal Court of Athens,

asking for leave to be heard in person.

     The applicant's challenge was heard on 11 May 1990. The Chamber

considered that it could not hear the applicant in person under

national law. It further considered that the investigating judge's

failure to introduce the applicant's application for the revocation of

the arrest warrant before the Chamber did not vitiate the judge's

subsequent order remanding the applicant in custody. Under the Code of

Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge was empowered to examine

the applicant's request himself.  The Chamber considered, however,

that, despite the existence of serious indications of guilt, the

applicant could be released on bail, which the Chamber fixed at GDR

10.000.000. The Chamber finally ordered the applicant not to leave the

country.

     On 5 November 1990 the Indictments Chamber of the Appeal Court

(Symvoulio Efeton) of Athens decided to commit the applicant for trial

before the three-member Court of Appeal of Athens, which it considered

competent to hear the case at first instance because of the nature of

the offence at issue, an aggravated form of malpractice. Although the

applicant had applied to be heard in person, the chamber did not

consider this necessary.

     On 23 December 1991 the Court of Appeal acquitted, by majority,

the applicant and ordered the return of the GDR 10.000.000 which had

been paid to obtain the applicant's provisional release. The court

decided, however, not to grant the applicant compensation for the

period he spent in detention on remand, since the investigating judge

had acted lawfully when ordering the applicant's arrest and detention

on remand and "it could not be said that there did not exist at the

time of his arrest any serious indication of guilt".

     On 2 January 1992 the Head of the Public Prosecutor's Office by

the Athens Court of Appeal appealed against this decision. On

10 June 1993 the five-member Court of Appeal of Athens confirmed the

first instance decision, considering unanimously that there existed

doubts as to the applicant's guilt.

     Immediately after the pronouncement of the decision of the court

on the merits, the Public Prosecutor proposed that the applicant should

not be granted compensation for the period he had spent in detention

on remand.  The applicant's counsel submitted that the court should not

address the issue on that day, as the defence would consider whether

to apply formally for compensation within the three day period

following the judgment, as prescribed by national law. The court

nevertheless decided that the applicant should not be granted

compensation, since the investigating judge had acted lawfully when

ordering the applicant's arrest and detention on remand and there

existed at the time of his arrest serious indications of guilt.

     The text of the decision of the five-member Court of Appeal was

finalised (katharographi) on 1 October 1993. The Public Prosecutor's

Office did not appeal in cassation within the thirty day period

prescribed by national law.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains of a violation of Article 5 para. 1 (c)

in that he was unnecessarily placed under arrest on 24 April 1990, as

he had appeared on his own free will before the investigating judge.

He further submits that, contrary to the requirements of the above-

mentioned provision of the Convention, there could have been no

reasonable suspicion against him, as the order of arrest did not refer

to a such a suspicion. He also argues that national law was breached

as well since the order of arrest did not contain any reasons, nor was

it mentioned that it had been issued to prevent the applicant from

committing new offences or fleeing.

     The applicant finally complains that the investigating judge

breached national law and the Convention when he ordered the

applicant's detention on remand on 26 April 1990, without referring to

any indications which would have justified the judge's conclusion that

there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed a

criminal offence, or that he was dangerous, or that there was a

reasonable suspicion that he would flee.

2.   The applicant complains of a violation of Article 5 para. 5 of

the Convention in that he was not awarded compensation, despite the

fact that he had been illegally detained on remand.

3.   By letter of 25 April 1994 the applicant raised the  following

additional complaints:

a)   He was not informed of the nature of the charges against him when

arrested on 24 April 1990. The investigating judge did not communicate

to him the contents of the file nor did he refer to any circumstances

which would justify a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a

criminal offence, or his conclusion that the applicant could flee or

commit a new criminal offence. He invokes in this connection Article

5 para. 2 of the Convention.

b)   He could not challenge under national law the lawfulness of the

original order of arrest. He invokes in this connection Articles 5

para. 4 and 13 of the Convention.

c)   He was unlawfully ordered to pay a sum of money as bail, in

breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

d)   He was unlawfully ordered not to leave the country, in violation

of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.

e)   The second instance court decided not to award him compensation

in respect of the period he spent in detention on remand without

hearing him. There was no possibility to appeal against this decision

under national law. He invokes in this connection Articles 6 para. 1

and 13 of the Convention.

f)   The investigating judge did not respect in his case the

presumption of innocence guaranteed under Article 6 para. 2 of the

Convention, as he ordered his arrest without hearing him or informing

him of the nature of the charges against him. He was given 48 hours

within which to prepare his initial statement before the investigating

judge, a period of time which was clearly inadequate under Article 6

para. 3 (b) of the Convention, given the complicated nature of the

charges against him.

g)   He was persecuted and subjected to inhuman and degrading

treatment on political grounds, in breach of Articles 3 and 14 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that his arrest and detention on remand

were not justified under Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the

Convention.

     Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention provides the

following:

     "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No

     one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases

     and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

     ..........

     c.  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for

     the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal

     authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an

     offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to

     prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having

     done so ...."

     The Commission notes that the applicant first complains that the

investigating judge did not respect national law when ordering his

arrest and detention on remand in that he failed to provide adequate

reasons as required by Articles 276 and 282 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

     The Commission recalls that the first condition laid down in

Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention is that the

detention must be ordered "in accordance with a procedure prescribed

by law" and that it must be "lawful" within the meaning of this

provision. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, the provision

refers back essentially to domestic law and lays down the obligation

to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof (Eur. Court

H.R., Wassink judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 185, p. 11,

para. 23). Moreover, under Article 60 (Art. 60) of the Convention,

nothing in the Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating

from any human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured

under the laws of the Contracting Party concerned.

     The Commission also recalls, however, that it is for the national

authorities in the first place, and especially the courts, to interpret

and apply domestic law and to settle any disputes arising therefrom

(Eur. Court H.R., Kemmache judgment of 24 November 1994, Series A no.

296-C, para. 37). Insofar as the present case is concerned, the

Commission notes that the applicant was initially arrested on the basis

of a warrant issued by the investigating judge, who remanded him in

custody two days later. Both the first and second instance courts, when

pronouncing on the applicant's entitlement to compensation, considered

that the judge had acted in full compliance with domestic law. The

Commission does not consider that there emerge from the case-file any

elements which cast doubt on this conclusion. As a result, it considers

that the deprivation of the applicant's liberty was "lawful" and

ordered "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law".

     Insofar as the applicant complains that he was arrested, although

there could not have been any reasonable suspicion against him, the

Commission notes that the applicant bases himself on the fact that

neither the arrest warrant nor the order remanding him in custody

mention any elements which would have justified such a conclusion.

     In accordance, however, with the Commission's case-law, the

Convention does not stipulate that the reasons for a person's arrest

should be stated in the text of the decision authorising detention.

Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) does not even require the reasons to be

given in writing to the detained person (No. 8098/77, Dec. 13.12.78,

D.R. 16 p. 111). Moreover, the reasonable suspicion in Article 5 para.

1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention does not mean that the suspected

person's guilt must at that stage be established and proven, and it

cannot be a condition for arrest and detention pending trial that the

commission of the offence with which the person concerned is charged

has been established. It is precisely the purpose of the official

investigation and detention the reality and nature of the offences laid

against the accused should be definitely proved (Eur. Court H.R.,

Murray judgment of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-B, para. 55;

No. 8224/78, Dec. 5.12.78, D.R. 15 p. 211; No. 10803/84, Dec. 16.12.87,

D.R. 54 p. 35).

     In the present case, before deciding to institute criminal

proceedings, the Public Prosecutor conducted a preliminary inquiry in

the context of which several witnesses had been examined and other

evidential material produced. The case-file, which the public

prosecutor transmitted to the investigating judge, was so voluminous

that the applicant complained that 48 hours could not suffice for the

preparation of his initial statement before the investigating judge.

Faced with what appears to be a thorough preliminary inquiry and in the

absence of any indications to the contrary, the Commission is satisfied

that the investigating judge could reasonably conclude that there

existed a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed a

criminal offence.

     The Commission finally notes that the applicant complains that

his arrest was abusive, since he was deprived of his liberty on the

basis of an arrest warrant which was purportedly issued to ensure his

appearance before the investigating judge, notwithstanding his clearly

manifested intention to submit himself to the proceedings instituted

against him.

     The Commission recalls that the applicant was facing serious

charges, rendering him liable to life imprisonment. When remanding him

in custody, two days after his arrest, the investigating judge

considered that he was dangerous and that there was a reasonable

suspicion that he would flee. Moreover, the applicant was not

provisionally released until he paid a substantial amount of money as

bail.

     In the light of all the above and its case-law to the effect that

the reasons for the suspect's arrest need not be mentioned in the text

of the decision which authorises it, the Commission considers that the

investigating judge acted reasonably when he originally ordered the

applicant's arrest.

     As a result, the above complaints do not disclose any appearance

of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in Article 5 para.

1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention. The Commission concludes that

this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant complains of a violation of Article 5 para. 5

(Art. 5-5) of the Convention in that he was not awarded compensation

despite the fact that he had been unlawfully detained on remand.

     Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention provides the

following:

     "Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in

     contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have

     an enforceable right to compensation."

     The Commission recalls that, in accordance with its constant

case-law, complaints based on Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention may be examined directly by the Commission only if the

domestic authorities have found a violation of any of the provisions

of paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article. In the absence of such a finding,

the Commission itself must first establish the existence of such a

violation (No. 7950/77, Dec. 4.3.80, D.R. 19 p. 213). In the present

case, however, no such violation has been established by either the

domestic authorities or the Commission. In the absence of such a

finding, no issue arises under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The Commission notes that by letter of 25 April 1994 the

applicant raised a number of complaints which he had not included in

his original application form. The applicant submits that these

complaints have been introduced within the six month time-limit

provided for under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, since the

last domestic court decision issued in his case became final on 1

November 1993, when the time limit for the lodging of an appeal in

cassation by the public prosecutor expired.

     The Commission does not consider it necessary to pronounce on the

issue whether the applicant has complied with the requirements of

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, as the complaints introduced

on 25 April 1994 are in any event manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention for the

reasons mentioned below.

a)   Insofar as the applicant complains that he was not informed of

the nature of the charges against him when he was arrested, the

Commission recalls that Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention

provides that everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in

a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of

any charge against him.

     The Commission notes that the applicant complains in essence of

the alleged failure of the investigating judge to communicate to him

before ordering his arrest the contents of the file and to substantiate

his conclusion that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant

had committed a criminal offence and that he could flee or commit a new

criminal offence.

     In accordance, however, with the constant case-law of the

Commission and the Court, although Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2)

requires that sufficient information must be provided to the accused

to facilitate the pursuit of the remedy envisaged by Article 5 para.

4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention, it does not require that a complete

description of all the charges should be given to the accused at the

moment of his arrest. Neither does it require the disclosure of the

complete case-file (Eur. Court H.R., Fox, Campbell and Hartley judgment

of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 19, para. 40; No. 8098/77, Dec.

13.12.78, D.R. 16 p. 111; No. 9614/81, Dec. 12.10.83, D.R. 34 p. 119).

     The Commission notes that the applicant does not dispute that he

was told immediately in general terms why he was apprehended. Neither

does he dispute that the entire case-file was disclosed to him on the

following day, ie one day before making his initial statement before

the investigating judge. The applicant finally accepts that in the

remand in custody order which was issued after his initial examination,

the investigating judge referred to the grounds which rendered, in his

view, the applicant's detention necessary.

     In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

applicant was promptly and sufficiently informed of the reasons for his

arrest and of the charges against him in accordance with Article 5

para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

b)   Insofar as the applicant complains that he could not challenge

the lawfulness of the original order of arrest on the basis of which

he had been detained for two days before being remanded in custody

after his examination by the investigation judge, the Commission

recalls that Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention provides

that everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention

shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his

detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered

if the detention is not lawful.

     The Commission recalls that the applicant was detained on the

basis of an arrest warrant for two days and on the basis of a remand

in custody order thereafter. The applicant could and did apply to the

investigating judge for provisional release during the two day period

at issue. Thereafter he acquired the right to seize the Indictments

Chamber with the question of the lawfulness of his detention further

to the remand in custody order.

     The Commission considers that, in these circumstances, no

appearance of a violation of Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the

Convention is disclosed (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Fox, Campbell and Hartley

judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 20, para. 45;

No. 11256/84, Dec. 5.9.88, D.R. 57 p. 47). It follows that this part

of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

c)   Insofar as the applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) that he had been ordered to pay a sum of money as bail,

the Commission recalls that the applicant was placed in detention on

remand on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of having committed a

criminal offence.

     It further recalls that Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention expressly authorises the release on bail of persons detained

on remand and that Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2)

authorises the control of the use of property in accordance with the

general interest.

     Recalling that the amount of money, which was paid as bail in

this case, was returned to the applicant after his acquittal, the

Commission considers that the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill-

founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

d)   Insofar as the applicant complains of a violation of Article 2

of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2), which provides that everyone shall be free

to leave any country, including his own, the Commission recalls that

Greece has not ratified this Protocol. As a result, this part of the

application must be rejected as incompatible with the provisions of the

Convention.

e)   Insofar as the applicant complains that the second instance court

refused to grant him compensation for the period he spent in detention

on remand and invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,

the Commission recalls that this provision guarantees the right to be

heard by the court which will determine one's civil rights.

     The Commission notes that in the present case the domestic court

decided to exercise its power to address the issue proprio motu

immediately after the pronouncement of its decision acquitting the

applicant. The applicant was invited to submit his observations

thereon, which he chose not to. In these circumstances the Commission

does not consider that, assuming that Article 6 (Art. 6) applies, the

applicant was deprived of his right to be heard.

     His complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be

rejected, pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

f)   Insofar as the applicant complains of a violation of Article 6

para. 2 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-2, 6-3-b) of the Convention, the Commission

notes that at the end of the proceedings the applicant was acquitted

of the offences with which he had been charged.

     The outcome of the trial has been favourable for the applicant

and any defects the proceedings might have had must be considered to

be remedied. It follows that the applicant can no longer claim to be

a victim, within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25), of a violation

of Article 6 of the Convention (cf. No. 8083/77, Dec. 13.3.80,

D.R. 19 p. 223 and No. 15831/89, Dec. 25.2.91, D.R. 69 p. 317). His

complaint is, therefore, manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected,

pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

g)   The applicant finally complains of a violation of Articles 3 and

14 (Art. 3, 14) of the Convention.

     However, insofar as the matters complained of have been

substantiated and are within its competence, the Commission finds that

they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.

     This part of the application must be, therefore, rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the                    Acting President of

  First Chamber                      the First Chamber

(M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (J. LIDDY)