AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 24604/94

                      by R.S.

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 6 September 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber,

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 16 September 1993

by R.S. against the United Kingdom and registered on 13 July 1994 under

file No. 24604/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen residing in Liverpool and he

was born in 1951. The facts as submitted by the applicant, and as may

be deduced from the documents, may be summarised as follows.

     In 1983 the applicant began a relationship with PC and they co-

habited until July 1992. On 17 April 1989 PC had a daughter while the

couple were living in Wales and the applicant is the father of the

child. The couple moved frequently (in order to avoid the attention of

social services) and eventually settled in Ireland.

     In July 1992 the applicant left and took the child to England.

It was later accepted by the courts that the child was taken without

PC's consent. The applicant and the child were subsequently found

living in accommodation for the homeless in London. On 7 August 1992

the Wirral Borough Family Proceedings Court made a residence order

(pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 - "the 1989 Act") on

an interim and ex parte basis in favour of PC. With the assistance of

the police, PC subsequently recovered the child in August 1992 from the

applicant. The child has lived with PC in the United Kingdom, in her

maternal grandparents house, since that date.

     On 1 October 1992 the Family Proceedings Court requested the

local authority to provide a full report (pursuant to section 37 of the

1989 Act) and appointed a guardian ad litem. In addition and in light

of some concerns about PC's mental health, she was assessed in October

1992 by two approved social workers who concluded that no action was

required under the Mental Health legislation. A social work report

dated 20 November 1992 stated that the local authority did not wish to

apply for a care order and another dated 15 January 1993 commented on

the child's good progress.

     Between October 1992 and February 1993 the applicant had two

access visits which were arranged by the guardian ad litem who reported

that these visits were successful and that the child was relaxed in the

applicant's company. On the 23 February 1993 the report of the guardian

ad litem was finalised.

     On 3 and 4 March the Magistrates' Court heard the parties in

relation to the interim residence order and an application of the

applicant for a residence order. The court had, inter alia, two reports

before it from consultant psychiatrists. The first referred to PC's

treatment with anti-depressants and tranquilisers for a stress-induced

illness and to her subsequent discharge from hospital in January 1993.

The second confirmed that the applicant showed no signs of mental

illness or psychiatric disorder and that there were no objections from

a psychiatric point of view to the child living with the applicant. The

report from the guardian ad litem concluded that it was not in the

child's best interests to be removed from PC, that it was vital that

contact between the applicant and the child be re-established as soon

as possible and that it was clear from the two periods of access had

that the child had a strong affection for the applicant.

     The court, in agreeing with the local authority and the guardian

ad litem, found that there was no need to make a care or supervision

order in favour of the local authority but made a residence order in

favour of PC and a parental responsibility order in favour of the

applicant. The court ordered that the applicant was to have access once

a week for two hours at a Family Centre until a different arrangement

was agreed between the parties with the help of a social worker who

would be fulfilling a family assistance order for six months.

     The family assistance officer was appointed on 12 May 1993 and

unsupervised access visits in the Family Centre took place between

10 March and 15 July 1993. On 12 May 1993 the applicant, who had been

unable to agree on any additional access visits with PC, applied for

extended access.

     On 1 July 1993 a directions hearing before the Magistrates' Court

was adjourned until 15 July 1993 pending the completion of a welfare

report by the family assistance officer. In July 1993 the family

assistance officer began a comprehensive three month assessment of the

family. PC agreed to the assessment but the applicant did not.

     On 15 July 1993 the directions hearing was again adjourned until

12 August 1993. The date for the full hearing was fixed by the court

for October 1993 and the location for the access visits was changed to

the local authorities offices. On 6 August 1993 PC applied for an order

discharging the access orders made by the court in March 1993.

     However, in August 1993 the existing access arrangements were

suspended by the local authority, the applicant having indicated orally

and in writing that he had no intention of adhering to the court's

orders as to access or working in partnership with the local authority.

     On 19 and 20 August 1993 the Magistrates' Court considered PC's

application and a request for directions from the local authority (in

light of the suspension of the access visits). The court ordered one

access period of two hours per week at a place and time to be specified

by the local authority and the completion of the family assessment

within six weeks.

     PC gave her consent to the consequent programme of assessment (to

include unsupervised access) but the applicant would not. On

1 September 1993 the applicant turned up for a pre-arranged

unsupervised access visit, took the child without speaking to the

social workers, brought her to a place just at the back of the child's

grandparent's home (where PC resided) and attempted to return the child

to her grandparents' home rather than to the local authority offices.

The child was reported to be distressed during this visit and her

behaviour was poor for the following days. On 8 September 1993 further

access visits were suspended because the applicant would not agree to

the assessment plan. On 13 September 1993 another emergency directions

hearing resulted in the reiteration of the access orders given in

August 1993. The applicant subsequently again confirmed that he was not

willing to comply with those access arrangements unless the local

authority was excluded and did not speak to the child. He did not

attend for further access visits.

     The family assessment officer finalised his report on

30 September 1993 and it stated that the applicant's behaviour

throughout the proceedings was extremely difficult and unreasonable,

that the applicant appeared intent on prolonging the power struggle

between PC and himself, that he was using the child care proceedings

for achieving this and that he had used the access visit on

1 September 1993 in order to taunt PC giving no consideration to the

effect of his actions on the child. He referred to the applicant's

consistent failure to cooperate with the access arrangements, to his

attempts to undermine PC's relationship with the child and concluded

that these issues combined with the applicant's volatile and

unpredictable personality left him with concern, particularly regarding

the child's future opportunity to develop a sense of security and

stability.

     On 20 October 1993, after a hearing, the Magistrates' Court

ordered that the applicant have no further access to the child. The

court stated that the "paramount consideration" was the welfare of the

child and that the court had approached the issue from the assumption

that the child's needs were such that the applicant should have access

unless there were cogent reasons against this.

     The court went on to find as follows. While the child's age

limited her ability to express her wishes she appeared content living

with PC, happy to see the applicant and would choose to remain in

contact with him. Her current environment was stable and any increased

access would be unsettling. PC was capable of meeting the majority of

the child's needs and had worked hard at providing a stable environment

for the child. However, ceasing access would end the distress caused

to the child by the applicant's use of the child in his attempts to

have her live with him. The applicant was obsessed with the issue of

access, was unable to accept anyone's views but his own and his

insistence on his own views had affected his judgment leading him to

place his own needs ahead of those of the child. The court also

referred to the possibility that the applicant might abduct the child

again. As to other access options, the applicant's recent behaviour

indicated that such options would be doomed to failure or were likely

to be abused by him. In conclusion the court stated that:

     "unless there is a considerable change in

     attitude he is totally incapable, for the time being, of meeting

     needs and that emotional welfare and

     current stability would be at risk if contact were to continue."

     The applicant dismissed his legal representatives during the

hearing before the Magistrates' Court and again on 8 December 1993

during a another court hearing though not, according to the High Court,

before his counsel had settled his notice of appeal to the High Court.

     The High Court noted in its judgment dated 2 February 1994 that

the essential thrust of the applicant's appeal was that the

Magistrates' Court was wrong. The High Court found that there was

evidence upon which the Magistrates' Court could come to a conclusion

that there were cogent reasons to bring the access to an end and that

the applicant had not demonstrated that the Magistrates' Court's

decision was wrong.

     The High Court noted that the Magistrates' Court had not "shut

the door" forever on access and that it was open to the applicant, if

he was prepared to approach the question of access in a sensible

cooperative spirit as opposed to an obsessively disruptive spirit, to

seek to renew access. However, the High Court noted in this respect

that the applicant would have to demonstrate to a court that he had

changed and was genuinely willing to cooperate in assessment rather

than abuse and insult those seeking to carry out such an assessment.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant mainly complains about being deprived of access to

his child in violation of his right to respect for his family life. He

makes many explanatory submissions in this respect essentially to the

effect that the procedures followed (by the local authority, the police

and the courts) were unlawful and unfair, that the decisions of the

courts on access were unjustified and wrong in light of the evidence

submitted and not in the child's interests and that there was

unacceptable delay in the proceedings and in arranging access visits.

     He also complains about a consequent violation of his rights to

freedom of thought, conscience, religion and expression.  He further

complains that he has also been consequently denied the right to ensure

that the education of his child is in conformity with his own

philosophical convictions in violation of the Convention. In addition,

he complains about a violation of his right to liberty because he did

not fulfil a contractual obligation and of intrusions into his private

life and correspondence.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant mainly complains of being deprived of access to his

child in violation to his right to respect for his family life. The

Commission finds it appropriate to consider this complaint under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which

provide as follows:

     "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family life ...

     2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the

     exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the

     law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of

     national security, public safety or the economic well-being of

     the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The Commission finds in accordance with its established case-law

that the decision refusing the applicant access constituted an

interference with his right to respect for his family life as

guaranteed in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (see eg.

Eur. Court H.R., Eriksson judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A no. 156,

p. 27, 59).

     The Commission has consequently examined whether this

interference is justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the

Convention, namely, whether it is "in accordance with the law", pursues

one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8 para. 2

(Art. 8-2) and whether it is "necessary in a democratic society" for

one or more of those reasons.

     The Commission recalls that access by the applicant to his child

was refused by the Magistrates' Court and that that decision was

confirmed on appeal by the High Court in the context of the exercise

of those courts' jurisdiction under the Children Act 1989. The decision

was taken on the basis of that court's assessment that further access

would be detrimental to the child. The Commission notes that the High

Court, having before it arguments as to the lawfulness of the actions

of the local authority, did not find that such actions were unlawful.

The Commission also notes that the police, in removing the child from

the applicant, acted in pursuance of a court order. The Commission

accordingly finds that the decision was taken "in accordance with law"

and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the child's health and

rights.

     As to whether the measure was necessary within the meaning of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention, the case-law of the

Convention organs establishes that the notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and that it is

proportionate to the aim pursued. Furthermore, in determining whether

an interference is necessary, the Convention organs will take into

account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States

who are in principle in a better position to make an initial assessment

as to the necessity of given measure (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., W. v.

the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 27,

para. 59).

     When determining whether or not the decision refusing access was

necessary, the Commission observes that it is not its task to take the

place of the competent national courts and make a fresh examination of

all the facts and evidence. The Commission's task is to examine whether

the reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant

and sufficient" (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March

1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).

     The Commission recalls that the decision of the Magistrates'

Court, which was confirmed on appeal by the High Court, to end the

applicant's access was made in light of that court's findings as to the

best interests of the child. In particular, the court had regard to the

applicant's attitude and behaviour, his refusal to comply with orders

of the court, the possibility that the applicant might abduct the child

again, the applicant's use of the child and his disregarding the

child's welfare in order to achieve access and the probable reduction

in distress to the child if access ceased. The Commission further notes

that prior to reaching its decision the court considered, but in light

of the applicant's behaviour felt bound to dismiss, other possible

access options. Finally, it is noted, as it was by the High Court, that

the Magistrates' Court left open some possibility of the applicant

seeking to renew access should he be prepared to renew access in "a

sensible cooperative spirit". The Commission is therefore satisfied

that the decision in relation to access was not arbitrary or

unreasonable and was supported by "relevant and sufficient reasons".

     As regards the procedural requirements implied in Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention to ensure effective respect for family life

(see eg. Eur. Court H.R., H. v. UK judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A

no. 120, pp. 27-28 and 59 paras. 87-90 and W. v. UK judgment, loc.

cit., pp. 28-29, pp. 63-65), the Commission notes that while the

applicant represented himself at the appeal hearing, he was represented

initially in the proceedings by solicitor and counsel but he discharged

his legal representatives during the hearing in March 1993 in the

Magistrates' Court and again after he had lodged his appeal to the High

Court. In addition, having considered the relevant submissions of the

applicant, the Commission does not find that the procedures employed

by the local authority (including in arranging access visits) and by

the police were excessive, unfair or showed a lack of respect for the

applicant's family life.

     Furthermore, the Commission is satisfied that the applicant was

given the possibility of putting forward any views which in his opinion

would be decisive for the outcome of the case. The Commission also

considers that the length of the overall proceedings, being

approximately 19 months, was not unreasonable and it does not appear

that it led to a de facto determination of the issues by the mere

effluxion of time or deprived the applicant of a decision upon the

merits of the case (further considered below). The Commission therefore

finds that the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention were complied with and that the applicant

was involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to

provide him with the requisite protection of his interests.

     The Commission therefore concludes, bearing in mind the margin

of appreciation accorded to the domestic authorities, that in the

circumstances of the present case the interference was justified as

being "necessary in a democratic society" for the protection of the

health and rights of the children. Consequently, this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant also complains about the decisions taken by the

courts, about the procedures adopted by the courts and about delay

during the proceedings. The Commission has considered these complaints

of the applicant under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,

the relevant parts of which provide as follows:

     "1.   In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is

     entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time

     by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law..."

(a)  Insofar as the applicant complains that the decisions taken by

the courts were wrong and unjustified in light of the evidence

submitted, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance

of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In

particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,

except where it considers that such errors might have involved a

possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the

Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its constant case-

law (see eg. No. 458/59, X v Belgium, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp.222,

236; No. 5258/71, X v Sweden, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp.71, 77; No.

7987/77, X v Austria, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).

     In particular, the Commission recalls that as regards the courts

assessment of the case, it is not for the Commission to re-assess the

factual or legal elements of the case before the domestic courts, given

that the decisions taken had a basis in law and were, as found above,

based on relevant and sufficient reasons (see eg. Eur. Court H.R.,

Barbera, Messegué and Jabardo judgment of 6 December 1988, Series A no.

146, p. 31, para. 68).

(b)  The applicant also makes submissions to the effect that the

procedures before the courts were not fair or equitable in that, inter

alia, he had to make his submissions from behind the barristers bench

(after he discharged his representatives), he was treated with bias and

prejudice by the court and he was overly constrained by the judges when

giving evidence and cross-examining. The Commission has considered all

of the submissions of the applicant in this respect and does not find

that the applicant has substantiated any procedural unfairness in the

manner in which the proceedings were conducted.

(c)  As regards the applicant's complaint about delay in the

proceedings, the Commission recalls that the proceedings commenced in

August 1992 and terminated on 2 February 1994, a period of

approximately 19 months.

     According to the constant case-law of the Convention organs, the

reasonableness of the delay in civil proceedings must be considered

with regard to the circumstances of the particular case and with the

help of the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct

of the parties and the conduct of the authorities dealing with the case

and what was at stake in the litigation for the applicant (see eg. Eur.

Court H.R. H. v. UK judgment of 8 July 1987, loc. cit. p. 59, para. 87-

71). In addition, it is recalled that special diligence is required in

cases relating to a person's civil status and capacity (Eur. Court

H.R., Maciariello judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-A, p.

10, para. 18).

     In the present case, while the subject-matter of the proceedings

- access to a child - was not particularly complex, the Commission has

had regard to the sensitive nature of the decision-making process in

this type of case which frequently, as in this case, require the

compilation of expert reports based on observation over a period of

time. It recalls that in the present case reports were filed in court

by the guardian ad litem, the family assessment officer, psychiatric

consultants and social workers.

     The Commission does not find that the conduct of the courts or

of the local authority led to any significant or unreasonable delay in

the proceedings and considers that the applicant's lack of cooperation

with the local authority led to some difficulty in completing social

work investigations and reports and necessitated the holding of further

directions hearings, which factors contributed to the overall length

of the proceedings.

     The Commission has also had careful regard to the importance of

what was at stake for the applicant. The proceedings were decisive for

his future relationship with his child and in a case of this kind there

is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that

the lapse of time may result in the de facto determination of the

matter before the court. There is, however, also a duty to ensure that

all the evidence which may be needed for the court to make a decision

of such importance to the applicant is collected and put before the

court. In the present case, the Commission is satisfied that the matter

was determined with the benefit of the necessary material and on the

merits of the case.

     Consequently, the Commission finds, having weighed all the

relevant circumstances that the proceedings, which involved two

instances, did not exceed a reasonable time within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     The Commission concludes that the applicant was not in the

circumstances of the case deprived of a fair hearing within a

reasonable time the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains about an interference with his

private life and that he has been denied the right to freedom of

thought, conscience, religion and to ensure that the education of his

child is in conformity with his own philosophical convictions as a

result of the access proceedings and the decisions on access. He

submits, inter alia, in this respect that during the proceedings and

as a result of the final order as to access, he was and is prevented

from contributing to, or continuing with, his child's religious,

educational and general up-bringing. He further submits that the courts

would not allow him to maintain his own views as to the best interests

of the child and, because he would not change those views or comply

with the courts' view in this respect, he lost access to his child. The

Commission has examined the submissions of the applicant in this

respect and considers that these complaints do not give rise to any

issue separate to those considered above in the context of Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

     As regards the applicant's complaint of a violation of his right

to liberty, the Commission recalls that the word "liberty" in Article

5 (Art. 5) of the Convention means a freedom from arrest and detention

(see, for example, No. 7050/75, Dec. 12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 5). However,

the applicant complains in this respect that he was obligated to comply

with contractual terms, which obligation does not constitute a

deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the

Convention. The Commission also considers that the applicant has not

substantiated his complaint about an interference with his

correspondence.

     The Commission therefore finds these complaints of the applicant

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

     (M. F. BUQUICCHIO)                     (C. L. ROZAKIS)