AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 29102/95

                      by Amanda BULLOCK

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 16 January 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 15 May 1995 by

Amanda BULLOCK against the United Kingdom and registered on

8 November 1995 under file No. 29102/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as

follows. The applicant is an British citizen, born in 1967 and is

resident in Durham. She is represented before the Commission by Anthony

Pickford, a barrister practising in London.

Particular circumstances of the case

     On 14 October 1992 the Magistrates' Court convicted the applicant

of allowing her dog, being "of the type known as the pit bull terrier",

to stray contrary to section 1(2)(e) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

The court ordered, inter alia, that the dog be destroyed. The

prosecution's experts confirmed that the dog was of the relevant type

and the applicant's sole expert witness, who challenged this, admitted

that she had only examined the dog visually through a car window.

     On 16 November 1992 the Crown Court (after a full re-hearing)

dismissed the applicant's appeal. Mr. Recorder Lumley of that court

noted that the applicant had admitted ownership and that she had

allowed the dog to stray but that she had contested the identity of the

dog. In referring to section 5(5) of the 1991 Act, the judge noted that

the burden of proof was on the applicant and that the standard of proof

was on the balance of probabilities. Having heard the evidence, the

judge concluded ("not without a great deal of regret") that the

applicant had not discharged the burden of proof.

     A subsequent application to the Crown Court to state a case to

the High Court was dismissed by Mr. Recorder Lumley as frivolous, that

judge remarking that the question of dangerousness was not material to

the particular offence with which the applicant was charged.

     In April 1994 the High Court gave the applicant leave to apply

for judicial review of Mr. Recorder Lumley's decision. A recent

domestic court judgment had confirmed that, since the American Dog

Breeders Association breed standards used in identifying dogs of the

type known as the pit bull terrier included two characteristics of

behaviour (gameness and aggressiveness), there must be some

consideration of these types of behaviour in reaching a conclusion as

to a dog's "type".

     On 10 May 1995 the High Court dismissed the application for

judicial review and refused to refer the case back to the Magistrates'

Court for rehearing. The main judgment of the court referred to the

evidence presented before the Magistrates' Court together with the

recent domestic decision noted above and concluded that there was no

evidence before the High Court to demonstrate that the Magistrates'

Court's decision would be any different even taking into account those

two behavioural characteristics.

     The dog (which was seized when the applicant was charged) was

subsequently destroyed.

Relevant domestic law and practice

     Pit bull terriers were bred as fighting dogs. When dog fighting

was banned in the United Kingdom, this breed died out but was re-

imported back into the United Kingdom from the United States in the

1970's.

     Dogs generally have breed standards which are laid down and

recognised by different associations of dog breeders. The English

Kennel Club has no standards in relation to pit bull terriers because

of the long period when those dogs were not bred in the United Kingdom.

The United States, on the other hand, has two associations setting down

such standards - the American Dog Breeders Association ("ADBA") and the

United Kennel Club ("UKC").

     The ADBA exists for pit bull terriers alone, its standards are

widely used, it is concerned to take into account fighting standards

and the dogs imported into the United Kingdom in the 1970's were

registered with the ADBA. Its breed standards mainly relate to the

physical characteristics of a pit bull terrier but also refer to the

dog's "gameness and aggressiveness". The UKC provides standards for

many breeds of dog registered with it (including pit bull terriers) but

is mainly concerned with show dogs.

     In 1991, and pursuant to considerable public concern about recent

attacks on persons by, inter alia, pit bull terriers, parliament

enacted the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act") which Act is

ultimately aimed at the eradication of pit bull terriers as a breed

from the United Kingdom.

     Section 1(1)(a) of the 1991 Act states that section 1 of that Act

applies, inter alia, to "any dog of the type known as the pit bull

terrier". Section 1(2)(e) of the 1991 Act prohibits an owner of a dog

to which section 1 applies from abandoning such a dog or, being the

owner or the person for the time being in charge of such a dog, from

allowing it to stray. Contravention of section 1 is an offence,

carrying a potential punishment of imprisonment for a term not

exceeding six months or a fine (section 1(7)) and requiring the court

to make a destruction order in relation to the relevant dog (section

4).

     Section 5(5) of the 1991 Act, insofar as relevant, reads as

follows:

     "If in any proceedings it is alleged by the prosecution that a

     dog is one to which section 1 ... applies it shall be presumed

     that it is such a dog unless the contrary is shown by the accused

     by such evidence as the court considers fit; and the accused

     shall not be permitted to adduce such evidence unless he has

     given the prosecution notice of his intention to do so not later

     than the fourteenth day before that on which the evidence is to

     be adduced".

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains about section 5(5) of the 1991 Act

arguing that it is a denial of the benefit of the presumption of

innocence in violation of Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention.

2.   She also complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that

she was denied a fair trial as the dog's past character or behaviour

was not examined or taken into consideration and because of the

decision of the High Court not to return the case for a rehearing.

3.   She further complains under Article 8 of the Convention that she

has been deprived of her basic right to have a dog as a pet in

violation of her right to respect for her private and family life.

4.   The applicant also claims that the 1991 Act has denied her

peaceful enjoyment of her possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol

1 as the measures in question went beyond any fair view of the public

interest.

5.   In addition, she complains under Article 14 of the Convention

that the 1991 Act discriminates against a certain type of dog

irrespective of the character or conduct of the relevant dog.

6.   Finally, she complains under Article 13 of the Convention that

she has no effective domestic remedy because there is no option, other

than a destruction order, available to a court having convicted an

owner under section 1(3) of the 1991 Act.

THE LAW

1.   In the first place, the applicant submits that the presumption

as to fact contained in section 5(5) of the 1991 Act is in violation

of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention. She argues that the

practical effect of the 1991 Act is that unless very strong evidence

is raised by the defence the owner of the dog is convicted and the dog

is destroyed. Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention reads as

follows:

     "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed

     innocent until proved guilty according to law."

     The Commission recalls that the criteria to be applied in

determining whether proceedings involve the determination of a criminal

charge are the qualification of the offence in domestic law, the very

nature of the offence together with the nature and severity of the

penalty which the accused risks incurring (see, for example, No.

13877/88, Dec. 17.5.90, D.R. 65 p. 279). Applying these criteria and

in view, in particular, of the sanction set out in section 1(7) of the

1991 Act for a contravention of section 1(2)(e) of that Act, the

Commission considers that the proceedings against the applicant

constituted the determination of a criminal charge.

     The Commission also recalls that the Court, in the Salabiaku

judgment and more recently in the Pham Hoang judgment, stated that the

Convention does not prohibit presumptions of fact or law in principle,

but does require Contracting States to remain within certain reasonable

limits as regards criminal law which limits take into account the

importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence.

The Court, in the above-mentioned judgments, also considered whether

the application of the relevant presumptions was compatible with the

presumption of innocence (Eur. Court H.R., Salabiaku judgment of

7 October 1988, Series A no. 141-A, pp. 14-18, paras. 26-30 and Pham

Hoang judgment of 25 September 1992, Series A no. 243, pp. 21-22, para.

33).

     In the present case, the Commission recalls that the presumption

contained in section 5(5) of the 1991 Act is one as to fact namely, it

is presumed that a dog is "of the type known as the pit bull terrier".

     The Commission notes what was at stake for the applicant namely,

a possible criminal conviction together with a potential penalty of,

inter alia, six months imprisonment and the destruction of her dog.

However, the Commission finds that it is significant that section 5(5)

of the 1991 Act expressly provides an opportunity to the defendant to

adduce evidence as to a dog's breeding. The sole issue of substance

throughout the domestic proceedings was whether the dog in question was

"of the type known as the pit bull terrier". Expert evidence was

submitted by the prosecution and the defence as to the dog's breeding

before the Magistrates' Court and the Crown Court concluded that the

applicant had not, on the balance of probabilities, established that

her dog was not of a type known as a pit bull terrier. When domestic

case-law then established that two behavioural characteristics included

in the ADBA breed standards must be considered in identifying the dog

as of the relevant type, the High Court reviewed the evidence before

it, and that evidence previously produced, before concluding that there

was no evidence to demonstrate that the decision as to the identity of

dog would be any different even using these two additional standards.

     In such circumstances, the Commission considers that section 5(5)

of the 1991 Act falls within reasonable limits, even in light of what

was at stake for the applicant, given the opportunity expressly

provided to the defence to rebut the presumption of fact and that that

section was applied in a manner compatible with the presumption of

innocence. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the applicant's

complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the condemnation of a category of

dog, on the basis of physical appearance alone without accepting

evidence as to past good character and conduct, violates her right to

a fair trial set out in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

However, having regard to the nature of these submissions, the

Commission considers that they are more properly considered under

Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1), this complaint essentially being a

grievance with the provisions of the 1991 Act itself.

     As regards the applicant's complaint that the Crown Court

decisions were delivered before the change in the domestic case-law and

that the High Court did not then refer the case back for a rehearing,

the Commission notes that a right to a rehearing cannot be derived from

the provisions of the Convention (No. 7761/77, Dec. 8.5.78, D.R. 14 p.

171). In any event, the Commission notes that the High Court reviewed,

in light of that change in the domestic case-law, the evidence which

had been presented thus far in the case and took the view that, even

taking account of the relevant two behavioural characteristics, the

decision of the Magistrates' Court would not be any different. The

Commission therefore finds this complaint manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   She further complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention

that the  deprivation of her dog constituted a violation of her right

to respect for her private and family life.

     As to whether the applicant's complaint is within the scope of

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission recalls its

previous case-law in which it held that the keeping of a pet does not

fall within the sphere of the owner's private or family life for the

purposes of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (No. 6825/74, X v.

Iceland, Dec. 18 May 1976, D.R. 5 p. 86). While the applicant argues

to the contrary, the Commission does not consider that, in the

circumstances of this case, there exists any reason to depart from or

to distinguish the aforementioned case-law (cf., No. 25517/94, Dec.

3.4.95, unpublished).

     Accordingly, the Commission finds this complaint incompatible

ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.   The applicant also claims that the 1991 Act has denied her

peaceful enjoyment of her possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol

1 (P1-1) as the measures in question went beyond any fair view of the

public interest in the control of the use of property.

     Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1), insofar as relevant, reads as

follows:

     "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

     enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

     his possessions except in the public interest and subject

     to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

     principles of international law."

     The Commission recalls that the applicant's dog was seized and

subsequently destroyed and considers that the applicant was deprived

of her property within the meaning of the second sentence of the first

paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1).

     In order to be justified, it must be shown that the deprivation

was in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and in the

public interest. Furthermore, not only must the aim of the deprivation

of property be in the public interest, but there must also be a

reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed

and the aim sought to be realised (cf., for example, Eur. Court H.R.

Holy Monasteries judgment of 9 December 1994, to be published in Series

A no. 301-A, para. 70). This implies that a fair balance must be struck

between the demands of the general interests of the community and the

requirement to protect the individual's fundamental rights, which

balance would not be found if the individual was found to have borne

an excessive burden (Eur. Court  H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment

of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 26-28, paras. 69-73).

(a) Subject to the conditions provided for by law

     The Commission recalls that the term "law" in the Convention

refers not only to compliance with the domestic law but also to the

quality of that law requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law

so that, inter alia, the law in question must not be arbitrary and must

be formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate

their conduct (Eur. Court H.R., James and Others judgment of

21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 41, para. 67 and the Sunday Times

judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 20, p. 31, para. 49).

     The Commission, having examined the applicant's submissions,

finds no evidence that the prosecution of the applicant was other than

in accordance with the 1991 Act or that her prosecution or conviction

was arbitrary in its effect. In view of the availability of objective

standards by which various characteristics of a dog can be assessed to

establish its identity (the ADBA breed standards) and the clear

prohibition on allowing such dogs to stray, the Commission does not

find that the 1991 Act lacked sufficient clarity to have enabled the

applicant to regulate her conduct as regards her dog to avoid

prosecution under section 1(2)(e) of the 1991 Act.

(b) Public interest

     The Commission considers that it is clear that the provisions of

the 1991 Act, which applied in the applicant's case, operate in the

interests of public safety.

(c) Proportionality of the deprivation

     The applicant disputes the necessity of the mandatory destruction

order and contests the denouncing of a breed of dog rather than a

particular dog's dangerous behaviour (section 1(1)(a)). In this respect

she submits that her dog has never caused any trouble, has lived

happily with the applicant's four children and was not causing any

trouble when it was found as a stray.

     On the one hand, the Commission accepts that the conviction based

on breed rather than past behaviour and the consequent mandatory

destruction order, being provisions ultimately aimed at eradicating pit

bull terriers as a breed from the United Kingdom, are draconian

measures. However and on the other hand, the Commission is cognisant

of the fact that the pit bull terrier breed was developed as a fighting

animal which, prior to the introduction of the 1991 Act, was known to

have attacked persons in the United Kingdom causing much public

concern. In addition, the Commission does not consider the requirement

to prevent such animals straying to be an unreasonably onerous measure

on owners of such animals.

     In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the

provisions of the 1991 Act referred to by the applicant demonstrate a

reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed

and the aim sought to be realised in that a fair balance was struck

between the importance of ensuring the safety of the public and the

requirement to protect the applicant's rights under Article 1 of

Protocol 1 (P1-1).

     Therefore the Commission concludes that this complaint of the

applicant is manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.   The applicant further complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention arguing that the 1991 Act discriminates against a certain

breed of dog irrespective of the character or behaviour of the dog in

question. Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, insofar as relevant,

reads as follows:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as ...  political or other opinion, ... property or other

     status."

     The Commission recalls that this Article protects individuals in

analogous situations from a discriminatory difference in treatment in

the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention

and its Protocols. Article 14 (Art. 14) has, therefore no independent

existence and the Commission has accordingly considered this complaint

of the applicant in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1),

into the scope of which latter Article a complaint relating to the

seizure and destruction of the applicant's dog could be said to fall.

     However, such a difference in treatment will only be

discriminatory if it has "no objective and reasonable justification"

namely, if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" and if there is no

"reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed

and the aim sought to be realised" (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R.,

Darby judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 187, p. 12, para. 31).

Furthermore, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of

appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in

otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law; the

scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the

subject matter and the background (Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow judgment

of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, para. 177).

     The Commission accepts that the 1991 Act singles out, inter alia,

owners of pit bull terriers which stray from owners of other dogs which

stray and which by their behaviour show themselves to be dangerous.

However, the Commission finds that this difference in treatment has an

objective and reasonable justification given that this type of dog is

bred for fighting and the experience of pit bull terriers in the United

Kingdom. The Commission further finds that such difference in treatment

pursues the legitimate aim of public safety and demonstrates a

reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed

and the aim sought to be realised in light, in particular, of the

reasonable requirement of control through ensuring that the animal does

not stray. Having regard, in addition, to the margin of appreciation

enjoyed by the Contracting States in this area, the Commission

considers that this difference in treatment is not discriminatory

within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

Accordingly, the Commission finds this complaint manifestly ill-founded

pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6.   Finally, the applicant complains under Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention that she has no effective domestic remedy.

In this respect, she points to the mandatory nature of the destruction

order pursuant to conviction under section 1(2)(e) of the 1991 Act and

the inability of the courts to make any alternative orders upon such

conviction.

     Insofar as the applicant claims that there was no domestic remedy

in respect of her complaints that the provisions of the relevant

legislation do not comply with the Convention provisions and Protocols,

the Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does

not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State's

laws as such to be challenged before the national authority on the

grounds of being contrary to the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., James and

Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 47, para. 85).

     Insofar as the applicant complains about the consequences for her

of the application of the legislation, the Commission recalls that

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not require a remedy in

domestic law for all claims alleging a breach of the Convention; the

claim must be an arguable one (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment

of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). In light of the

above conclusions of the Commission concerning the applicant's other

complaints, the Commission finds that the applicant does not have an

arguable claim, of a breach of her rights and freedoms by the

application of the legislation in her case, which warrants a remedy

under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

     The Commission therefore considers this complaint manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                          (C.L. ROZAKIS)