Search
document

Document text Analytics

DAHLSTRÖM and HÅKANSSON v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 24866/94 • ECHR ID: 001-2359

Document date: October 19, 1995

Inbound citations: 0
•
Cited paragraphs: 0
•
Outbound citations: 1

DAHLSTRÖM and HÅKANSSON v. SWEDEN

Doc ref: 24866/94 • ECHR ID: 001-2359

Document date: October 19, 1995

Cited paragraphs only

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 24866/94

by Sture DAHLSTRÖM and Kurt HÅKANSSON

against Sweden

The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 19 October 1995, the following members being present:

MM. G. JÖRUNDSSON, Acting President

H. DANELIUS

J.-C. SOYER

H.G. SCHERMERS

F. MARTINEZ

L. LOUCAIDES

J.-C. GEUS

M.A. NOWICKI

I. CABRAL BARRETO

J. MUCHA

D. SVÁBY

P. LORENZEN

Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 5 May 1994 by

Sture Dahlström and Kurt Håkansson against Sweden and registered on

9 August 1994 under file No. 24866/95;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The first applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1931, resides at

Fagersta. The second applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1944, resides

at Sysslebäck. Before the Commission they are represented by

Mr. Carl-Gustaf Elwe, a lawyer practising at Karlskoga.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

When the applicants' paternal uncle died in 1954, his estate was

inherited by his wife, E.M.J. After her death on 25 January 1991, half

of the property left by her went to the uncle's heirs. According to the

estate inventory deed (bouppteckning), drawn up on 4 May 1991, these

heirs were two other children of the applicants' deceased father. The

applicants, half-siblings of the heirs, were not mentioned in the

inventory deed, as they were born out of wedlock. It is true that since

1 January 1970 a child born out of wedlock has the same right of

inheritance as a child born in wedlock, i.e. it inherits from both its

parents and their relatives. However, as the person from which the

applicants derived their claim to inheritance - their father - had died

in 1959, i.e. before 1 January 1970, the old rules still applied.

According to these old rules - laid down in Chapter 4 of the Code of

Inheritance (Ärvdabalken) - a child born out of wedlock, save for a few

exceptions of no relevance to the present case, inherited only from its

mother and her relatives. Consequently, the applicants did not inherit

from their paternal uncle and was thus not entitled to any part of the

property left by E.M.J. For the same reason, the applicants had not

inherited anything from their father when he died in 1959.

The applicants allegedly learned of the contents of the inventory

deed about three or four months after it had been drawn up. Thereafter

they unsuccessfully negotiated with the beneficiaries of E.M.J.'s

estate in an attempt to be acknowledged as beneficiaries and thus

entitled to part of the estate. These negotiations allegedly ended a

couple of months before the introduction of the present application.

Apparently, the estate was wound up in the beginning of 1994.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicants complain that they were discriminated against, as,

being born out of wedlock, they did not, like children born in wedlock,

inherit from their father and his relatives and were, thus, not

entitled to any part of the property left by E.M.J., their paternal

uncle's wife. They invoke Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction

with Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the

Convention. They also invoke Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the

Convention.

2. The applicants further claim that they could not obtain a court

determination of their alleged right of inheritance, as they were not

beneficiaries and a court action, therefore, would have been dismissed.

In this respect, they invoke Article 6 of the Convention.

3. Under Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants finally claim

that they did not have an effective remedy against the alleged

violations of their Convention rights.

THE LAW

The applicants complain that they were discriminated against,

that they could not obtain a court determination and that they did not

have an effective remedy against the alleged violations of their

Convention rights.

However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a

violation of the Convention, as the application is inadmissible for the

following reasons.

The Commission recalls that, pursuant to Article 26 (Art. 26) of

the Convention, it "may only deal with the matter ... within a period

of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken".

According to the Commission's case-law, the "final decision" for

purposes of the six months rule must normally be regarded as the date

of the acts or decisions complained of where there exists no domestic

remedy in respect of the complaint. However, the six months period can

only begin to run from the moment the applicants learn of the act or

decision of which they complain (cf., e.g., No. 12015/86, Hilton v. the

United Kingdom, Dec. 6.7.88, D.R. 57, p. 108).

In the present case, the Commission observes that the alleged

violations of the applicants' rights all relate to the fact that they

did not inherit from their paternal uncle and were thus not entitled

to a part of the property left by his wife E.M.J. As there existed no

domestic remedy, the Commission finds that the six months period under

Article 26 (Art. 26) began to run from the moment the applicants

learned that they were not entitled to any part of that property.

The Commission recalls that E.M.J. died on 25 January 1991 and

that the estate inventory deed was drawn up on 4 May 1991. As the

applicants were not mentioned among the beneficiaries in the inventory

deed, the Commission finds that the applicants became aware that they

would not receive any part of the property left by E.M.J. at the latest

when they learned of the contents of the inventory deed. The applicants

claim that this occurred about three or four months after it had been

drawn up, i.e. sometime in August or September 1991. The present

application was introduced on 5 May 1994, which is more than six months

later.

It follows that the application has been introduced out of time

and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to Acting President

the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber

(M.-T. SCHOEPFER) (G. JÖRUNDSSON)

LEXI

Lexploria AI Legal Assistant