AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 23546/94

                      by M. L.

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 28 June 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 14 September 1992

by M. L. against the United Kingdom and registered on 28 February 1994

under file No. 23546/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen residing in Lancashire and he

was born in 1952. He is represented before the Commission by Felix

Moss, a solicitor practising in Lancashire.

     The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as

follows.

     The applicant is the father of five children, M (a boy born

16 March 1987), J (a girl born 29 April 1988), R (a boy born

15 September 1989), B (a boy born 25 August 1992) and JL (a boy born

15 October 1994).

     The applicant's wife first came to the attention of social

services in 1985 when she was a patient in a hospital in Preston and

there was concern about her erratic behaviour.

     On 18 March 1987 (two days after M's birth) a case conference was

held to discuss the applicant's wife's ability to care for M and

concluded that there was no evidence of risk to the child. During

subsequent contacts with a health visitor the applicant denied that he

was M's father. The health visitor noticed developmental delays in M

and referred the family to social services. Records indicate that the

applicant repeatedly requested financial assistance from social

services and complained about his wife's "bizarre" behaviour. The

applicant and his wife separated for a while about this time.

     Following a case meeting, held on 15 April 1988 at the request

of a health visitor from a Lancashire hospital, the family was given

financial assistance and M was given a place at a day nursery.

     J was born on 29 April 1988. A case conference was held on

29 May 1988 where anxiety was expressed regarding J's care as she was

losing weight and not thriving. The applicant and his wife both

subsequently alleged that each other was at fault, the applicant

claiming that his wife force fed J and could not cope, while the

applicant's wife claimed that the applicant constantly criticised her.

The applicant then went to court in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain

custody of the children in case of a separation.

     On 17 May 1988 J was admitted to hospital in light of her falling

weight. Due to unfit living conditions in the family home M and J were

received into voluntary care but were discharged from care on

8 July 1988. The applicant and his wife were married on 9 July 1988.

     On 19 July 1988 J was re-admitted to hospital but was

subsequently discharged by the applicant's wife against medical advice.

On 18 August 1988 J was again admitted to hospital. She subsequently

gained weight, was discharged, lost weight and was readmitted on

25 August 1988 where she remained for a thorough assessment. Though the

applicant and his wife did not cooperate with social services to enable

an assessment to be carried out, at the next case conference it was

decided that J could go home. After further case conferences in

December 1988 and February 1989 the children's names were removed from

the risk register because of satisfactory progress.

     By 1 March 1989 the applicant and his wife had again separated.

On 10 March 1989 social services closed the family's file but input on

the children's progress was to be received from the day nursery which

both children were attending.

     R was born on 15 September 1989. The applicant again claims that

his wife could not cope and would not let him help. On 26 October 1989

the applicant's wife turned up at her solicitor's office at 3.00pm

claiming that she had not fed R since the morning as she had no money.

The applicant's wife then went to live in a homeless unit for a while

and the applicant requested social services to take the children into

care as his wife could not look after them.

     M and J continued to attend the day nursery. The nursery staff

noted that M's behaviour was disruptive and dangerous for the other

children. It was also reported that he had begun to exhibit "precocious

sexual awareness and overtly sexual behaviour and actions". J was

reported as a happy child although concern was expressed when she

sustained a suspected fractured collar bone and she was not taken for

medical attention for several days. In March 1991 she too was also

reported as exhibiting sexual behaviour and had alleged that she was

sexually abused by her father.

     Interviews by social services with M and J followed. During his

interview M repeated the sexual behaviour demonstrated previously

though J revealed little of note. Place of Safety Orders were

subsequently obtained and in April 1991 M was placed in Easington Walk

Children's Home (his behaviour and language being sufficiently anti-

social as to prevent his placing in foster care) and J and R were

placed with foster parents. Neither of these three children have since

been returned to their parents.

     On 29 April 1991 J made further allegations of sexual abuse to

the day nursery staff and on 30 April 1991 the applicant made

allegations in this respect against his wife. On 2 May 1991 M and J

were again interviewed by social services and J gave a demonstration

of moving in a sexual manner.

     On 10 May 1991 wardship proceedings were commenced by Lancashire

County Council ("the local authority") in the Family Division of the

High Court (Preston District Registry), pursuant to that court's

inherent jurisdiction to make a child a ward of court.

     On 13 May 1991 M was reported as having referred to games he had

played with his father of a sexual nature and on 16 May 1991 social

services received information regarding a previous allegation of child

abuse involving the applicant.

     On 16 May 1991 Mr. Justice Hollings, having heard counsel for all

parties involved, made the three children (M, J and R) wards of court.

Interim care and control of the children was to remain vested in the

local authority which was given leave to continue the existing

placements of the children. The applicant and his wife were to have

supervised access to the children twice a week for two hours. Any

further reports or affidavits were to be served by the local authority

within seven days and the matter was relisted for hearing on

23 May 1991.

     At a directions hearing in or around this time, a social worker

apologised to the court as it had recently come to the attention of the

local authority that the same solicitors had been instructed by the

applicant's wife and the local authority for a couple of months. The

applicant claims that the local authority had been previously aware of

this and it appears that the applicant's wife then changed solicitors.

     On 23 May 1991 Mr Justice Hollings, having heard Counsel for all

parties, continued the wardship, care and access orders. The parties

were ordered to instruct Clinical Psychologists. The local authority

was given leave to have the wards examined by a Child Psychologist and

to carry out a family assessment. Time limits were set for the filing

of further affidavits by the parties.

     During June and July 1991 M and J were assessed by a Clinical

Psychologist and the subsequent report (dated 24 January 1992) was

inconclusive as to the allegations of sexual abuse.

     During September and October 1991 the applicant and his wife

underwent a family assessment by personnel from social services and

from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. The

assessors' conclusions, reported in a Family Assessment Report dated

14 February 1992, stated that working with the couple proved extremely

difficult because of their difficulties in remembering and

understanding issues. The information gained from them did not make

sense to the assessors and appeared untrue. It was unclear to the

assessors whether the applicant and his wife lived in fantasy worlds

or were simply trying to impress them. In conclusion, the assessors

were unable to comment firmly on the parenting abilities of the

applicant and his wife due to the difficulties encountered during the

sessions with them.

     On 29 October 1991, the local authority applied, on an ex-parte

basis, for leave to place M with the foster parents who at the time

also cared for R and J, basing the application on the affidavit

evidence of the key social worker in the case which, inter alia, noted

M's dramatic improvement in care and recommended such placement. On

30 October 1991 District Judge Walker of the Family Division of the

High Court (Preston District Registry), granted the local authority's

application on an interim basis. This order was confirmed on

6 November 1991 by District Judge Walker having heard the solicitors

for the parties. The existing access arrangements (twice weekly at the

day nursery) were to continue until further order.

     On 15 January 1992 Judge Walker, having heard the parties

solicitors, ordered the filing of further affidavits by the parties and

the setting down of the case for hearing before a judge of the Family

Division of the High Court. The applicant filed an affidavit in

January 1992. Further directions were given by Judge Walker on

20 May 1992 for the filing of affidavits by 22 May 1992.

     On 22 May 1992 numerous reports and assessments of the parents

and the children were filed in court. These included the Psychologist's

report dated 24 January 1992, the Family Assessment Report dated

14 February 1992 together with affidavits of two social workers

(involved, inter alia, in supervising the access visits) and of the key

social worker. The latter affidavits were negative as regards the

parenting abilities of the applicant and his wife.

     As a result of the concerns expressed in the above-mentioned

affidavits, a planning meeting was held on 17 June 1992 between the key

and assistant social workers of the local authority and the authors of

the Family Assessment Report to discuss the future plans for the

children. It was agreed at this meeting that a permanent home for the

children away from their parents was to be recommended. It was noted

that the services of a Court Welfare Officer or a Guardian ad litem

would be required by the court to assist it in its decision in this

respect. Further affidavits were filed by the key social worker and

three health visitors (on 18 September 1992) requesting the appointment

of a Guardian ad litem and recommending a permanent home for the

children away from their parents.

     On 2 July 1992 a further case conference was held because the

applicant's wife was now expecting a fourth child. It was decided that

a placement of the applicant, his wife and the new baby in a supervised

residential setting would provide an additional opportunity to fully

assess the parenting skills of the applicant and his wife. B was born

on 25 August 1992. Having unsuccessfully attempted supervision at home,

on 24 September 1992 the local authority admitted the applicant, his

wife and B to Cheshire House for a 12 week assessment.

     However, in view of the applicant's and his wife's threats to

leave Cheshire House, the local authority made an application for a

care order for B. On 20 October 1992 the Hyndburn Magistrates Court

made an interim care order under the Children Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act")

in relation to B. The following day the applicant left Cheshire House.

     The applicant subsequently attempted to reconcile with his wife

but on 10 November 1992 the applicant's wife filed for divorce claiming

that the applicant kept the family unnecessarily and continuously short

of money, that he failed to show her emotional support and was absent

from the family home for periods of time without explanation.

     On 10 November 1992 Mr Justice Ewbank in the Family Division of

the High Court (Preston District Registry), having heard Counsel for

all parties, declared the wardship discharged by operation of law (due

to the coming into force of the 1989 Act). As regards the three older

children, he declared a deemed care order to be in operation since

13 October 1992 pursuant to the 1989 Act. In order to speedily and

definitively deal with the question of those three children's future

care under the 1989 Act, the applicant's wife was requested to

undertake to the court to issue proceedings for residence orders under

that Act. All documentation filed with the court to date was to be used

in the subsequent proceedings. An order was made for the appointment

of a Guardian ad litem.

     The applicant's wife lodged the applications for residence orders

in relation to the three older children on 10 November 1992 (her

detailed supporting affidavit was filed later).

     On 25 and 27 November 1992 the applicant's wife threatened

suicide and on 27 November 1992 she requested foster care for B as she

could no longer cope. The applicant's wife also requested psychological

and psychiatric assessments.

     On 9 December 1992 the applicant applied for the family and

divorce proceedings to be transferred outside of Lancashire as he

claimed he could not get a fair hearing in Lancashire due, inter alia,

to the alleged prejudice of social services.

     On 11 December 1992 a report, detailing recent developments

mainly in relation to B, was filed in court by Ms. Wright of social

services. That report noted that on the evidence to date, the applicant

had little commitment to B and that it would be of no benefit to

continue his access visits with B. This report also referenced the

applicant's wife's disorganisation, emotional instability, her wavering

commitment to B, her lack of attention to safety, her tendency towards

aggression and her mood swings and concluded that the risks of leaving

B in the sole care of the applicant's wife would be too great. The

report recommended a care order and placement of B with foster parents.

     On 15 December 1992 the Accrington Magistrates Court extended the

interim care order in favour of the local authority in relation to B

until 12 January 1993 and B was placed with foster parents.

     On 23 December 1992 a District Judge of Blackburn County Court

consolidated all outstanding applications concerning the family,

ordered the applicant and his wife to file further affidavits within

fourteen days and adjourned the matter to January 1993 for further

directions. The applicant's wife's affidavit (dated December 1992,

signed by her and submitted by the applicant to the Commission)

repeated detailed allegations of sexual abuse of the children by the

applicant (made previously to the local authority and social services).

     On 12 January 1993 a District Justice at Blackburn County Court,

inter alia, continued the interim care order in relation to B, ordered

that the consolidated proceedings be transferred to the High Court

(insofar as they were not already in that court), and declared, on an

interim basis, that parental access continue on a once a week basis.

The matter was adjourned until February 1993 for further directions.

     The applicant completed his own detailed statement on

9 February 1993 and in February 1993 the District Judge at Blackburn

County Court made further interim orders and directions.

     Subsequently, further detailed reports dated 17 and

22 February 1993 from the Practice Manager (Child Care) of social

services and from social workers were filed in court. As regards the

three oldest children, the reports recommended, inter alia, long term

placement together without parental access. As regards B the reports

recommended adoption on his own, without parental access, with indirect

and infrequent access to his siblings and with one relinquishment

access session for each parent.

     On 19 March 1993 the Guardian ad litem finalised her detailed

report on the family. She had conducted personal interviews with, inter

alia, the applicant, his wife, the three oldest children, numerous

social workers, day nursery nurses, health visitors and teachers. She

read family case files from 1988 and the numerous statements made in

the course of the proceedings by the family and others. As regards the

applicant the Guardian reported that the applicant wanted to be totally

reconciled with his wife and to have his four children live with them.

As regards the applicant's wife the Guardian reported her thoughts

disordered, her short-term memory weak and that she did not appear to

be willing to talk about her children. The applicant's wife had moved

back in with the applicant but only, according to his wife, as a

temporary measure. The applicant's wife wanted the children back but

to stay with her only.

     According to the Guardian, R expressed reluctance to attend

access visits with his parents. M and J indicated their wish to

continue living with their foster parents. As regards the effects of

any future change, it was noted that B was still very young. A change

from foster parents was not to be recommended in relation to R. J had

more of a bond with her parents as she was older and thus a permanent

move to foster parents would have to be handled carefully. M was a more

difficult case though he appeared to have developed a strong sense of

trust in his foster parents.

     The report went on to assess in great detail the relevant

characteristics of the children and any harm suffered to date

(including summarising the children's references to inappropriate

sexual behaviour of the applicant and the applicant's wife's specific

charges against the applicant in this respect). The report also dealt

with the parents capabilities, the possible orders available to the

court, the probable impact of such orders on the children and the care

plan recommended by social services. The Guardian recommended that the

care orders remain in relation to each child and that the local

authority should be given the power to immediately refuse access to B,

and to refuse access to the three older children after six months

during which period the access visits should gradually diminish.

     The consolidated proceedings were heard by Judge Brown of the

High Court at Preston on 12-15 July 1993. Two preliminary matters arose

at the hearing. In the first place, it emerged that the local authority

was represented at the hearing by a barrister who had represented the

applicant's wife at a previous directions hearing. Having heard the

submissions of the parties in this respect the judge found that the

matter was not serious enough to warrant adjourning the hearing. The

second matter related to the content of the report of Ms. Wright which

was filed on 11 December 1992. The judge found that her statement

consisted of the evidence of three other social workers involved in the

case and, while it was confirmed by Ms. Wright that she had verified

the information contained therein with those three social workers, that

this manner of presenting evidence was misleading and that in future

individual affidavits should be filed.

     On 15 July 1993 judgment was delivered.

     As regards the applications for residence orders and the care

order in relation to B, Judge Brown noted that the history of the

family was one of extreme dysfunction, which situation was not likely

to change in the future. The court noted that there was still some

doubt as to the relationship between the applicant and his wife, that

when the applicant and his wife were together it was harmful for the

children but when they were apart the applicant's wife could not cope

with the children. It was noted that the applicant had been of little

assistance to his wife in this respect. The applicant's presence in the

home was expressed by the court as being "in doubt" in light of the

allegations as to his sexual behaviour and, though not making any

particular findings in this respect, it was noted that the parents had

failed to protect the children from such matters. The judge noted

specifically that if B were to be returned to his parents, he would

risk emotional harm.

     Therefore, the applications for residence orders in relation to

the three older children were dismissed (so that they were to remain

in the care of the local authority) and it was ordered that B was also

to remain in the care of the local authority.

     As regards future access, the judge gave the local authority

permission to refuse to allow the applicant and his wife continued

access to B because, in the judge's view, there was no benefit in

access with the parents and to continue access would prejudice the

chance of B's future adoption. The local authority was also given

permission to refuse to allow the applicant and his wife access in the

future to the three older children. The judge noted in this respect

that to continue access with those children was not desirable as it

would disrupt the placement process and the quality of access in the

past had not been good. However, the judge ordered that one more access

visit be allowed with B and that the parents were to wind down access

with the three older children over the space of three months at which

stage all access would cease. In reaching his conclusions on the access

issues the judge relied on the report of the Guardian ad litem.

     The applicant and his wife were legally aided and represented

throughout all of the proceedings concerning the care of the children.

     On 15 October 1994 the applicant's wife gave birth to JL and JL

was immediately taken into care pursuant to an Emergency Protection

Order (under the 1989 Act). The applicant is to file a separate

application before the Commission in relation to this child.

     The applicant and his wife continue to share a home though it is

not clear whether the divorce proceedings have been withdrawn.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that the proceedings in relation to his

children were unfair. In this respect he alleges a material conflict

of interest in that between April and June 1991 the same solicitor or

firm of solicitors acted for the local authority and his wife and that

a barrister, who had acted for his wife at a directions hearing,

represented the local authority at the hearing in July 1993. The

applicant also complains about a statement by Ms. Wright, social

worker, which was presented to the court as her own when in fact it

consisted of the evidence of three other social workers.

2.   The applicant also complains of an interference with his family

life under Article 8 of the Convention in relation to the taking into

care of his children, the lack of parental access and the length of the

proceedings by which the question of the children's care was resolved.

     He further complains under Article 8 of the Convention about,

inter alia, the use of baby monitors in the living area in Cheshire

house to monitor the applicant and his wife, the inappropriate handling

of the case by social services and the local authority (in that they

allegedly failed to adhere to "Government Guidelines", changed the

dates and times of the access visits and treated M negligently while

in care), a conspiracy between social services and the local authority

to ensure his children remained in care, social services and the local

authority taking advantage of his wife due to her "personality flaw"

and the authorities pressurising his wife to issue divorce proceedings.

     In addition, he complains that the Area Team Manager (who chaired

all the case conferences) was not independent and that there was no

independent complaints body or person within social services, that the

children were denied the right to their own religion because social

workers did not endeavour to bring up the children in the applicant's

chosen religion, that a student attended a case conference against his

wishes and that he was never informed, while in Cheshire House, that

his wife was to have a hysterectomy.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant argues that the proceedings were unfair because of

two alleged material irregularities namely, an alleged conflict of

interest on the part of a barrister and a solicitor (or a firm of

solicitors) together with the use by the court of Ms. Wright's

statement.

     The Commission has examined these complaints under Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which, insofar as is relevant,

reads as follows:

     "In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is

     entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time

     by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

     The Commission considers, in light of previous case-law (see, for

example, Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July

1987, Series A no. 121, pp. 32-35, paras. 72-79, and H. v. the United

Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120, p. 58, paras. 68-

69), that these proceedings involved the determination of the

applicant's "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     Insofar as the applicant complains about the decisions of the

courts specifically on the submissions made in relation to these two

allegations or about the decision of Judge Brown of 15 July 1993 in

view of those alleged irregularities, the Commission recalls that, in

accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task

is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the

Parties in the Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal

with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been

committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such

errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights

and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, for example, Eur. Court

H.R., Schenk judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, para.

45).

     The Commission notes that the local authority raised in court the

matter of the alleged conflict of interest (on the part of the

solicitor or firm of solicitors in question) some time after

25 April 1991, indicating that the matter had just come to its

attention and apologising for the oversight. At the directions hearing

in question the court accepted the local authority's apology. It is

also noted that these allegations as to a conflict of interest related

to April to June 1991 which was at the beginning of the proceedings.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the applicant was legally

represented at the numerous hearings after this conflict issue was

first raised in court and thus he had every opportunity to make

representations, to provide evidence and to make submissions as to the

impact of this alleged conflict of interest to the court.

     As regards the conflict of interest allegation in relation to the

barrister, the Commission recalls that the barrister in question

represented the applicant's wife at one directions hearing only and

further that the applicant was represented at the hearing in July 1993

when Judge Brown found that this matter was not sufficiently serious

to warrant adjourning the hearing.

     As regards the use by the court of the evidence of Ms. Wright,

it is noted that Ms. Wright verified the information in the statement

with the other social workers involved prior to signing the statement

and that it is not alleged by the applicant that the information

contained in the report was untrue or inaccurate. In these respects,

it is further recalled that it is not for the Commission to re-assess

the factual or legal elements of the case before the domestic courts,

given that the decisions taken had a basis in law and were based (as

noted above in respect of the specific court rulings on these

allegations and below as regards the judgment of Judge Brown on

15 July 1993 on relevant and sufficient reasons (cf., for example, Eur.

Court H.R., Barbera, Messegué and Jabardo judgment of 6 December 1988,

Series A no. 146, p. 31, para. 68).

     In light of these considerations, the Commission finds that there

is no appearance of a violation of the requirement of a fair hearing.

This complaint of the applicant is therefore manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention about:

(a) the taking into care of his children without, in the end, any

parental access; and

(b) the length of the proceedings.

     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, insofar as is relevant,

reads as follows:

     "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family

     life....

     2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the

     exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the

     law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

(a)  The Commission considers that the taking into care of the

applicant's children, initially with and subsequently without parental

access, constituted an interference with the applicant's right to

respect for his family life as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1

(Art. 8-1) of the Convention and notes that these matters were finally

decided by the High Court on 15 July 1993. In this respect, the

Commission recalls that the applicant's three older children have been

in care since April 1991 and that B. has been with foster parents since

December 1992. The applicant has not had access to the three older

children since October 1993 or to B. since the final access visit

following the final decision of the High Court.

     The Commission has consequently examined whether this

interference was justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention namely, whether the interference is "in accordance with the

law",  pursues one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article

8 para. 2 and whether it is "necessary in a democratic society" for one

or more of those aims.

     As regards the first two conditions, the Commission notes that

the courts' interim decisions on care and parental access (initially

made pursuant to the Family Division of the High Court's inherent

wardship jurisdiction and subsequently pursuant to the 1989 Act) were

conclusively dealt with and confirmed by the High Court (under the 1989

Act) on 15 July 1993. The Commission also notes that the courts'

decisions on wardship, care and access were made on the basis of the

evidence produced on an ongoing basis as to the parents' inability to

care for their children and in the best interests of the children. The

Commission therefore finds that the decisions of the courts on

wardship, care and access were in accordance with the law and pursued

the legitimate aims of protecting the children's health and rights. The

applicant submits, in this respect, that the local authority and social

services did not comply with "appropriate Government guidelines".

However, the Commission considers this submission unsubstantiated in

that the applicant does not specify the guidelines to which he refers

or in what respect any such breach took place.

     It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was

"necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the children.

     According to the established case-law of the Convention organs,

the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to

a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to

the legitimate aim pursued. Furthermore, in determining whether an

interference is "necessary in a democratic society" the Commission and

the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left

to the Contracting States, which are in principle in a better position

to make an initial assessment of the necessity of a given interference.

It is not the Commission's task to take the place of the competent

national courts and make a fresh examination of all the facts and

evidence in the case. The Commission's task is to examine whether the

reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and

sufficient" (Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series

A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).

     The Commission recalls that the judgment of the High Court of

15 July 1993 confirmed the interim care orders and allowed the local

authority to refuse the parents any further access to the children

(after some final access visits).

     The Commission notes the extent and nature of the evidence before

the High Court and, in particular, the recommendations contained in the

social work report filed in September 1992 and those dated

February 1993 together with the report of the Guardian ad litem.

     The Commission also notes that Judge Brown refused the

applications by the applicant and his wife for residence orders and

ordered that B. remain in care on the basis of his findings as to the

family history (of extreme dysfunction), as to the parents inability

to care for the children whether together or separated and as to the

best interests of the children. As regards access, the judge concluded

that continued access was not desirable in the interests of the

children. However, the judge allowed final access visits in order that

the parents could wind down access to the older children gradually and

could have a final access visit with B (who was, at that stage, less

than one year old).

     The Commission is satisfied that the decision of the High Court

of 15 July 1993 was based on a thorough and careful investigation of

the case, was not unreasonable or arbitrary and was supported by

"relevant and sufficient" reasons.

     As regards the procedural requirements implied in Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention (excluding the length of proceedings

complaint which is dealt which below) to ensure effective respect for

family life, the Commission notes that the applicant was legally

represented throughout the proceedings and is satisfied that the

applicant had the possibility of putting forward any views which he may

have felt would be decisive to the outcome of the case. While the

applicant complains about a conflict of interest in respect of a

solicitor (or a firm of solicitors) and a barrister and about the use

of Ms. Wright's statement, the Commission has found above that these

matters did not affect the fairness of the overall proceedings as

regards the applicant. The Commission considers that the procedural

requirements, implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, were

complied with and that the applicant was involved in the decision-

making process to a degree sufficient to provide him with the requisite

protection of his interests (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., H. v.

the United Kingdom, loc. cit., pp.27-28, paras. 87-90 and W. v. the

United Kingdom, loc. cit., pp. 28-29, paras. 63-65).

     The Commission therefore finds that, bearing in mind the margin

of appreciation accorded to the domestic authorities in this respect,

the interference in the present case was justified under the terms of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention as being "necessary in

a democratic society" for the protection of the health and rights of

others.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

(b)  As to the applicant's complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention about the length of the proceedings, the Commission has

considered whether the length of proceedings (being approximately two

years and three months) has failed to show respect for the applicant's

family life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. The

Commission recalls that delays by the authorities resulting in

proceedings taking 31 months, leading to a de facto determination of

the issues by the effluxion of time, has been found to constitute a

violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., H.

v. the United Kingdom, loc. cit., pp. 27-28, paras. 87-90).

     In the present case, the Commission notes the consistent views

expressed in the various affidavits and reports filed by the social

workers, health visitors, psychologists and by the Guardian ad litem.

The Commission also notes the opinion of Judge Brown, given in his

judgment of 15 July 1993, as to the applicant's and his wife's parental

abilities and as to the best interests of the children. It is therefore

not established that, in the circumstances of the present case, the

length of the proceedings led to a de facto determination of the

issues. In addition, the Commission notes that the matter was

relatively complex due to the number of children involved and the birth

during the proceedings of B. The Commission further notes the

importance of what was at stake for the applicant, the need to

carefully collect information and to put that information before the

courts and the contradictory statements of the applicant and his wife

made in the course of the proceedings.

     It therefore finds that this complaint of the applicant is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   The applicant also raises a number of additional complaints under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

     He complains, inter alia, that the Cheshire House authorities

used baby alarms in the living area in Cheshire house in order to

monitor the applicant and his wife. He also complains about the

handling of the matter by social services and the local authority and,

in particular, about the changing of the times of the access visits by

social services and about the negligent treatment of M. while in care.

He also alleges that there was a conspiracy between the local authority

and social services to ensure that the children remain in care. He

further submits that his wife was taken advantage of by the local

authority and social services due to her personality flaw and was

pressurised by the authorities to institute divorce proceedings. The

Commission has examined the allegations made and the documents

submitted by the applicant. It considers that these complaints have not

been substantiated.

      The applicant also complains, inter alia, that the Area Team

Manager (who chaired all the case conferences) was not independent and

that there was no independent complaints body or person within social

services. In this respect the Commission notes that the applicant had

access to the courts in relation to the case on an ongoing basis, was

legally represented and any complaint as to the Area Team Manager's

independence, and consequently the evidentiary value of his or other's

statements, could have been made by the applicant in court. As regards

the claim that the children have been denied the right to their own

religion because social workers did not endeavour to bring up the

children in the applicant's chosen religion, there is no indication

given by the applicant as to what religion he refers and no evidence

has been submitted by the applicant indicating that this matter was

ever raised with social services, the local authority or the courts.

     As to his complaint in relation to the attendance of a student

at one of the case conferences, there is no evidence that the student

was doing anything other than observing the meeting. As regards the

applicant's complaint that he was never informed while in Cheshire

House that his wife was to have a hysterectomy, it is noted that the

applicant's wife subsequently gave birth in October 1994.

     The Commission has examined these complaints, the arguments of

the applicant and the material submitted to the Commission by him and,

insofar as these complaints have been substantiated, the Commission

concludes that they do not disclose a violation of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber   President of the First Chamber

     (M. F. BUQUICCHIO)                     (C. L. ROZAKIS)