AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 22977/93

                      by Britt-Marie and Stanley OLSSON

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 7 September 1995, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, Acting President

           Mr.   H. DANELIUS

           MM.   G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 3 May 1993 by

Britt-Marie and Stanley Olsson against Sweden and registered on

22 November 1993 under file No. 22977/93;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

      The first applicant, a librarian born in 1947, resides at

Askersund. The second applicant, the first applicant's father, an

economist born in 1917, resides at Växjö. Before the Commission, the

first applicant is represented by the second applicant.

      The first applicant owns property in Växjö. It was given to her

as a gift by the second applicant in 1981. Tenancy rights were,

however, reserved for the second applicant and his wife. The second

applicant still lives on the property.

Adoption of a building plan

      In 1987 the municipality started to plan an extension of the

public baths built in the early 1970's on the land adjoining the

applicants' property. An extension would require the acquisition of the

applicants' property. The applicants hence requested the Building

Committee (Byggnadsnämnden) of Växjö to adopt a building plan

(detaljplan) for the property, which was located in an unplanned area.

By decision of 13 December 1988, the Committee rejected the request.

Referring to the possible extension of the public baths, it stated that

it was not prepared to zone their property for housing purposes.

      On 21 June 1990 the Municipal Council (Kommunfullmäktige) of

Växjö, pursuant to the Plan and Building Act (Plan- och bygglagen,

1987:10), adopted a building plan for the area where the applicants'

property is located. Apparently, the applicants' property was now zoned

for housing purposes. Before adopting the plan, the Council had

consulted different authorities and the affected property owners,

including the applicants, who had submitted their observations on the

proposed plan. The applicants had requested the Council to amend the

plan by extending a road situated close to their property and to change

its incline, by incorporating another road with their property, as it

served as their access road, and by improving the drainage system on

the municipality's land so as to avoid floods on their property. The

applicants had alleged that the foundations of their house had been

damaged due to insufficient drainage on the municipality's land. With

the exception of the incorporation of the applicants' access road with

their property, the Council, however, decided not to make the requested

amendments, finding them unnecessary or inappropriate.

      The applicants appealed to the County Administrative Board

(Länsstyrelsen) of the County of Kronoberg, insisting that the plan be

amended in accordance with their requests to the Municipal Council.

They claimed, inter alia, that the design of the roads in question did

not serve their purpose and did not correspond to the standard of the

other roads of the area, as required by the relevant provision of the

Plan and Building Act. However, on 15 October 1990, the Board, agreeing

with the Municipal Council's assessments, upheld its decision.

      On 17 October 1991 the Government rejected the applicants'

further appeal, stating that it agreed with the assessments made by the

County Administrative Board.

      The applicants then applied to the Supreme Administrative Court

(Regeringsrätten) for a review of the Government's decision under the

Act on Judicial Review of Certain Administrative Decisions (Lagen om

rättsprövning av vissa förvaltningsbeslut, 1988:205 - "the 1988 Act").

Requesting that the Court examine whether the decision was in conflict

with any rule of law, they claimed that it was in conflict with Chapter

3, Sections 15-18, of the Plan and Building Act, Section 6 of the

Public Roads Act (Väglagen, 1971:948) and Chapter 1, Section 9, of the

Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen). The said provisions of the

Plan and Building Act state that plots of land and public places shall

be arranged and maintained in a suitable way having regard to, inter

alia, the geography, the traffic conditions and the adjoining land.

      In its judgment of 16 November 1992, the Supreme Administrative

Court first noted, with reference to the travaux préparatoires to the

1988 Act, that its examination concerned the question whether the

challenged decision was in conflict with any rule of law, but that the

Court's competence was not limited to an interpretation of the law. The

Court should also assess the facts and the evidence of the case and

examine whether principles such as objectivity, impartiality and

equality before the law had been respected. Moreover, the Court should

examine whether there had been any procedural errors which might have

affected the outcome of the case. If the provisions applied in the case

left a certain discretion to the relevant authority, the Court should

examine whether the challenged decision fell within that discretion.

      As regards the particular circumstances of the case, the Supreme

Administrative Court found that the Government had acted within its

discretion under the Plan and Building Act and that its decision was

not in conflict with any rule of law. The Court, thus, upheld the

Government's decision.

Claim for damages

      In March 1990 the applicants brought an action for damages under

the Environmental Damage Act (Miljöskadelagen, 1986:225) against the

municipality of Växjö in the District Court (Tingsrätten) of Växjö.

They asserted that, while constructing and maintaining the public

baths, roads, parking places and open spaces on the land adjoining

their property, the municipality had damaged the drainage system and

removed a great deal of the vegetation on that land. This had allegedly

changed the current and raised the level of the water on that land and

the applicants' property, and so damaged the foundations of the

applicants' house.

      The District Court held a hearing, at which the applicants were

present and represented by a lawyer. The second applicant was heard,

as well as five witnesses proposed by the applicants, among them four

experts, and one expert witness proposed by the municipality. A report

made by an engineering firm was submitted by the applicants.

Furthermore, the Court inspected the site.

      By judgment of 19 October 1991, the District Court rejected the

applicants' claim. It stated that the applicants had not shown that the

damage to their property was caused by changes of the current and level

of water on the municipality's land. Instead, the Court found the

statements made at the hearing to indicate that the drainage system on

the applicants' property had been inadequate.

      The applicants appealed to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta

hovrätt), which held a further hearing in the case, at which the

applicants and their lawyer were present. On 16 April 1993 the Court

of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court. On 14 September

1994 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave

to appeal.

      The second applicant later reported the municipality's legal

representative to the Swedish Bar Association, claiming that he had

acted contrary to the Association's statutes and its rules on

professional practice (god advokatsed) during the hearings in the

District Court and the Court of Appeal. Allegedly, the representative

had, inter alia, made false statements and influenced a witness to do

the same. The matter is apparently still pending before the Board of

the Bar Association.

COMPLAINTS

1.    Invoking Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants complain

that they could not bring before a court the local authorities'

decisions concerning the building plan. In this respect, they claim

that the Supreme Administrative Court was not a tribunal within the

meaning of Article 6, as it was not competent, under the 1988 Act, to

deal with all aspects of the case.

2.    Further under Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants assert

that the District Court and the Court of Appeal were not impartial when

examining their claim for damages.

3.    The applicants complain that the municipality, ever since the

building of the public baths, has interfered with their right to the

peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

4.    The applicants also allege that their rights to respect for their

family life and their home under Article 8 of the Convention have been

violated, as the road conditions and the general living environment

were impaired by the building of the public baths in the early 1970's,

the adoption of the building plan in 1990 and the alleged damage to

their property due to the raised groundwater level on the

municipality's land.

      Furthermore, the applicants maintain that the measures undertaken

by the public authorities and the courts have limited their invoked

rights and freedoms to a greater extent than is provided for in the

Convention. They further maintain that the restrictions permitted under

the Convention have been applied for other purposes than those for

which they have been prescribed. They invoke Articles 17 and 18 of the

Convention.

5.    The applicants further complain that they have been discriminated

against in violation of Article 14 of the Convention in that the

conditions with regard to, inter alia, roads, parking places and

drainage systems, are better in the southern part of the area covered

by the adopted building plan than in the part where the applicants'

property is located.

6.    The applicants finally allege that they did not have an effective

remedy under Article 13 of the Convention in respect of which they

could complain about violations of their rights committed by civil

servants during the exercise of their duties.

THE LAW

1.    Invoking Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the applicants

complain that they could not bring before a court the local

authorities' decisions concerning the building plan. In this respect,

they claim that the Supreme Administrative Court was not a tribunal

within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6), as it was not competent,

under the 1988 Act, to deal with all aspects of the case.

      The relevant part of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by an

      independent and impartial tribunal ...".

      The Commission recalls that the applicants sought to have the

building plan amended in accordance with the requests they had

submitted to the Municipal Council. Even assuming that the decisions

taken by the authorities and the Supreme Administrative Court in this

respect involved a determination of the applicants' civil rights, and

that thus Article 6 (Art. 6) is applicable to the present complaint,

the Commission finds, for the reasons set out below, that the facts

submitted do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the said

Article.

      The Commission first takes into account that the competence of

the Supreme Administrative Court under the 1988 Act is not limited to

an examination of how the law has been applied but may include a

re-examination of the facts of the case. The Court shall also examine

whether fundamental legal principles such as objectivity, impartiality

and equality before the law have been respected and whether there have

been any procedural errors which might have affected the outcome of the

case.

      The Commission also recalls that the scope of review must be

assessed in the light of the fact that the relevant authorities do not

have unfettered discretion when taking decisions concerning a building

plan but that, for example, the Plan and Building Act lays down certain

conditions for these decisions. As a further example, the Commission

recalls the above-mentioned Chapter 3, Sections 15-18, of the Act which

concern the arrangement and maintenance of plots of land and public

places. It was for the Supreme Administrative Court to satisfy itself

that there had been compliance with these provisions.

      Finally, the Commission recalls that in the case in question the

applicants requested the Supreme Administrative Court to examine

whether the Government's decision was in conflict with any rule of law.

Confining itself as far as possible to examining the question raised

before it, the Commission finds no evidence in this case which would

lead to the conclusion that the Court, in examining the applicants'

request, had to decline jurisdiction (cf. No. 18660/91, Bengtsson v.

Sweden, Dec. 7.12.94, D.R. 79 p. 11).

      In these circumstances the Commission finds that the review

available to the applicants in the instant case fulfilled the

requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    Further under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the

applicants assert that the District Court and the Court of Appeal were

not impartial when examining their claim for damages.

      In this connection, the applicants maintain that the

municipality's legal representative acted contrary to the Bar

Association's professional practice rules and that his conduct was

allowed by the District Court judge. The partiality of the two courts

was allegedly further shown by their departure from existing case-law

concerning the required evidence in environmental damage cases.

      Noting in particular that the applicants were represented by

their lawyer during the court hearings and were able to respond to the

statements of the municipality's legal representative, the Commission

finds that an examination of this complaint as it has been submitted

does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and

freedoms set out in the Convention and in particular in the Article

invoked.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The applicants complain that the municipality, ever since the

building of the public baths, has interfered with their right to the

peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. They invoke Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which reads as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      The applicants assert that the construction and maintenance of

the public baths and the attached parking place have caused damage to

their property since 1971. They further claim that their ownership of

the property has been threatened since 1987 when the municipality

started to plan an extension of the public baths. Their property rights

have further been infringed by the decisions taken in connection with

the adoption of the building plan, inter alia the decisions concerning

the roads adjacent to the applicants' property.

      The Commission first notes that the applicants have not been

deprived of their possessions, nor have any of the decisions taken

deprived them of their property. The alleged interference with their

property rights, therefore, falls under the second paragraph of the

above provision concerning control of the use of property.

      The Commission recalls that, by its planning decision of

21 June 1990 which was later upheld on appeal, the municipality

rejected the applicants' requests that a road situated close to their

property be extended, its incline be changed, and the drainage system

on the municipality's land be improved. The requested amendments to the

plan were found to be unnecessary or inappropriate. Concerning the

damage on the applicants' property, the Commission further recalls that

the applicants' action against the municipality was rejected by the

domestic courts as it had not been shown that the damage was caused by

changes of the current and level of water on the municipality's land.

      The Commission, having regard to the findings of the domestic

courts, considers that the applicants' submissions fail to show that

their property has been damaged by actions or events for which the

State could be held responsible. Moreover, it has not been shown that

any decisions or measures taken in the present case have interfered

with the use of the applicants' property.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    The applicants allege that their rights to respect for their

family life and their home, ensured by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention subject to certain limitations, have been violated. In this

connection, they claim that the road conditions and the general living

environment were impaired by the building of the public baths in the

early 1970's, the adoption of the building plan in 1990 and the alleged

damage to their property due to the raised groundwater level on the

municipality's land.

      Furthermore, the applicants maintain that the measures undertaken

by the public authorities and the courts have limited their invoked

rights and freedoms to a greater extent than is provided for in the

Convention. They allege that the restrictions permitted under the

Convention have been applied for other purposes than those for which

they have been prescribed. They invoke Articles 17 and 18 (Art. 17, 18)

of the Convention, which prohibit the abusive interpretation or

application of Convention rights and limitations.

      However, having regard to the basis of its conclusions in respect

of the applicants' above complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1), the Commission also finds these complaints unsubstantiated,

failing to disclose any appearance of a violation of Articles 8, 17 or

18 (Art. 8, 17, 18) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    The applicants complain that they have been discriminated against

in that the conditions with regard to, inter alia, roads, parking

places and drainage systems, are better in the southern part of the

area covered by the adopted building plan than in the part where the

applicants' property is located. They invoke Article 14 (Art. 14) of

the Convention, which reads as follows:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

      ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

      political or other opinion, national or social origin,

      association with a national minority, property, birth or

      other status."

      Recalling that this provision has no independent existence, but

prohibits discrimination only with respect to the enjoyment of the

rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the Commission finds

no evidence of discrimination disclosed in the present case as it has

been submitted.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.    The applicants allege that they did not have an effective remedy

under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in respect of which they

could complain about violations of their rights committed by civil

servants during the exercise of their duties. Article 13 (Art. 13)

provides the following:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      The Commission notes that the applicants have not stated which

violations they were unable to complain about before a national

authority. Having regard to this and to its above conclusions in

respect of the Convention complaints submitted, the Commission

considers that the applicants do not have any arguable claims

necessitating a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series

A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). The Commission also notes that the

applicants had access to and used several channels of complaint. It

recalls that the applicants' complaints concerning the building plan

were examined by the County Administrative Board, the Government and

the Supreme Administrative Court, and that their claim for damages was

heard by courts at three levels.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

       Secretary                              Acting President

  to the Second Chamber                    of the Second Chamber

    (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                           (G.H. THUNE)