AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25942/94

                      by Paul Matthew COYNE

                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

28 November 1995, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 H. DANELIUS

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Mr.   F. MARTINEZ

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 D. SVÁBY

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;   Having regard to the

application introduced on 23 November 1994 by Paul Matthew COYNE

against the United Kingdom and registered on 14 December 1994 under

file No. 25942/94;

      Having regard to:

-     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

      the Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

      20 June 1995 and those in reply submitted by the applicant under

      cover of letter dated 11 August 1995;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as

follows. The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1972 and resident

in Bedford. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. Gilbert

Blades, a solicitor practising in Lincoln.

A.    Particular circumstances of the case.

      In 1992 the applicant was a non-commissioned officer in the Royal

Air Force of the United Kingdom stationed at Brüggen, Germany.

      In June 1992 the applicant applied for premature voluntary

release and this was granted in July 1992 subject to payment. In

November 1992 he returned to the United Kingdom with a view to his

final discharge on 9 December 1992.

      As a result of a police investigation into the applicant's

financial activities while in Germany, his final release was turned

down. Having been initially detained by the air force authorities in

the United Kingdom, he was returned to Brüggen in June 1993.

      Though the German and the air force authorities have concurrent

jurisdiction over servicemen (by reason of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation Status of Forces Agreement 1951), the air force

authorities concluded that the applicant was best tried by air force

court-martial.

      In August 1993 the applicant was charged, pursuant to section

70(1) of the Air Force Act 1955, with four civilian criminal offences

(the fourth charge being an alternative to the third) of using a false

instrument together with obtaining services by deception contrary to

the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and the Theft Act 1968.

      The Convening Officer was the Air Officer Commanding No. 2 Group,

Royal Air Force, Rheindahlen and as such was the commander of all

personnel serving in Germany. By order dated 21 January 1994, the

Convening Officer convened a district court-martial, appointing all

members of the court-martial by name.

      The President of the court-martial was a Wing Commander of the

Royal Air Force Station, Uxbridge and he was a permanent president. The

other two members were a Squadron Leader of the Royal Air Force

Station, Laarbruch and a Flight Lieutenant of the Royal Air Force

Station, Gatow, respectively. Both of these members were stationed in

Germany, were subordinate in rank to, and within the chain of command

of, the Convening Officer. The Prosecuting Officer was appointed by the

Convening Officer from the Directorate of Legal Services and was also

within the Convening Officer's chain of command. A Judge Advocate was

appointed by the Judge Advocate General's office.

      The court-martial took place at the Royal Air Force Station,

Brüggen on 26-28 January 1994. The applicant was found guilty of one

of the charges (under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981) and was

sentenced to nine months detention, dismissal from the air force and

to be reduced to the ranks.

      On 31 January 1994 the applicant presented a petition to the

Confirming Officer (against conviction and sentence) claiming that the

Judge Advocate had erred in his summing up of the case, that the

finding of guilt on one charge was inconsistent with his acquittal on

another charge and that the sentence was excessive. However, on

3 March 1994 the applicant's conviction and sentence were confirmed by

the Confirming Officer who had obtained the advice of an assistant

Judge Advocate (not the trial Judge Advocate).

      On 8 March 1994 the applicant presented an appeal petition

(against conviction and sentence) to the Defence Council. The Air Force

Board took the decision on this petition (having obtained the advice

of the Judge Advocate General) and informed the applicant's legal

representative of its decision to reject this latter petition by letter

dated 26 May 1994.

      The applicant's subsequent application for leave to appeal

against conviction and sentence to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court was

accepted by a single judge of that court, not on the basis of any of

the grounds presented by the applicant, but on the basis of a question

raised by the single judge as to whether the Judge Advocate had

properly advised the court-martial as to what was required to be proven

in relation to an instrument being false. By judgment dated 11 October

1994 the applicant's appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court was

rejected, that court finding that the Judge Advocate had properly

advised the court-martial.

      No reasons were given for the decisions of the court-martial, the

Confirming Officer or the Air Force Board. The applicant was legally

represented before the Courts-Martial Appeal Court.

B.    Relevant domestic law and practice.

1.    General

      The law and procedures in respect of court-martials for air force

personnel are contained, inter alia, in the Air Force Act 1955 ("the

1955 Act") and in the Rules of Procedure (Air Force) 1972.

      Under section 70(1) of the 1955 Act "civilian" offences are also

offences under the 1955 Act. Therefore air force personnel can be tried

on charges of civilian criminal offences under air force law and by the

air force authorities. Jurisdiction issues between the United Kingdom

air force authorities and the German authorities, in matters concerning

servicemen stationed in Germany, are governed by the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation Status of Forces Agreement 1951.

      Depending on their gravity, charges against air force law can be

tried by a general, field or district court-martial convened by the

Convening Officer. A district court-martial must consist of a President

(who must not be under the rank of Flight Lieutenant) and not less than

two other officers (each of whom must have had at least two years

commissioned service). The President of the court-martial must be

appointed by name by the Convening Officer and is normally one of a

number of permanent Presidents. The Convening Officer may appoint the

remaining members by name or by requiring a commanding officer to

nominate an officer of the required rank. A Judge Advocate ("J.A.") may

also be assigned to a district court-martial, though not as a member.

       Each member of a court-martial must swear the following oath:

      "I swear by almighty God that I will well and truly try the

      accused before the court according to the evidence, and that I

      will duly administer justice according to the Air Force Act 1955,

      without partiality, favour or affection, and I do further swear

      that I will not on any account at any time whatsoever disclose

      or discover the vote or opinion of the president or any member

      of this court-martial, unless thereunto required in the due

      course of law."

2.    The Convening Officer

      The Convening Officer of a district court-martial must be a

"Qualified Officer" or an officer (not below the rank of Flight

Lieutenant) to whom the Qualified Officer has delegated his powers. A

Qualified Officer is any officer not below the rank of Squadron Leader

or corresponding rank who is in command of a body of the regular air

forces or of the command within which a body of the regular air force

is serving.

      The Convening Officer is not responsible for the decision to

charge the accused nor for the investigation of those charges. However,

once the accused's commanding officer has decided that the accused

should be tried by court-martial, the Convening Officer assumes

responsibility for the case.

      The Convening Officer is empowered, inter alia, to direct upon

what charges the accused is to be tried, to decide the wording of those

charges, to decide in what order the accused is to be tried on those

charges and to ensure that the accused has been remanded for trial on

those charges. The Convening Officer convenes a court-martial for each

case and decides on the type of court-martial required. The convening

order specifies, inter alia, the date, place and time of the trial, the

name of the President, the details of the other members and whether a

J.A. has been appointed. In this latter respect, if the Judge Advocate

General does not assign a J.A. to a district court-martial, a J.A. may

be assigned by the Convening Officer himself. The Convening Officer

also appoints the Prosecuting Officer or directs a commanding officer

to make this appointment. The Prosecuting Officer must be an officer

subject to air force law or counsel assisted by such an officer. In

serious cases the Prosecuting Officer is chosen from the staff of the

Directorate of Legal Services (Air Force) and is answerable to the

Director of Legal Services (Air Force).

      The Convening Officer sends the charge sheet and convening order

to the President and copies of these documents to the members of the

court-martial and to the J.A.. He also sends an abstract of the

evidence to the Prosecuting Officer and to the J.A. and may indicate

to the Prosecuting Officer the passages of the evidence which may be

inadmissible. He procures the attendance at trial of all witnesses to

be called for the prosecution. When charges are withdrawn the Convening

Officer's consent is normally obtained, though it is not necessary in

all cases, and when a plea to a lesser charge is made by the accused

it cannot be accepted without the consent of the Convening Officer.

      The Convening Officer must also ensure that the accused has a

proper opportunity to prepare his defence and proper contact with,

inter alia, the defence witnesses. The Convening Officer must see that

the accused is informed that he may require the attendance of defence

witnesses and must order the attendance of witnesses "reasonably"

requested by the defence. No other authority has this latter power.

Witnesses not subject to military law may be summoned to attend the

trial by order of the Convening Officer. The accused must also be

informed by the Convening Officer whether the Prosecuting Officer is

legally qualified so as to allow the accused the opportunity to obtain

his own legal representation. He must copy the accused at least 24

hours before the trial with, inter alia, the convening order, the

charge sheet and the abstract of the evidence.

      A court-martial can be dissolved by the Convening Officer, either

before or during the trial, when required in the interests of the

administration of justice (section 95 of the 1955 Act).

      The Convening Officer also usually acts as Confirming Officer.

3.    Judge Advocate General and Judge Advocates

      The current Judge Advocate General was appointed by the Queen in

February 1991 for five years. He is answerable to the Queen and is

removable from office by the Queen for inability or misbehaviour.

      A number of assistant and deputy J.A.'s are appointed to the

Judge Advocate General's office by the Lord Chancellor and they must

have at least seven and five years experience respectively as an

advocate or barrister. The J.A. does not swear an oath upon appointment

and is normally exempted from doing so at an individual court-martial.

The J.A. is removable only by the Lord Chancellor for inability or

misbehaviour but is responsible for the proper discharge of his

functions to the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General and

J.A.'s receive, out of money provided by parliament, such salaries

together with travelling and subsistence allowances as the Lord

Chancellor may determine.

      The Judge Advocate General's role is mainly advisory. He advises

the Secretary of State for Defence on all matters touching and

concerning the office of the Judge Advocate General and this advice

includes advice on air force law and the procedures and conduct of the

court-martial system. He also advises the confirming and reviewing

authorities on post-trial matters and in this respect he may, if

necessary, give some general information as to the purpose and function

of the review, the lawfulness of a particular finding or sentence, the

range of sentences appropriate to a particular offence based on

precedent, as to how the Crown Court might consider a similar offence

and as to specific service aspects of the offence. He is also

responsible for superintending the administration of air force law and

retaining the records of courts-martial. He is a legal adviser to the

Ministry of Defence and the relationship between the Judge Advocate

General and the Ministry of Defence can be described as one of lawyer

and client.

      Once assigned to a court-martial, the J.A. must provide on

request an opinion on any point of law or procedure to the prosecution

and the accused prior to the court-martial hearing. During the hearing,

with the consent of the court-martial, he must provide any opinion so

requested. He advises on all questions of law and procedure that arise

during the hearing and the court-martial must accept his advice unless

it has weighty reasons (which must be recorded) for not doing so. On

a number of specified matters, on which he is consulted by the court-

martial, the opinion of the J.A. must be followed. The J.A. is also

responsible for advising the court-martial as to any defect in its

constitution or in the charge sheet.

      At the opening of the trial it is the practice for the J.A. to

satisfy himself that none of the members of the court-martial either

know the accused or have heard anything about the charges. Where an

accused pleads guilty the J.A. has particular duties including

satisfying the court-martial that the accused and his representative

are not under any misapprehension as to the plea of guilty and that the

accused's clear admission has addressed all elements of the charges.

At the close of the court-martial hearing the J.A. sums up the relevant

law and evidence. If during the court-martial's deliberations on the

charges (at which the J.A. cannot be present) further advice is

required then the court-martial must receive that advice in open court.

The J.A. can, however, advise the members of the court-martial in

private on the general principles governing the approach to sentencing.

The J.A. is not a member of the court-martial and has no vote either

on the decision on the charges or on the sentence.

      Finally, the J.A. must ensure (in conjunction with the President)

that the accused does not suffer any disadvantage during the hearing.

4.    The court-martial hearing

      At the commencement of the court-martial the accused can object

to individual members of the court-martial and such an objection is

considered in closed court.

      The accused is then asked to plead in respect of the charge. Once

a plea of not guilty is entered the procedure is very similar to that

followed in the Crown Court. After the prosecution has made its case

the accused can submit that there is no case to answer. If this

submission is not accepted then the J.A. advises the accused on the

alternatives open to him and the defence case proceeds. Witnesses can

be called for the prosecution and the defence and both sides can make

a closing submission, the defence submission being the last. During the

trial the court-martial may adjourn to consult the Convening Officer

on points of law who must then take legal advice from the Judge

Advocate General.

      The members of the court-martial retire (without the J.A.) to

deliberate on their findings, return and pronounce those findings. If

the accused is found guilty or pleads guilty, the Prosecuting Officer

puts in evidence the defendant's service record and other evidence

having a bearing on the sentence to be imposed. The defence then makes

a plea in mitigation and can call witnesses to support this plea. The

members of the court-martial then retire (this time with the J.A.) to

consider the sentence. The sentence is then announced in open court.

There is no provision for the giving of reasons by the court-martial

for its decision on the charges or on the sentence.

5.    Sentencing

      Certain types of sentences are not available to a court-martial

even if the charges relate to civilian offences. A court-martial

cannot, inter alia, suspend a prison sentence, issue a probation order

or sentence to community service. In addition, a district court-martial

cannot order imprisonment for more than two years. A court-martial must

award one global sentence for all of the offences for which the accused

is found guilty. The opinions of members on sentence are given orally

in closed court and these opinions shall be given in ascending order

of seniority. A decision can be reached by majority.

6.    Confirmation and post-hearing reviews

      The court-martial's findings are not treated as a finding of

guilt or on sentence until confirmed by the Confirming Officer. The

confirmation procedure is automatic but if a petition is presented

prior to the decision of the Confirming Officer it will be considered.

Prior to confirmation the Confirming Officer must consult the Judge

Advocate General's office for advice but the J.A. who attended the

court-martial hearing does not proffer this advice. The Confirming

Officer can withhold confirmation, substitute a sentence, remit in

whole or in part any punishment, commute a punishment for one or more

lesser punishments and postpone the carrying out of the sentence. Once

confirmed, the conviction and sentence are then promulgated.

      If the conviction and sentence have been confirmed, and if the

accused wishes to leave open the option of an appeal to the Courts-

Martial Appeal Court, he may present an appeal petition against

conviction and sentence. The reviewing authority which normally decides

upon appeal petitions of air force personnel is the Air Force Board

which has the power to quash a sentence and to exercise the same powers

as the Confirming Officer in relation to substituting and remitting or

commuting sentences.

      A petitioner is not informed, when making the relevant petition,

of the identity of the Confirming Officer or of the reviewing authority

considering his case nor is he told when such consideration will take

place. No statutory or formalised procedures are laid down for the

conduct of the procedures before the Confirming Officer and the

reviewing authority and no reasons are given for the ensuing decisions.

Neither the fact that advice has been received nor the nature of the

advice received from the Judge Advocate General's office by the

Confirming Officer or the reviewing authority is disclosed to the

petitioner.

7.    Courts-Martial Appeal Court ("CMAC")

      The CMAC has the same status and, in essence, the same procedure

as the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. The judges of this court

include ordinary and ex officio judges of the Court of Appeal and such

judges of the High Court as are nominated by the Lord Chief Justice.

      If an appeal petition is rejected by the Air Force Board an

appellant may apply to a single judge of the CMAC (and, if necessary,

also to the full court) for leave to appeal against conviction to that

court. There is no provision for an appeal (by air force personnel)

against sentence only although certain powers of revising such

sentences, pursuant to an appeal against conviction, are available to

the CMAC.

      In considering the question of leave to appeal, the single judge

or the CMAC shall have regard to any expression of opinion made by the

Judge Advocate General that the case is a fit one for appeal and if any

such expression is so made they may, without further consideration,

give leave to appeal. The Judge Advocate General can also refer a

matter to this court if he is of the opinion that the finding involves

a matter of exceptional public importance.

      As regards the substantive appeal, the CMAC must allow the appeal

against conviction if it considers that the finding of the court-

martial is, under all the circumstances of the case, unsafe or

unsatisfactory or involves a wrong decision on a question of law. The

appeal must also be allowed if there was a material irregularity in the

course of the trial. In any other case the CMAC must dismiss the

appeal.

      In hearing the appeal, the CMAC can consider any question

necessary to be determined for the purpose of doing justice in any case

and may authorise a new trial (by court-martial) where a conviction is

quashed in light of fresh evidence. It also has power, inter alia, to

order the production of documents or exhibits connected with the

proceedings, order the attendance of witnesses, receive evidence,

obtain reports from members of the court-martial or from the J.A. and

order a reference of any question to a special commissioner for

inquiry. All powers of the CMAC must be exercised by it insofar as it

thinks necessary or expedient in the interests of justice.

      An appellant must have the leave of the CMAC to attend any

hearing in relation to the appeal before that court but he may present

his appeal in writing. The CMAC will only give the appellant such leave

where it considers that his presence will serve some useful purpose or

is necessary in the interests of justice. Legal aid for an appeal to

the CMAC is available under certain conditions and the appellant may

obtain an order for costs in his favour if his appeal is allowed by the

CMAC.

      A further appeal, on a point of law of general public importance,

can be made to the House of Lords with the leave of the CMAC.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

that, in being tried by court-martial, he was denied a fair hearing by

an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

2.    The applicant also complains in his observations about delay by

the authorities in dealing with his case, the extension of the

applicant's date for discharge from the air force and about the

procedure by which he was assessed for legal aid by the Director of

Legal Services.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 23 November 1994 and was

registered on 14 December 1994.

      On 28 February 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

applicant's complaint as to the lack of a fair hearing by an

independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6

para. 1 of the Convention to the respondent Government and to request

written observations on the admissibility and merits of this complaint.

      The Government's observations were received on 20 June 1995,

after two extensions in the time-limit fixed for this purpose, and the

applicant's observations in reply were submitted under cover of letter

dated 11 August 1995.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant mainly complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

      "1. In the determination .... of any criminal charge against him,

      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

      established by law...."

      The applicant essentially complains that, in being tried by

court-martial, he did not receive a fair hearing, by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law. He submits that the arrangement

between the United Kingdom and Germany, which allowed him to be tried

by the air force authorities, meant that he was denied a trial in a

civilian court (with a broad sentencing regime and a jury) on what were

civilian criminal charges.

      As regards the alleged lack of independence of the court-martial,

the applicant refers, inter alia, to the rank and wide powers of the

Convening Officer. He also claims that the Convening Officer controls

court-martial proceedings through the Prosecuting Officer. He further

submits that the members of the court-martial and the Prosecuting

Officer depend on, inter alia, the convening authority for promotions,

re-engagements and salary increases so that the members of the court-

martial and the Prosecuting Officer will have their careers in mind

when carrying out their functions. He also notes, in this respect, that

there are no members of the judiciary appointed to a court-martial. The

applicant further argues that the manner of convening and proceeding

with a court-martial, together with the identity of those involved in

the court-martial, establishes a close connection and institutional

dependence between the prosecuting authority and the accused's

commanding officer, the Convening Officer, the members of the court-

martial, the Prosecuting Officer, the Judge Advocate, Confirming

Officer and Air Force Board.

      As to the question of impartiality, the applicant submits that

the court-martial did not present an appearance of impartiality due,

inter alia, to the manner in which its members were appointed, the

duration of their terms of office, the lack of guarantees against

outside pressures and the rank of those involved in the court-martial.

      The applicant submits that he does not need to demonstrate an

actual lack of independence and impartiality but rather that a

reasonable person would perceive this to be the case.

      In addition, the applicant argues that the proceedings were

unfair because of, inter alia, the secrecy surrounding the proceedings,

including the lack of reasons given for the decisions against him

together with the non-disclosure of the advice given by the Judge

Advocate to the court-martial on sentencing, by the Judge Advocate

General to the Confirming Officer and by the Judge Advocate General's

office to the Air Force Board. He also refers, in this respect, to his

inability to appear before the Confirming Officer or the Air Force

Board and he alleges that the sentence against him was unfair and

unreasonable.

      He further argues that courts-martial are not "established by

law", within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention, due, inter alia, to the manner in which they are convened

and to the fact that the Confirming Officer can cancel the sentence of

the court-martial. Finally, since there is no right to appeal to the

Courts-Martial Appeal Court against sentence only and since that court

could not rehear his case, it could not, according to the applicant,

remedy the defects in the prior proceedings.

      The Government point out, in the first place, that in light of

the circumstances of this case and having regard to the charges against

the applicant and to the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation Status of Forces Agreement 1951, a trial by court-martial

was the only effective way in which the charges against the applicant

could be heard.

      As to the independence of the court-martial, the Government argue

that the military identity and subordinate rank (to the Convening

Officer) of the members of the court-martial do not mean that the

court-martial lacks independence. The Government point to the oath

sworn by the members, the lack of instruction by, or accountability to,

a higher or outside authority and to the inability of any such

authority to remove individual members of the court-martial. In

addition, it is submitted that the convening of a court-martial on an

ad hoc basis and the role of the Judge Advocate, being independent of

the parties to the case, enhances its independence.

      As regards the impartiality of the members of the court-martial,

the Government note that the applicant has not made specific

allegations as regards the subjective impartiality of those members and

that the members, sitting as they do as individuals and reaching their

conclusions independently of outside pressure or influence, satisfy the

objective test of objective impartiality. Furthermore the Government

argue that the proceedings, viewed as a whole, are fair in light of the

procedural guarantees afforded to defendants.

      The Government deny that the convening authority has any control

over the promotions, pay and engagements of the court-martial members,

such matters being the responsibility of the Promotions Board and the

Armed Forces Pay Review Body, respectively. It is also denied that the

Convening Officer can be equated with the executive or the prosecuting

authority or that he controls the proceedings through the Prosecuting

Officer. In addition, though two members of the court-martial together

with the Prosecuting Officer were in the chain of command of the

Convening Officer, it does not follow that they were accountable to the

Convening Officer - the members of the court-martial, pursuant to their

oath, were accountable to no one and the Prosecuting Officer was

answerable to the Director of Legal Services. The President was not in

the Convening Officer's chain of command. Therefore, the Government

strongly dispute that a member's or the Prosecuting Officer's

performance at a court-martial could affect their future evaluation by

their superiors and that any member of the court-martial or the

Prosecuting Officer would have career matters in mind when carrying out

their functions on the court-martial.

      As to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, the Government note that

the applicant does not challenge the independence and impartiality of

the judges of that court. The Government submit that, if there was any

defect in the court-martial proceedings, the applicant could have

raised this matter (but he did not) in his appeal to the Courts-Martial

Appeal Court.

      The Government therefore submit that this complaint is manifestly

ill-founded or, in the alternative, that it discloses no violation of

the Convention.

      The Commission considers that this complaint of the applicant

raises serious issues of fact and law which are of such complexity that

their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. This

complaint cannot therefore be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

2.    In addition, the applicant complains about delay by the

authorities in dealing with his case, the extension of the applicant's

date for discharge from the air force and about the procedure by which

the applicant was assessed for legal aid by the Director of Legal

Services.

      However, the Commission notes that these matters have been raised

for the first time in the applicant's observations in reply submitted

under cover of letter dated 11 August 1995 and that they have been

introduced more than six months after the final decision in the

applicant's case handed down by the Courts-Martial Appeal Court on 11

October 1994. The Commission therefore finds these complaints out of

time and inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE without prejudging the merits the applicant's

      complaints about the lack of a fair hearing by an independent and

      impartial tribunal established by law;

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                       (S. TRECHSEL)