H. W. K. v. SWITZERLAND
Doc ref: 23224/94 • ECHR ID: 001-2825
Document date: April 12, 1996
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 23224/94
by H. W. K.
against Switzerland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber)
sitting in private on 12 april 1996, the following members being
present:
MM. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
S. TRECHSEL
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on
15 December 1993 by H. W. K. against Switzerland and registered on
10 January 1994 under file No. 23224/94;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
23 December 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 10 April 1995;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant, a Swiss citizen born in 1931, is a lawyer residing
at Zumikon in Switzerland. Before the Commission he is represented by
Messrs. B. Badertscher and Th. Poledna, lawyers practising in Zurich.
Particular circumstances of the case
I.
The applicant's wife was a member of the Federal Council
(Bundesrat) and Head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police
(Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement). On
14 December 1988 the applicant's wife announced her resignation as
from 28 February 1989 in view of allegations, which she disputed, that
she had passed on secret information to the applicant in a telephone
conversation. On 31 January 1989 the Swiss Parliament instituted a
Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry (Parlamentarische
Untersuchungskommission) to examine the exercise of her office and her
resignation.
The Commission submitted its Report on 22 November 1989. While
identifying various issues in connection with the exercise of the
office of the applicant's wife, the Report also concluded that she had
dealt with her work carefully and prudently. In February 1990 the
Federal Court (Bundesgericht) acquitted the applicant's wife of the
charge of a breach of official secrets (Amtsgeheimnisverletzung).
II.
On 28 January 1988 a client asked the lawyer H., who worked in
the applicant's office, to examine the legality of certain letters
rogatory (Rechtshilfeverfahren) of the United States. H. undertook a
preliminary examination of the matter whereupon he refused to deal
with the matter, referring to an instruction in the applicant's office
not to take on any cases concerning the Federal Department of Justice
and Police, or the applicant's wife. The case was then passed on to
the law firm N.
On 10 June 1988 the law firm N. filed a request with the Federal
Office for the Police (Bundesamt für Polizeiwesen) to consult the
letters rogatory. On 23 August 1988 the Federal Office transmitted to
the law firm N. a shortened ("gestrippte") version of the letters
rogatory.
III.
Shortly after the Parliamentary Commission (above I.) was instit-
uted, its President L. obtained information that a certain X., a US
citizen, had apparently obtained a particular document from the
applicant which both the Federal Office for the Police and the Federal
Court had previously refused to make available. X. had allegedly
offered the applicant 250,000 SFr to obtain this document from the
Federal Department of Justice and Police. L. obtained this infor-
mation from a certain Y. who in turn had obtained the information from
the main informant Z.
It later transpired that X. was involved in letters rogatory from
the USA, containing secret information as to his role in organised
crime. The suspicion therefore arose that the document which the
applicant was allegedly asked to obtain concerned these letters
rogatory; and that a person at the Federal Department of Justice and
Police could, in breach of official secrets, have handed out documents
to unauthorised persons.
On 21 November 1989 the Federal Attorney (Bundesanwalt)
instituted judicial investigations (gerichtspolizeiliches
Ermittlungsverfahren) against unknown persons. The purpose thereof
was to address (ansprechen) the informant Y. and eventually to
identify the person in the Federal Department of Justice and Police
who might have breached official secrets.
IV.
In the course of the investigations it transpired that the
applicant's law firm, and later the law firm N. (see above II.) had
attempted to obtain documents from the Federal Office for the Police,
though the latter had refused to transmit those parts of the letters
rogatory which concerned X.'s involvement in organised crime.
The judicial investigations of 21 November 1989 (above III.)
included the surveillance of the telephone lines of X., Y., the
applicant and his wife. The applicant was involved as a "third
person" (see below, Relevant domestic law) rather than as a suspect.
On 23 November 1989 the President of the Indictment Chamber
(Anklagekammer) of the Federal Court granted the Federal Attorney's
request to monitor altogether 13 lines, including the applicant's
private telephone lines, the telephone lines of his office and his
wife's telephone lines, in particular a secret number granted to her
as a former Federal Councillor. The order contained the remark
"Lawyers' conversations must be disregarded" (Anwaltsgespräche sind
nicht zu erfassen").
Six of these lines were no longer monitored after
1 December 1989. On the other hand, the President of the Indictment
Chamber granted on 1 December 1989 the monitoring of a further
telephone line. The order again contained the remark "Lawyers'
conversations must be disregarded".
Also on 1 December 1989 a meeting took place between the Federal
police, the informant Y. and the President of the Parliamentary
Commission L.
On 4 December 1989 L. contacted the main informant Z. The latter
was questioned by the Federal Attorney's Office on
8 December 1989.
On 11 December 1989 the Federal Office for the Police, having
found that the suspicion of a breach of official secrets had been
invalidated, terminated the surveillance of all telephone lines of the
applicant and his wife.
On 14 December 1989 the Federal Attorney's Office
(Bundesanwaltschaft) issued its final report in which it concluded
that no concrete suspicion had transpired as to a breach of official
secrets. The Report noted that in 1988 the lawyer H., who worked in
the applicant's office, had passed on a case, concerning the letters
rogatory, to the law firm N., and that there were no indications that
the applicant or his wife could have been directly involved in the
matter.
On 6 March 1990 the Federal Attorney's Office decided to close
the investigations as there was no confirmation of the suspicion that
the applicant's wife or a collaborator of the Federal Department of
Justice and Police had breached official secrets by passing on secret
parts of letters rogatory.
By letter of 9 March 1990 the applicant was informed that under
Sections 320 and 340 para. 1, subpara. 7 of the Penal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch, see below, Relevant domestic law) judicial inves-
tigations had been instituted on suspicion of a breach of official
secrets, and that under Sections 66 et seq. of the Federal Code of
Criminal Procedure (Bundesstrafprozessordnung, see below, Relevant
domestic law) his private and professional telephone lines had been
monitored. The letter stated that the surveillance had lasted from 21
November 1989 until 11 December 1989 and that "conversations conducted
in the function as a lawyer had been excluded from the surveillance"
("von der Ãœberwachung ausgenommen waren die in anwaltschaftlicher
Eigenschaft geführten Gespräche"). It was also stated that in
application of Section 66 para. 1ter of the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure (see below, Relevant domestic law) all recordings had been
destroyed.
V.
On 12 March 1990 the Parliamentary Commission (see above I.)
issued a communiqué stating inter alia:
"In the course (of the investigations of the Federal Attorney's
Office), which also included authorised telephone surveillance,
the Office found that Swiss representatives of a US citizen had
attempted, with the help (of the applicant), to obtain access to
a secret document. They hoped for an easier access to the
Federal Department of Justice and Police, as he was the husband
of the Federal Councillor concerned. A lawyer of (the
applicant's) office examined, for a fee, the possibility of taking
over the case, but then refused. As a result, there was an attempt to
obtain the secret part of the documents with the help of another
lawyer. The US letters rogatory were finally handed out, though the
crucial parts were censored. Based on this result the Federal
Attorney's Office closed its investigations ... The suspicion of a
breach of official secrets thus proved to be unfounded. The police
investigations demonstrate, however, how the rumour arose which led to
the indications and the suspicion."
"Im Rahmen (der Ermittlungen der Bundesanwaltschaft), zu welchen
auch bewilligte Telefonabhörungen eingesetzt wurden, eruierte
diese, dass die Schweizer Vertreter des amerikanischen
Staatsangehörigen versucht hatten, durch Einschaltung (des
Beschwerdeführers) zum geheimen Aktenstück zu gelangen. Sie
versprachen sich einen leichteren Zugang ins EJPD, weil er Gatte
der zuständigen Bundesrätin war. Ein Rechtsanwalt des Büros (des
Beschwerdeführers) prüfte gegen Honorar die allfällige
Mandatsübernahme, lehnte sie jedoch ab. In der Folge wurde mit
einem anderen Rechtsanwalt die Herausgabe des geheimen Teils der
Akten versucht. Schliesslich wurde zwar das amerikanische
Rechtshilfegesuch herausgegeben, die entscheidenden Passagen
jedoch abgedeckt. Gestützt auf dieses Ergebnis stellte die
Bundesanwaltschaft die Ermittlungen ein. ... Der Verdacht auf
Verletzung des Amtsgeheimnisses erwies sich als unbegründet. Die
polizeilichen Ermittlungen zeigen jedoch auf, wie das Gerücht,
das zu Hinweis und Verdacht führte, entstanden ist."
On 13 March 1990, various Swiss newspapers, including the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung and the Tages-Anzeiger, published articles on the
communiqué of the Parliamentary Commission. Therein, reference was
made to the applicant as one of the persons involved, and to telephone
surveillances which had been undertaken.
VI.
On 10 April 1990 the applicant filed a complaint (Beschwerde)
with the Federal Department of Justice and Police about a breach of
the provisions concerning telephone surveillance, and of Article 8 of
the Convention.
Following a further complaint about the delay in the proceedings
the Department dismissed the complaint on 2 November 1992. The
Department, which dealt with the complaint as a hierarchical complaint
(Aufsichtsbeschwerde), decided inter alia to refuse the applicant's
request for unrestricted access to the case-file.
VII.
On 2 December 1992 the applicant filed an administrative appeal
(Verwaltungsbeschwerde) with the Federal Council against the decision
of the Federal Department of Justice and Police of
2 November 1992. In his appeal he complained inter alia that the
telephone surveillance had been unlawful and that he had been refused
unrestricted access to the case-file.
In his appeal the applicant stated inter alia that it was
irrelevant whether the European Court of Human Rights had regarded
Sections 66 et seq. of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure as
conforming with the Convention, as long as the application of these
norms was not in conformity with the Convention; the incorrect or
arbitrary application of a norm that conformed with the Convention
could also breach the Convention. Under the headline "Breach of
Article 8 of the Convention", the appeal continued:
"In this connection it must not be overlooked that the telephone
lines belonging to the applicant's legal practice, which was
shared by a number of other lawyers, were tapped. However,
Section 66 para. 1bis of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure
expressly prohibits the tapping of such telephone calls. The
tapping of the telephone conversations with the applicant's law
firm was therefore unlawful under the aforementioned provision of
domestic law."
"In diesem Zusammenhang darf auch nicht übersehen werden, dass
die Telefonanschlüsse der Anwaltskanzlei des Beschwerdeführers
abgehört wurden, an der eine Reihe von Anwälten beteiligt war.
Art. 66 Abs. 1bis BStP schliesst aber das Abhören solcher
Telefongespräche ausdrücklich aus. Das Abhören der
Telefongespräche der Anwaltskanzlei des Beschwerdeführers war
somit auch unter der vorgenannten innerstaatlichen Gesetzes-
bestimmung widerrechtlich."
The Federal Council dismissed the administrative appeal on
30 June 1993 in a decision numbering 26 pages.
In its decision the Federal Council recalled that, even without a
legal basis, hierarchical complaints in cases of telephone
surveillance were treated as formal administrative appeals.
The Federal Council found that the applicant should have access
to the case-file only to the extent that the documents directly
related to his telephone surveillance as a "third person". The
Federal Council noted that the applicant had had restricted access to
documents some of which had been censored in particular in respect of
names of informants. Other documents, concerning for instance
telephone surveillances, had not been handed out, though the applicant
had been orally informed of their existence and content. The Federal
Council found that the Federal Department of Justice and Police had
acted in an exemplary and generous manner. Insofar as documents
concerning third persons had not been handed out, the interests of the
latter outweighed the applicant's interest therein.
The Federal Council further found that Section 66 of the Federal
Code of Criminal Procedure permitted the telephone surveillance of
third persons such as the applicant if there were indications that the
latter would receive information from, or pass it on to, the
perpetrator of an offence. The Federal Council considered that the
applicant had not contested the conformity of Sections 66 et seq. of
the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure with Article 8 of the
Convention, though he claimed that the authorities had incorrectly
applied the pertinent rules. The Federal Council then examined
whether or not Federal civil servants had breached their duties in
connection with the applicant's telephone surveillance.
The Federal Council considered that at a time of general
insecurity following rumours of subversion (eine durch Unterwande-
rungsgerüchte verunsicherte Zeit) there had been concrete indications
of a breach of official secrets within the Federal Department of
Justice and Police. The document at issue concerned secret
information in respect of which assurances had been given to the
United States; thus, Switzerland's credibility was at stake. A risk
arose as the applicant, the husband of the former Head of the
Department of Justice and Police, had been mentioned. The civil
servants concerned could justifiably have been criticised if in such
circumstances they had not undertaken the necessary investigations.
Furthermore, the telephone surveillance had to occur at the
beginning of the investigations before contacts were established with
Y. and Z. Thus, the civil servants concerned had not immediately
examined the credibility of the informants as any further contact
would have jeopardised the investigations.
The applicant's phones had been monitored, not as those of a
suspect, but as those of a "third person" within the meaning of
Section 66 para. 1bis of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure;
conversations which he conducted as a lawyer had expressly been
excluded. As the applicant was not a civil servant, he could not have
been the perpetrator of the offence. His wife had been included in
the theoretical circle of suspects, but there were no concrete
suspicions either against her or against other persons. The
applicant's telephone surveillance thus neither amounted to a
suspicion in the criminal sense nor was it conducted against unknown
persons merely for the sake of appearances. There were also no
political motives, and the President of the Parliamentary Commission
had not been in a position to influence the police investigations.
The decision concluded that the conversations monitored had been
irrelevant for the investigations, and no written record had been
prepared. In any event, even if such a record had been given to the
Parliamentary Commission, it could not have been abused, as the
Commission members were bound by the secret of office (Amtsgeheimnis).
VIII.
Against the decision of the Federal Department of Justice and
Police of 2 November 1992 (see above, VI.), the applicant also filed
an administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwerde). In his
appeal he requested the Court to conclude that the telephone
monitoring had been unlawful, and that for this reason criminal
proceedings should be instituted against the persons concerned.
On 8 March 1994 the Federal Court dismissed the applicant's
administrative law appeal.
The Court first dealt with the issue whether the applicant should
have been permitted to consult the entire case-file during the
proceedings before the Federal Department of Justice Police. The
Court found that those parts of the document which had been pertinent
for the decision (entscheidungswesentlich) had been shown to the
applicant, and that it had been correct not to disclose the names of
the informants; in the Court's opinion, this conclusion also
corresponded with a decision of the Parliamentary Commission of
Enquiry (see above, I.) to keep informants' names confidential.
Indeed, the applicant had been sufficiently able to file complaints on
the basis of a partial consultation of the case-file (gestützt auf die
ihm zugestellten "gestrippten" Akten).
The Court further found that the applicant's appeal to the
Federal Department of Justice and Police satisfied the requirements of
Article 13 of the Convention.
The Court then examined the issue whether criminal proceedings
should be instituted in view of the surveillance of the applicant's
telephones. It found that it need not completely (abschliessend)
examine the issue whether or not the telephone surveillance breached
Article 8 of the Convention, inter alia as the applicant had already
filed a complaint with the Federal Department of Justice and Police.
"Based on information received by the Federal Attorney's Office
from the President of the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry,
the Office instituted proceedings on suspicion of a possible
breach of official secrets. Suspects were Federal civil servants
who had dealt with the letters rogatory and the confidential
document. There was at least a connection with the applicant's
office and the letters rogatory in that a partner of his office
had examined whether or not to take over the case for a fee of
6'000 SFr - and not free of costs as the applicant maintains. As
it turned out, the partner finally refused to take on the case,
apparently because it concerned the Federal Department of Justice
and Police, of which the applicant's wife was at that time the
head. The supposition of the Federal Attorney's Office, namely
that the original informant or the unfaithful civil servant would
contact the applicant, and that this would lead to the resolution
of the offence, did not therefore in view of the entire
circumstances of the case appear incorrect."
"Aufgrund der Informationen, welche die Bundesanwaltschaft vom
PUK-Präsidenten erhalten hatte, ermittelte sie wegen allfälliger
Amtsgeheimnisverletzung. Als Verdächtige kamen Bundesbeamte in
Frage, die sich mit dem fraglichen Rechtshilfeverfahren und dem
geheim zu haltenden Dokument befasst hatten. Mit dem Anwaltsbüro
des Beschwerdeführers und dem Rechtshilfeverfahren bestand
immerhin insofern ein Zusammenhang, als ein Partner seines Büros
die Mandatsübernahme gegen ein Honorar von Fr. 6'000.-- - und
nicht unentgeltlich, wie der Beschwerdeführer behauptet -
geprüft, schliesslich aber, wie sich herausstellte, offenbar
deshalb abgelehnt hatte, weil das EJPD betroffen war, dem damals
die Ehefrau des Beschwerdeführers vorstand. Die Vermutung der
Bundesanwaltschaft, der Erstinformant oder der ungetreue Beamte
werde sich mit dem Beschwerdeführer in Verbindung setzen, was zur
Aufklärung der Tat führen könnte, erscheint aufgrund der gesamten
Umstände des Falles nicht als abwegig."
Relevant domestic law
I.
According to Section 320 para. 1 of the Penal Code (Strafgesetz-
buch), whoever discloses a secret entrusted to him in his function as
a civil servant will be punished with imprisonment or a fine. Section
340 para. 1 (7) of the Penal Code determines the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court (Bundesgericht) in respect of this offence.
II.
Section 66 para. 1 the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure
(Bundesstrafprozessordnung) envisages telephone surveillance if a
person is suspected of a criminal offence.
Section 66 para. 1bis of the Federal Code states as follows:
"If the conditions concerning the accused or the suspect have
been met, third persons may also be monitored if it must be
assumed on the basis of certain facts that they will receive
certain messages from, or transmit such messages to, him.
Persons who according to Section 77 can refuse to give evidence
shall be excluded. The telephone of third persons may always be
monitored if there is a well-founded suspicion that the accused
uses it."
"Sind die Voraussetzungen beim Beschuldigten oder Verdächtigen
erfüllt, so können Drittpersonen überwacht werden, wenn aufgrund
bestimmter Tatsachen angenommen werden muss, dass sie für ihn
bestimmte oder von ihm herrührende Mitteilungen entgegennehmen
oder weitergeben. Ausgenommen sind Personen, die nach Art. 77
das Zeugnis verweigern dürfen. Der Telefonanschluss von
Drittpersonen kann stets überwacht werden, wenn der Verdacht
begründet ist, dass der Beschuldigte ihn benutzt."
According to Section 66 para. 1ter of the Federal Code of
Criminal Procedure telephone recordings which are not necessary for
the investigations are kept under lock and key (unter Verschluss) and
are destroyed after the termination of the proceedings.
Section 77 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure states:
"Clergy, lawyers, notaries, doctors, pharmacists, midwives and
their professional assistants shall not be ordered to give
evidence in respect of secrets which have been entrusted to them
officially or professionally."
"Geistliche, Rechtsanwälte, Notare, Ärzte, Apotheker, Hebammen
und ihre beruflichen Gehilfen dürfen über Geheimnisse, die ihnen
in ihrem Amte oder Berufe anvertraut worden sind, nicht zum
Zeugnis angehalten werden."
COMPLAINTS
1. Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant complains of the
telephone surveillance.
He submits, first, that the measure was not "in accordance with
the law" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention.
Thus, according to Sections 66 para. 1bis and 77 of the Federal Code
of Criminal Procedure, a lawyer may assume that his telephone and the
telephones of his partners and other lawyers in his office are not
monitored. Article 8 of the Convention prohibits telephone
surveillance regardless of whether a written record is prepared. It
is thus irrelevant if the Federal District Attorney's Office gave
instructions not to prepare a written record of the surveillance of
the applicant's office telephones. The aim of the Federal Attorney's
Office was to monitor a particular discussion between client and
lawyer as well as all legal telephone conversations.
He submits, secondly, that the measure was disproportionate in
that it was unnecessary. The authorities only insufficiently examined
the credibility of the information as to a breach of official secrets.
There were also no indications at all as to the applicant's
participation therein. Moreover, the duration of the telephone
surveillance was also disproportionate, having commenced before it had
been authorised by the President of the Indictment Chamber of the
Federal Court and before the main informant Z. had been questioned.
Finally, the surveillance of all private and official telephone lines
- even the secret line of his wife - and the disclosure by the
Parliamentary Commission thereof to the public severely damaged the
confidence placed in him by his partners, employees and clients.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 13 of the
Convention that for two different reasons he had no effective remedy
at his disposal to complain of the telephone surveillance.
He submits, first, that the authorities treated his complaint as
a hierarchical complaint in respect of which they had no full powers
of examination, even if they stated that they were in fact dealing
with it as an administrative appeal. No authority examined his
complaint in substance. The Federal Council examined neither the
legality nor the proportionality of the measure. It was also not
examined whether the suspicion of a breach of official secrets could
justifiably have been assumed, or continued to exist.
He complains, secondly, that he could only consult certain
documents in part, and other documents not at all. He refers inter
alia to the letters rogatory, to various documents, including written
records of the telephone surveillance, concerning X. and Y. and to the
written records of the surveillance of his own telephones. If the
suspicion directed against him stemmed from third persons, he should
have had the possibility of commenting on the credibility of the
statements and the persons themselves. As he could not do so, the
remedy was ineffective. It is irrelevant if the Federal Department of
Justice and Police in its decision of 2 November 1992 did not rely on
these documents as he was deprived of the possibility exhaustively to
inform himself of the legality of the measure.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 15 December 1993 and registered
on 10 January 1994.
On 31 August 1994 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48
para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
23 December 1994, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that
purpose. The applicant replied on 10 April 1995, also after an
extension of the time-limit.
THE LAW
1. Under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention the applicant
complains of the telephone surveillance. He submits, first, that the
measure was not "in accordance with the law" within the meaning of
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention. Thus, according to
Sections 66 para. 1bis and 77 of the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure, a lawyer may assume that his telephone and the telephones
of his partners and other lawyers in his office are not monitored.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention prohibits telephone surveillance
regardless of whether a written record is prepared. The aim of the
Federal Attorney's Office was to monitor a particular discussion
between client and lawyer as well as all legal telephone
conversations.
The applicant further submits that the measure was
disproportionate in that it was unnecessary. The authorities only
insufficiently examined the credibility of the information as to a
breach of official secrets. There were also no indications at all as
to the applicant's participation therein. Moreover, the duration of
the telephone surveillance was also disproportionate, having commenced
before it had been authorised by the President of the Indictment
Chamber of the Federal Court and before the main informant Z. had been
questioned. Finally, the surveillance of all private and official
telephone lines - even the secret line of his wife - and the
disclosure by the Parliamentary Commission thereof to the public
severely damaged the confidence placed in him by his partners,
employees and clients.
a) The Government contend that the applicant did not raise before
the domestic authorities the complaint which he is now raising before
the Commission, namely that the interference was not "in accordance
with the law". Thus, before the Commission he has referred to
Sections 66 para. 1bis and 77 of the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure. Accordingly, the Federal Council, in its decision of
30 June 1993 stated that the applicant did not contest the conformity
of Sections 66 et seq. of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure with
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
The applicant submits that in his appeal to the Federal Council
of 2 December 1992 he stated that the monitoring of his telephone
conversations was unlawful under Section 66 para. 1bis of the Federal
Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Commission notes that in his appeal to the Federal Council of
2 December 1992 the applicant complained under the headline "Breach of
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention" that the telephone lines at
issue belonged to the applicant's legal practice, which was shared by
a number of other lawyers; that Section 66 para. 1bis of the Federal
Code of Criminal Procedure expressly prohibited the tapping of such
telephone calls; and that the tapping of the telephone conversations
with the applicant's law firm was therefore unlawful under domestic
law.
The Commission considers, therefore, that before the Federal
Council the applicant sufficiently raised the complaint which he is
now making before the Commission.
As a result, the applicant's complaints cannot be declared
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies within the
meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
b) The Government furthermore contend that the interference at issue
was justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention,
and that the lawfulness of the measure could not be called in question
by the fact that the telephone surveillance did not eventually confirm
the original suspicions. In the Government's submissions, due regard
must be had to the political and legal framework of the case;
reference is made here in particular to the Parliamentary Commission
of Enquiry. It is further recalled that the US citizen X. tried all
legal possibilities to obtain the document of the Federal Department
of Justice and Police; that the confidentiality of the proceedings had
in fact been requested by US authorities; and that the President of
the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry had himself confirmed the
credibility of the informants.
As regards the proportionality of the interference, the
Government point out that the telephones of various other persons were
also monitored, and that the national authorities considered it
essential also to monitor the applicant's telephones; and that the
interference was considered only in last resort since the person who
had breached an official secret could not be determined by other means
of surveillance.
The Government also recall the practice of the Swiss authorities
in such matters. Thus, the decision of the Federal Attorney's Office
to monitor a person's telephone is transmitted to the President of the
Indictment Chamber of the Federal Court as well as to the Law
Department of the General Directorate of the Swiss Federal Postal,
Telephone and Telegraph Services. The latter will then record the
telephone conversations. Specialised staff will listen to the tapes
to determine any pertinent conversation in respect of the proceedings
at issue. If no pertinent conversations are conducted, no transcripts
will be prepared, and no information on the conversation will be
transmitted to the prosecuting authorities. The recorded tapes are
simply kept for ten days in case the authorities put further
questions; if not, the recordings are deleted.
The Government point out that in the present case the control of
the monitored telephone conversations was personally entrusted to the
head of the service concerned in Zurich. Moreover, no recording
whatsoever was held back and transmitted to the Federal Attorney's
Office; all recordings of the applicant's telephone conversations were
deleted. The telephone surveillance of the applicant and his family
thus remained within the legal framework of the secrecy of the Swiss
Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Services. The rules at issue thus
protected the applicant, as the Swiss authorities were prevented from
learning, even by coincidence, of information which he was not obliged
to give in view of this right to refuse to give evidence.
The Government state that they are aware of the difficulties of
distinguishing between telephone conversations conducted "with a
lawyer" and those which are not. However, this distinction is
irrelevant in the present case as the applicant's telephone
conversations were not transmitted to the Federal Attorney's Office.
In the applicant's submissions, it is striking that the
Government acknowledge the political and legal context of the case.
The applicant himself pointed out during the domestic proceedings that
the telephone surveillance did not in fact serve to clarify an alleged
criminal offence, but to check on the behaviour of the applicant and
his wife in the course of the proceedings of the Parliamentary
Commission of Enquiry. The applicant sees a confirmation herefor in
the fact that his wife's telephone was also monitored; moreover, the
Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission was said to have received the
information concerning the applicant's alleged involvement in
procuring the secret documents from a newspaper which had previously
conducted a vicious media campaign against the applicant; indeed, the
telephone surveillance was ordered solely on the basis of a tip-off
given to the President of the Parliamentary Commission.
The applicant points out in detail how he and his wife had come
under pressure from a number of quarters, and were parties to several
court proceedings. For the Parliamentary Commission there could be no
better period to conduct a hearing than the end of November 1989.
Since a criminal investigation was unnecessary, the hearing obviously
served political purposes.
The applicant further submits that the surveillance of other
parties' telephones does not alter this assessment. It transpires
from the press communiqué of the Parliamentary Commission that the
surveillance was clearly directed at the applicant. Indeed, it is
particularly serious that uninvolved third parties, especially the
lawyers working at the applicant's office, were subjected to the
surveillance.
The applicant contends that the Government's reference to the
Swiss interception procedures does not alter the fact that when
officials of the Swiss Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Services listen
in to telephone conversations, this constitutes an interference within
the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. In this respect
it is irrelevant whether transcripts have been prepared, whether these
transcripts still exist or whether they have been destroyed. It is
equally irrelevant whether the officials were instructed not to record
conversations with lawyers, since they have first to be listened to
before a decision is taken on their suitability for use as evidence.
In any event, the files given to the applicant for consultation in no
way indicate that no transcripts were made or that they were
destroyed.
The Commission, having examined these complaints, finds that they
raise serious issues of questions of fact and law which are of such
complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of
the merits. This part of the application cannot, therefore, be
regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article
27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground for
declaring it inadmissible has been established.
2. The applicant further complains under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention that for two different reasons he had no effective remedy
at his disposal to complain of the telephone surveillance.
He submits, first, that the authorities, in particular the
Federal Department of Justice and Police and the Federal Council,
treated his complaint as a hierarchical complaint in respect of which
they had no full powers of examination, even if they stated that they
were in fact dealing with it as an administrative appeal. No
authority examined his complaint in substance. The Federal Council
examined neither the legality nor the proportionality of the measure.
It was also not examined whether the suspicion of a breach of official
secrets could justifiably have been assumed, or continued to exist.
He complains, secondly, that he could only consult certain
documents in part, and other documents not at all. He refers inter
alia to the letters rogatory, to various documents, including written
records of the telephone surveillance, concerning X. and Y. and to the
written records of the surveillance of his own telephones. If the
suspicion directed against him stemmed from third persons, he should
have had the possibility of commenting on the credibility of the
statements and the persons themselves. As he could not do so, the
remedy was ineffective. It is irrelevant if the Federal Department of
Justice and Police in its decision of 2 November 1992 did not rely on
these documents as he was deprived of the possibility exhaustively to
inform himself of the legality of the measure.
The Government refer to the Commission's case-law according to
which the administrative appeal to the Federal Department of Justice
and Police met the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention (see
No. 11811/85, Dec. 8.3.88, D.R. 55, p. 182). In any event, the
procedure has to be considered as a whole. In the present case the
President of the Indictment Chamber of the Federal Court as well as
the Federal Court in its judgment of 8 March 1994 examined the
justification of the telephone surveillance.
The Government further point out that the applicant was
considered a "third person" for purposes of the criminal investigation
and could not, therefore, have access to the entire case-file.
Indeed, the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry aimed at protecting
the informants. In the present case the applicant had access to all
the documents enabling him effectively to file an appeal. While the
Government admit that they have not consulted all documents mentioned
by the applicant, it is submitted that the applicant could consult all
files directly relating to the telephone surveillance and even other
documents. Finally, the Federal Court, which possessed the entire
case-file, was able to conclude in its judgment of 8 March 1994, on
the one hand, that the applicant had had access to all the pertinent
documents in order effectively to file an appeal: and on the other
that it appeared justified that informants' names remained
confidential.
The applicant replies that the Federal Court's judgment of
8 March 1994 is irrelevant insofar as the proceedings concerned the
institution of criminal proceedings. They did not concern the issue
whether the administrative appeal before the Federal Council was an
effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention. The President of the Indictment Chamber of the Federal
Court, on the other hand, when he authorised the telephone
surveillance, only undertook a cursory examination of the matter.
The applicant further submits that the documents which he could
not consult constituted very important files which had to be consulted
in order to lodge an effective remedy. The applicant contests the
assertion of the Government, and of the Federal Court, that partial
consultation sufficed in his case; the Government admit that they did
not have the full file at their disposal, and the Federal Court also
was not in possession of the full file.
In the applicant's opinion, the files that were not, or not in
their entirety, available for consultation were of great importance
for assessing the question as to whether it was necessary to order the
telephone surveillance, whether the surveillance was properly carried
out, and whether the applicant had sufficient opportunity to put
forward his case. The applicant thus requests the Government to hand
out all documents for consultation and comment.
The Commission, having examined these complaints, finds that they
raise serious issues of questions of fact and law which are of such
complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of
the merits. The remainder of the application can also not, therefore,
be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other ground
for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the
merits of the case.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)