AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 21062/92

                      by Kristina KRAMELIUS

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 17 January 1996, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE, Acting President

           MM.   H. DANELIUS

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 29 September 1992

by Kristina KRAMELIUS against Sweden and registered on 14 December 1992

under file No. 21062/92;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 10 March 1995, the observations in reply submitted by the

applicant on 3 May 1995 and the additional observations submitted by

the Government on 16 June 1995;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Swedish citizen of Polish origin, born in 1946

and resident at Huddinge near Stockholm. She is represented by

Mr. Peter Klevius, an anthropologist at Borgå, Finland.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

I.    Particular circumstances of the case

      1.   Background

      The applicant moved from Poland to Sweden in 1976. A daughter,

Anette, was born to her in February 1979. The applicant is a single

mother and Anette's legal custodian. Anette's father is of Iranian

origin.

      In December 1988 the Pupil Welfare Committee (elevvårdsteamet)

reported Anette's behaviour in school to the Sub-Municipal

Administration (kommundelsnämnden) of Flemingsberg. The report

concluded that Anette's mental condition had been poor since she had

started school in 1986. Her behaviour had been "destructive" and the

school had repeatedly discussed her problems with the applicant, who

had considered, however, that they had been caused by the school and

society. The report also questioned the applicant's mental condition.

The report was lodged pursuant to section 71 of the 1980 Social

Services Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620). The Sub-Municipal

Administration exercised the functions of a Social Council

(socialnämnd) such as referred to in the 1980 Act with Special

Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lag 1980:621 med särskilda

bestämmelser om vård av unga) and subsequently in the 1990 Act with the

same name (lag 1990:52; hereinafter "the 1990 Act"). According to the

applicant, the report purported to have been lodged by the whole Pupil

Welfare Committee was produced exclusively by the school's headmaster.

      In September 1990 two teachers at Anette's school again reported

her situation to the Sub-Municipal Administration (hereinafter referred

to as "the Social Council"). They considered that Anette was expressing

"morbid" ideas, e.g., in the form of essays, and that this was a call

for help. The teachers were anxious about her mental health and

suspected that Anette's problems were due to the applicant's behaviour.

For instance, the applicant had untruthfully alleged that a teacher had

called her to report that Anette had been hit by another pupil.

      The applicant later lodged a criminal complaint, alleging that

staff at Anette's school had failed to intervene in order to stop the

bullying of Anette which had allegedly been caused by her parents'

origin. The applicant invoked a medical report of 5 October 1990

supporting to some extent the claim that Anette had been subjected to

physical assaults. The report concluded, for instance, that a scar in

Anette's hand could well have been caused by a nail which a fellow

pupil had allegedly tried to hammer into her hand. According to the

applicant, she had attempted to discuss the bullying with Anette's

principal teacher, who had threatened "to make things worse" for Anette

unless the applicant stopped making untruthful allegations.

      Meanwhile, a social welfare officer had begun to suspect that the

applicant was mentally ill and that she might herself have inflicted

the injuries on Anette. Having contacted staff of the school, the

police decided not to pursue its investigation of the applicant's

complaint and contacted the Social Council.

      2.   The public care orders and their implementation

      On 15 October 1990 Anette was provisionally placed in public care

by decision of the Chairman of the Social Council pursuant to section 6

of the 1990 Act. The provisional care order was based on a finding that

the applicant's behaviour was jeopardising Anette's mental health. The

applicant had rejected every attempt by social welfare officials to

meet Anette. She had not agreed to let Anette undergo a psychological

assessment in a residential home for children. Neighbours of the

applicant had also filed reports with the Social Council in which they

had expressed their concern about Anette's well-being. According to the

applicant, the provisional care order was not preceded by any

inspection of the conditions in her and Anette's home. Nor had it been

shown that the applicant was not in good mental health.

      On 16 October 1990 Anette was fetched from the applicant's and

her home and placed for observation in the Geneta residential home for

children. The provisional care order was upheld by the County

Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Stockholm on 25 November 1990.

      On 27 November 1990 the Social Council requested that Anette be

placed in public care pursuant to section 2 of the 1990 Act. The

applicant received a copy of the Council's investigation. She objected

to the Council's request, stating that Anette's need of care could be

satisfied with voluntary means. Anette's official counsel supported the

Council's request.

      On 11 December 1990 the County Administrative Court held a

hearing and on 8 January 1991 it granted the Social Council's request.

It noted, inter alia, that when Anette had started elementary school

in 1986 her teacher and the school psychologist had found her to suffer

from mental problems. The school had provided her with support

activities such as picture therapy. The applicant had objected to the

support activities which had then been discontinued against the

school's wishes. The Social Council had twice been contacted by

Anette's school on account of Anette's behaviour. The applicant had,

however, not accepted the Council's offers to appoint a support family

and to contact the local children's and young persons' psychiatric

clinic. According to a report of 16 November 1990 submitted by Kristina

Ã…nstrand, an authorised psychotherapist, Anette's concept of her own

identity was "confused" and she had difficulties "perceiving reality".

She was suffering from "a strong internal pressure of unsorted

primitive aggression which was being projected on others", whom she

considered as her persecutors. She was therefore in need of long-term

care around the clock in combination with "intensive parenting" and

individual psychotherapy. The Court furthermore had regard to a report

of 16 November 1990 by Mr. Dan Fränkel, Superintendent at the

children's home. Mr. Fränkel had noted, inter alia, that Anette had

herself expressed a wish to receive help. He concluded that the

applicant categorically denied that Anette was having problems.

      The County Administrative Court finally reasoned as follows:

      (Translation)

      "... Consistent information from [Anette's] school,

      neighbours and [the children's home] has shown that she has

      been suffering from mental and physical disturbances since

      she started school. Psychological expertise has interpreted

      these disturbances as an indication that she is in need of

      qualified help. ... [The applicant] has on several

      occasions ... expressed herself in a manner which might

      indicate that she is suffering from paranoia. [She] has

      also made statements which could be interpreted as pointing

      towards suspicions that [she] is in need of mental care.

      Against the background of [Anette's] need of qualified care

      the applicant cannot, in the light of her [own] personal

      problems, be considered as being able to meet Anette's care

      needs.

      ...

      It is true that the applicant has now consented to care

      [services] such as support conversations and, moreover, to

      the appointment of a contact person. There is no reason to

      doubt that this consent is genuine. ... The evidence in the

      case does not support the assumption that voluntary care

      could be provided to the necessary extent as long as [the

      applicant] has the care responsibility. Therefore, ... [the

      Social Council's request] shall be granted. ..."

      The applicant did not challenge the implementation of Anette's

public care in the Geneta children's home. In March 1991 Anette was

moved from the Geneta children's home to a so-called "family home"

(familjehem; hereinafter "foster home") at Lindås some 400 kilometres

away from Huddinge. The parents of that home had two children of their

own and four other children, who were also placed in public care.

      According to the Government, the Social Council had wished to

avoid placing Anette in a so-called residential treatment centre. No

suitable foster home had been found in the Stockholm area and it had

been deemed therapeutically correct to implement the public care at

some distance from the applicant. The applicant's travel to visit

Anette in the "family home" was to be paid by the authorities.

According to the Government, the applicant refused to participate in

the planning of how the public care was to be implemented, e.g., as

regards the applicant's visits to the foster home. According to the

applicant, she was not informed in advance of the removal of Anette

from the Geneta children's home, nor was she given any information

about the foster home.

      On the applicant's appeal the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) of Stockholm on 12 April 1991 upheld the care order,

considering, in essence, that the applicant lacked the necessary

understanding for Anette's care needs.

      The applicant requested leave to appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). Since her submissions had been

lodged out of time the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the

appeal on 17 May 1991. On 27 September 1991 the Supreme Administrative

Court refused to restore the expired time-limit.

      According to the Government, the applicant on several occasions

declined to visit the applicant in the foster home together with social

welfare officials or staff of the Geneta residential home. In

August 1991, after Anette had expressed concern about the fact that the

applicant had not visited her and while the applicant's request for a

termination of Anette's public care was pending, the applicant agreed

to one such meeting with Anette. During her visit the applicant mainly

accused officials and authorities of Anette's placement in public care.

She refused to plan any future visits to the foster home, since Anette

"was to come home very soon". In September 1991 the applicant again

visited the foster home and made Anette state that she was longing to

return home. The applicant taped this statement and told Anette to keep

quiet about it. After the applicant's visit Anette nevertheless told

the parents of the foster home as well as a social welfare officer

about the incident.

      In a report of 21 October 1991 drawn up by the Social Council the

applicant was recognised as wishing the very best for Anette. She was,

however, incapable of observing Anette's needs. This was causing Anette

a dilemma, since she wished to remain loyal to the applicant but found

it difficult to tolerate her lies and accusations.

      On 30 October 1991 the Social Council, noting the report of

21 October 1991, rejected the applicant's request that Anette's public

care be terminated and ordered that her care should continue to be

implemented in the foster home at Lindås.

      The applicant was served with the expert report and the Council's

decision on 18 November 1991. She appealed against the Council's

decision in so far as it had refused to terminate the public care. She

argued that Anette was not in need of public care and asserted, inter

alia, that her mental state had deteriorated during her stay in a

foster home at Lindås, where she had also lost weight.

      Both the Social Welfare Committee and Anette's official counsel

objected to the applicant's appeal. On 24 February 1992 it was rejected

after an oral hearing. The County Administrative Court noted that

Anette had developed favourably during her public care but found that

sufficient time had not yet passed for a termination thereof. It also

considered that the applicant did not understand and could not

therefore satisfy Anette's need for qualified care.

      The applicant lodged a further appeal with the Administrative

Court of Appeal, questioning, inter alia, the accuracy of Dr.

Ã…nstrand's opinion of November 1990 which had been drawn up shortly

after Anette's placement in public care, i.e. when she had been "in a

state of shock".

      The Social Council objected to the applicant's appeal, submitting

inter alia, that she had not allowed Anette to "adapt" to staying in

the foster home and that Anette's loss of weight was due to a healthier

diet and her having reached her teens. Anette's official counsel also

objected to a termination of the public care.

      On 10 April 1992 the Administrative Court of Appeal held an oral

hearing at which it heard a further witness on the applicant's request.

This witness, a neighbour of the applicant, found no reason to question

the conditions in the applicant's and Anette's home prior to the

issuing of the care orders. The witness had met Anette once during her

placement in public care and had concluded from that meeting that she

had not been "well".

      The applicant's appeal was rejected on 30 April 1992, the

Administrative Court of Appeal having found no reason to question the

expert opinion of November 1990 or the conditions in Anette's foster

home. On 3 July 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the

applicant leave to appeal.

      On 26 August 1992 the Social Council rejected the applicant's

further request for a termination of Anette's public care and ordered

that the care should continue to be implemented in the foster home at

Lindås. The Council based itself on a social welfare report of

14 August 1992. In her appeal to the County Administrative Court

concerning the refusal to terminate the public care the applicant

alleged, inter alia, that Anette was depressed and skinny and that she

had been the victim of physical and mental abuse. Both the Social

Council and Anette's official counsel objected to the applicant's

appeal and on 12 January 1993 it was rejected.

      In her further appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal the

applicant argued, inter alia, that Anette's public care had created a

split between them which had not existed earlier. At the applicant's

request the Administrative Court of Appeal heard two of the applicant's

neighbours as witnesses. They found no reason to question the

conditions in the applicant's and Anette's home prior to her placement

in public care.

      Both the Social Council and Anette's official counsel objected

to the applicant's further appeal and on 30 March 1993 it was rejected.

The Administrative Court of Appeal considered the witnesses credible

but found that they had not had a sufficiently close contact with the

applicant and Anette. Therefore no decisive weight should be given to

their testimony.

      According to the Government, the contact between the applicant

and the parents of the foster home improved in the spring and summer

of 1993. The foster parents planned to take Anette along on a visit to

a children's' home in Poland with children for whom the foster parents

were considering acting as godparents. The applicant objected to the

idea of Anette going on the trip and claimed that Anette did not wish

to go. According to the Government, this allegation was untruthful.

      On 6 October 1993 the Social Council reviewed Anette's care needs

under section 13 of the 1990 Act and decided to maintain the public

care.

      The applicant did not request leave to appeal to the Supreme

Administrative Court against the Administrative Court of Appeal's

judgment of 30 March 1993 but requested a re-opening of the

proceedings. This request was rejected on 1 November 1993.

      According to the Government, the attempts of the social welfare

officials to hear the applicant in regard to Anette's future and care

failed, since the applicant did not show up at a meeting in

January 1994 in spite of having been approached by a social welfare

official both by telephone and mail. She had been informed by the

social authorities that she could be assisted by counsel.

      In February 1994 Anette briefly stayed at the Geneta residential

home.

       On 13 April 1994 the Social Council rejected the applicant's

further request for a termination of Anette's public care. It also

decided that Anette's further care needs should be examined at the

children's and young persons' psychiatric clinic at Huddinge Hospital.

She stayed there until 4 July 1994, when she was moved to Villa

Rödkinda, a treatment home in Farsta near Stockholm. This move took

place after a consultation with the applicant on 26 May 1994. According

to the applicant, Villa Rödkinda is a home for teenage drug abusers.

      According to the Government, Anette stated categorically during

this investigation that she did not wish to live with the applicant.

The applicant regularly attended meetings with staff in charge of

Anette's examination during the first four weeks but later declined to

come to any further meetings. She started accusing the hospital staff

of acting partially, i.e. on behalf of the social welfare authority.

Meanwhile, Anette visited the applicant in their home on several

occasions.

      The applicant appealed against the Social Council's decision of

13 April 1994 in so far as it concerned its refusal to terminate

Anette's public care. The applicant stated that she would consent to

Anette's treatment at Huddinge Hospital, if only the public care would

be terminated. The Social Council opposed a termination of the care,

inter alia since the applicant might later withdraw her consent to the

care planned for Anette. Anette herself, now fifteen years of age, also

opposed a termination of her public care.

      On 6 June 1994 Dr. Frank Ståhl, Chief Physician, Annika Elinder,

a psychologist, and Dr. Clara Gumpert, Assistant Physician, submitted

a report based on the examination of Anette's care needs as carried out

at Huddinge Hospital. They concluded that the applicant had

difficulties in perceiving Anette's emotional needs and mental problems

which were of such a magnitude that she would remain dependent on the

resources of a treatment home for a long time. The report was served

on the applicant on 7 June 1994.

      After an oral hearing the County Administrative Court on

16 June 1994 rejected the applicant's appeal against the Social

Council's decision of 13 April 1994. The Court had regard, inter alia,

to the expert report of 6 June 1994.

      On 22 September 1994 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected

the applicant's further appeal which both the Social Council and

Anette's official counsel had objected to. The Court considered, inter

alia, that the necessary care could not be afforded to Anette with the

applicant's consent. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative

Court was later refused.

      In September 1994 Anette lodged a complaint with the police,

accusing the foster father of having sexually harassed her in

February 1994. The investigation was later closed.

      In October 1994 Anette was moved to Magelungen treatment centre

in Stockholm.

      3.   Anette's schooling

      According to the Government, a period of instability began in

Anette's life in the autumn of 1993. She started testing the limits in

the foster home. She also began to harass some of her teachers. In

January 1994 the foster parents no longer felt capable of providing the

necessary assistance and informed the Social Council accordingly. In

February 1994 they reported that Anette's school had decided not to

allow her to attend classes for the rest of a week. Anette had posted

notes with pejorative statements regarding a particular teacher. She

had repeatedly forced her way into the teachers' room. She would speak

incoherently, scream and curse. A School Welfare Officer had been

assigned to deal with Anette's problems, but this attempt had been in

vain. A new special teacher had been giving Anette lessons so as to

avoid contact between her and the teacher whom she had been harassing.

According to the Government, the foster parents also reported that

Anette had been aggressive and violent in the foster home, breaking a

window. It was then decided that Anette should receive lessons in the

foster home. Plans were also made to send Anette to Huddinge Hospital

near Stockholm for a psychological examination.

      According to the Government, Anette received one hour of

individual schooling per day during her stay at Villa Rödkinda. After

her move to Magelungen treatment centre it was intended to provide

ordinary schooling in the ninth grade. Having attended school for one

day, Anette refused to go back. According to the Government, the

treatment centre was unable to provide schooling on its own premises.

According to an opinion submitted by Dr. Ståhl on 28 November 1994

Anette's need of care had, for the time being, to be given priority

over her need of education. It furthermore transpires from a report of

Dr. Ståhl of 12 June 1995 that Anette has consistently and as recently

as 6 June 1995 refused to receive education in whatever form offered

to her.

      4.   Other remedies resorted to by the applicant

      In January 1990 the applicant complained to the Parliamentary

Ombudsmen (Riksdagens justitieombudsmän) about alleged cooperation

problems between her and the schools where Anette had been a pupil. In

the course of the investigation these allegations were refuted by the

teaching staff. On 22 March 1990 one of the Ombudsmen found, inter

alia, that the officials who had, in 1988, reported Anette's behaviour

to the Social Council had been acting in compliance with the law.

      In response to the applicant's further petition one of the

Ombudsmen, on 28 April 1992, found no reason to criticise the Social

Council in regard to Anette's placement in public care. On 8 June 1994

a further petition by the applicant was considered as being partly

time-barred. As to the rest no reason was found for criticising the

Social Council's actions.

      In response to the applicant's petitions the County

Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of Stockholm on 17 September 1991,

14 May and 24 July 1992 as well as on 24 March 1994 found no reason to

criticise the manner in which Anette's case had been handled.

II.   Relevant domestic law

      1.   Public care orders

      According to the 1980 Act Social Services Act, any person who

learns that a minor is being treated in a manner which could jeopardise

his or her health or development should report this to the Social

Council which shall immediately start an investigation (sections 50 and

71).

      According to the 1990 Act, public care of a young person shall

be provided if there is a particular reason to believe that his or her

health or development may be jeopardised because of insufficient care

or any other circumstance in his or her home and if it can be assumed

that the necessary care cannot be provided with the consent of his or

her custodian or custodians (sections 1 and 2).

      The Social Council, its Chairman or another authorised member of

the Council may decide provisionally to place a young person in public

care if it is likely that he or she is in need of such care and if a

court decision in the matter cannot be awaited (section 6, subsections

1 and 2).

      2.   Implementation of public care

      The Social Council is to decide how public care is to be provided

and where the young person is to reside. It may consent to the young

person residing in his or her own home, if this may be presumed to be

the most appropriate means of implementing the care. The public care

shall, however, always commence away from his or her home (sections 10

and 11 of the 1990 Act).

      Before ordering that public care is to be implemented in a foster

home the Social Council must investigate the conditions therein

(section 25). The Council must carefully monitor the young person's

development in the foster home by regularly visiting it and by meeting

with the person (section 39 of the 1981 Social Services Ordinance

(socialtjänstförordning 1981:750)).

      The Social Council shall carefully supervise the implementation

of the public care. If the care order has been issued under section 2,

the Social Council shall at least every six months review the legal

conditions for maintaining it (section 13, subsections 1 and 2). If

public care is no longer considered necessary, it shall be revoked. A

public care order pursuant to section 2 shall be revoked when the young

person reaches the age of eighteen (section 21, subsections 1

and 2).

      The Social Council is responsible for accommodating as far as

possible the young person's need of contact with his parents, custodian

or custodians. If it is necessary in order to achieve the public care

purposes, the Social Council may decide how the right of access to the

young person shall be exercised by a parent or custodian and decide

that the young person's whereabouts should not be revealed to a parent

or custodian. The Social Council shall at least once every three months

reconsider whether such a decision remains necessary (section 14).

      3.   Appeals and supervision

      The Social Council's decisions may be appealed to the County

Administrative Court, if, inter alia, the Council has decided where the

care of the young person is to begin; if it has decided on the removal

of the young person from the home where he or she is living; if it has

decided on the continuation of care in accordance with the Act; or if

it has decided on access in accordance with section 14 (section 41(1-3)

of the 1990 Act). According to the 1971 Administrative Procedure Act

(förvaltningsprocesslag 1971:291), the decisions of the County

Administrative Court may be appealed to the Administrative Court of

Appeal. With leave to appeal, a judgment of the Administrative Court

of Appeal may be challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court

(sections 33 and 35).

      The County Administrative Boards (länsstyrelserna) and the

Parliamentary Ombudsmen are responsible for the supervision of the

social authorities.

      4.   School legislation

      The compulsory school attendance is governed by the 1985

Educational Act (skollag 1985:1100) and corresponds to a right to a

nine-year long education provided by the public school system (chapter

3, section 1). The competent municipality is responsible for ensuring

that children who do not attend public school receive education

otherwise (section 13). Disciplinary action affecting the possibility

for the pupil to attend school may only be used to a limited extent

(section 11).

      According to the 1988 Compulsory Education Ordinance (grundskole-

förordning 1988:655), special education may be provided for children

of school age with specific needs (chapter 5, section 17). Such

education shall, as far as possible, correspond to the education in

which the child is unable to participate. It must, however, be provided

only if the child's doctor has consented thereto.

      The National Agency for Education (statens skolverk) supervises

the public school system and may examine complaints relating to its

implementation (section 4 of the relevant 1991 Ordinance (1991: 1121).

      The so-called pupil welfare committees are composed of the

school's headmaster, teachers, the school's physician, its nurse as

well as its welfare officer.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that Anette's public care has not been

sufficiently justified. The real reason for her placement in such care

was allegedly the applicant's objections to the lax attitude of

Anette's teachers in regard to the bullying which occurred in her

school. The reports from Anette's school to the Social Council were "an

act of revenge" on the part of some of her teachers. The applicant

challenges the experts' findings that Anette was suffering from mental

disturbances at the time of her placement in public care and that she

is currently still in need of such care. Finally, certain

investigations by the social authorities concerning Anette's care needs

have allegedly not been communicated to the applicant. She invokes

Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

2.    The applicant complains about the particular manner in which the

provisional care order was enforced in October 1990. Allegedly, social

officials broke into a toilet in the applicant's and Anette's home and

did not inform the applicant of the reasons for the provisional care

order. The applicant again invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the

Convention.

3.    The applicant also complains about the implementation of Anette's

public care. The Social Council refused to allow the implementation to

take place in her and the applicant's home. The care was partly

implemented at a considerable distance from her and the applicant's

home. Anette's foster family at Lindås had already received several

other children placed in public care and also had two children of their

own. Anette had to stay in a very small room. The foster parents

allegedly interfered with the applicant's and Anette's correspondence

and telephone conversations. While Anette was placed in the foster home

the applicant was allowed to see her only on rare occasions and always

in the presence of a social welfare official or one of the foster

parents. She was not always informed in advance of the duration of the

meetings. During certain meetings she was not allowed to speak to

Anette or show her physical affection. The applicant again invokes

Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.

4.    In her submissions of 17 October and 18 November 1994 the

applicant also complains that Anette is not being provided with any

effective possibility of completing her compulsory education. In this

respect the applicant invokes no particular provision of the Convention

or its Protocols.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 29 September 1992 and

registered on 14 December 1992.

      On 30 November 1994 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to

communicate part of the application to the respondent Government,

pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure. The

Government were requested to submit written observations in regard to

the complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention as well as

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 with the exception of the complaint

concerning the manner in which the provisional care order was enforced.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

10 March 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose. The applicant replied on 3 May 1995. Additional observations

were submitted by the Government on 16 June 1995.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that neither the provisional care order

of 15 October 1990 nor the care order of 8 January 1991 was based on

sufficient reasons. In any event, there are no longer any reasons for

maintaining her daughter Anette's public care.

      The Government submit that domestic remedies have not been

exhausted, since the applicant did not appeal against the provisional

care order. Nor did she properly seek leave to appeal against the

judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal on 12 April 1991

upholding the care order of 8 January 1991. Alternatively, in so far

as the definitive care order is concerned, the complaint has been

lodged belatedly, even if the six months' time-limit prescribed by

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention were to be calculated from the

Supreme Administrative Court's decision of 27 September 1991 not to

restore the time-limit for the applicant's request for leave to appeal.

Finally, the applicant did not challenge the decisions of 26 August

1992 and 6 October 1993 not to terminate Anette's care.

      The Government concede, however, that many circumstances of

relevance to the initial care order have later been examined by the

administrative courts dealing with the applicant's requests for a

termination of Anette's public care. The Commission should therefore

consider the complaint in the light of the entire proceedings up to and

including the Supreme Administrative Court's refusal of leave to appeal

on 3 July 1992. Should the Commission take this approach, the

Government argue that the complaint is nevertheless manifestly

ill-founded. Anette's placement in public care and the maintaining of

that care has been based on the 1990 Act and has served the legitimate

aim of protecting the interests and welfare of herself.

      As to the necessity of the public care order, the Government

recall that the Parliamentary Ombudsman found no reason to criticise

the report of the Pupil Welfare Committee of 1988. The Government

further refer to the findings of the Social Council and the expert

reports of 16 November 1990 from which it became clear that Anette was

in need of long-term treatment for her problems. Since the applicant

failed to comprehend those problems and considering the risk that

Anette's mental health and development would otherwise suffer,

voluntary care was out of the question. These reasons were relevant and

sufficient and responded to a pressing social need. Moreover, hearings

were held before administrative courts on two levels.

      As to the necessity of maintaining Anette's public care, the

Government refer to the findings of the Social Council and the

administrative courts as well as the expert report of 6 June 1994

indicating that Anette remained in need of treatment. Furthermore, the

applicant has persistently denied Anette's problems. Finally, Anette's

official counsel has consistently opposed a termination of the public

care.

      The Government admit that the applicant's general attitude in the

matter has made her participation in the decision-making process

difficult. She has nevertheless been duly informed of every measure

taken in regard to Anette's public care and her views have been taken

into account to the extent possible, also bearing in mind Anette's

welfare. Throughout the proceedings the applicant has been represented

by official counsel. Both the applicant's requests that an "impartial

person" should be present during meetings and her requests that

witnesses should be heard before the courts have been granted. Case

notes show, however, that on several occasions, when the social

authorities have attempted to meet her and her representative, neither

of them attended the proposed meetings.

      The applicant contends that the care needs of Anette which she

has been considered incapable of comprehending have never been

specified by the authorities. She questions the quality of the initial

examination of Anette's care needs in November 1990 and asserts that

the real reason for the initial care order was that she was seen as a

"troublemaker" after having reported the bullying in Anette's school.

Although the Government claim that the reports by the Pupil Welfare

Committee of Anette's school to the Social Council were initiated by

her teachers, the applicant contends that the reports are unknown to

them and that they were produced by the headmaster wishing to protect

the school's reputation. Moreover, the applicant's problems with the

Swedish language has led the social welfare authorities to include in

their reports absurd statements which she is said to have made and

which she has not been allowed to correct.

      The applicant furthermore recalls that Anette's placement in

public care was considered necessary because it was presumed that

continued care in the applicant's home could jeopardise Anette's

development. However, the qualified care and support which the

authorities considered Anette to be in need of has never been provided.

On the contrary, her violent behaviour started only as a result of her

placement in public care, as did her problems in school. Her foster

father has sexually abused her and threatened her at gunpoint, she has

been prevented from attending school and she has been placed in a

treatment centre where drugs are common and which does not provide the

peaceful environment which the authorities have considered her to be

in need of. The applicant also refutes the Government's statement that

Anette's development was continuously being monitored by a psychologist

at the Huddinge Hospital. Her only therapy has been provided by a

non-authorised psychologist accused of violence against another young

person placed in a treatment centre.

      The applicant finally refutes the Government's statement that

Anette has not wished to see her. On the contrary, she wants to spend

as much as time as possible with the applicant and has continuously

been corresponding with her. Occasionally, she has been spending up to

eight hours a day with the applicant and this situation is continuing.

Anette has furthermore stated to her that she has been dissuaded by

social welfare officials from expressing her wish to move back home and

return to school; otherwise they would see to it that she would be

placed in psychiatric care.

      The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention it may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies

have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of

international law, and within a period of six months from the date on

which the final decision was taken. It considers, however, that the

public care of Anette can arguably be considered as a situation which

started on 15 October 1990 and is still continuing. In this case it can

be left open whether the applicant has complied with the six months'

time-limit prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26) in respect of the various

aspects of the present complaint. Nor does the Commission need to

determine whether the applicant has complied with the exhaustion

requirement prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26), since, even if this

were the case, the complaint is inadmissible for the following reasons.

      The Commission considers that the complaint falls to be examined

under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which reads, in so far as

it is relevant, as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family

      life, ...

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      The Commission finds that the placement of Anette in public care

constituted an interference with the applicant's right to respect for

her family life. In order to be justified under the terms of Article 8

para. 2 (Art. 8-2) such an interference must satisfy three conditions:

it must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of

the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it

must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those

legitimate aims. The notion of necessity implies that the interference

corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, requires that

it be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining

whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the

Commission will also take into account that a margin of appreciation

is left to the Contracting States, but its review is not limited to

ascertaining whether a respondent State exercised its discretion

reasonably, carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, in exercising its

supervisory function, the Commission cannot confine itself to

considering the impugned decisions in isolation, but must look at them

in the light of the case as a whole. It must determine whether the

reasons adduced to justify the interferences at issue were "relevant

and sufficient" (see Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68). Finally, certain procedural

requirements are also implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8) to the extent that

in child care matters the parents must have been involved in the

decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to

provide them with the requisite protection of their interests. This

requirement implies that the parents should be sufficiently informed

of the outcome of investigations carried out by the authorities

(cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of

8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, pp. 28-29, paras. 63-65; cf. also the

above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p. 33, para. 71).

      In the Commission's view the 1990 Act which was applied in this

case was clearly designed to protect young persons and there is nothing

to suggest that it was applied for any other purpose. The interference

in question was intended to safeguard the development of the

applicant's daughter Anette and therefore served the legitimate aim of

protecting her health and rights.

      As regards the necessity of the various care orders, the

Commission observes that Anette's need of public care has been

carefully and repeatedly examined by Swedish administrative courts. The

purpose of placing Anette in such care has essentially been to provide

her with long-term treatment outside her home, which the applicant has

not been willing to accept. The Commission considers that this reason

is clearly relevant and sufficient to justify Anette's placement in

public care and the decisions to maintain that care.

      The Commission finally finds no indication that the applicant has

not been sufficiently informed of the investigations concluding that

Anette is still in need of public care. Nor can it find that she has

at any stage of the domestic proceedings been prevented from presenting

the views which would in her opinion be of importance for the

examination of the care order and the subsequent maintaining of that

order. In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant

was sufficiently involved in the decision-making process, seen as a

whole, so as to provide her with the requisite protection of her

interests.

      Taking all the circumstances of the case into account and having

regard to the State's margin of appreciation, the Commission is

satisfied that the Swedish authorities have reasonably been entitled

to consider Anette's placement in public care as necessary so as to

achieve the above-mentioned legitimate aims. The Commission therefore

finds no appearance of any violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) in this

respect.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant has also complained about the particular manner in

which the provisional care order was enforced in October 1990.

      The Commission notes, however, that the present complaint was

introduced on 29 September 1992, that is more than six months later.

An examination of the complaint does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the

running of the six months' period prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26).

Accordingly, this complaint has been lodged belatedly.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 27

para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant also complains about the implementation of Anette's

public care.

      The Government submit that domestic remedies have not been

exhausted, since the applicant never appealed against the decisions to

place Anette in the Geneta children's home or in the foster home at

Lindås. Nor did the applicant challenge Anette's conditions in the

last-mentioned home by requesting that she be moved to another home.

      In the alternative, the Government submit that this complaint is

manifestly ill-founded. They concede that the foster home at Lindås is

situated about 400 kilometres from the applicant's home. However, the

Social Council had wished to avoid placing Anette in a treatment centre

and no suitable foster home had been found in the Stockholm area. It

had also been deemed therapeutically correct to implement Anette's

public care at some distance from the applicant. The applicant's

travels to visit Anette in the foster home were paid by the

authorities. Referring to the findings of the administrative courts,

the Government, moreover, refute the applicant's allegation that the

conditions in that home were unsatisfactory. Reference is also made to

the County Administrative Board's and the Parliamentary Ombudsman's

decisions in which no reason was found to criticise the handling of the

case by the authorities.

      The Government furthermore submit that during Anette's stay in

the foster home at Lindås continuous contact was kept with the Huddinge

Hospital. A plan to have Anette undergo special psychological care

nevertheless had to be postponed in view of her strong opposition

thereto. The experiences of the Magelungen treatment centre have been

very good.

      The Government finally underline that the social authorities

repeatedly attempted to bring about meetings between the applicant and

Anette. However, bearing in mind the care which Anette was receiving,

she was not forced by the authorities to see the applicant. On several

occasions the applicant herself declined to visit Anette after having

been given such an opportunity. Finally, on several occasions the

authorities tried to draw up a plan together with the applicant,

indicating when and how the contacts between her and Anette were to

take place. The applicant refused to co-operate. Anette suffered from

the applicant's refusal to visit her and when she eventually did, in

April 1991, it was a great disappointment to Anette. The Government

finally submit that lately there has been a certain increase of

contacts between Anette and the applicant.

      The applicant questions, in particular, the long distance between

her home and Anette's foster home at Lindås. During the applicant's

visit they were not allowed to sit next to each other and talk to each

other in private. This was the real reason for Anette's disappointment

after the meeting.

      The Commission considers that it need not determine whether

domestic remedies have been exhausted in accordance with Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention in respect of this complaint, since the

complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

(a)   The Commission recalls that, in so far as a public care order

does not aim at the adoption of the child concerned, any measure of

implementation of a public care order shall be consistent with the

ultimate aim of reuniting the child and the family. The prospect of a

successful reunification will necessarily be weakened if impediments

are placed in the way of their having easy and regular access to each

other (see the above-mentioned Olsson judgment, pp. 36-37, para. 81).

Whether or not a parent shows an uncooperative attitude towards the

social welfare authorities is not necessarily decisive (cf., ibid.,

p. 37, para. 83).

      The Commission observes that Anette's public care has been

implemented in several different environments. It finds no indication

that the implementation has not been "in accordance with the law" nor

can it find that it lacked the aims which the Commission has previously

found to have justified Anette's placement in public care. As regards

the necessity of the implementation, the Commission does not find it

established that the quality of the care given to Anette in the various

environments has not been satisfactory. It observes, in particular,

that in so far as the care was implemented in the foster home at

Lindås, efforts were made so as not to create any insurmountable

practical obstacles to meetings between the applicant and Anette.

      In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the

implementation of Anette's public care has not been supported by

sufficient reasons justifying them as being proportionate to the

legitimate aims pursued. Accordingly, the implementation has been

"necessary in a democratic society" in pursuance of those aims and

there is no appearance of any violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) on this

point either.

(b)   The Commission furthermore finds no indication that the applicant

has not had at her disposal an effective remedy within the meaning of

Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention for the purpose of challenging

the implementation of Anette's public care.

      It follows that this complaint must as a whole also be rejected

as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.    In her submissions of 17 October and 18 November 1994 the

applicant finally complains that her daughter Anette is not being

provided with any effective possibility of completing her compulsory

education.

      The Government again submit that domestic remedies have not been

exhausted, since the applicant did not complain to the National Agency

for Education. Moreover, considering the conflict of interests between

the applicant and Anette, the Government question whether the applicant

can represent Anette, now sixteen years old, in this matter before the

Commission.

      In the alternative, the Government argue that this complaint is

also manifestly ill-founded. Anette's problems in school which began

to escalate in 1993 were due to a number of factors. Her behaviour in

school made learning difficult for everyone in her class. Despite the

School Welfare Officer's attempts to support her the situation turned

into a crisis. The decision not to allow Anette to attend lessons at

school which meant that she should instead receive individual lessons

in her "family home" was reasonably necessitated by her mental

condition and was not a disciplinary measure. She also received

individual lessons at Villa Rödkinda up to October 1994. In April 1995

plans were made with a view to enabling her to complete her ninth grade

by receiving one individual lesson per day at the Magelungen treatment

centre. She refused to cooperate. The Government furthermore emphasise

that according to expert reports priority now has to be given to

Anette's care needs. Summing up, the Government concede that, although

Anette has been temporarily prevented from attending classes in school,

she has not been deprived of schooling to a larger extent than

necessary in her case. The authorities have done their utmost to

provide her with schooling, bearing in mind her condition and

well-being. The social authorities still intend to provide her with the

education corresponding to the compulsory nine-year long education.

      The Commission considers that it can leave open the question

whether the applicant, Anette's legal custodian, can represent Anette

before the Commission as regards this particular complaint. Nor does

the Commission need to determine whether domestic remedies have been

exhausted in accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention,

since the complaint is in any case inadmissible for the following

reasons.

      The Commission considers that this complaint falls to be examined

under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention which, in

so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:

      "No person shall be denied the right to education. ..."

      The Commission recalls that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

(Art. P1-2) is concerned primarily with elementary education (e.g., No.

7671/76 et al., Dec. 19.5.77, D.R. 9 p. 185). It guarantees a "right"

of "access" to the educational establishments existing at a given time

(No. 11533/85, Dec. 6.3.87, D.R. 51 p. 125). In the Commission's view

it cannot therefore be interpreted so as to impose an absolute

obligation on a Contracting State to provide schooling for someone who

clearly does not wish to make use of this right. Given the

circumstances in the present case, the Commission would therefore agree

with the Government that, for the time being, the necessary measures

have been taken by the Contracting State so as to ensure Anette's right

to education within the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

(P1-2) In these circumstances the Commission finds no appearance of any

violation of this provision.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

         Secretary to                       Acting President of

      the Second Chamber                     the Second Chamber

      (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                        (G.H. THUNE)