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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 26903/95

by Anthony COLLMAN

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 18 January 1996, the following members being present:

Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. E. BUSUTTIL

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. MARXER

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

E. KONSTANTINOV

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 24 January 1995

by Anthony COLLMAN against the United Kingdom and registered on

28 March 1995 under file No. 26903/95;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1953. He lives in

London. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

The applicant was convicted of reckless driving at Middlesex

Guildhall Crown Court on 9 July 1992. He was fined £100.00 and ordered

to pay £30.00 compensation to each of the two policemen he had driven

at. He represented himself at the trial.

The applicant did not pay the sums due, and on 17 June 1993 was

committed to prison for 21 days by the Marlborough Magistrates' Court

that is, a period of 14 days in default in respect of the conviction

on 9 July 1992, and a further, consecutive, period of 7 days in default

in respect of a separate financial imposition (an order for costs by

the Knightsbridge Crown Court) of 27 January 1992.

The total of 21 days' detention in default was reduced to a total

of 14 days by the Marlborough Street Magistrates' Court on 21 June

1993. The applicant served the period of detention.

On 22 November 1993 the applicant applied, in connection with the

conviction of 9 July 1992, for an extension of time, for leave to

appeal against conviction and sentence, and for legal aid. The

application was refused by a single judge of the Court of Appeal on

9 June 1994. The judge stated "the judge was right to hold that this

was a case of all or nothing. The lesser verdict of careless driving

did not arise on the way in which the case was presented to the court.

The judge was perfectly entitled, when carrying out the sentencing

exercise, to make the compensation orders based on the evidence heard

by her during the trial". All applications were refused.

The applicant renewed his applications to the full Court of

Appeal, which rejected them on 19 August 1994. The Court held:

"... [The applicant] appeared at Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court

on 9 July 1992, where he was tried. [He] appeared in person.

The judge at the trial directed the jury that either the

defendant, as he then was, drove recklessly or he did not. She

was right to do so. The applicant now says that she should have

left careless driving to the jury, though at the time he agreed

that it was "an all or nothing case". It is the duty of the

judge to define the issue in the case for the jury. She did.

This application fails.

The applicant has submitted in writing further complaints about

his trial, none of which have any substance whatever. For all

those reasons this application is refused."

COMPLAINTS

The applicant alleges violation of Articles 6 paras. 1 and 3(c)

of the Convention, and of Articles 6 para. 2, 7, 13 and 14 of the

Convention.

In connection with Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the

applicant alleges that the trial judge erred in putting the case to the

jury in the way she did. He also complains that he was not permitted

to put his case in person before the Court of Appeal, and states that

he had neither funds to engage a legal representative for the hearing

nor legal aid for the Court of Appeal hearing.

The applicant also alleges that the absence of legal aid for the

proceedings before the Court of Appeal was in violation of Article 6

para. 3 (c) of the Convention, and that it discriminated against him

on the grounds of his status as a pauper, contrary to Article 14 of the

Convention.

The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 2,

Article 7, and Article 13 of the Convention. In connection with

Article 7 of the Convention, he claims that a compensation order should

not have been made because the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 under

which the compensation order was made excludes "accidents".

THE LAW

1. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention in connection with the way in which the

judge put the case to the jury.

The Commission notes that both the single judge of the Court of

Appeal and the Court of Appeal mentioned that at the trial, the

applicant had agreed that it was an "all or nothing case", that is,

that if the facts alleged were made out, then he was guilty of reckless

driving, and that if they were not made out, then he was guilty neither

of reckless nor of careless driving.

In these circumstances, the Commission finds no unfairness in

connection with this part of the application.

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant also alleges violations of the Convention in

connection with the leave to appeal proceedings. In particular, he

complains that he did not have legal aid for those proceedings, and

that he was not permitted to put his case in person to the Court of

Appeal. He also alleges that the proceedings before the Court of

Appeal were not public as, although he was present and the judgment was

delivered publicly, a member of the public who had been present would

not have known the contents of the applicant's application for leave

to appeal, as he was not given a chance to address the Court of Appeal,

and the Court of Appeal did not refer to his arguments, but merely

dismissed them wholesale.

The Commission first notes that the applicant does not complain

that he did not have legal aid at first instance. It further notes that

he did not apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed time limit

of 14 days (for a description of leave to appeal proceedings, see Eur.

Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A

no. 115, p. 12- 14, paras. 23 - 27). The single judge and the Court

of Appeal did not, however, reject the application for leave as being

out of time, and so the Commission will deal with the substance of the

applicant's complaints.

The Commission recalls that in the above-mentioned Monnell and

Morris judgment, the European Court of Human Rights found that neither

the absence of an oral hearing nor the absence of legal aid before the

Court of Appeal in leave to appeal proceedings violated Article 6

para. 1 or para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention.

The present case is different from the case of Monnell and Morris

in that the applicant had not had legal aid at first instance -

apparently because he did not apply for it - and so did not have the

benefit of legal advice as to whether to appeal. However, it is also

different in that the applicant suffered no adverse consequence from

his unsuccessful application for leave to appeal, and in that he was

in fact present at the Court of Appeal's hearing on 19 August 1994.

In the light of the conclusions of the Court in the above-

mentioned Monnell and Morris case, the Commission finds in the

particular circumstances of this case that the absence of legal aid for

the leave to appeal proceedings did not conflict with the requirements

of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention. Given that

the applicant, but not the prosecution, was present before the Court

of Appeal on 19 August 1994, the Commission also finds the principle

of equality of arms was met, and that the making of written submissions

only on the applicant's applications for leave to appeal did not

otherwise "put the accused at a disadvantage" (see above-mentioned

Monnell and Morris judgment, p. 24. para. 62, with further references).

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3. The applicant alleges that the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973

does not apply to accidents, and that it should therefore not have been

applied in his case. He considers that Article 7(Art. 7) has been

violated. Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention provides as follows.

"1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on

account of any act or omission which did not constitute a

criminal offence under national or international law at the time

when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed

than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence

was committed.

2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment

of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it

was committed, was criminal according to the general principles

of law recognised by civilised nations."

Section 35 (3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973

provides, so far as relevant, that "no [compensation] order shall be

made in respect of injury, loss or damage due to an accident arising

out of the presence of a motor vehicle on a road ...". The applicant,

however, was not involved in an "accident" but was convicted of driving

(recklessly) at two policemen. In any event, Article 7 (Art. 7) of the

Convention prohibits retroactive criminal legislation and penalties.

The Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 was in force when the applicant

committed the offence in issue in the present case, and so the

complaint under Article 7 (Art. 7) is misconceived.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4. The applicant makes further complaints under Articles 6, 13 and

14 (Art. 6, 13, 14) of the Convention.

The Commission has examined these complaints, and finds, to the

extent that they are substantiated and are within its competence, that

they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the provisions

referred to.

It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber

(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)

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COLLMAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

COLLMAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

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