AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25522/94

                      by Milan RAI, Gill ALLMOND, and "NEGOTIATE NOW"

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 6 April 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 18 October 1994

by  Milan Rai, Gill Allmond and "Negotiate Now" against the United

Kingdom and registered on 3 November 1994 under file No. 25522/94;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant is a Hong Kong citizen born in 1965 and

resident in London. The second applicant is a British citizen born in

1963 and also resident in London. Both applicants are members of the

an unincorporated association "Negotiate Now", which is the third

applicant.

      The applicants are represented before the Commission by Mr. John

Wadham of Liberty, a solicitor practising in London.

      The facts as submitted by the applicants may be summarised as

follows.

a.    Particular circumstances of the case

      "Negotiate Now" is a non-partisan, non-governmental organisation

which seeks to promote peace in Northern Ireland and espouses the

policy that the Government must support peace negotiations without a

prior cease-fire.

      The applicants wished to hold a rally in Trafalgar Square in

London in order to promote their views and to ask the Government

publicly to enter into negotiations without preconditions.

      The third applicant contacted the Department of the National

Heritage requesting permission to hold a "stationary" rally in

Trafalgar Square on Saturday 21 May 1994 to be addressed by speakers

and stating the estimated number of participants was to be 1,000.

      The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police was informed of the

applicants' intentions and his view was that the proposed rally would

create no danger to public order. The applicants expended monies for

leaflets and posters.

      On 21 April 1994, the Department of National Heritage refused

permission for the rally to take place:

      "This is in accordance with Government policy on meetings in

      Trafalgar Square on issues related to Northern Ireland."

      On 4 May 1994, Mr. Tony Benn, Member of Parliament, requested the

Secretary of State for National Heritage to reconsider the refusal.

      On 16 May 1994, the Secretary of State replied confirming the

decision not to grant permission for the rally:

      "It has been the policy of successive Governments since 1972 to

      refuse permission for any public demonstrations or meetings on

      the issue of Northern Ireland in Trafalgar Square. This policy

      has been applied in an entirely impartial way. The only, very

      rare, exceptions have been approval for entirely uncontroversial

      peace demonstrations, such as the Peace People in the 1970's. My

      judgment is that the proposed "Negotiate Now" rally does not come

      into this category."

      The Secretary of State stated however that demonstrations on

Northern Ireland may be held in Hyde Park and identified the person

whom the applicants could approach to organise a demonstration in Hyde

Park.

      On 17 May 1994, the applicants sought leave to bring proceedings

for judicial review to quash the decision made on 21 April 1994 and/

or 16 May 1994 refusing permission to hold a rally in Trafalgar Square.

      In opposing the application, counsel for the Secretary of State

stated that permission had been refused on public order grounds and

that the rally did not fall within the narrow exception of being

"uncontroversial".  Counsel stated that the applicants were:

      "calling on the Government to negotiate with the Sinn Fein before

      the Sinn Fein renounced its support for violence... The

      controversial nature of that policy is self-evident. It is

      equally self-evident that the matter is one of very great

      sensitivity at the present time."

      Leave was refused. The judge found that no legitimate expectation

had been created that the rally could be held and that there was no

arbitrariness or irrationality or failure to take into account relevant

considerations disclosed by the decision of refusal.

      It was agreed between the parties that the applicants would not

renew their application to the Court of Appeal since the Secretary of

State agreed that no point would be taken concerning the applicants

exhausting their domestic remedies.

b.    Relevant domestic law and practice

      Regulatory powers concerning Trafalgar Square

      Pursuant to the Trafalgar Square Act 1844 the care control

management and regulation of Trafalgar Square was placed in the hands

of Commissioners, whose functions are currently exercised by the

Secretary of State for National Heritage.

      Section 2 (1) of the Parks Regulation (Amendment) Act 1926

provided the Commissioners (and their successors) with the right to

      "make such regulations...as they consider necessary for securing

      the proper management of [any] park and the preservation of order

      and prevention of abuses therein..."

      Under this provision the relevant Minister made the Trafalgar

Square Regulations 1952 (1952 SI 776), paragraph 3 of which provides

that permission is required, inter alia, to organize, conduct or take

part in any assembly, parade or procession or to make or give a public

speech or address in Trafalgar Square.

      Policy concerning demonstrations in Trafalgar Square

      In 1972, following the IRA bombing of Aldershot which killed 7

civilians, the Secretary of State for the Home Office issued a

statement in the House of Commons banning demonstrations in Trafalgar

Square which related to Northern Ireland:

      "It has always been accepted that this is one of the best-known

      places for public demonstrations, and traditionally, it is

      available to any individual or organisation who wishes to use it.

      Permission to use the Square is usually given unless it seems

      likely that the assembly will result in breaches of the law or

      in grave disorder.. the decision is that of the Secretary of

      State for the Environment who invariably consults the appropriate

      Government Departments and always consults the Commissioner of

      Metropolitan Police.

      The position with regard to applications this year in relation

      to demonstrations concerned with the Irish situation is that such

      application had to be considered against the background of the

      terrorist campaign by the IRA in Northern Ireland and the

      appalling carnage at Aldershot. In those circumstances in view

      of the situation in  Northern Ireland the Government had to

      decide whether it would be fitting to permit the use of the

      Square by any organisation that had declared its support for the

      perpetrators of violence of that kind and they had no hesitation

      in deciding that it would be an affront to the British people to

      do so.

      The Government having made the decision, it would be wrong to

      attempt to distinguish between different organisations. The right

      decision therefore -regrettable as it may be- was to refuse to

      grant permission to any demonstration on the issue of Northern

      Ireland in Trafalgar Square until further notice."

      In 1976 the Peace People and in 1978 the Better Life for All

campaigners were allowed to hold rallies in Trafalgar Square.

      In 1984 a rally was also held in the Square by the Apprentice

Boys of Derry, which was addressed by the Reverend Ian Paisley, leader

of the Ulster Democratic Party who is well known to be a committed

Unionist and militant anti-Republican. A letter from the Department of

the Environment to "Information on Ireland" (3.2.86) stated:

      "It is true that Dr. Ian Paisley addressed a meeting in Trafalgar

      Square on 17 November 1984. The Apprentice Boys of Derry...asked

      for permission to hold a rally with hymns and a speaker from one

      of their visiting clubs. The Rally was to follow a march from

      Temple East via Whitehall were two wreaths were to be placed at

      the Cenotaph in remembrance of all the members of the Apprentice

      Boys of Derry who died in the two world wars. The organiser

      categorically stated that the meeting was not to be a political

      rally. It was only after giving considerable thought to the terms

      of the application that the rally was allowed to go ahead. As you

      know despite the assurances were given, the rally was used as a

      political arena. We have every intention of avoiding any

      repetition of that sort of incident."

      On 1 October 1991, Baroness Blatch, as spokeswoman for the

Department of the Environment, described the justification for the

exceptions to the ban:

      "Two exceptions have been made to the ban: in 1976 for the Peace

      People and in 1978 for the Better Life for All campaign organised

      by the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade

      Unions. Both were regarded as special exceptions for

      demonstrations that were non-controversial and non-partisan."

      In 1993 a rally was held in Trafalgar Square by a group called

"Peace 93" formed after the Warrington bombing by the IRA in which two

children died.

      Permission to hold rallies or meetings in Trafalgar Square was

refused to the Anti-Internment League (1972), Sinn Fein (1972), Clann

na hEireann (1972,1973 and 1974), British Constitution Defence

Committee (1972), Connolly Association (1972), Grand Orange Lodge of

England (1973), Irish Civil Rights Association (1973), Troops out

Movement (1974, 1975 and 1977), British Peace Committee and Troops out

of Ireland (1974), British Peace Committee (1975), Bloody Sunday

Commemoration Committee (1978), United Troops Out Movement (1978),

Committee for Withdrawal from Northern Ireland (1980), May 7th

Committee (1983), Irish Republican Socialist Party (1984) August 18th

Committee (1984), Co-ordinating Committee for British Withdrawal from

Ireland (1986).

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants submit that the ban on their demonstration

infringes their freedom to manifest their beliefs in public, their

right to freedom of expression and their right to freedom of peaceful

assembly. They invoke Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention.

      They submit, inter alia, that the right to freedom of assembly

is a fundamental right in a democratic society and that Article 11

imposes an obligation on States to take reasonable and appropriate

steps to allow peaceful demonstrations to proceed. The interference in

this case was not prescribed by law since the discretion conferred

under the 1952 regulations is so broad and undefined that it did not

enable the applicants to regulate their conduct or to foresee the

decision. The purpose of the interference which bans any demonstration

which is not "uncontroversial" does not, in their view, constitute a

legitimate aim permitted under the second paragraph. In this context

the applicants refer to Article 18 of the Convention on the basis that

their rights have been interfered with because they are alleged to

offend or shock rather than in pursuance of any legitimate aim set out

in the second paragraph of Article 11.  The applicants further submit

that the restriction is not necessary in a democratic society and is

not proportionate since, inter alia, there was no foreseeable danger

to public safety, a demonstration would have been possible in Hyde Park

and it could not be said that a demonstration in Trafalgar Square would

make it more liable to violence and any potential problems could have

been regulated in co-operation with the police and with the use of

stewards for example.

      The applicants also contend that they have no effective remedy

for their complaints as required by Article 13 of the Convention.

Judicial review proceedings allow such decisions to be challenged only

on the basis of irrationality and could not directly address the issues

in the case.

      Finally, the applicants complain that they have been

discriminated against on the ground of political opinion, namely an

unwillingness to permit the voicing of views that were contrary to

Government policy.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants have complained of the refusal of permission to

hold a rally in Trafalgar Square. They have invoked Article 9

(Art. 9) (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Article 10

(Art. 10) (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (Art. 11) (freedom of

peaceful assembly) of the Convention.

      The Commission notes that the applicants make their submissions

principally under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention. The problems

of freedom of thought and belief and freedom of expression cannot in

this case be separated from that of freedom of assembly. The Commission

therefore considers that Article 11 (Art. 11) takes precedence as the

lex specialis for assemblies and will in its examination under this

provision have regard to Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) in interpreting

Article 11 (Art. 11) (see eg. No. 10126/82, Dec. 17.10.85, D.R. 44

p. 65).

      Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention provides:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and

      to freedom of association with others, including the right to

      form and to join trade unions for the protection of his

      interests.

      2.   No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these

      rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary

      in a democratic society in the interests of national security or

      public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

      protection of health or morals or for the protection of the

      rights and freedoms of others.  This Article shall not prevent

      the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these

      rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the

      administration of the State."

      The Commission's case-law establishes that the right to freedom

of peaceful assembly, which is a fundamental right in a democratic

society, is guaranteed to everyone who has the intention of organising

a peaceful demonstration (see eg. No. 8440/78, D.R. 21 p. 138). The

applicants' intention to hold a peaceful rally was not disputed in the

domestic proceedings. The Commission finds that the refusal of

permission to the applicants to hold their rally in Trafalgar Square

constitutes a restriction on their rights as guaranteed under the first

paragraph of Article 11 (Art. 11).

      The Commission has therefore examined whether this restriction

was justified under Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) of the Convention,

in particular, whether it was "prescribed by law", pursued one or more

of the aims enumerated and was "necessary in a democratic society" to

achieve that or those aims.

      As regards the criterion of "prescribed by law", the applicants

have argued that the discretion conferred on the authorities regulating

the use of Trafalgar Square is so broad and undefined as to render them

unable to regulate their conduct or foresee the outcome of their

request.

      The Commission recalls that a law which confers a discretion is

not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability

inherent in this concept, provided that the scope of the discretion and

the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity to

give the individual protection against arbitrary interference ( see eg.

Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130).

While the power to regulate the use of the Square for assemblies is not

subject to defined restrictions, the Commission notes that the policy

of excepting demonstrations relating to Northern Ireland was the

subject of a public statement in the House of Commons and that numerous

refusals of demonstrations occurred subsequent to this. It is

compatible with the requirements of foreseeability that terms which are

on their face general and unlimited are explained by executive or

administrative statements, since it is the provision of sufficiently

precise guidance to individuals to regulate their conduct rather than

the source of that guidance which is of relevance (See eg. Eur. Court

H.R. Silver judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, pp. 33-34,

paras. 88-89).

      The Commission accordingly finds that the scope and manner of the

exercise of the power to regulate assemblies in Trafalgar Square are

indicated with the requisite degree of certainty to satisfy the minimum

requirements of the criterion of "prescribed by law".

      The applicants have contested that the restriction pursued one

of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 11

(Art. 11). The applicants argue that their assembly was banned in

Trafalgar Square because it was "controversial" and liable to shock or

offend rather than for any reason of public safety or possible

disorder.

      The Commission notes that counsel for the Secretary of State

claimed that the refusal was on grounds of public order. While the

applicants contend that the police anticipated no problems with public

safety  arising out of the proposed rally, the Commission recalls that

the policy of banning demonstrations relating to Northern Ireland is

founded on the concern to avoid the use of the square by those

supporting the use of violence and that, in order not to discriminate

between different organisations, the decision was taken to refuse all

requests. The Commission finds that, in the circumstances of Northern

Ireland where sensitive and complex issues arise as to the causes of

the conflict and any possible solutions, the Government can be

considered in its general policy of banning demonstrations concerning

the subject to be pursuing the aim of preventing disorder and

protecting the rights and freedoms of others.

      The question remains whether the restriction is necessary in a

democratic society. The case-law of the Convention organs establishes

that the notion of necessity corresponds to a pressing social need and

in particular that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

In this assessment, a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting

States (see eg. Eur. Court H.R. W. v the United Kingdom judgment of

8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 27, para. 60).

      The applicants submit that the restriction was not "necessary"

and was not proportionate, referring to the lack of real risk of

disorder, the granting of permission to several other groups and the

possibility of avoiding any potential problems by using for example

stewards and co-operating with the police as to organisational details.

      The Commission does not doubt the peaceful intention of the

applicants in the present case and it has had regard to the fact that

the refusal of permission for the assembly has repercussions also on

their freedom to express their views and beliefs as to the necessity

for the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland to enter into

negotiations without pre-conditions such as a prior cease-fire. The

assessment as to whether this policy of unconditional negotiation was

"controversial" or not when compared to the permission previously and

exceptionally granted to three non-partisan groups falls, in the

Commission's view, within the Government's margin of appreciation. It

notes that the Government had previously granted permission to a group

-the Apprentice Boys of Derry- which had, contrary to their assertions

beforehand, used the occasion for political propaganda purposes and

that there was a concern to avoid a repetition of this. It finds no

indication of any element of arbitrariness or bias on the part of the

authorities in deciding not to extend exceptional permission to the

applicants.

      Having regard to the fact that the refusal of permission did not

amount to a blanket prohibition on the holding of the applicants' rally

but only prevented the use of a high profile location (other venues

being available in central London) the Commission concludes that the

restriction in the present case may be regarded as proportionate and

justified as necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of

Article 8 paragraph 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicants have invoked Article 18 (Art. 18) of the

Convention which provides:

      "The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said

      rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other

      than those for which they have been prescribed."

      Having regard to its findings above, the Commission considers

that the circumstances of the present case do not disclose any

indication that the restriction in the present case was applied for a

purpose not prescribed by the provisions of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The applicants complain that they have been discriminated against

on the basis of political opinion. They invoke Article 14 (Art. 14) of

the Convention which provides:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

      minority, property, birth or other status."

      The applicants contend that they have been discriminated against

by the Government on the ground of political opinion, namely an

unwillingness to permit the voicing of views that were contrary to

Government policy.

      The Commission recalls however that the authorities apply a

general policy of banning demonstrations in Trafalgar Square concerning

the situation in Northern Ireland and only grant permission

exceptionally where the meeting is "uncontroversial". From the material

submitted it appears that numerous requests for meetings in Trafalgar

Square from many different groups concerned with the Northern Ireland

situation have been refused. While permission has been granted on four

occasions since 1972, three involved peace groups with no political

overtones  and the fourth, involving the Apprentice Boys of Derry, was

intended to be a commemorative event for the two world wars but

degenerated into a political rally despite firm assurances to the

authorities by its organisers.

      In light of the above, the Commission finds that the applicants

have not established that they have been subject to any difference of

treatment on the ground of political opinion.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    The applicants finally invoke Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention, which provides that:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

      The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not

require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation

of the Convention.  It only applies if the individual can be said to

have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court

H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131,

p. 23, para. 52).

      The Commission finds that the applicants cannot be said, in light

of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of

their Convention rights.

      It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission unanimously

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                            (C.L. ROZAKIS)