AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 22588/93

                      by Matti and Eliina FÖRSTI

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 18 October 1995, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 24 June 1993 by

Matti and Eliina Försti against Finland and registered on

7 September 1993 under file No. 22588/93;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicants are Finnish citizens residing in Espoo, Finland.

Matti Försti, hereinafter MF, a journalist by profession, was born in

1926 and Eliina Försti, hereinafter EF, the first applicant's wife, was

born in 1933.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

A.    The particular circumstances of the case

      MF owns two pieces of real property in the municipality of Espoo,

namely Mattila 4:187 with an area of 803 m2 and Mattila I 4:185 with

an area of 93 m2 or 92 m2. On 25 November 1967 his title to the

property in question was registered. On the land there is a house in

which the applicants live and an outbuilding.

1.    The present town plan and compulsory acquisition proceedings

      It appears that in 1967, when the first applicant's title to the

relevant property was registered, the area in question was not subject

to any detailed plan but according to section 7 of the Building Act

(rakennuslaki), which came into force on 1 July 1959, new buildings

could not be constructed without permission.

      A town plan for an area including the first applicant's real

property was drawn up in 1981. Appeals against the town plan were

finally dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein

hallinto-oikeus) on 22 December 1981.

      According to section 42 subsection 1 of the Building Act, a new

building may not be constructed contrary to a town plan or plot

division (building restriction).

      According to the relevant town plan, the area in question is a

block for residential multi-storey units with a maximum of three

storeys, the ratio of unit area to plot area being 0.55. The area

includes also recreation areas. The first applicant's property belongs

to block No. 40333, which, according to the plot division approved on

8 May 1984, forms one plot.  On 11 January 1985 the plot was entered

in the directory of plots in the process of formation

(tontinmuodotusluettelo) as No. 1/40333.

      However, since this plot consisted, and still consists, of parts

belonging to different owners, it could not be entered in the land

register (tonttirekisteri). The different owners are, inter alia, MF

and a housing association, V-S. The housing association V-S tried to

purchase the other parts of the plot. As this proved impossible, on

7 November 1985 V-S requested a compulsory purchase (lunastus) pursuant

to section 54 of the Building Act, which allows compulsory purchase in

certain circumstances. All the other owners of the parts of the plot

had an equal right to request a compulsory purchase.

      On 20 January 1986 the Provincial Survey Office (maanmittaus-

toimisto) of Uusimaa gave an order on the execution of the compulsory

purchase. The order was signed by a county surveyor (lääninmaan-

mittausinsinööri) named L. Subsequently, a compulsory acquisition

committee (lunastustoimikunta), hereinafter "the committee" was

established to carry out the compulsory purchase proceedings. The chair

of the committee was an executive engineer (toimitusinsinööri) named H.

      The compulsory purchase proceedings commenced on 9 April 1986.

Only V-S lodged a request to purchase the other parts of the plot. On

11 November 1986 the committee inspected the real property in question.

      On 10 December 1986 the committee decided that V-S was, by virtue

of section 54 of the Building Act, entitled to purchase those parts of

plot No. 1/40333 which it did not already own, including the real

property owned by MF.

      The payments for the compulsory purchase to the first applicant

MF were fixed at FIM 584,637 for Mattila and FIM 25,631 for Mattila I.

The second applicant was not mentioned in the committee's decision as

she is not the owner of the real property. The payments were ordered

to be made by 10 March 1987. However, as V-S did not make the payment

as provided, the compulsory purchase lapsed. After this the other

owners of the plot had a second opportunity to ask for a right to a

compulsory purchase.

      Subsequently, on 24 May 1988 the committee rejected the second

applicant's claim for damages for the lapsed compulsory purchase

proceedings on the grounds that her claim was not directed at V-S,

which had applied for the compulsory purchase. On 6 April 1989 the Land

Court (maaoikeus) of Southern Finland rejected the second applicant's

appeal against the committee's decision concerning the claim for

damages. On 11 October 1989 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus) refused

her leave to appeal.

2.    The building prohibition and the amendment of the town plan

      According to section 42 subsection 2 point 2 of the Building Act

a building prohibition (rakennuskielto) applies to a plot that has not

been entered in the land register.

      Since plot No. 1/40333, as mentioned above, still consists of

parts belonging to different owners it cannot be entered in the land

register. Because of this it is at present covered by a building

prohibition pursuant to section 42 subsection 2 point 2 of the Building

Act.

      In 1991 a new planning process began in order to amend the town

plan relating to the relevant block. The City Board (kaupunginhallitus)

of Espoo decided on 25 October 1994 to keep the proposal for the town

plan amendment on public display. The purpose of the amendment is to

allow block No. 40333 to be divided into plots in a manner that would

reflect the current ownership situation. The process concerning this

amendment is still pending. A building prohibition also applies to an

area for which a town plan amendment has been approved until the

submission for ratification of this amendment has been considered

(section 42 subsection 2 point 4 of the Building Act).

3.    Proceedings concerning claim for damages and offences in office

      Regardless of the fact that no compulsory purchase of the first

applicant's property had taken place and of the fact that the second

applicant's claims for damages in this respect had been rejected

(cf. 1 above), in June 1990 the second applicant, EF, sued the county

surveyor L, who had given the order on execution of compulsory purchase

as well as the executive engineer H, who had been the chair of the

relevant committee, for damages. The claim, as specified during the

trial, was based on inconvenience, damage, mischief, unnecessary

packing and looking for a new residence which were allegedly caused by

the compulsory purchase proceedings.

      The District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus) of Espoo heard the case

between 20 September 1990 and 31 January 1991. The District Court

consisted of a judge acting as the chair of the Court and of seven lay

judges. According to the District Court Lay Boards Act (laki kihla-

kunnanoikeuden lautakunnasta), as it stood until 1 December 1993, the

lay judges were to be appointed by the City Council (kaupunginval-

tuusto) for the same term as the City Council itself, i.e. for four

years. In the District Court of Espoo the lay judges were appointed by

the City Council of Espoo.

      The second applicant, EF, appeared in person before the District

Court. On 20 September 1990 the District Court granted her legal aid

pursuant to the Act on Cost-free Legal Proceedings (laki maksuttomasta

oikeudenkäynnistä). However, the District Court found that she was

able, at least at that phase of the proceedings, to represent herself

without legal assistance and thus it did not ex officio appoint counsel

for her. The District Court decided to postpone the case to

29 November 1990 on the grounds that the applicant had asked for an

adjournment in order to instruct counsel herself. On 29 November 1990

there was another hearing, but the proceedings were adjourned on the

grounds of the late hour. The parties did not call any witnesses.

      There was a further hearing on 31 January 1991. The second

applicant objected to the chair of the District Court. She stated that

the chair was biased on the grounds, inter alia, that he had on

6 November 1978, allegedly illegally, registered the City of Espoo's

title to the real property known as Armas 4:12, which lay in the

vicinity of the real property owned by the first applicant. The

registration of title to property does not confer ownership but raises

a presumption of ownership. The District Court dismissed her objection.

      By judgment of 31 January 1991 the District Court rejected the

second applicant's claim for damages.

      The second applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus)

of Helsinki. She stated, inter alia, that a compulsory purchase permit

granted by the Ministry of the Environment (ympäristöministeriö) would

have been necessary for the compulsory purchase. She requested an oral

hearing and an order concerning free legal assistance. She alleged that

her claim had not been dealt with, she had been interrupted and the

evidence of her witnesses had not been heard. She maintained further

that the District Court had wrongly stated that it had been she who had

asked for an adjournment, although she had declared that she was ready

for the case to be decided in her first written submission.

      In her appeal to the Court of Appeal the second applicant also

submitted that two judges in the Land Court and the judge in the

District Court had committed offences in office when they were dealing

with her cases.

      The Court of Appeal requested the prosecuting counsel of the

Court of Appeal (kanneviskaali) to give his opinion on the second

applicant's information concerning the three judges. The prosecuting

counsel stated that the information did not call for him to take

further measures. In the light of this opinion, the Court of Appeal

decided on 22 January 1992 that there were no grounds to render a

judicial pronouncement on the information concerning the three judges.

      Further, on 22 January 1992 the Court of Appeal rejected the

second applicant's appeal concerning the claim for damages and the

request for an oral hearing and legal assistance.

      On 8 January 1993 the Supreme Court refused the second applicant

leave to appeal in so far as her appeal concerned the claim for

damages.

      In a separate judgment of the same day, the Supreme Court

referred the case back to the Court of Appeal to be heard on the issue

of the information about offences in office allegedly committed by the

three judges.

      Subsequently, on 1 April 1993 the second applicant gave notice

that she was bringing a private prosecution, under section 93 of the

Constitution Act (Hallitusmuoto), against two judges in the Land Court,

the judge in the District Court and the Director General of the

National Survey Board (maanmittaushallitus) with offences in office.

      On 23 December 1993 the Court of Appeal noted that the legal aid

granted by the District Court applied also to the case concerning

offences in office and appointed a lawyer to assist the second

applicant. However, the lawyer withdrew from the case on 17 March 1994.

The Court of Appeal held an oral hearing on 24 August 1994. It then

appointed a new lawyer to assist the second applicant. The second

applicant further claimed damages totalling FIM 1,500,000 and expenses.

      By judgment of 31 January 1995 the Court of Appeal dismissed the

charges the second applicant had brought as well as rejecting her fresh

claim for damages.

      The second applicant appealed against the Court of Appeal's

judgment to the Supreme Court, where the case is apparently still

pending.

4.    The street tax

      In 1992 the first applicant MF requested the City Board of Espoo

to adjust his assessment to street tax for the years 1983 to 1992. He

alleged that no street led to his property and therefore he could not

be obliged to contribute towards the construction and maintenance of

a street. It appears that the street tax was under FIM 200 per year.

      The City Board rejected his claim partly without considering the

merits on the grounds that the request was lodged out of time in

respect of that part. According to the Act on Street Taxes (laki

kunnalle suoritettavasta katumaksusta), as it stood, the amount of a

street tax was based, on the one hand, on the taxable value of the

relevant property and, on the other hand, on the classification of the

relevant street. The streets were classified into three payment

categories. The City Board found that the street tax in question was

not based on an incorrect taxable value and that, furthermore, the

street tax was in the lowest payment category. The County

Administrative Court (lääninoikeus) of Uusimaa rejected the first

applicant's appeal on 12 October 1993, also partly without considering

the merits. On 25 May 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the

first applicant leave to appeal.

B.    Relevant domestic law

      The Court of Appeal may, if it considers it necessary, hold an

oral hearing in a case in which an appeal against the judgment of the

court of first instance has been lodged. Such a judgment cannot, as

regards the charges brought against an accused, be amended by the Court

of Appeal following a re-evaluation of the evidence without a

re-hearing having been held, unless the sentence imposed by the Court

of Appeal amounts only to fines or unless a re-hearing would clearly

be unnecessary. In assessing the latter  special regard shall be had

to the interests of the accused (chapter 26, sections 7 and 8 of the

Code of Judicial Procedure).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicants complain that their right to use their property

according to the town plan in force has been violated. They complain

under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that their right

to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions has been violated on the

grounds that their real property has, allegedly, been subject to a

building prohibition since 13 November 1968. They allege that as their

real property cannot be entered in the land registry this prevents the

realization of the town plan and gives rise to a building prohibition.

2.    The applicants further complain under Article 13 of the

Convention that they have been denied an effective remedy to end the

building prohibition.

3.    As regards the compulsory purchase proceedings, the applicants

complain under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings were

not fair. They further complain under Article 8 of the Convention that

the inspection of the relevant real property on 11 November 1986

violated their private and family life. The second applicant complains,

under Article 14 of the Convention, that in the compulsory purchase

proceedings she was discriminated against on the grounds of her sex and

opinions, since she did not personally receive any compensation for the

compulsory purchase. She also invokes Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to

the Convention in that she was not accepted as a party to the

compulsory purchase proceedings. Finally, the applicants complain that

they did not receive any compensation for the lapsed compulsory

purchase proceedings.

4.    The applicants also complain that the present process concerning

the amendment of the town plan violates their private and family life.

They maintain that the amendment of the town plan has caused a new

building prohibition based on section 42 subsection 2 point 4 of the

Building Act.

5.    The applicants complain, under Article 6 of the Convention, that

the trial concerning the second applicant's claim for damages was not

fair. The applicants maintain that since 9 April 1986, when the

compulsory purchase proceedings began, they have been forced to

institute proceedings against several authorities in order to be able

to use their real property according to the town plan in force.

      They submit that the District Court was biased in the proceedings

against L and H. They maintain in this respect that the chair of the

District Court had in 1978, allegedly illegally, registered the City

of Espoo's title to a real property known as Armas 4:12 which lay in

the vicinity of the property owned by the first applicant. They further

allege that the lay judges were biased because they were appointed by

the City Council of Espoo. They further maintain that the proceedings

were secret, that an oral hearing and a hearing of witness evidence

were refused and that the second applicant was refused the assistance

of a lawyer. They further submit that the District Court's judgment as

well as the appellate courts' judgments concerning the second

applicant's claim for damages contain incorrect information and that

they are based on errors of law.

      The applicants also complain that it took almost 10 months for

the Supreme Court to give its judgment in the case and that after such

a long period of deliberation the Supreme Court merely refused the

second applicant leave to appeal.

      The applicants further complain that they have not had an

effective remedy in respect of the proceedings concerning the claim for

damages on the grounds that the alleged mistakes have been committed

by legally trained persons while the applicants, on the other hand, are

laymen. The applicants have not been able to bring a private

prosecution against the authorities and their claim for damages has not

been dealt with. They invoke in this respect Article 13 of the

Convention.

      The applicants also complain that because the second applicant

was refused the assistance of a lawyer, she was discriminated against

on the grounds of property. They invoke Article 14 of the Convention.

6.    The applicants complain that the proceedings concerning the

private prosecution the second applicant had brought against certain

officials have not been fair. They invoke in this respect Articles 6

and 13 of the Convention.

7.    Finally, the applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 to the Convention, that they have been ordered to pay street tax

for a non-existent street.

8.    The applicants further invoke Articles 1 and 17 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

      The Commission first considers that the question whether the

second applicant can be considered to be a victim within the meaning

of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention as regards the use of the

real property and the street tax can be left open, as can the question

whether the first applicant can be considered to be a victim within the

meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention as regards the civil

and criminal proceedings the second applicant has instituted since it

considers that the application is in any event inadmissible for the

following reasons.

1.    The applicants complain that their right to use their property

according to the town plan in force has been violated on the grounds

that their property is covered by a building prohibition. They invoke

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      The Commission notes that the town plan in force was adopted in

1981, whereas the Convention entered into force with regard to Finland

on 10 May 1990. The Commission therefore finds that the application is

incompatible ratione temporis with the Convention in so far as concerns

the lawfulness, purpose and proportionality of the restrictions

resulting from the town plan as such. In so far as the effects

resulting from the town plan can be regarded as a continuous situation,

the plan and the other developments preceding 10 May 1990 can be taken

into account as a background to the issue whether the restrictions in

force after that date constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention. In this respect the Commission first

notes that the alleged restrictions fall to be considered under the

second paragraph of that Article (P1-2).

      The Commission further notes that ever since the first applicant

has owned the real property in question, construction of a new building

on it has required a building permit. Further, the Commission notes

that there is a house on the real property in question.

      The Commission further notes that according to Finnish law a new

building may not be constructed contrary to a town plan or plot

division. It is true that the relevant property is affected by a

building prohibition. This building prohibition is not, however,

decisive in the case. It is namely the town plan in force which

regulates the building in the relevant area. The Commission notes that

no absolute right to build on the relevant real property could be

deduced from the town plan.

      In so far the application concerns the applicants ability to

construct new buildings on the relevant real property the Commission

does not find that the present town plan interferes with the applicants

property rights in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to

the Convention.

      It follows that this part of application must be rejected under

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicants further complain, under Article 13 (Art. 13) of

the Convention, that they have not had an effective remedy to end the

building prohibition.

      Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention the Commission

notes that the building prohibition is based on the fact that the

relevant plot consists of parts belonging to different owners. The town

plan and the plot division were approved in 1981 and 1984,

respectively. The first applicant, as the landowner, had the right to

participate in the planning process. However, as the Convention entered

into force with regard to Finland in 1990, the Commission is not

competent to supervise these proceedings.

      This part of the application is incompatible ratione temporis.

      Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the town plan is in the

process of being amended. Nothing has emerged which could lead to the

conclusion that the applicants cannot take part in this process or

resort to remedies, including those provided by administrative courts,

available to them. In these circumstances the Commission finds no

appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected

under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicants further complain, under Articles 6, 8 and 14

(Art. 6, 8, 14) of the Convention and under Article 5 of Protocol

No. 7 (P7-5)to the Convention, about the compulsory purchase

proceedings and the subsequent proceedings in the Land Court and

Supreme Court.

      The Commission notes, first, that the compulsory purchase

proceedings lapsed in 1987. Secondly, the Commission notes that the

final judgment concerning the compensation for the lapsed compulsory

purchase proceedings was given by the Supreme Court on 11 October 1989.

      As the Convention entered into force with regard to Finland on

10 May 1990, this part of the application is outside the competence

ratione temporis of the Commission.

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected

under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.    The applicants complain that the present process concerning the

amendment of the town plan violates their private and family life. The

applicants have not, however, substantiated their claim under Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    The applicants complain of several infringements of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention in connection with the civil proceedings the

second applicant has instituted against two officials, L and H. They

refer in this respect also to Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the

Convention.

a)    The applicants have raised the question of impartiality with

regard to the chair of the District Court as well as the lay judges of

the District Court. They maintain that the chair had in 1978 registered

the City of Espoo's title to a piece of real property in the vicinity

of the first applicant's real property. They allege that because of

this the chair as well as the lay judges were biased.

      The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for the

purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be determined according

to a subjective test and also according to an objective test (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Fey judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255, p. 12,

para. 28). As regards the subjective test, the Commission and the Court

of Human Rights have constantly held that the impartiality of a judge

must be presumed until the contrary is established (cf. for example,

Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of

23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 25, para. 58).

      The Commission notes that the chair of the District Court had in

1978 registered the City of Espoo's title to another piece of real

property. This registration does not preclude a decision on a possible

dispute over ownership. Furthermore, the City of Espoo was not a party

to the compulsory purchase proceedings or in the proceedings concerning

the claim for damages deriving from the compulsory purchase. The

registration of title in question does not give any reason to doubt the

chair's impartiality. As the second applicant's claims were not

directed at the City of Espoo and furthermore, as the lay judges do not

represent the City of Espoo, the relevant registration of title does

not give any reason to doubt the impartiality of the lay judges either.

The Commission further notes that no other evidence has been adduced

which could raise doubt as to the subjective or objective impartiality

of the chair of the District Court or of the lay judges of the same

court.

b)    The applicants further claim that the proceedings concerning the

claim for damages were secret and that an oral hearing was refused.

They also maintain that a hearing of witnesses was refused.

      The Commission recalls that in the District Court there was a

public oral hearing.

      The Commission notes that the relevant case concerned a claim for

damages. The Commission furthermore notes that the second applicant had

the opportunity to call witnesses to the District Court, but she did

not call any witnesses. On the contrary, she had, according to her

appeal to the Court of Appeal, declared that she was ready for the case

to be decided.

c)    The applicants also complain that the second applicant was not

assigned a legal representative. The Commission notes that the second

applicant was granted legal aid and that in the District Court the case

was adjourned in order to give the second applicant the opportunity to

instruct counsel herself.

d)    The applicants further complain that the District Court's

judgment concerning the claim for damages contains incorrect

information. They further maintain that the District Court's and the

appellate courts' judgments thereupon are based on errors of law.

      With regard to the judicial decision of which the applicants

complain, the Commission recalls that its task is to ensure the

observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the

Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an

application alleging that errors of fact and law have been committed

by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might

have involved a possible violation of any of the rights of freedoms set

out in the Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its

constant case-law (cf., e.g., No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77-A,

p. 88). The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention is this respect.

e)    The applicants complain about the length of the proceedings in

the Supreme Court.

      The proceedings began in June 1990 when the second applicant sued

L and H for damages and ended on 8 January 1993 when the Supreme Court

refused the second applicant leave to appeal. Thus the length of the

proceedings was approximately two years and six months.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the

case and having regard to the following criteria: the complexity of the

case, the conduct of the parties and that of the authorities dealing

with the case (Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991,

Series A no. 198, p. 12, para. 30).

      The Commission notes that the proceedings in the District Court

lasted approximately seven months. In her appeal to the Court of Appeal

the second applicant stated as a new fact that three judges had

committed offences in office. Because of this the Court of Appeal

requested an opinion from the prosecuting counsel of the Court of

Appeal. The second applicant also submitted a fresh claim for damages.

The proceedings in the Court of Appeal lasted approximately one year.

The proceedings in the Supreme Court, which also gave a separate

judgment concerning the alleged offences in office, lasted about eleven

months. Taking into account that the case contained not only the

original claim for damages against L and H but later also a separate

case concerning offences in office and a fresh claim for damages, the

Commission considers that a reasonable time was not exceeded.

f)    The applicants also complain about the lack of an oral hearing

in the Court of Appeal in the proceedings concerning the claim for

damages.

      In this respect the Commission notes Finland's reservation to

Article 6 (Art. 6) which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

      "For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right to an

      oral hearing in so far as the current Finnish laws do not

      provide such a right. This applies to:

      1. proceedings before the Courts of Appeal, ... in

      accordance with Chapter 26 Sections 7 and 8, ... of the

      Code of Judicial Procedure ... "

      The Commission observes that chapter 26, section 7 of the Code

of Judicial Procedure does not provide a right to an oral hearing in

appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeal. Chapter 26, section 8 of the

Code of Judicial Procedure concerns only criminal cases. The Commission

finds that Finland's reservation covers this complaint.

g)    The applicants complain that they did not have an effective

remedy before a national authority. They maintain in this respect that

the proceedings they instituted were aimed against judicially trained

authorities. They further complain that the second applicant was

discriminated against on the grounds of property because she did not

obtain legal assistance. They invoke Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14)

of the Convention.

      As regards Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the Convention the

Commission finds that the applicants' references to these provisions

amount in substance to the same complaints as those made under

Article 6 (Art. 6). The Commission, having regard to its findings

above, finds that no separate issue arises under Articles 13 or 14

(Art. 13, 14) of the Convention.

      In sum, the Commission considers that the applicants' complaints

do not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of

the Convention or of Articles 13 or 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is incompatible

ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention in so far it concerns the oral

hearing in the Court of Appeal and the remainder of this part of the

application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.    Finally, the applicants complain, under Articles 6 and 13

(Art. 6, 13) of the Convention, that the proceedings concerning the

private prosecution the second applicant has brought against certain

officials have not been fair.

      In this respect the Commission notes that the case is apparently

still pending in the Supreme Court. Even assuming that Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention were to be applicable to these proceedings,

the application is nevertheless premature. The applicants have not, in

accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, complied with

the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.

      It follows that this part of the application must be rejected

under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

7.    The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

to the Convention, about the street tax.

      In this respect the  Commission, taking into account the State's

right to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to secure the payment

of taxes, finds no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

8.    Finally, the Commission finds that no separate issue arises under

Articles 1 or 17 (Art. 1, 17) of the Convention. It follows that this

part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

       (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)