AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 23532/94

                      by Sulo JUNTUNEN

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 12 April 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 18 August 1993 by

Sulo Juntunen against Finland and registered on 24 February 1994 under

file No. 23532/94;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 14 June 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicant on 18 and 24 July 1995;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1930. He is resident

in Tampere. He is on early retirement and placed under guardianship.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

      In 1991 the applicant was hit by a car. On 13 February 1992 the

City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Tampere convicted the

perpetrator (H.), sentenced him to fines and ordered him to compensate

the procedural costs incurred by the applicant.

      Acccording to the applicant, who was not assisted by counsel, he

had also requested compensation for damages but the City Court had

refused to consider this claim. According to the Government, the

applicant had failed to show that H.'s insurance company had refused

to pay him compensation, for which reason the Court had been unable to

examine his claim.

       The applicant's appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal

(hovoikeus, hovrätten) of Turku on 5 May 1993 and he was ordered to pay

the defendant's costs for submitting a reply to his appeal. The

prosecution had not appealed. On 3 August 1993 the Supreme Court

(korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to

appeal.

      On 27 November 1992 the City Court replaced the applicant's

guardian with M.

      By letter of 22 September 1993 the City Court informed the

applicant that it had requested the Guardianship Board (holhous-

lautakunta, förmyndarenämnden) of Tampere to institute proceedings in

order to have a guardian ad litem appointed for him in respect of his

intended action for damages against his guardians. At the Board's

request the City Court, on 6 October 1993, appointed a guardian ad

litem, a lawyer, for the purpose of bringing a possible action. The

applicant had consented to the appointment.

      According to the Government, the applicant soon thereafter lost

confidence in his guardian ad litem, who then withdrew from the matter.

      On 20 July 1993 the Social Insurance Institution (kansaneläke-

laitos, folkpensionsanstalten) decided that the applicant's disability

pension should be paid to M. The pension had been granted in 1975. The

applicant appealed, arguing that the pension should be paid to himself.

On 22 December 1993 the Appellate Board for Social Insurance

(tarkastuslautakunta, prövningsnämnden) rejected the appeal after an

examination of its merits. No further appeal lay open.

      At the applicant's request the District Court (käräjäoikeus,

tingsrätten) of Tampere (the former City Court), on 15 December 1994,

appointed the Official Guardian (virkaholhooja, tjänsteförmyndare) of

Tampere as his new guardian.

Relevant domestic law

      1.   Compensation claims relating to traffic accidents

      According to the 1959 Traffic Insurance Act (liikennevakuutuslaki

279/59, trafikförsäkringslag 279/59), a compensation claim relating to

the use of a motor vehicle and based on other legislation shall not be

examined by a court, unless the claimant shows that the adversary's

insurance company has refused to pay the compensation demanded

(section 12, subsection 2).

      2.   The Appellate Board for Social Insurance

      According to the 1963 Sickness Insurance Act (sairasvakuutuslaki

364/63, sjukförsäkringslag 364/63), the members of the Appellate Board

for Social Insurance are appointed by the Council of State (valtio-

neuvosto, statsrådet) for a maximum of four years but with a

possibility of being reappointed (section 54, subsections 2 and 3).

      According to the 1964 Decree on the Appellate Board (asetus

422/64 tarkastuslautakunnasta, förordning 422/64 om prövningsnämnden),

the Board consists of a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and fifteen further

members with personal substitute members. The Chairman, the

Vice-Chairmen as well as six further members must have a law degree.

The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen must also have experience as judges

(section 2). The Appellate Board may sit in chambers consisting of the

Chairman, two other lawyers and three further members (section 7). The

casting vote both in plenary and chamber sessions rests with the

Chairman (section 14).

      The Council of State may, when necessary, appoint a Chairman ad

interim or appoint a member to temporarily replace a member of the

Board (section 6). Although the procedural rules applicable to regular

courts in principle also apply to the Appellate Board, its procedure

is merely written (section 8). The rules concerning a member's bias are

to be found in the Code of Judicial Procedure. All members must have

sworn or must swear a judicial oath before taking up office (section 9

of the 1964 Decree).

      3.   Protection of a ward's correspondence and possessions

      Under section 12 of the 1919 Constitution Act (Suomen hallitus-

muoto 94/19, Regeringsform för Finland 94/19), as in force at the

relevant time, there was to be no interference with the secrecy of

correspondence other than by means of an exception provided for by law.

As of 1 August 1995, the secrecy of correspondence is guaranteed by

section 8 of the Constitution Act, although restrictions may be imposed

by law (as amended by Act no. 969/95).

      Prior to its amendment as of 1 December 1995 the 1898

Guardianship Act (holhouslaki 34/1898, lag 34/1898 angående

förmynderskap) contained no explicit provision concerning the screening

of a ward's correspondence.

      A ward's possessions shall be administered by his guardian in a

manner ensuring that the property and any proceeds thereof are used for

the ward's benefit (section 42 of the Guardianship Act). The ward shall

have recourse to any possessions needed for his personal use as well

as to a reasonable amount of cash, having regard to his needs and other

circumstances. Any possessions not used for the ward's subsistence or

otherwise for his needs shall be invested so as to ensure adequate

preservation of their value as well as reasonable proceeds

(section 43). A guardian ad litem shall be appointed for the ward,

inter alia, in matters where his interests conflict or may conflict

with those of the guardian (section 65).

      If, for certain reasons, a pension cannot be paid directly to the

person entitled thereto and no guardian has been appointed, the Social

Insurance Institution may order that the pension shall be paid to the

Social Welfare Board (sosiaalilautakunta, socialnämnden) or, with the

pensioner's consent, to some other suitable receiver (section 44 of the

1956 Social Insurance Act (kansaneläkelaki 347/56, folkpensionslag

347/56)).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that he was denied a fair hearing in the

criminal proceedings against H., since his compensation claim was not

at all examined by the courts. He was, moreover, deprived of his

possessions, as in the traffic accident his moped was destroyed and he

could not obtain compensation for this, allegedly since the vehicle

causing the damage had not been insured. He invokes Article 6 para. 1

of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains that in the criminal proceedings

against H. he was unlawfully ordered to compensate H.'s costs for

replying to his appeal to the Court of Appeal. He invokes no express

Convention provision in this respect.

3.    The applicant also complains about the length of the criminal

proceedings against H. He again invokes Article 6 of the Convention.

4.    The applicant complains that he has been denied a public hearing

of his action for damages which he considers to have instituted against

his guardians in 1993. He refers to the City Court's "decision" of

22 September 1993. In his submissions of 17 April 1994 he also

complains about the length of the above proceedings. He invokes

Articles 6, 17 and 18 of the Convention.

5.    The applicant complains that he has been denied access to an

appeal court in order to challenge the City Court's "decision" of

22 September 1993. He again invokes Articles 6, 17 and 18 of the

Convention.

6.    In his submissions of 11 February 1994 the applicant also

complains about the absence of a right of appeal against the decision

of the Appellate Board for Social Insurance of 22 December 1993. He

invokes no express provision in this respect.

7.    In his submissions of 20 January 1995 the applicant finally

complains about interference with his correspondence. He invokes

Article 8 of the Convention.

8.    Finally, in his submissions of 20 January 1995 the applicant

complains that his pension has been collected by his guardian M. He

further alleges that out of the collected pension a monthly amount of

1.000 FIM has "disappeared", but that no police investigation has been

carried out in this respect. He invokes Article 1 of Protocol No.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 18 August 1993 and registered

on 24 February 1994.

      On 5 April 1995 the Commission decided to communicate complaints

nos. 1, 4, 6 and 7 to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48

para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

14 June 1995. The applicant replied on 18 and 24 July 1995.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that he was denied a fair hearing in the

criminal proceedings against H., since his compensation claim was not

at all examined by the courts. He also complains that he was deprived

of his possessions, since he was allegedly unable to obtain the

compensation which he had claimed. He invokes Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the

Convention.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) reads, as far as relevant to the

case, as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

      or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled

      to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

      independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      The Government principally submit that the applicant cannot claim

status as a "victim" within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1

(Art. 25-1) of the Convention of a violation of any of the above

provisions. Under domestic law his claim could not be examined by the

courts, since he had not shown that his adversary's insurance company

had refused to pay the compensation claimed. In any case, the applicant

received appropriate compensation from that company.

      Leaving aside the question whether the applicant can still claim

"victim" status, the Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention secures, inter alia, the right of access

to a court (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Philis judgment of 27 August 1991,

Series A no. 209, p. 20, para. 59). This provision does not, however,

debar Contracting States from making regulations, in the interests of

the good administration of justice, concerning such access. Such

regulations must not reduce the right of access to court to such an

extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (ibid.).    In

the present case the Commission observes that the applicant was barred

from presenting his compensation claim to the courts, since he had

failed to show that his adversary's insurance company had refused to

pay the requested compensation. The Commission finds that this

regulation by law of the applicant's right of access to a court was in

the interests of the good administration of justice and finds no

indication that it was contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). Nor

is there any appearance of a violation of the applicant's property

rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.    The applicant further complains that in the criminal proceedings

against H. he was unlawfully ordered to compensate H.'s costs for

replying to his appeal to the Court of Appeal. He invokes no express

Convention provision in this respect.

      Even assuming that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the

Convention is applicable and that domestic remedies have been

exhausted, the Commission finds that the applicant has not referred to

any specific element which might permit it to conclude that there has

been an unjustified interference with his property rights. Accordingly,

there is no appearance of any violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.

1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    The applicant also complains about the length of the criminal

proceedings against H. He again invokes Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

      The Commission observes that there was no determination of any

criminal charge against the applicant, but against H. Therefore

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) does not apply in its criminal aspect. In

addition, the Commission has just found that the domestic courts were

unable to examine the applicant's claim for compensation. They were

thus unable to determinate any pecuniary and thereby "civil" right of

the applicant. It follows that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not

applicable in its civil aspect either.

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

4.    The applicant further complains that he has been denied a public

hearing of his action for damages which he considers to have instituted

against his guardians in 1993. He refers to the City Court's "decision"

of 22 September 1993. In his submissions of 17 April 1994 he also

complains about the length of the above proceedings. He invokes

Articles 6, 17 and 18 (Art. 6, 17, 18) of the Convention.

(a)   As far as the complaint concerns the alleged lack of a hearing,

the Government underline that a guardian ad litem was appointed by the

City Court for the purpose of bringing a possible action for damages

on the applicant's behalf. He was thus offered a possibility of gaining

appropriate access to a court. He did not, however, avail himself of

this possibility.

      The Commission has examined this complaint under the above-cited

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention only. It recalls that

the access to a court guaranteed by this provision may be subjected to

certain regulation. Moreover, this provision cannot be interpreted as

including an unlimited right to have an ad hoc guardian appointed for

the purpose of bringing a court action (cf., e.g., No. 10877/84, Dec.

16.5.85, D.R. 43 p. 184).

      In the present case the Commission observes that a guardian ad

litem was appointed for the purpose of bringing a possible court action

for damages on behalf of the applicant. He was thus offered a

possibility of gaining effective access to a court. He did not,

however, avail himself of this possibility, apparently having lost

confidence in his guardian ad litem. He has not explained his reasons

therefor nor shown that he has attempted to have another guardian ad

litem appointed in her place. In these circumstances the Commission

finds no indication that his alleged lack of access to a court is

imputable to the respondent State. Accordingly, there is no appearance

of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) on this point.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(b)   As far as the applicant complains about the length of "the

proceedings", the Commission finds that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

is again inapplicable, since no court action has yet been brought on

his behalf.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the

Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) .

5.    The applicant also complains that he has been denied access to

an appeal court in order to challenge the City Court's "decision" of

22 September 1993. He again invokes Articles 6, 17 and 18

(Art. 6, 17, 18) of the Convention.

      The Commission has examined this complaint under the above-cited

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention only. It considers that

the letter of the City Court dated 22 September 1993 did not constitute

a formal decision or judgment in which the applicant's "civil rights"

were determined. Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) does not

apply.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).

6.    In his submissions of 11 February 1994 the applicant also

complains about the absence of a right of appeal against the decision

of the Appellate Board for Social Insurance of 22 December 1993. He

invokes no express provision in this respect.

      The Government primarily argue that Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not apply. They concede that the

applicant's right to a disability pension was a "civil right" within

the meaning of that provision. However, the sole issue at stake in the

proceedings ending before the Appellate Board for Social Insurance was

whether his pension should be paid to the applicant's guardian or to

himself. According to the Government, domestic law provided that it be

paid to his guardian in pursuance of section 44 of the Social Insurance

Act. The applicant's guardian M.'s request to receive the pension thus

gave the Social Insurance Institution and the Appellate Board very

little discretion. The Government conclude that the proceedings before

the Appellate Board did not determine any "civil right" of the

applicant.

      Subsidiarily, the Government argue that the complaint is

manifestly ill-founded. The Appellate Board is a permanent body

established by law. Its jurisdiction is compulsory and its composition

defined by law. Half of its members are lawyers and any casting vote

rests with such a member. All members must have sworn a judicial oath

before taking up office. The procedure before the Appellate Board

resembles that before administrative courts. The Government therefore

assert that the Appellate Board was "an independent and impartial

tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), when

examining the applicant's appeal.

      Assuming that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable, the

Commission must examine whether the Appellate Board met the

requirements of a "tribunal" within the meaning of that provision. In

the determination of whether a body can be considered to be independent

of the executive and of the parties to the case regard must be had to

the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term

of office, the existence of regulations governing their removal or

guarantees for their irremovability, laws prohibiting their being given

instructions by the executive in their adjudicatory role, the existence

of legal guarantees against outside pressures, the question whether the

body presents an appearance of independence and the attendance of

members of the judiciary in the proceedings (e.g., Eur. Court H.R.,

Campbell and Fell judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, pp. 39-41,

paras. 78-81, with further references). The existence of impartiality

for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be determined

according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal

conviction of a particular judge in a given case, and also according

to an objective test, that is ascertaining whether the judge offered

guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect

(e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Piersack v. Belgium judgment of 1 October 1982,

Series A no. 53, p. 14, para. 30).

      The Commission finds that the applicant has not referred to any

specific element which might permit it to conclude that the Appellate

Board for Social Insurance was not an "independent and impartial

tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). Insofar

as his complaint may concern the absence of a right to appeal against

the decision of the Board, the Commission recalls that Article 6

(Art. 6) does not guarantee any right to appeal (e.g., No. 11826/85,

Dec. 9.5.89, D.R. 61 p. 138).

      In this connection the Commission also recalls Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention which reads as follows:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      The word "remedy" in this context does not imply a remedy bound

to succeed, but simply an accessible remedy before an authority

competent to examine the merits of a complaint (e.g., No. 11468/85,

Dec. 15.10.86, D.R. 50 p. 199).  The Commission notes that the

applicant challenged the Social Insurance Institution's decision of 20

July 1993 in his appeal to the Appellate Board which was fully

competent to examine it. Accordingly, there is no appearance of any

violation either of Article 6 or Article 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the

Convention in this particular case.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

7.    In his submissions of 20 January 1995 the applicant also

complains about interference with his correspondence. He invokes

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which, as far as relevant, reads

as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his ...

      correspondence.

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      The Government consider that the complaint is unsubstantiated.

Moreover, their own investigation of the alleged screening of his

correspondence has not enabled them to conclude that an interference

has taken place.

      The Commission recalls that in a previous case against Finland

it has found a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention in

that the screening by a guardian of a ward's correspondence was not

foreseeable and thus not in accordance with the law (Ollila v. Finland,

Comm. Report 30.6.93; Resolution DH (96) 3 of the Committee of

Ministers). As in the Ollila case, the alleged screening in the present

case also predates 1 December 1995, i.e. the date when the Guardianship

Act was amended so as to include provisions concerning the conditions

for such screening. However, the applicant has in no way indicated the

dates or even the contents of the allegedly screened letters. In this

connection the Commission bears in mind that he is unrepresented in the

Convention proceedings. Nevertheless, considering the circumstances as

a whole, the Commission cannot find that the present complaint has been

sufficiently substantiated. Accordingly, there is no appearance of any

violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

8.    Finally, in his submissions of 20 January 1995 the applicant

complains that his pension has been collected by his guardian M. He

further alleges that out of the collected pension a monthly amount of

1.000 FIM has "disappeared", but that no police investigation has been

carried out in this respect. He invokes the above-cited Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

(a)   As far as the complaint concerns the guardian's administration

of the applicant's pension, the Commission recalls that such a measure

constitutes an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment

of his possessions. It amounts to a control of the use of his property

which must be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) as to its lawfulness, purpose and proportionality

(e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Tre Traktörer AB judgment of 7 July 1989,

Series A no. 159, pp. 22-24, paras. 55-62). The Commission has

previously found that such an interference with a ward's possessions

was in accordance with Finnish law and in the general interest.

Finally, having regard to the State's wide margin of appreciation in

the field of property rights, the measure was found to be proportionate

to the legitimate aim of safeguarding a ward's possessions (No.

18969/91, Dec. 30.11.92, not published). In the circumstances of the

present case the Commission finds no reason to depart from this

finding.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

(b)   As regards the alleged "disappearance" of certain pension

amounts, the Commission observes that under section 65 of the

Guardianship Act the applicant is entitled to be represented by a

guardian ad litem in matters where his and his ward's interests

conflict or may conflict. The applicant may therefore request the

competent court to appoint such a guardian for the purposes of bringing

a possible criminal complaint concerning the "disappearance" of part

of his pension. The applicant has apparently not availed himself of

this opportunity. In these circumstances the applicant has not yet

exhausted domestic remedies, as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention, and the Commission is not required to decide whether or not

the complaint discloses any appearance of a violation of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected in

accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)