AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 25353/94

                      by Michael C. G. McMULLEN

                      against Ireland

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 28 February 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 6 April 1994 by

Michael C. G. McMULLEN against Ireland and registered on

29 September 1994 under file No. 25353/94;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as

follows. The applicant is a British citizen living in Ireland and he

was born in 1942.

     In 1983 the applicant claims that he discovered that three Irish

firms of solicitors ("Defendants 1, 2 and 3") had been negligent in

respect of advices given to him on provisions in a lease pursuant to

which lease the applicant occupied a large castle in Ireland. Since at

least 1977 relations between the landlord and the applicant had been

bad and questions, relating to the right of the applicant to alienate

or change the use of the castle without the landlord's consent, arose.

     By summons dated 19 March 1986 the applicant issued negligence

proceedings in the High Court against Defendants 1, 2 and 3. From then

until its hearing of the case, the High Court considered a number of

interim applications made by all parties including a number of

applications for judgment made on behalf of the applicant. Most of

these applications were dealt with by the court on consent namely, on

the basis of prior agreement having being reached between the parties.

     The case was set down for hearing on 21 March 1991 and in

July 1991 the High Court heard the applicant's case over a period of

nine days. The case against Defendant 1 was dismissed as it was found

that the applicant had failed to establish any negligence against that

firm and because, in any event, the case against that Defendant was

instituted out of time. The High Court reserved judgment as regards

Defendants 2 and 3.

     A detailed written judgment (41 pages) was delivered on

18 February 1992 finding Defendants 2 and 3 negligent. The applicant

was awarded £2,210 damages (representing certain planning fees) against

Defendants 2 and 3 jointly, that being the only item of damage claimed

which the court found was attributable to the negligence established.

Costs to date were awarded against Defendants 2 and 3 in the

applicant's favour and against the applicant in favour of Defendant 1.

     On 1 May 1992 the High Court refused the applicant's application

for, inter alia, an order indicating that the costs to be recovered by

the applicant should be at the High Court scale. This meant that the

costs recoverable would follow the District Court scale in view of the

level of damages awarded by the High Court, the District Court being

the appropriate jurisdiction for an award of damages of that level.

     On 25 May 1992 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court on the

grounds that the damages awarded were inadequate. On 28 May 1992

Defendant 2 also appealed contesting the finding of negligence and, in

the alternative, claiming that even if negligence was established the

applicant had not demonstrated any causal link between any such

negligence and the damages claimed. Defendant 3 did not appeal

separately but rather contested the applicant's appeal.

     On 6 November 1992 the transcript of the High Court hearing was

delivered to the Supreme Court Office, the applicant's books of appeal

were lodged on 22 December 1992, on 18 January 1993 the transcript of

the High Court hearing was sent to the High Court judge for approval

which judge returned the transcript approved on 25 January 1993 and on

the 27 January 1993 the case was set down for trial at which stage it

went into the Supreme Court list of cases awaiting a hearing date.

     The case was heard by the Supreme Court on 26 January 1994.   The

Supreme Court, by judgment dated 9 February 1994, confirmed the finding

as to the negligence of Defendants 2 and 3 but found that the

negligence of Defendant 2 was not a causative feature of any damage the

applicant suffered. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the

applicant's appeal and confirmed the award of damages against Defendant

3 only.

     The Supreme Court on 12 July 1994, after hearing submissions from

the parties representatives on appeal costs, ordered that the applicant

pay the costs of Defendant 3 in respect of the applicant's Supreme

Court appeal and no costs order was made in relation to Defendant 2 (in

which case both the applicant and Defendant 2 each were each liable for

their own appeal costs). It is submitted by the applicant that the

Supreme Court stated on this date that the length of time taken for the

High Court to deliver its judgment was of "no importance".

     On 16 December 1994 the Supreme Court made no order following the

applicant's motion seeking a stay of execution on all costs orders

awarded him. The applicant attended this hearing and made submissions

but was not legally represented.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant mainly complains that he has been denied a fair

hearing. In particular, he complains about the decisions of the courts

about the merits of the case, damages and costs. He also takes issue

with the courts' handling of certain evidentiary matters. The applicant

submits that, as a result, he has been financially punished for

bringing the negligence action despite the fact that there was a

finding of negligence.

     The applicant further complains of bias on the part of the courts

which he claims were, inter alia, protecting its own officers (the

Defendants), which bias was compounded by the absence of a jury to hear

his case. The applicant also complains about the length of time it took

for the High Court to deliver its judgment. The applicant invokes

Articles 6 para. 1 and 14 of the Convention together with Article 1 of

Protocol 1 and Article 2 of Protocol 4.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 6 April 1994 and registered on

29 September 1994.

     By letter dated 20 April 1995 the member of the Commission acting

as Rapporteur requested the Government to supply, pursuant to rule 47

para. 2(a) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, factual information

in relation to the progress of the proceedings and in relation to the

various costs orders made.

     By letter dated 26 May the Government submitted the information

requested and the applicant's comments were received on 3 July 1995.

THE LAW

1.   Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention

     The applicant mainly complains that the proceedings were unfair

and he invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which,

insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

     ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law..."

     The Commission considers that, insofar as the proceedings

involved the determination of the liability of the applicant's former

solicitors for negligent advice, those proceedings involved the

determination of the applicant's civil rights (No. 10475/83, Dec.

9.10.84., D.R. 39, p. 251).

(a)  As to the allegation of bias, the applicant submits that the

relevant judges were biased in favour of the Defendants because of the

applicant's nationality (British) and due to the Defendants' identity

(solicitors) and that that bias was compounded by the absence of a

jury. However, the Commission does not find that the absence of a jury

rendered the courts less than impartial in any way and considers that

the applicant has not demonstrated that the judges involved in his case

were biased against him or in favour of the Defendants. The Commission

therefore considers this complaint unsubstantiated and, as such,

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(b)  Insofar as the applicant complains about the absence per se of

a jury, the Commission notes that there is no right guaranteed by the

Convention to a jury trial (see, for example, No. 8299/78, Dec.

10.10.80, D.R. 22, p. 51) and accordingly finds the complaint

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

(c)  The applicant also complains about the courts' decisions on the

merits and on damages (including challenging the courts' assessment and

admission of evidence in these respects). However, the Commission

recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the

Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the

obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular,

it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors

of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it

considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of

any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.  The

Commission refers, on this point, to its constant case-law (see eg. No.

458/59, X. v. Belgium, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3, pp. 222, 236; No.

5258/71, X. v. Sweden, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43, pp.71, 77; No.

7987/77, X. v. Austria, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18, pp. 31, 45).

     In addition, as regards the assessment of the evidence, it is not

for the Commission to re-assess the factual or legal elements of the

case before the domestic courts, given that the decisions taken had a

basis in law and were based on relevant and sufficient reasons (see eg.

Eur. Court H.R., Schenk judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140,

Barbera, Messegué and Jabardo judgment of 6 December 1988, Series A no.

146 and De Moor judgment of 23 June 1994, Series A no. 292-A).

     In these respects, the Commission notes that the applicant's

hearing before the High Court lasted nine days, that he also had a

Supreme Court hearing, that he was legally represented before those

courts and that the judgments were full and reasoned. In addition it

is recalled that the High Court found negligence on the part of

Defendants 2 and 3 and considered that no causal link had been

established between the heads of damage alleged by the applicant and

the established negligence, with the exception of a small sum in

relation to planning fees which was awarded to the applicant.

Similarly, the Supreme Court found that the applicant had not

established that causal link between the heads of damage alleged and

the negligence established on the part of Defendant 2.

     In such circumstances, the Commission finds these complaints of

the applicant manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(d)  As regards the applicant's complaints about the costs awards, the

Commission considers that it is not necessary to determine whether the

relevant proceedings constituted a determination of the applicant's

civil rights and obligations since the complaint is, in any event,

inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

     The Commission notes that the applicant's case against Defendant

1 was rejected as, inter alia, having been instituted out of time and

that the applicant was obliged to pay that Defendant's costs. Once the

negligence of Defendants 2 and 3 was established in the High Court, the

applicant was awarded his costs to date but (because of the level of

damages recovered) he received those costs on the District Court scale.

In addition, the applicant's appeal was unsuccessful in the Supreme

Court and he was obliged to pay Defendant 3's appeal costs. No order

as to costs was made by the Supreme Court as regards Defendant 2, the

latter being partially successful and unsuccessful in his appeal.

     The Commission recalls that it is not an unreasonable requirement

of civil litigation that the unsuccessful party pay the adversary's

legal costs (No. 15007/89, Dec. 1.10.90, unpublished). In addition and

since the motivation behind the award of costs on the District Court

scale would appear to be to ensure that proceedings are instituted

before the appropriate court, the Commission considers that, insofar

as this constitutes a restriction on access to court, it has a

legitimate aim (efficient functioning of the judicial system) and

demonstrates a reasonable relationship between the means employed

(award of costs according to the court's decision as to the correct

jurisdiction for the proceedings) and the aim sought to be achieved

(See, for example, Eur. Court H.R. Fayed judgment of 21 September 1994,

Series A no. 294, pp. 49-50, para. 65).

     In such circumstances and in view of the margin of appreciation

available to the Contracting States in this respect, the Commission

considers that, even assuming that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention is applicable to this complaint, the costs awards of which

the applicant complains do not disclose a violation of Article 6 para.

1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Accordingly, the Commission finds this

complaint manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(e)  In the context of his complaint about the overall fairness of the

proceedings, the applicant complains about delay on the part of the

High Court in delivering its judgment. The Commission notes in this

respect that the proceedings issued on 19 March 1986 and the first

hearing on the merits of the case took place in the High Court in

July 1991, the High Court judgment was delivered in February 1992 and

the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the merits on

9 February 1994. Approximately five months later the Supreme Court gave

its decision on the appeal costs matter.

     The Commission recalls that, according to the constant case-law

of the Convention organs, the reasonableness of the delay in civil

proceedings must be considered with regard to the circumstances of the

particular case and with the help of the following criteria: the

complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct of

the authorities dealing with the case and what was at stake in the

litigation for the applicant (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., H. v. United

Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120, p. 59, para. 71).

     The Commission considers that the length of proceedings issue,

to which the application gives rise, involves complicated issues of

fact and law and that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine

its admissibility at this stage. It is therefore necessary, in

accordance with rule 48 para. 2(b) of the Commission's Rules of

Procedure, to request the observations of the respondent Government.

2.   Other complaints

(a)  The applicant also complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention alleging that he was treated differently by the Irish courts

because of his nationality (British) and in light of the identity of

the Defendants (solicitors). While the Commission would consider this

complaint in conjunction with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention, the Commission, having examined the submissions of the

applicant, finds no evidence of any such difference in treatment and,

accordingly, considers this complaint of the applicant manifestly ill-

founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(b)  The applicant has also invoked Article 1 of Protocol 1 (P1-1) and

the Commission notes that, in this context, he challenges the courts'

handling of his professional negligence action.

     Therefore, insofar as he complains about the impact (on the value

of his holding in the property) of the actions of his lawyers, his

complaint is incompatible ratione personae with the Convention

provisions and insofar as he complains about the decisions of the

courts in this respect, the Commission considers that any such

complaints are more appropriately addressed, and have been so addressed

above, under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

(c)  The applicant also invokes Article 2 of Protocol 4 (P4-2).

However, the Commission considers that the applicant has not

demonstrated that his right to liberty of movement, to choose his

residence or his right to leave a country have been interfered with.

Therefore this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicant's complaint

     concerning the length of the negligence proceedings; and

     DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

    Secretary to the First Chamber     President to the First Chamber

           (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                  (C.L. ROZAKIS)