AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25205/94

                      by Adrianus KREMERS

                      against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 19 October 1995, the following members being present:

           MM.   H. DANELIUS, President

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 14 December 1993

by Adrianus KREMERS against the Netherlands and registered on

20 September 1994 under file No. 25205/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1959, and residing in

Velp, the Netherlands. Before the Commission he is represented by

Mr. L.J.L. Heukels, a lawyer practising in Haarlem, the Netherlands.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

a.   Particular circumstances of the case

     In or around August 1990, the police started investigating

accusations of rape and sexual abuse, lodged by three sisters: A. (born

in 1968), B. (born in 1972), and C. (born in 1974). The sisters alleged

that they had been raped and sexually abused over a long period of time

by several relatives, amongst whom the applicant who is their uncle.

     The police investigation was initially directed against, inter

alia, the applicant and two of his brothers. Later, at the end of 1990

or the beginning of 1991, A., B. and C. also accused two other

relatives, Mr. H. and a third brother of the applicant. Subsequently,

the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) ordered the re-opening

of the police investigation. During the re-opened police investigation

additional evidence against the applicant appeared. The results of the

re-opened police investigation were added to the applicant's case-file

in November 1991.

     It appears that, as a result of the complaints by the three

sisters, criminal proceedings  were brought against at least seven

persons, amongst whom the applicant, three of his brothers, his

brother-in-law H., his sister Mrs. B.K. who is also the mother of A.,

B. and C., and Mr. H.W. who is married to a sister of A., B. and C.

     The applicant was arrested on 18 September 1990 and subsequently

detained on remand. He remained detained throughout the criminal

proceedings against him. His requests for release were rejected on

26 February, 6 May, 5, 10 and 19 June 1992, respectively.

     During the applicant's interrogations by the police on 18, 19,

20 and 28 September and 2 October 1990, he admitted having raped A.,

B. and C.

     On 23 November 1990, the applicant was summoned to appear before

the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Arnhem on

11 December 1990. He was charged with the multiple rape of A., the

multiple rape of B., and the multiple rape, committed either alone or

together with another, of C. These offences were alleged to have taken

place between 1981 and 1987.

     On 11 December 1990, the Regional Court adjourned its examination

of the case. On 22 January 1991, the Regional Court referred the case

to the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) for the examination

of a number of witnesses.

     In January and February 1991, the investigating judge heard A.,

B. and C., two of their sisters and their mother. The applicant and his

lawyer were given the opportunity to submit questions in writing to the

investigating judge but were not allowed to question the witnesses

directly. The applicant and the public prosecutor could follow the

examinations on a TV-monitor in a separate room.

     On 26 and 27 March 1991, the Regional Court tried the case. The

applicant denied all accusations against him. He stated that his

confessions to the police were incorrect and that they were the result

of pressure exerted by the police during the interrogations. He

admitted, however, that he had had sexual intercourse with A., but

stated that this had happened with her consent.

     On 9 April 1991, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of

all charges and sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment. It used in

evidence statements made by A., B. and C. to the police and the

applicant's confessions before the police. The Regional Court stated

that it had not been made plausible that the police had exerted

unacceptable pressure on the applicant. Both the applicant and the

public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal

(Gerechtshof) of Arnhem.

     In November 1991, the results of the re-opened police

investigation (see above) were added to the applicant's case-file by

the Procurator General (Procureur-Generaal) to the Court of Appeal.

     On 10 December 1991, the Court of Appeal started its examination

of the case. In compliance with the applicant's request, the Court of

Appeal referred the case to the investigating judge, in order to

examine witnesses, amongst whom the alleged victims.

     On 13 and 14 January 1992, the investigating judge heard B. and

C., A. was not heard. The investigating judge, the court registrar and

the witnesses were in a room on the first floor of the police station

of Velp. The Procurator General was in an adjacent room. The applicant

and his lawyer were in a room on the second floor. The Procurator

General and the defence could follow the hearings on TV-monitors. Video

recordings were made of the hearings. The investigating judge

interrupted each of the hearings to give the defence the opportunity

to put additional questions to the witnesses. In addition to B. and C.,

the investigating judge also heard their elder brother, one of the

other accused Mr. H.W., and Ms. H., a friend of A., B. and C.

     On 25 February 1992, the Court of Appeal resumed its examination

of the case. At that time, the separate cases of all accused, except

Mr. H.W. who had not filed an appeal against his conviction by the

Regional Court, were pending before the Court of Appeal. The Court of

Appeal dealt with all the cases on 25 and 26 February, 6 May and 2, 3,

5, 10, 17 and 19 June 1992. Although all cases were dealt with

simultaneously, they remained formally separated. The applicant denied

the accusations against him. He admitted he had had intercourse with

A., but maintained that she had consented.

     On 25 February 1992, the Court of Appeal heard police officers

K., M., S. and W. These police officers had been involved in the

examinations of the alleged victims and/or the interrogations of the

applicant and the other accused. The Court of Appeal questioned them,

inter alia, on the interrogation tactics used, on how the applicant's

confession before them had come about and whether they had exerted

pressure on the applicant.

     On 26 February 1992, at the applicant's request, the Court of

Appeal heard Mr. P., a psychologist having a certain expertise as

regards the particular problems surrounding incest. On the same day,

the Court of Appeal viewed parts of the video recordings of the

hearings of B. and C. by the investigating judge on 13 and

14 January 1992. Subsequently, the applicant filed objections to the

way in which the investigating judge had carried out the examinations

of the witnesses on 13 and 14 January 1992. He objected, inter alia,

to the fact that the questions had to be submitted in writing

beforehand, that not all the questions he had submitted had been put

to the witnesses, and that the defence had not been given the

opportunity to question the witnesses directly. He also alleged that

the investigating judge had played too active a role when questioning

B. and C. The applicant argued that as a consequence of these

irregularities the prosecution should be declared inadmissible. If the

Court of Appeal should reject the request to declare the prosecution

inadmissible, he requested that A. be summoned before the Court of

Appeal.

     The Procurator General, stating that A. was in hospital, objected

to a further hearing of the alleged victims in view of the mental

stress such examinations already had caused and would continue to cause

them.

     The Court of Appeal, however, decided to summon A. and adjourned

its further examination until 6 May 1992.

     On 6 May 1992, the Court of Appeal adjourned its further

examination of the case until 2 June 1992 as the Procurator General

could not attend the hearing and as it had not been possible for a

colleague to get acquainted with the extensive case-file in time.

     On 2 June 1992, the Court of Appeal resumed its examination.

Despite objections by the defence, the Court of Appeal decided to

examine A. in camera and in the absence of the applicant. It

considered, inter alia:

     "... that the hearing of the witness A. ... shall take

     place in camera, for the weighty reason that the interest

     of the investigation and the finding of the truth so

     require. After all, the witness must be enabled to respond

     as freely and frankly as possible to the questions that

     will be put to her about the charges against the suspect,

     knowing that her statements will not immediately come to

     public notice ... that, furthermore, the hearing shall take

     place in the absence of the suspect, since a direct

     confrontation between the witness and the suspect is

     psychologically and emotionally too burdensome for the

     witness...."

     A. was heard in a separate room in the presence of the three

judges of the Court of Appeal, the Registrar to the Court of Appeal,

the Procurator General, the applicant's lawyer and her own lawyer. The

applicant remained in the court room, where he could follow the

examination via a TV-monitor. In addition to the applicant, the lawyers

of the other accused, the expert-witness Mr. P. and a number of court

officers (parketpolitie) were present in the court room. They too could

follow the examination on the TV-monitor.

     The Court of Appeal put a number of questions to A., which had

been submitted beforehand in writing by the applicant. The Court of

Appeal gave the applicant's lawyer and the Procurator General the

opportunity to put additional questions to the witness directly. The

examination of the witness was interrupted in order to allow the

applicant's lawyer to consult his client to find out whether he wished

to put additional questions to the witness. The applicant availed

himself of this opportunity. After A. had been heard, the applicant

stated that he did not request her presence any longer. Subsequently,

the three judges, the Registrar, the Procurator General and the

applicant's lawyer returned to the court room, where the President of

the Court of Appeal gave a summary of the statements of the witness.

     Also on 2 June 1992, the Court of Appeal heard B. and C. in the

cases of some of the other accused. At the applicant's request, the

transcripts of their examinations were added to his case-file.

     On 3 June 1992, the applicant informed the Court of Appeal that

he did not wish to examine any more witnesses. At his request, the

Court of Appeal added to his case-file statements made on 3 June 1992

by witnesses in the cases against some of the other accused in the

case.

     On the same day, the Court of Appeal again heard Mr. P. He said

that he had seen the hearings of A., B. and C. on 2 June 1992 via a TV-

monitor. He stated that his first impression was that the hearings had

been extremely burdensome, painful and emotional for them, that they

had repeatedly been unable to answer a question because of their

emotions, and that these emotions appeared to be genuine.

     In the course of Mr. P.'s examination, the applicant's lawyer

mentioned that in April 1988, B. and C. had reported to the police that

Mr. W., at that time a friend of their mother, had raped them.

     On 5 June 1992, the applicant stated that the contents of the

case-file concerning Mr. W. had come to his attention the day before.

That case-file contained two medical certificates from the

gynaecologist Dr. H.-K., who had examined B. and C. on 27 April 1988.

In the certificates, Dr. H.-K. stated that B.'s hymen was ruptured and

that C.'s hymen appeared not to be ruptured. Mr. W.'s case-file also

contained a procès-verbal in which B. stated that she did not know much

about sex and that she supposed that her hymen had been ruptured by

Mr. W. when he had intercourse with her for the first time in 1987 or

1988, because she had lost blood on that occasion. Police officer M.

had been involved in the case against Mr. W.

     The Court of Appeal decided to add the case-file of Mr. W. to the

applicant's case-file and to summon Dr. H.-K. as an expert witness. The

Court of Appeal heard Dr. H.-K. that same afternoon.

     Dr. H.-K. stated that it is practically impossible to state with

100% certainty whether intercourse has taken place on the basis of an

inspection of the hymen. Dr. H.-K. had had the impression, given the

state of B.'s hymen and the state of B.'s vaginal secretion, that B.

had had frequent sexual intercourse. She further stated that B.'s

behaviour had given her the impression that she had "a complete life

behind her". As regards C. she had had the impression that C. had not

had frequent sexual intercourse.

     On 10 June 1992, the applicant's lawyer informed the Court of

Appeal that, in accordance with an agreement concluded between the

lawyers representing the other accused in the separate appeal

proceedings simultaneously pending before the Court of Appeal, the

defence wished to submit a general defence plea. This general plea

concerning all cases was subsequently submitted by one of the lawyers

representing one of the accused, namely Mr. L.J.L. Heukels. The

defence, inter alia, drew attention to the apparent discrepancies

between B.'s and C.'s accusations against the applicant on the one hand

and the contents of Mr. W.'s case-file on the other. The defence

requested the Court of Appeal to appoint one or more experts, such as

a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, an incest expert and/or a

traumatologist, in order to investigate the mental health of B. and C.

     The Court of Appeal decided to hear another gynaecologist. It

rejected the request by the defence to appoint other experts since it

did not consider this necessary. The Court of Appeal decided to summon

the gynaecologist Professor H., who had been proposed by both the

Procurator General and the defence.

     On 17 June 1992, the Court of Appeal heard Professor H. and Dr.

H.-K. The applicant was given the opportunity to question both

witnesses. Professor H. stated that, having regard to the inspection

method used by Dr. H.-K. in this medical examination, the latter's

finding that C.'s hymen appeared to have been intact was not

necessarily correct.

     On 19 June 1992, the Court of Appeal, at the applicant's request,

heard another gynaecologist, Professor E., as an expert witness. He

stated that Dr. H.-K.'s method of examination was reliable and that he

had no reason to doubt her conclusions.

     Also on 19 June 1992, the Court of Appeal heard the Procurator

General's closing speech, in which she demanded a sentence of fourteen

years' imprisonment, and the applicant's final pleas. The applicant's

final pleas consisted of a general final plea concerning the separate

cases of all accused, presented by Mr. L.J.L. Heukels, an additional

final plea concerning all accused, presented by Mr. P.R. Wery, and an

additional final plea concerning the specific case against the

applicant, presented by his lawyer Mr. J.C.C.M. Brand.

     The defence argued, inter alia, that the prosecution should be

declared inadmissible for a number of reasons. It alleged that the

police, for whose actions and failures the prosecuting authorities are

responsible, had intentionally withheld Mr. W.'s case-file, including

the medical certificates on B. and C. The defence pointed out that the

public prosecutor had ordered the re-opening of the police

investigation during the trial before the Regional Court without

informing the defence or the Regional Court, and that the results of

the re-opened police investigation were added to his case-file by the

Procurator General in November 1991, after he had lodged his appeal.

He further objected to the fact that during a recess of one of the

hearings before the Court of Appeal, the Procurator General had entered

the judges' chambers, where the fully-robed judges were present.

     In addition, the applicant complained that the Court of Appeal

had refused to summon other experts as witnesses and that the Court of

Appeal had told A. before she was examined that she was not obliged to

answer every question. The applicant requested a new examination of B.

and C. in view of the contents of the case-file of Mr. W. as well as

the appointment of experts.

     In its judgment of 3 July 1992, the Court of Appeal quashed the

Regional Court's judgment of 9 April 1991, acquitted the applicant of

the charges involving C., convicted him of the charges involving A. and

B. and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment with deduction of the

time he had been detained on remand. The Court of Appeal used in

evidence statements made by A. to the police and before the Court of

Appeal, statements made by B. to the police, the applicant's statement

before the Court of Appeal that he had had intercourse with A. and his

confessions to the police. The Court of Appeal held that the methods

used in the police investigation had not been incorrect and that it had

not been made plausible in any way that the police had acted improperly

or without due care.

     As regards the alleged withholding of documents, the Court of

Appeal held:

     "The argument that the police intentionally failed to add

     to the case-file [the reports made by B. and C. against Mr.

     W. and the medical certificates on them of 27 April 1988]

     lacks foundation, because both in the ... procès-verbal in

     the present criminal proceedings nr. M 9932/AB/1991 of

     March 1991 ... and in the procès-verbal of the examination

     of C. dated 29 January 1991, nr. M 9931/G/1991 ... the

     police officers explicitly referred to the case-file of the

     criminal case against Mr. W., mentioning both the date of

     the criminal complaint and the registration number of the

     case-file."

     As regards the presence of the Procurator General in the judges'

chambers, the Court of Appeal held:

     "The court considers on this point that the Procurator

     General entered the judges' chambers during a recess of the

     trial only in order to hand a number of letters from the

     lawyers in the present and other cases to the members of

     the court. This happened while no deliberations were taking

     place in the judges' chambers, which, as is correctly

     stated in the [defence's] written plea, has been stated by

     the President [of the Court of Appeal].

     In the opinion of the court there were, under these

           circumstances, no reasonable grounds to fear

           that the Procurator General was involved in any

           way in deliberations in chambers."

     As regards the re-opening of the police investigation, the Court

of Appeal held:

     "The court rejects this argument. The re-opened [police]

     investigation, which resulted in the second procès-verbal

     with annexes, took place because [A., B. and C.] made new

     statements, causing suspicions to arise against persons

     who, up to that moment, had not been suspected of ...

     involvement in respect of the facts at issue. This second

     [police] investigation was, therefore, not a further

     investigation in respect of the suspects who, at that

     moment, had already been summoned, but was directed against

     new suspects. This does not alter the fact that during the

     re-opened police investigation information came forward

     concerning the suspects who had already been summoned at

     that moment.

     It was open to the Procurator General, pursuant to Section

     414 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which gives the

     suspect and his lawyer the same competence, to add new

     documents to the case-file pending the appeal proceedings."

     Insofar as the applicant had complained that the proceedings had

been unfair, the Court of Appeal considered, inter alia, that:

     "In the course of the various court hearings, the defence

     has been able to submit whatever it considered relevant. As

     a result of the addition of documents to the case-file at

     the court hearing of 5 June 1992, an expert witness was

     heard on the same day and two additional experts were heard

     during the court hearings of 17 June and 19 June 1992,

     respectively. Those additional hearing dates were

     determined in consultation with and with the approval of

     the defence and the Procurator General. The court finds

     that the suspect - in view of this procedure - cannot have

     been harmed in his defence and that there has been no

     violation of the principle of a fair trial."

     The Court of Appeal further rejected the applicant's request to

re-open its investigation and to examine several witnesses and experts.

     The applicant subsequently lodged an appeal in cassation with the

Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) within the time-limit of 14 days after the

pronouncement of the Court of Appeal's judgment, as provided for in

Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van

Strafvordering).

     The hearing before the Supreme Court was scheduled for

17 February 1993. A notification was sent to the applicant in person.

However, no notice was sent to his lawyer. At that time, the lawyer who

had represented the applicant before the Court of Appeal was replaced

by Mr. Heukels, who had represented Mrs. B.K. before the Court of

Appeal. Mr. Heukels did not become aware of the date of the Supreme

Court hearing until 11 February 1993. At Mr. Heukels' request, the

Supreme Court postponed the hearing until 23 February 1993. It rejected

a request for a longer postponement.

     On 23 February 1993, the applicant objected to the fact that he

had not been informed in accordance with Section 437 in conjunction

with Section 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the date of the

hearing before the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court had

postponed the hearing for six days only, due to which he allegedly did

not have adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence. The

applicant reiterated his complaints on the alleged withholding of

documents, the re-opening of the police investigation, and the presence

of the Procurator General in the judges' chambers. He further

complained of the length of the criminal proceedings against him and

objected to the fact that the Court of Appeal had failed to decide on

his request to examine B. and C.

     On 27 April 1993, the Advocate General (Advocaat-Generaal) to the

Supreme Court submitted his written conclusions, which were sent to the

applicant, who replied on 7 June 1993.

     On 22 June 1993, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's

appeal in cassation. It upheld the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and

considered that the Court of Appeal, given its rejection to re-open its

investigation and to examine several witnesses and experts, had not

failed to reply to the request to summon B. and C. as witnesses.

     As regards the failure to notify the applicant's lawyer, the

Supreme Court held that, in cassation proceedings, it can only examine

complaints concerning a judicial decision against which an appeal in

cassation has been lodged. Complaints concerning decisions of the

Supreme Court or acts of the Public Prosecutions Department to the

Supreme Court cannot be examined in cassation proceedings.

     The Supreme Court also rejected the complaint of the length of

the proceedings. It noted that this complaint had not been raised

before the trial courts and found that these courts had dealt with the

complex case with the required expediency. It further did not find that

significant delays had occurred in the cassation proceedings. Finally

the Supreme Court found that the total duration of the criminal

proceedings, during which the case had been dealt with at three levels,

had not exceeded a reasonable time.

b.   Relevant domestic law

     Pursuant to Section 24 of the Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op

de Rechterlijke Organisatie) it is prohibited for members of the

judiciary to have private contacts about pending or future proceedings

with the parties to those proceedings. Non-compliance with this

prohibition may result in a disciplinary reprimand (Section 14 of the

Judicial Organisation Act) or, if the offence is repeated, even

dismissal (Section 11 d.3 of the Judicial Organisation Act). Pursuant

to Section 28 of the Judicial Organisation Act members of the judiciary

are obliged to keep deliberations secret.

     Pursuant to Sections 433 and 439 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure an appellant in cassation may submit his grounds of appeal

in cassation (middelen van cassatie) at the latest on the day of the

hearing before the Supreme Court. Pursuant to Section 99 of the Act on

Judicial Organisation the scope of an appeal in cassation is limited

to points of law.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that, during the proceedings before the

Regional Court, the public prosecutor ordered the police to re-open the

police investigation, without informing the Regional Court or the

defence whilst the results of the re-opened investigation were added

to his case-file after he had lodged his appeal with the Court of

Appeal.

2.   The applicant complains that the police withheld crucial

information, in particular the medical reports of 27 April 1988 and

B.'s and C.'s statements made to the police in the case against Mr. W.

3.   The applicant finally complains that the Court of Appeal failed

to summon B. and C. for a second time, although new relevant facts had

come to light thereby depriving the defence of the possibility to

question these witnesses about these new facts.

4.   The applicant complains that the Procurator General was present

in the judges' chambers of the Court of Appeal while the judges of that

court were there to deliberate. The Court of Appeal thus gave the

impression of allowing itself to be influenced by the Procurator

General and therefore not to be impartial.

5.   The applicant complains that the Procurator General to the

Supreme Court, contrary to Section 437 para. 1 in conjunction with

Section 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, failed to inform his

lawyer of the date of the hearing before the Supreme Court.

6.   The applicant complains that the Supreme Court postponed its

hearing for only six days, which, in view of the size of the case-file,

was insufficiently long for his lawyer to study the case-file.

7.   The applicant further complains that the Supreme Court failed to

decide the two previous complaints, although they had been raised

explicitly in the cassation proceedings.

8.   The applicant complains that the criminal charges against him

were not determined within a reasonable time.

     The applicant relies on Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant has lodged a number of complaints under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention. This provision reads, insofar as relevant,

as follows:

     "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge against

     him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal....

     ....

     2.    Everone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

     innocent until proved guilty according to law.

     3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

     minimum rights:

           ....

           b.    to have adequate time and facilities for the

     preparation of his defence;

           ....

           d.    to examine or have examined witnesses against him and

     to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his

     behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;

           ...."

2.   Insofar as the applicant alleges that the proceedings against him

were not in conformity with Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the

Convention and insofar as this complaint has been raised in the

domestic proceedings, the Commission considers that it has remained

fully unsubstantiated.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifeslty ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The Commission will examine the applicant's complaints under

Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-3) taken together, since the

guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-3) represent constituent

elements of the general concept of a fair hearing set forth in

paragraph 1 (Art. 6-1) of this provision (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Lala

judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A no. 297-A, p. 12, para. 26).

4.   The applicant complains that during his trial before the Regional

Court, the public prosecutor ordered the police to re-open its

investigation, without informing the Regional Court or the defence, and

that the results of the re-opened investigation were added to his case-

file after he had lodged his appeal with the Court of Appeal.

     The Commission notes that the Regional Court rendered its

judgment in the applicant's case on 9 April 1991. In accordance with

Section 414 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows both the

Procurator General and the defence to add new documents to the case-

file during proceedings on appeal, the results of the re-opened police

investigation were added to the applicant's case-file in November 1991.

     The Commission further notes that the Court of Appeal started its

examination of the applicant's case on 10 December 1991. It then

adjourned its examination until 25 February 1992. Between 25 February

and 19 June 1992, the Court of Appeal examined the case in the course

of nine hearings and pronounced its judgment on 3 July 1992.

     The Commission finds, as regards the addition of the results of

the re-opened police investigation to the applicant's case-file, that

the defence has been provided with ample time and opportunity to study

and to challenge these additional means of evidence and does not find,

on this point, that the defence was placed at a substantial

disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecuting authorities.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.   The applicant further complains that the police withheld crucial

information, in particular Dr. H.-K.'s medical reports of 27 April 1988

and the statements B. and C. made to the police in the case against

Mr. W.

     The Commission recalls that the domestic courts rejected this

complaint for lack of foundation. The Commission notes that, after the

defence had realised the possible relevance of the facts of the case

of Mr. W., it requested the Court of Appeal to add Mr. W.'s case-file

to the applicant's file, which request was granted. The Commission

further notes that, in the course of the last four hearings before the

Court of Appeal, the contents and relevance of the material contained

in Mr. W.'s case-file formed the subject of an elaborate examination

before the Court of Appeal, including the hearing of three

gynaecologists. The Commission finally notes, on this point, that in

its judgment the Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant of the charges

involving C.

     The Commission, therefore, finds that on this point there is no

indication that the proceedings were not in conformity with the

requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.   The applicant complains that the Court of Appeal rejected the

request by the defence to summon B. and C. in order to examine them on

their statements made in the case of Mr. W.

     Insofar as the present complaint concerns C., the Commission

observes that the applicant was acquitted of the charges involving her.

As regards this part of the complaint, the applicant cannot, therefore,

claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention.

     Insofar as the present complaint concerns B., the Commission

recalls that Article 6 (Art. 6) does not grant the accused an unlimited

right to secure the appearance of witnesses in court. It is normally

for the national courts to decide whether it is necessary or advisable

to hear a witness (cf. No. 8231/78, Dec. 6.3.82, D.R. 28, p. 5;

No. 10563/83, Dec. 5.7.85, D.R. 44, p. 113; and Eur. Court H.R.,

Bricmont judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 158, p. 31, para. 89).

     The Commission further recalls that the taking of evidence is

primarily governed by the rules of domestic law, and that it is in

principle for the domestic courts to assess the evidence before them.

The task of the Convention organs in this respect is to ascertain

whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which

evidence was taken, were fair (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Saïdi judgment of

20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C, p. 56, para. 43).

     All evidence must normally be produced in the presence of the

accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument.

However, the use in evidence of other statements previously made is not

in itself inconsistent with paragraphs 3 (d) and 1 of Article 6

(Art. 6-3-d, 6-1), provided that the rights of the defence have been

respected. As a rule, these rights require that defendants be given an

adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question witnesses

against them either when these statement were made or at a later stage

of the proceedings (Saïdi judgment, loc. cit., p. 56, para. 43).

     As to the notion of "witness", the Commission recalls that B.,

for the purposes of Article 6 para. 3 (d) (Art. 6-3-d) of the

Convention, is to be regarded as a witness - a term to be given its

autonomous interpretation - because her statements in the case of Mr.

W. were in fact before the Court of Appeal, which took them into

account (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Asch judgment of 26 April 1991, Series A

no. 203, p. 10, para. 25).

     It must, therefore, be examined whether the applicant was

provided with an adequate opportunity to exercise his defence rights

within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in respect

of the evidence submitted by B.

     B. was, in the applicant's case, not heard by the trial courts.

She was, however, examined by the investigating judge in the presence

of the applicant's lawyer, the first time in early 1991 and the second

time on 13 January 1992. The defence was provided with the opportunity

to put questions to her. The Commission notes in this respect that the

applicant did not avail himself of the possibility to have B. heard by

the Court of Appeal in his own case, when she was heard by the Court

of Appeal on 2 June 1992 in respect of the other related cases, which

were being dealt with simultaneously.

     The Commission further notes, that after the case-file of Mr. W.

had been admitted as evidence, three gynaecologists were extensively

examined before the Court of Appeal in connection with information

contained in this case-file.

     The Commission has regard to the special features of criminal

proceedings concerning rape and other sexual offences. Such proceedings

are often conceived of as an ordeal by the victim, in particular when

the latter is unwillingly confronted with the defendant. In the

assessment of the question whether or not in such proceedings an

accused received a fair trial, account must be taken of the right to

respect for the victim's private life. Therefore, the Commission

accepts that in criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse certain

measures may be taken for the purpose of protecting the victim,

provided that such measures can be reconciled with an adequate and

effective exercise of the rights of the defence (Baegen v. the

Netherlands, Comm. Report 20.10.94, para. 77).

     The Commission recalls that Mr. P., a psychiatrist, stated before

the Court of Appeal that his first impression was that the examination

before the Court of Appeal had been extremely burdensome, painful and

emotional for the witnesses, that it happened repeatedly that they

could not answer a question because of their emotions, and that these

emotions appeared to be genuine.

     In these circumstances the Court of Appeal's decision not to

summon B. cannot be considered as arbitrary or unreasonable.

     In addition, B.'s statements were not the only evidence on which

the Court of Appeal based its conviction of the applicant as regards

the charges involving her. It had regard in particular to the

confessions the applicant had made to the police. It is true that the

applicant withdrew his earlier confessions before the trial courts,

but, where a court is confronted with a contradiction between an

earlier statement and subsequent evidence at the trial, it is the task

of this court to consider the credibility of the various statements

concerned (cf. No. 8414/78, Dec. 4.7.79, D.R. 17, p. 231).

     The Commission, therefore, finds that the proceedings against the

applicant in this respect do not disclose a violation of his rights

under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-d) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

7.   The applicant further complains of the Procurator General's

presence in the judges' chambers of the Court of Appeal during an

interruption of the court hearing. He submits that this cast a doubt

on the impartiality of the Court of Appeal.

     The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for the

purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention must be

determined according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the

personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also

according to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge

offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this

respect (Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A

no. 154, p. 21, para. 46; Padovani judgment of 26 February 1993,

Series A no. 257-B, p. 20, para. 25).

     The Commission notes that the applicant has not expressed doubts

as to the personal impartiality of the members of the Court of Appeal.

     As to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite

apart from the judge's conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may

raise doubts as to his impartiality. In this respect even appearances

may be of a certain importance. What is at stake is the confidence

which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the public and

above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the

accused. It follows that, in deciding whether in a given case there is

a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality,

the opinion of the accused is important but not decisive. What is

decisive is whether his fear can be regarded as objectively justified

(Padovani judgment, loc. cit., p. 20, para. 27).

     In its judgment of 3 July 1992, the Court of Appeal stated on

this point that during an interruption of the trial, the Procurator

General entered the judges' chambers only in order to hand a number of

letters to the members of the Court of Appeal and that no deliberations

were taking place at that time. The Commission has no reason to doubt

the accuracy of this statement. Having regard also to Section 24 in

conjunction with Sections 14 and 11 of the Judicial Organisation Act,

the Commission finds no elements that warrant misgivings about the

objective impartiality of the Court of Appeal.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

8.   The applicant complains that his lawyer was not duly informed of

the date of the hearing before the Supreme Court. He submits that the

lawyer was not aware of this hearing until 11 February 1993. When his

lawyer requested a postponement, the Supreme Court postponed the

hearing for only six days, which gave the lawyer insufficient time to

study the case-file.

     Insofar as the applicant complains that the Procurator General

to the Supreme Court violated Section 437 para. 1 in conjunction with

Section 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Commission recalls

that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its

task is to ensure the observation of the obligations undertaken by the

parties to the Convention. It is not competent to deal with a complaint

alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic

authorities, except where it considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out

in the Convention (cf. No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77 pp. 81 and

88).

     Therefore, it has to be examined whether in the proceedings

before the Supreme Court the applicant's rights under Article 6

paras. 1 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-b) of the Convention have been

respected.

     The Commission notes in the first place that the applicant filed

a timely appeal in cassation, i.e. not later than 17 July 1992. The

Supreme Court examined the case in February 1993, which is more than

six months later.

     The Commission further notes that the applicant himself was

notified of the date of the hearing before the Supreme Court. It has

not been alleged nor appeared that this notification did not reach the

applicant before 11 February 1993, or that he was prevented from

informing his lawyer of this notification in time.

     The Commission also notes that the lawyer, who had represented

the applicant before the Court of Appeal, did not represent the

applicant before the Supreme Court. In the latter proceedings the

applicant was represented by another lawyer, namely Mr. Heukels who

had, at two occasions, delivered general defence pleas concerning the

separate cases of all accused, including the applicant, in the

proceedings before the Court of Appeal, which had dealt with all cases

simultaneously.

     The Commission finally notes that Mr. Heukels learned on

11 February 1993 that the hearing before the Supreme Court was

scheduled for 17 February 1993 and that, following his request for a

postponement, this hearing was postponed until 23 February 1993.

     The Commission finds that, in view of the fact that Mr. Heukels

presented on two occasions a general defence plea to the Court of

Appeal in the cases of the applicant and the other accused, he cannot

be regarded as having been unfamiliar with the facts of the applicant's

case. Moreover, he learned of the date of the hearing before the

Supreme Court on 11 February 1993. Following his request for a

postponement, this hearing was postponed and took place on 23 February

1993. The applicant's lawyer thus had twelve days to prepare the appeal

in cassation, which was limited to points of law, and he could submit

the grounds of appeal at the latest on the day of the hearing before

the Supreme Court.

     In these circumstances the Commission considers that, on this

point, there is no appearance of a violation of the applicant's rights

under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-b) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

9.   The applicant complains that the Supreme Court did not deal with

his complaints of the failure to notify his lawyer of the date of the

hearing before the Supreme Court and of the postponement of this

hearing.

     The Commission recalls that if a State makes provisions for an

appeal in cassation, it is entitled to lay down the provisions by which

the appeal shall be governed and fix the conditions under which it may

be brought (cf. No. 12972/87, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54, p. 207).

     In the present case the Supreme Court considered that the

complaints at issue fell outside the scope of a cassation procedure.

This finding cannot be considered to violate Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

10.  The applicant complains that the criminal charges against him

were not determined within a reasonable time.

     The Commission observes that the proceedings at issue began on

18 September 1990 when the applicant was arrested, and ended with the

Supreme Court's judgment of 22 June 1993. They thus lasted two years,

nine months and four days.

     The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings is to be determined with reference to the criteria laid

down in the Convention organs' case-law and in the light of the

particular circumstances of the case, which in the present case call

for an overall assessment (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Vendittelli judgment

of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 293-A, p. 10, para. 22).

     The Commission notes that the present proceedings formed part of

a relatively complex case. The proceedings concerned serious offences

which were alleged to have taken place over a long period of time,

involving three victims and at least seven accused. Both the police

investigation and the examination before the trial courts were

elaborate, involving the examination of the accused, the victims,

several witnesses and experts. In addition, the applicant's case was

considered by three different courts.

     For these reasons, the Commission is of the opinion that the

charges against the applicant have been determined within a reasonable

time as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the Second Chamber       President of the Second Chamber

       (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                       (H. DANELIUS)