BUCHINGER v. AUSTRIA
Doc ref: 25484/94 • ECHR ID: 001-2372
Document date: October 18, 1995
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25484/94
by Johann BUCHINGER
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 18 October 1995, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 1 June 1994 by
Johann BUCHINGER against Austria and registered on 26 October 1994
under file No. 25484/94;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant, born in 1950, is an Austrian national and resident
in Vienna. He is receiving a disability pension.
As regards the applicant's previous Application No. 15198/90
concerning the length of civil proceedings, the Commission adopted its
Article 31 Report on 1 July 1992, and on 3 February 1994 the Committee
of Ministers, in its Resolution DH(94)7, found a violation of Article 6
para. 1 of the Convention. His further Application No. 21210/93
relation to complaints about the lack of fairness of domestic court
proceedings was declared inadmissible on 1 April 1993.
On 27 July 1991, at about 8.40 p.m., the applicant entered a
Vienna bus and intended to stand behind the driver's seat during the
ride. According to the applicant, he suffered pain when getting up
from a seat due to his physical handicap and he had therefore usually
taken the space behind the driver's seat in a bus in order to stand
there during the ride. On the above occasion, the bus driver requested
the applicant to sit down or to go to the standing area at the back of
the bus. As the applicant refused, the bus driver stopped after a
short drive and called for the police. Some minutes later, police
officers U. and G. of the Vienna Federal Police Department (Bundes-
polizeidirektion) arrived and asked the applicant to choose another
place in the bus. When the applicant still refused, the police
officers arrested him and by force got him out of the bus, hand-cuffed
him and took him to the police car. He was brought to the police
station where he was released at 9.45 p.m.
On 10 September 1991 the applicant, assisted by counsel, filed
a complaint with the Vienna Independent Administrative Senate
(Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat), claiming that the forced removal from
the bus, his subsequent arrest and hand-cuffing by the police officers
had violated his right to liberty under Article 5 of the Convention and
had subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning
of Article 3 of the Convention. According to the applicant, the police
officers had dragged him forcibly out of the bus without having
pronounced his arrest. When insisting on information about the
officers' service numbers, they had hand-cuffed him. The applicant
further submitted that he had been entitled to stand behind the
driver's seat as he did not hinder the driver in any way and that the
police officers had not been entitled to remove him forcibly from the
bus and to arrest and hand-cuff him afterwards.
The Vienna Federal Police Department, in its comments on the
applicant's complaint, submitted that the Police Officers U. and G. had
acted upon the request of the bus driver who had been hindered in
driving the bus on the ground of the applicant's choice of place behind
the driver's seat. The applicant had refused to comply with the
driver's, and later also with the Police Officers' requests to choose
another place and had been aggressive. Further the applicant had
refused to give his personal data. His conduct had disturbed the
regular driving of the bus. At 9.05 p.m., Police Officer U. had,
therefore, effected the applicant's arrest in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Austrian law. Upon the applicant's
resistance to leaving the bus, he had been hand-cuffed, and the hand-
cuffs were taken off upon arrival at the police station. At that time
the applicant had not complained about any pain or injuries. Having
established the applicant's identity, he had been released.
On 28 January 1992 the Vienna Independent Administrative Senate
conducted a hearing on the applicant's complaint. The Senate heard the
applicant as well as the bus driver and Police Officers U. and G.
The applicant indicated that on 27 July 1991 he had intended to
stand behind the driver's seat as he had usually done because of his
physical handicap. He considered that the bus driver had requested him
to leave this place in order to take revenge for several complaints
which the applicant had lodged about various bus drivers. The bus
driver had called for the police. The Police Officers had requested
him to sit down or to move to the back of the bus, and, when he
refused, had established his identity and then forcibly removed him
from the bus. He had then been hand-cuffed, hit in his chest and
pushed into the police car. At the police station, he was searched and
questioned. He had only been released at 10.10 p.m.
The bus driver stated that he had already previously requested
the applicant to leave the area behind the driver's seat as he hindered
the driver from properly looking into the rear-view mirror and also
hindered the other passengers from entering the bus. In the evening
in question, two other passengers had asked him to tell them when to
change the bus. He had again asked the applicant to take place
elsewhere in the bus and had explained that he could not properly look
into the rear-window mirror. When the applicant had refused, stating
the outside mirror was sufficient, the bus driver had called for the
police. The Police Officers had requested the applicant to leave his
place behind the driver's seat and had talked to him politely for about
five to seven minutes. The Police Officers had then firmly requested
the applicant to take place at the back of the bus or to leave the bus,
and when he refused, rather carefully and cautiously removed him from
the bus. The bus driver had left the bus station with a delay of ten
minutes.
Police Officer U. stated that he could well remember the events
in the evening of 27 July 1991, when he was called with a colleague to
a bus which had stopped about 100 meters from the bus stop. They had
tried to persuade the applicant to move further to the back of the bus
and had explained to him that he hindered the driver and also that the
place behind the driver was a security risk in case of accident. The
applicant had been unreasonable and aggressive. Police Officer U. had
therefore warned the applicant that he would be charged for having
disturbed the public order. Upon further resistance and refusal to
state his identity, Police Officer U. had effected the applicant's
arrest in the bus. When the applicant thereupon held fast to one of
the bars, he and his colleague had, as carefully as possible, carried
the applicant out of the bus. Outside the bus, the applicant had hit
out with his arms. They had therefore hand-cuffed him in order to put
him into the police car. At the police station the applicant had
finally indicated his name, and following a check with the general
register, he was released. Police Officer U. also indicated that
before the applicant's release, he had verified that the applicant had
suffered any injuries. No injuries could be found, and the applicant
himself had not complained about any injuries.
Police Officer G. further explained the circumstances of their
mission in the evening of 27 July 1991. He confirmed that they had
repeatedly tried to persuade the applicant to move to a place at the
back of the bus. The applicant had refused. After five to ten
minutes, the other passengers started to get impatient, he and his
colleague had therefore carried the applicant out of the bus. The bus
had left. The applicant had then refused to show his identity papers.
Thereupon, Police Officer U. had effected the applicant's arrest. As
the applicant had resisted entering the police car, he had been hand-
cuffed. The hand-cuffs had been removed at the police-station, where
the applicant indicated his name. He had then been released. Upon
questioning Police Officer stated that the applicant had not suffered
any injuries, not even due to the hand-cuffing.
On 28 January 1992, following the hearing, the Vienna Independent
Administrative Senate dismissed the applicant's complaints.
In its decision, the Senate, considering the applicant's
submissions in his complaint and the evidence taken at the hearing,
gave credence to the bus driver's and the Police Officers' statements.
In this respect the Senate took into account that these witnesses, on
account of their professional situation, had a particular duty to tell
the truth. Moreover, their statements were clear, conclusive and in
themselves not contradictory. There were no contradictions as to the
relevant facts. Furthermore, the contradictions in their statements
as to some details were of a minor nature and not decisive. The Senate
referred in particular to the questions to what extent the applicant's
behaviour had been aggressive, the other passengers' reactions, or the
exact time when the applicant's arrest was effected. The Senate also
noted that the applicant had not mentioned any injuries in his first
submissions, and that he had not submitted any evidence such as a
medical certificate.
The Senate considered that the applicant's right to liberty had
not been violated. The Senate found that the applicant had been
arrested in accordance with S. 35 of the Law on Administrative Offences
(Verwaltungsstrafgesetz). According to S. 35 (1), the agents of the
security forces may, except in the cases specially regulated by law,
arrest persons caught in the act of committing an offence, for the
purpose of bringing them before the authorities, if, inter alia, the
identity of the person in question is not known and cannot be
established and if, despite being warned, the person in question
persists in the culpable conduct or attempts to repeat it. The Senate
found that the applicant had been reasonably charged with an
administrative offence within the meaning of S. IX para. 1 of the
Introductory Law of the Administrative Procedure Laws (Einführungs-
gesetz zu den Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetzen), which relates to
offending public decency or causing excessive noise. The Senate also
observed that the applicant had failed to comply with the bus driver's
request, pursuant to the relevant rules of the Passenger Service Act
(Kraftfahrliniengesetz).
Moreover, the Senate concluded that the applicant's removal from
the bus was a necessary consequence of his arrest to which the
applicant resisted. Likewise, the fact that he was hand-cuffed
following his further resistance did not violate his right to liberty.
As regards the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention,
the Senate found that the applicant's lawful arrest could not as such
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. Referring to the case-law
of the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), the Senate
considered that the force used by the Police Officers was proportionate
to the aim of removing the applicant from the bus. In this respect,
the Senate noted the concurring statements of the bus driver and the
Police Officer that the applicant had been carefully carried out of the
bus. Furthermore, having regard to the applicant's resistance to his
arrest and entering the police car, he had to be hand-cuffed. The
Senate found that the applicant had failed to show that the Police
Officers had thereby caused any pain or injuries which went beyond the
typical inconveniences.
On 14 June 1993 the Constitutional Court refused to entertain the
applicant's complaint about the decision of 28 January 1992. The
Constitutional Court considered that the complaint did not raise any
specific questions of constitutional law. The Constitutional Court
referred the case to the Austrian Administrative Court (Verwaltungs-
gerichtshof), finding that it was not excluded from the competence of
that Court. The decision was served on 24 June 1993.
On 20 September 1993 the Administrative Court rejected the
applicant's complaint. The Administrative Court, referring to its
case-law, considered that the complaint was inadmissible. The
Administrative Court found that, pursuant to the relevant procedural
provisions, it had no competence to decide on the complaint on the
ground that it exclusively concerned questions of constitutional law
belonging to the competence of the Constitutional Court, and not at
least partly questions of the application of ordinary laws. In this
respect, the Administrative Court noted that the Independent
Administrative Senate, in its decision of 28 January 1992, had, in
accordance with the applicant's complaints, decided on the questions
of a violation of his right to liberty under Article 5 of the
Convention and his right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, thus only on matters
of a constitutional character. The decision was served on
3 December 1993.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that he was unlawfully ordered to leave
his place behind the driver's seat in the bus and that his arrest had
therefore been unlawful and arbitrary. He considers that the obviously
unlawful arrest of a physically handicapped person amounts to inhuman
and degrading treatment. He also appears to complaint that his arrest
was effected without due proceedings. He invokes Articles 3, 5 and 6
of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that in the evening of 21 July 1991 he
was deprived of his liberty contrary to Article 5 (Art. 5) of the
Convention.
He also invokes Article 6 (Art. 6) in this respect.
The Commission has examined the applicant's complaint about his
arrest under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, which is the
relevant provision regarding the matter concerned. Article 5 (Art. 5),
as far as relevant, provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected
for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence
or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
..."
The question arises whether the contested arrest was founded on
laws covered by the Austrian reservation in respect to Article 5
(Art. 5).
The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by the
Austrian Government on 3 September 1958 contains, inter alia, the
following reservation:
"The provisions of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention shall be
so applied that there shall be no interference with measures for
the deprivation of liberty prescribed in the laws on
administrative procedure, BGBl. [Federal Official Gazette] No.
172/1950, subject to review by the Administrative Court or the
Constitutional Court as provided for in the Austrian Federal
Constitution."
The Commission notes the applicant's allegation that he had been
entitled to stand behind the driver's seat in the bus and had not,
therefore, committed any offence. However, in its decision of
28 January 1992, the Vienna Independent Administrative Senate, having
taken evidence, established that the applicant, had failed to comply
with the requests to choose another place during the bus ride in order
not to hinder the bus driver in the exercise of his functions and had
committed an administrative offence within the meaning of the relevant
provisions of the Introductory Law of the Administrative Procedure Laws
and the Law on Administrative Offences, respectively.
The Commission recalls that the Austrian reservation in respect
of Article 5 (Art. 5) is compatible with Article 64 (Art. 64) of the
Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Chorherr judgment of 25 August 1993,
Series A no. 266-A, pp. 33-35, paras. 15-21).
In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant's
submissions do not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 5
(Art. 5) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
2. The applicant further complains about Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention that his arrest amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.
According to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, "no one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment."
The Commission recalls that ill-treatment must attain a certain
level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3
(Art. 3). The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things,
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some
cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim etc. (Eur. Court
H.R., Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978,
Series A no. 25, pp. 65-67, paras. 162, 167; Tyrer judgment of
25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 14-15, paras. 29-30; Soering
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, p. 39, para. 100).
Such treatment causing, if not actual bodily injury, at least
intense physical and mental suffering falls into the category of
inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3). It is
degrading if it arouses in the person subjected thereto feelings of
fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing this
person and possibly breaking his or her physical or moral resistance
(Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment, loc. cit.,
p. 68, para. 174; Guzzardi judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A
no. 39, p. 40, para. 107; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali judgment
of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 42, paras. 90-91; Soering judgment,
loc. cit.).
In the present case, the Commission finds that the applicant
failed to show that his arrest amounted to treatment contrary to
Article 3 (Art. 3).
The Commission considers in particular that the fact of the
applicant's arrest is in itself not sufficient to reach the level of
severity for the purpose of Article 3 (Art. 3), even taking his
physical handicap into account.
As regards the circumstances of the applicant's arrest, the
Commission is confronted with versions differing on various points.
The Commission notes that the Vienna Independent Administrative
Senate, when examining the applicant's complaint about the events in
question, heard the applicant, the bus driver and the Police Officers
U. and G. In its decision of 28 January 1992, the Independent
Administrative Senate considered that the force used by the Police
Officers was proportionate to the aim of removing the applicant from
the bus. In this respect, the Senate noted the concurring statements
of the bus driver and the Police Officer that the applicant had been
carefully carried out of the bus. Furthermore, having regard to the
applicant's resistance to his arrest and entering the police car, he
had to be hand-cuffed. The Senate found that the applicant had failed
to show that the Police Officers had thereby caused any pain or
injuries which went beyond the typical inconveniences.
The Commission, having regard to this evidence obtained at the
domestic level and the factual findings of the Independent
Administrative Senate as well as the applicant's further submissions
in the Commission proceedings, finds no indication that he was
subjected to treatment which went beyond the inevitable element of
suffering connected with an arrest (cf., Eur. Court H.R., Klaas
judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269, pp. 17-18,
paras. 29-30). In this respect, the Commission attaches particular
importance to the fact that the applicant's allegations of injuries
were not supported by any medical or other evidence.
Accordingly, the applicant's submissions do not disclose any
appearance of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is likewise
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2).
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
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