AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 23378/94

                      by P.S. V.

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 18 October 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 1 December 1993

by P.S. V. against Finland and registered on 2 February 1994 under file

No. 23378/94;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1960. He is an

industrial cleaner and resides in Barcelona, Spain. Before the

Commission he is represented by Mr. Juha Tapio Keltti, a lawyer

practising in Helsinki, Finland.

      The facts of the case, as they can be established on the basis

of the submissions of the applicant and the documents available, may

be summarised as follows.

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      On 21 October 1979 the applicant was called up for military

service. He was then granted a postponement concerning his military

service. He was granted further postponements on 11 November 1982 and

on 11 March 1985, the last postponement covering the period until

31 December 1987.

      Under a so-called clearance certificate (esteettömyystodistus)

of 30 October 1987 given to allow the applicant to obtain a residence

permit abroad the applicant was permitted to stay abroad until

11 October 1988. The applicant's passport was valid until the same day.

      On 21 October 1987 the head of the Military District of Kajaani

ordered the applicant to report for military service on 11 October 1988

in the Border Guard Department of Kajaani.

      On 19 October 1988 the Headquarters of the Military District sent

the applicant a letter stating that he had not reported for military

service as ordered and requesting him to contact the Finnish Embassy

in Spain.

      Further on 19 October 1988 the Headquarters of the Military

District sent the Finnish Embassy in Spain a letter according to which

the order concerning the applicant's military service had been sent to

his address in Barcelona as a registered letter in October 1987 and

again in the spring of 1988. Both letters were, however, returned.

Further, on 31 August 1988 a similar letter was sent to the applicant

trough the Army Headquarters' Office for Foreign Affairs. The

Headquarters of the Military District requested the Embassy to serve

the order on the applicant in a manner capable of verification.

      In a letter dated 20 January 1989 a secretary, K, at the Finnish

Consulate General in Barcelona explained the efforts she had made in

order to serve the letter on the applicant. She stated that she had

sent a copy of the order to the applicant with four different letters

during November and December 1988, the last of the letters being a

registered one. None of these letters were returned. She had called the

applicant twice at his home, but she had been told once by a man,

probably the applicant, and once by a woman, probably the applicant's

cohabitee, that the applicant did not live in the apartment any more.

Lastly on 10 January 1989 she had gone to the applicant's apartment.

The names of the applicant and his cohabitee were still on the postbox

downstairs. K had then rung the applicant's doorbell and given the

original papers to a woman, probably the applicant's cohabitee, who had

opened the door, although the latter did not want to take the papers.

      Apparently a new order has been given according to which the

applicant should report for military service on 9 February 1989 in the

Light Infantry Brigade of Sodankylä.

      On 21 January 1991 the Headquarters of the Military District sent

a request for investigation to the Central Criminal Investigation

Police. According to this request the applicant had applied for a

passport and a clearance certificate. Because the applicant had reached

the age of 30 he was no longer obliged to report for military service.

Further it was stated that the applicant was wanted for questioning by

the police.

      On 11 April 1991 the Criminal Police of Kajaani questioned the

applicant in Kajaani, Finland about not reporting for military service.

      In April 1991 the Headquarters of the Military District of

Kajaani sent the minutes of the preliminary investigation to the

Military Lawyer at the Headquarters of the Military County of Northern

Finland in order to have charges brought against the applicant on the

grounds that the applicant had not reported for military service on

9 February 1989.

      The applicant was charged with desertion (karkaaminen) committed

from 9 February 1989 to 15 September 1990 by virtue of chapter 45

section 4 subsection 2 of the Penal Code (rikoslaki) which, together

with subsection 1, reads in so far as relevant as follows:

(translation)

      "A soldier who without permission leaves the troop or place

      in which he shall serve or does not report for duty there

      in the prescribed time, shall be convicted of illegal

      absence ...

      If the absence referred to in subsection 1 has lasted at

      least five days and has caused or might have caused an

      interruption of fundamental significance in the soldier's

      training or any other fundamental disadvantage to the

      service, the offender shall be convicted of desertion and

      sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum of one year or to

      disciplinary punishment."

      The case was heard by the District Court (raastuvanoikeus) of

Helsinki on 29 October 1991 according to military court procedure. This

meant, by virtue of the Act on Military Court Proceedings (sotilas-

oikeudenkäyntilaki), that the prosecutor was a Military Lawyer and that

of one of the three judges, and at the same time the presiding judge,

was a civilian judge, while the other two were military officers. The

applicant appeared in person before the District Court. He was assisted

by counsel, whom the Court, by virtue of section 28 of the Act on

Military Court Proceedings, ordered to be the applicant's counsel in

the case. The applicant pleaded not guilty to the charge of desertion

on the grounds that he had not received any order to report for

military service.

      On the grounds that the prosecutor had asked for an adjournment

the case was further heard on 17 December 1991. The applicant and his

counsel were present at the hearing. The District Court heard evidence

from the aforementioned secretary K about the efforts she had made to

notify the applicant of the order in question.

      The prosecutor stated that the applicant was guilty of desertion

and in any case he had acted contrary to section 41 of the Military

Service Act (asevelvollisuuslaki) by fraudulently avoiding military

service. The prosecutor requested that the case be transferred to such

division of the District Court as had jurisdiction over charges under

the Military Service Act. The applicant pleaded not guilty to the

charge of avoiding military service on the grounds that he had not

acted fraudulently. He requested an adjournment for hearing a witness.

      The District Court decided to transfer the case to be dealt with

by a division composed in the ordinary way of three civilian judges.

      On 31 December 1991 the Military Lawyer, on the grounds that

avoiding military service was not within his competence, asked the City

Prosecutor to bring charges against the applicant.

      The City Prosecutor drew up a written indictment of one page and

charged the applicant with avoiding military service between

1 January 1988 and 31 December 1990 contrary to section 41 of the

Military Service Act which reads in so far as relevant as follows:

(translation)

      "He who, in order to be freed from the liability to serve

      military service, ... injures himself or causes damage to

      his health or attempts to do so or for the said purpose

      gives false information or in other ways acts fraudulently

      shall be convicted of avoiding military service and

      sentenced to a fine or to imprisonment for a maximum of one

      year ..."

      On 27 February 1992 the District Court heard the case as an

ordinary criminal case. The applicant requested cost-free legal

proceedings. A certificate as to the applicant's financial situation,

dated 24 October 1991, was submitted to the District Court. The

District Court decided, in accordance with the Act on Cost-free Legal

Proceedings, not to grant the applicant cost-free legal proceedings on

the grounds that he did not fulfil the financial requirements therefor.

      The court heard the evidence from the applicant's cohabitee R-T,

who gave her testimony in Spanish. She had a translator as an

interpreter. Her evidence was tape-recorded. According to the minutes

of the hearing the chair of the District Court reminded R-T of her duty

to tell the truth and after R-T affirmed that she was telling the truth

the chair remarked that somebody in the case was "talking rubbish".

      The applicant declared that he was ready for the case to be

decided.

      Thereupon, on 27 February 1992 the District Court dismissed the

charge of desertion but found the applicant guilty of avoiding military

service and sentenced him to eight months' imprisonment. The District

Court stated inter alia that the applicant had, when living in

Barcelona, from 1 January 1988 to 31 December 1990, after the

postponements of his military service had expired, fraudulently been

evading the efforts of the clerk at the local Finnish Consulate General

to contact him concerning his military service by failing to answer

four letters, by giving three times, personally or through others,

false information concerning his address, by failing to renew his

passport after it had expired on 10 November 1988 and by thereafter

deliberately staying with his family in Spain without a residence

permit until the beginning of 1991, when he could no longer be ordered

to report for military service. Soon after this he had applied for a

clearance certificate from his Military District. Because of his

actions and because he had reached the age of 30 on 15 September 1990

it was no longer possible to order him to report for military service

after 31 December 1990. He has therefore been totally freed from

military service. The District Court based its judgment on the evidence

given by K. It did not find the applicant's explanation that he had not

received the letters as described by K reliable, taking into account

that he had had the same permanent address in Spain from 1986 to

March 1991. However, with regard to the desertion, the District Court

stated that it had not been proved that the applicant had been notified

of the order to report for military service.

      The applicant, assisted by counsel, appealed to the Court of

Appeal (hovioikeus) of Helsinki. He denied being guilty of avoiding

military service. The applicant stated that the witness K had not been

able to prove that the applicant had been aware that she was trying to

serve him an order concerning military service. He had not received any

letters or spoken with K. He had not acted fraudulently. He had

received a positive statement from the Spanish Ministry of Labour

concerning his work permit, which in his opinion meant in practice the

same as receiving the work permit itself. Furthermore, he had not been

in need of a passport. The Spanish postal service was not reliable and

there were also problems with the telephone lines. He attached to his

appeal a written statement given by his father concerning the troubles

his father had had when calling the applicant or posting things to him.

      On 15 September 1992 the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. The

Court of Appeal stated further that the above-mentioned written

statement did not contain such relevant information that there would

be reason to hear evidence from the person who had given it. The Court

of Appeal therefore by virtue of chapter 17 section 11 of the Code of

Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari) took no account of the

statement.

      On 2 June 1993 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to

appeal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the grant of legal

aid did not cover the charge of avoiding the military service but only

the desertion. The proceedings in the Supreme Court were not based on

the Act on Military Court Proceedings. Therefore the Supreme Court

decided that the applicant's counsel's fees were not to be paid from

the public funds.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      The Court of Appeal may, if it considers it necessary, hold an

oral hearing in a case in which an appeal against the judgment of the

court of first instance has been lodged. Such a judgment cannot, as

regards the charges brought against an accused, be amended by the Court

of Appeal following a re-evaluation of the evidence without a

re-hearing having been held, unless the sentence imposed by the Court

of Appeal amounts only to fines or unless a re-hearing would clearly

be unnecessary. In assessing the latter special regard shall be had to

the interests of the accused (chapter 26, sections 7 and 8 of the Code

of Judicial Procedure).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains, under Article 3 of the Convention, that

the proceedings which violated several articles of the Convention, the

severe punishment and the way in which the applicant's witnesses,

namely his cohabitee and his father, were treated, constitute, taken

as a whole, degrading treatment.

2.    The applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial. He

complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the District

Court was not independent and impartial since the District Court

obtained the main evidence while sitting as a military court. He

further maintains that the hearing of his evidence was insufficient.

He also maintains that the concept of a fair trial includes that due

reasons shall be given for the judgment. He submits that the charges

against him were raised after an unreasonably long period. Because the

conviction was based on slender evidence, the Court of Appeal should

have arranged an oral hearing.

      The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 2 of the

Convention that he was not presumed innocent. He maintains in this

respect that the District Court expected him to prove his innocence.

      Furthermore, he complains of infringements of Article 6 para. 3

(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Convention. He maintains that he was

not informed satisfactorily of the nature and cause of the accusation

against him, especially when he had to answer to a different charge

than that contained in the original indictment. The amendment of the

charge during the proceedings caused that he did not have adequate time

for the preparation of his defence. He was refused the right to legal

assistance and to cost-free proceedings. The witnesses were not heard

under the same conditions since the chair, on the one hand, pressed the

applicant's witness and, on the other hand, put leading questions to

the prosecution witness. In addition, the translation of the evidence

given by the applicant's witness was imperfect and this should be taken

into account at least when evaluating the fairness of the proceedings

and discrimination as a whole.

      The applicant complains further under Article 13 of the

Convention that he did not have an effective remedy before a national

authority since the Court of Appeal did not arrange an oral hearing nor

take into account, even in writing, the statement given by his father,

and since the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.

3.    The applicant complains under Article 7 para. 1 of the Convention

that the relevant provision of the Military Service Act was not

detailed and clear enough to guarantee such predictability of its

application that the act could constitute a criminal offence. He

further maintains that, at least since 1984, no one has been convicted

by virtue of the provision in question.

4.    Finally, the applicant complains under Article 14 of the

Convention that he has been discriminated against in comparison with

others who have been exempted de jure or de facto from military

service. He was convicted in a discriminatory way when he was

exercising his rights concerning private and family life guaranteed by

the Convention by living, studying, working and building a family

abroad. The Finnish authorities demanded that he should act in a way

which would have been unusual in his place of residence and thus

discriminated against him on the grounds of different culture.

5.    The applicant claims a compensation of FIM 60,000. He further

maintains that the aim of his complaint is also to get the provision

in question quashed.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains of several infringements of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention in connection with the criminal proceedings

instituted against him. He also invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention in this context. The Commission considers that these

complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention which, as far as relevant, reads as follows:

      "1.  In the determination ... of any criminal charge

      against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public

      hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and

      impartial tribunal ...

      2.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be

      presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

      3.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the

      following minimum rights:

           a.    to be informed promptly, in a language which he

           understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of

           the accusation against him;

           b.    to have adequate time and facilities for the

           preparation of his defence;

           c.    to defend himself in person or through legal

           assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not

           sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be

           given it free when the interests of justice so

           require;

           d.    to examine or have examined witnesses against

           him and to obtain the attendance and examination of

           witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as

           witnesses against him;

           e.    to have the free assistance of an interpreter if

           he cannot understand or speak the language used in

           court."

a)    The applicant first complains about the lack of an oral hearing

in the Court of Appeal.

      In this respect the Commission notes Finland's reservation to

Article 6 (Art. 6) which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

      "For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right to an

      oral hearing in so far as the current Finnish laws do not

      provide such a right. This applies to:

      1. proceedings before the Courts of Appeal, ... in

      accordance with Chapter 26 Sections 7 and 8, ... of the

      Code of Judicial Procedure ... "

      The Commission observes that chapter 26, section 7 of the Code

of Judicial Procedure does not provide a right to an oral hearing in

appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeal.

      The Commission further observes that under chapter 26, section 8

of the Code of Judicial Procedure a judgment of a court of first

instance cannot, as regards the charges brought against an accused, be

amended by the Court of Appeal following a re-evaluation of the

evidence without a re-hearing having been held, unless the sentence

imposed by the Court of Appeal amounts only to fines or unless a

re-hearing would clearly be unnecessary. In the instant case the

applicant's conviction was not amended on appeal.

      Under Finnish law the applicant was not entitled to a hearing

before the Court of Appeal. The Commission finds that Finland's

reservation covers this complaint.

      It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

b)    The applicant complains about the length of the proceedings.

      The proceedings began with the questioning of the applicant by

the police on 11 April 1991 and ended on 2 June 1993 when the Supreme

Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. Thus the length of the

proceedings was approximately two years and two months.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the

case and having regard to the following criteria: the complexity of the

case, the conduct of the parties and that of the authorities dealing

with the case (Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991,

Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).

      The Commission notes that the case was not very complex as

regards either the legal issues or the facts. The Commission has not

overlooked the fact that it took about eight months before the charge

of avoiding military service was brought against the applicant.

However, the proceedings in the District Court lasted about three

months after this, and the proceedings in the Court of Appeal and in

the Supreme Court lasted altogether about one year and three months.

Taking into account that the case was heard at three instances and that

the proceedings lasted altogether two years and two months the

Commission, making an overall assessment of the circumstances of the

case, considers that a reasonable time was not exceeded.

      As far as the other complaints are concerned the Commission

recalls that the guarantees in paragraphs 2 and 3 are specific aspects

of the right to a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1 (cf. for example

Eur. Court H.R., Unterpertinger judgment of 24 November 1986, Series

A no. 110, p. 14, para. 29). Accordingly, the Commission will have

regard to these aspects when examining the facts under paragraph 1 of

Article 6 (Art. 6-1). The Commission further recalls that it must

consider the proceedings as a whole. Its task is to ascertain whether

the proceedings in their entirety were fair (cf. for example Eur. Court

H.R., Stanford judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 282-A, p. 10,

para. 24).

c)    The applicant has questioned the independence and impartiality

in particular with regard to the District Court functioning as a

military court.  The Commission notes, however, that the charge of

avoiding military service was heard by the District Court sitting as

an ordinary court composed of three civilian judges. The fact that the

witness K, whose testimony played an important role in the case, was

heard by the District Court in its military composition, does not

disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. In this

regard the Commission notes that the witness was heard in the presence

of the applicant and his counsel (see p. 3) and that the presence of

military members on the bench of a court does not as such make a

tribunal partial within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Engel and Others judgment of 1 October 1975, Series A no.

22, p. 37, para. 89).

d)    The applicant further complains that the District Court did not

give proper reasons for its judgment.

      The Commission notes that the District Court set out the facts

and stated the relevant provision on which the judgment was based.

e)    The applicant has raised the question of a fair trial with regard

to the presumption of innocence. He maintains in this respect that the

District Court shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the

applicant.

      The Commission notes that the District Court heard all the

witnesses that the parties had requested should be heard and based its

judgment on this evidence. The Commission finds that no evidence has

been adduced to show that the applicant's right to the presumption of

innocence was violated.

f)    The applicant maintains that he was not informed satisfactorily

of the nature and cause of the accusation against him especially with

regard to the charge of avoiding military service and that he did not

have adequate time for the preparation of his defence.

      The Commission notes that the applicant was orally charged with

avoiding military service in the District Court on 17 December 1991 in

the presence of his counsel. This charge was based on the same facts

as the previous charge of desertion but it was based on a different

provision. A written indictment was also drawn up. The case was then

heard on 27 February 1992, i.e. two months and ten days after the

applicant had been notified of the charge of avoiding military service.

The Commission further notes that the applicant and his counsel

declared themselves to be ready for the case to be decided.

g)    The applicant submits further that he was refused the right to

legal assistance and to cost-free proceedings.

      The Commission recalls that unlike the rights embodied in other

provisions of Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3), the right to free legal

assistance is not absolute; such assistance is to be provided only if

the accused "has not sufficient means to pay" (cf. Eur. Court H.R.,

Croissant judgment of 25 September 1992, Series A no. 237-B, p. 34,

para. 33).

      The Commission notes that the District Court refused the

applicant free legal assistance on the grounds that the applicant did

not fulfil the relevant financial requirements.

h)    The applicant complains about the hearing of witnesses. He

maintains in this respect that the chair did not treat his witness in

the same way as the prosecution witness and that the evidence given by

his witness was not properly translated.

      The Commission recalls that, as a rule, it is for the national

courts to assess the evidence before them. The Commissions's task is

to ascertain whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including

the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (cf., for example Eur.

Court H.R., Isgrò judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 194,

p. 11, para. 31).

      The Commission notes that both the prosecution witness and the

applicant's witness were heard in the presence of the applicant and his

counsel. Furthermore, the applicant did not ask for an adjournment in

order for the prosecution witness to be heard again. The Commission

recalls that Article 6 para. 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) does not concern the

interpretation of witness evidence. The Commission also notes that the

applicant did not ask for an adjournment in order to find another

interpreter.

      The Commission finds, however, that the complaint may be

interpreted as to refer also to the question of impartiality with

regard to the questioning judge in the District Court. The Commission

has therefore examined the complaint also from this point of view.

i)    The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for the

purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be determined according

to a subjective test and also according to an objective test (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Fey judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255-A,

p. 12, para. 28). As regards the subjective test, the Commission and

the Court of Human Rights have constantly held that the impartiality

of a judge must be presumed until the contrary is established (cf. for

example Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment

of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 25, para. 58).

      In the present case it is true that the questioning judge

reminded the applicant's witness of the importance of telling the

truth. The Commission finds, however, that this does give any

legitimate suspicion of the judge being partial. Neither does the

Commission find any other evidence which could raise doubt as to the

judge's subjective or objective impartiality.

      In conclusion, the Commission considers that the proceedings as

a whole do not disclose that the applicant was deprived of a fair trial

within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. It follows

that the application, in so far as concerns complaints b) - i), is

manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in pursuance of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant complains that the relevant provision of the

Military Service Act was not detailed and clear enough to guarantee the

predictability of its application. He invokes Article 7 para. 1

(Art. 7-1) of the Convention, which reads in so far as relevant as

follows:

      "1.  No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on

      account of any act or omission which did not constitute a

      criminal offence under national or international law at the

      time when it was committed..."

      The Commission recalls that Article 7 para. 1 (Art. 7-1) of the

Convention embodies the principle that the law alone can define a crime

and prescribe a penalty and the principle that the criminal law must

not be widely construed to an accused's detriment, for example by

analogy; it follows from this that an offence must be clearly defined

in law. This condition is satisfied where the individual can know from

the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the

assistance of the courts' interpretation of it, what acts and

omissions will make him liable. The wording of many statutes is not

absolutely precise. The need to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep

pace with changing circumstances means that many laws are inevitably

couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague (cf.

Eur. Court H.R., Kokkinakis judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A

no. 260-A, p. 22, para. 52 and p. 19 para. 40).

      In the present case, the Commission has examined whether the act

committed by the applicant constituted an offence under Finnish law as

it stood. In this respect the Commission notes that the definition of

the offence of avoiding military service given in section 41 of the

Military Service Act comprises, inter alia, giving false information

and other ways of acting fraudulently in order to be freed from the

liability to carry out military service. The Commission notes that the

basis for the conviction was, on the one hand, that the applicant had

given false information and, on the other hand, matters falling under

the latter part of the definition.

      The Commission notes the applicant's allegation that the

provision in question has seldom been applied. However, the Commission

considers that, having regard firstly to the wording of the provision

in question, and secondly to the application of that provision in the

present case, this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The applicant complains, under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention, that he has been discriminated against in comparison with

others who have been exempted from military service. He also maintains

that the Finnish authorities demanded that he should act in a way which

would have been unusual in his new place of residence.

      As far as relevant Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads

as follows:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

      ground such as ... national or social origin ... or other

      status."

      The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) affords

protection against discrimination. For a claim of violation of this

Article to succeed, it has to be established, inter alia, that the

situation of the alleged victim can be considered similar to that of

persons who have been better treated (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Fredin

judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 19, para. 60).

      The Commission finds that the applicant was not in a similar

situation to that of other persons who may have been exempted from

military service on various grounds. The Commission has, finally,

considered the applicant's complaint as regards discrimination on the

grounds of the applicant's national origin and his culture but has

found no basis for a finding that Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention was violated.

      It follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    The applicant complains that the proceedings instituted against

him, taken as a whole, subjected him to degrading treatment in

violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, which reads:

      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

      degrading treatment or punishment."

      The Commission notes that the proceedings had as their object to

try the criminal case instituted against the applicant. The proceedings

did not denote any contempt or lack of respect for the personality of

the applicant and they were not designed to, and did not, humiliate or

debase him (cf. for example, Eur. Court H.R., Albert and Le Compte

judgment of 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, p. 13, para. 22). The

proceedings cannot therefore be regarded as degrading.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

       (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)