AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 29069/95

                      by Nadesta HIIPAKKA and Others

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 17 May 1994 by

Nadesta HIIPAKKA and Others against Finland and registered on

3 November 1995 under file No. 29069/95;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicants are four Finnish citizens, listed in the Appendix

in alphabetical order.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicants are owners of real property in the village of

Kuninkaanjoki, in the municipality of Soini.

      It appears that since the 1960s, some property owners in the

relevant area have wanted to build a new forest road. In the 1970s and

1980s, some property owners took a total of three initiatives to this

effect, but these initiatives did not lead to a concrete project.

      In May 1988 certain property owners requested the Forestry Board

(metsälautakunta, skogsnämnden) of Southern Ostrobotnia to draw up a

road construction plan (tiesuunnitelma, vägplan). As it was estimated,

on the basis of this request, that the majority of the property owners

were in favour of building the road, the Forestry Board began the

planning work. In the autumn of 1988 on-site planning work took place.

Later in 1988 the Forestry Board drew up the road construction plan for

building a forest road approximately 9 kilometres long.

      At the request of a property owner in the relevant area,

administrative proceedings (tietoimitus, vägförrättning) before the

Expert and Trustees (toimitusmiehet, sysslomän) were instituted in

accordance with the 1962 Act on Private Roads (laki yksityisistä

teistä, lagen om enskilda vägar) for the road construction plan to be

put into effect. A public notice concerning the forthcoming proceedings

was placed on the bulletin board of the municipality on 16 January 1990

and registered letters were sent to the property owners concerned,

including the applicants.

      The administrative proceedings began with a meeting on 2 February

1990. A further meeting, of which notice was given by public notice and

by sending registered letters to the property owners, was held on

13 June 1990. The planned road would affect 29 pieces of real property,

of which 18 were represented in these proceedings. The applicants, save

for the third applicant, were also represented.

      In the above-mentioned administrative proceedings it was decided

to confirm the road construction plan. The confirmation entailed, inter

alia, the approval of the proposed location of the road and the so-

called road units (tieyksikkö, vägenhet) indicating the relative

distribution of the road costs between the property owners, the

establishing of rights of way (14 metres wide road) pertaining to the

encumbered properties and the founding of a road maintenance

association (tiekunta, väglag - "the Association"). In the proceedings

the question of compensation was discussed but no requests for

compensation were made and, consequently, no decision as regards

compensation was made. The applicants' shares of the road costs,

totalling nearly FIM 500,000, were 3.74 %, 6.37 %, 5.85 % and 9.37 %

respectively. The road was supposed to cover 1,700 m2 of the second

applicant's land and 2,100 m2 of the third applicant's land. The

planned road would also run over the first and fourth applicants'

properties.

      The second applicant appealed to the Land Court (maaoikeus, jord-

domstolen) of Vaasa in relation to the road construction plan and the

distribution of the road costs, stating that the road construction plan

was not appropriate and that there were more efficient ways of building

a forest road. He stated, furthermore, that the method of dividing the

costs was inappropriate since it was based on forest taxation and not

on ton-kilometres. The second applicant did not appeal on the question

of compensation.

      On 11 October 1990 the Land Court, after arranging a site

inspection, rejected the appeal as regards both the road construction

plan and the distribution of the road costs.

      On 18 February 1991 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta

domstolen) refused the second applicant leave to appeal.

      On 5 March 1991 the administrative proceedings for the execution

of the relevant road construction plan were noted on the Land Register

(maarekisteri, jordregistret).

      On 2 May 1991 the applicants requested the Supreme Court to re-

open the case. They maintained, inter alia, that certain parts of the

road were unnecessary for them because there were alternative

connections with their property. As the construction of the road was

supposed to begin in the autumn, they requested the Supreme Court to

suspend the road construction works. Their request for a re-opening of

the case did not raise the question of compensation.

      On 5 September 1991 the Supreme Court decided to suspend the

execution of the Land Court's above-mentioned judgment of 11 October

1990.      On 4 May 1993 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants' request

for the case to be re-opened, whereupon its decision as regards the

suspension of the road construction works lapsed. The Supreme Court had

at its disposal an opinion given by the National Survey Board

(maanmittaushallitus, lantmäteristyrelsen), which was based, inter

alia, on a site inspection.

      Furthermore, on 28 February 1994 and on 8 September 1995, the

Supreme Court rejected further requests from the applicants for a re-

opening of the case.

      In the meantime, on 24 May 1993, the third applicant lodged a

complaint with the Chancellor of Justice about the Expert's actions in

the administrative proceedings in 1990 as regards, inter alia, the

question of compensation. On 12 December 1994 the Deputy Chancellor of

Justice (apulaisoikeuskansleri, justitiekanslersadjointen) criticized

the Experts's action as regards the requests for compensation. He found

that, as the Expert had not expressly asked if the third applicant, who

had not been present at the meetings, wanted to ask for compensation,

it had not been correct to conclude that no requests for compensation

had been made. He stated, furthermore, that it was open for the third

applicant to request damages directly from the relevant Ministry or to

bring an action against the State in the relevant first-instance court.

      In the meantime, on 12 April 1991, the newly established

Association held its annual general meeting (vuosikokous, årsstämma).

The applicants attended the meeting. The Association confirmed the

division of the road costs (maksuunpanoluettelo, debiteringslängd)

according to the confirmed road units. The applicants' road costs were

confirmed to be FIM 18,053, FIM 30,782, FIM 18,295 and FIM 45,302

respectively. An appeal against the Association's decision lay to the

Road Board (tielautakunta, vägnämnd) and subsequently to the Land Court

and, with leave, to the Supreme Court. The Association's decision was

not appealed against.

      As the applicants did not pay their contributions, the

Association lodged, in January 1994, a request for enforcement of the

payments (ulosotto, utsökning). The applicants appealed and requested

that the enforcement of the payments be suspended. Following certain

proceedings, on 27 October 1994 the Technical Board (tekninen lauta-

kunta, tekniska nämnden) of Soini, which functioned as the Road Board,

rejected the applicants' appeal.

      Furthermore, in the meantime, on 27 June 1994, the Association

held its annual general meeting. It appears that the Association

decided that no changes were needed to the confirmed road construction

plan or to the distribution of the road costs. The applicants appealed

against the Association's decision to the Technical Board, stating that

the road construction plan and the distribution of the road costs ought

to be changed. The Technical Board, on 27 October 1994, dismissed the

appeal without examining it on the merits since it found that the

appeal had been lodged out of time.

      The applicants appealed to the Land Court against the above-

mentioned two decisions made by the Technical Board.

      On 28 February 1995 the Land Court upheld the decisions made by

the Technical Board on 27 October 1994. As regards the enforcement of

the road cost payments, it stated that the payments were based on

decisions concerning road units that had acquired legal force.

      The applicants appealed against the Land Court's judgment to the

Supreme Court, which on 8 September 1995 refused them leave to appeal.

      In the meantime, several of the property owners had requested the

Forestry Board to grant them a subsidy under the Act on Forest

Improvement (metsänparannuslaki, skogsförbättringslagen) to build the

relevant road. The applicants did not, however, apply for such subsidy.

      On 15 August 1991 the Forest Board granted a subsidy to those

property owners who had applied for it.

      The applicants appealed against the Forest Board's decision. The

appeal was dealt with by the Appellate Board of Agricultural Industry

(maaseutuelinkeinojen valituslautakunta, landbruksnäringarnas besvärs-

nämnd), hereinafter "the Appellate Board".

      On 25 August 1993 the Appellate Board dismissed the appeal

without examining it on the merits. It stated that the applicants had

had the opportunity to apply for the relevant subsidy but had not done

so. Therefore, it found that the Forest Board's decision to grant a

subsidy to other property owners did not affect the applicants' rights

and, consequently, they did not have right of appeal.

      The applicants appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court

(korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningdomstolen) as regards the

Appellate Board's decision. They requested, furthermore, the Supreme

Administrative Court to suspend the enforcement of the payments and the

building of the road.

      On 17 December 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court stated that

it had no jurisdiction over the questions concerning the request for

suspension of the enforcement of the payments and the building of the

road. As regards the question of the subsidy, it stated that the

applicants had not requested the Forest Board to grant them a subsidy

although they had had the opportunity to do so. Therefore, the Forest

Board's decision did not affect the applicants' rights. The Supreme

Administrative Court upheld the Appellate Board's decision of 25 August

1993.      On 26 January 1995 the applicants requested the Supreme

Administrative Court to re-open the case as regards the subsidy and to

re-open the case decided by the Land Court on 11 October 1990.

      On 7 June 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the

applicants' request for a re-opening of the case as regards the

subsidy. It did not examine their request as regards the Land Court's

judgment on the merits since it found that it had no jurisdiction as

regards that judgment.

      The road construction works commenced in September 1995.

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicants complain that their right to the peaceful

enjoyment of their possessions has been violated since they have been

obliged to participate in a road construction project that is not

financially profitable for them and does not serve a general interest.

They maintain, furthermore, that the alternative road plan supported

by the applicants would not have affected their property so seriously

and would have saved, in total, about four hectares of forest in

comparison with the confirmed plan. The alternative plan would also

have been a considerably cheaper solution. In this respect they invoke

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

2.    The applicants maintain, furthermore, that they have been pressed

to accept the plan by threats of future enforcement proceedings in

relation to the road costs. They also maintain that attempts to

persuade them to participate in the project have even included visits

to their homes. The applicants complain that these facts have resulted

in a violation of their right to respect for their private life and

their home. They invoke Article 8 of the Convention.

3.    As regards the proceedings concerning the subsidy, i.e. the

proceedings before the Appellate Board and in the Supreme

Administrative Court, the applicants complain that neither of these

bodies gave them an opportunity to comment on the documents in the

case. In this respect they invoke Article 6 of the Convention.

4.    The applicants complain, furthermore, that they have been treated

unfairly in several respects in all the proceedings related to the

construction of the forest road.

      As regards the confirmation of the road construction plan and the

distribution of the road costs, they maintain that there were

procedural errors in the planning process which took place at the end

of the 1980s before the Forestry Board. They complain, furthermore,

that the summons to attend the administrative proceedings before the

Expert and Trustees in 1990 was not accurate enough. They complain,

furthermore, that the domestic courts, namely the Land Court and the

Supreme Court, did not take into account objectively conflicting

opinions and did not request expert opinions as regards the road

construction plan and distribution of the costs. They maintain that the

planned road is not appropriate and that parts of it are unnecessary

for them. They also complain that the distribution of the road costs

is not correct.

      The applicants maintain that the judgments made by the courts

were unlawful. In this respect they refer also to the other sets of

proceedings linked with the road construction plan.

      In the light of the above, the applicants complain that their

right to an effective remedy before a national authority as regards

their possession rights has been violated. They invoke Article 13 of

the Convention.

5.    Finally, the applicants complain that their rights under Article

17 of the Convention have been violated.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

to the Convention, that their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their

possessions has been violated. In this respect they maintain that the

road was unnecessary for them and that, furthermore, their financial

responsibility for the road costs was excessive. Article 1 of Protocol

No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention reads:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      In the present case the Commission will limit its examination to

whether the facts occurring after 10 May 1990, the date when the

Convention entered into force with regard to Finland, disclosed a

breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention. Events

prior to 10 May 1990 will be taken into account merely as a background

to the issues before the Commission (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hokkanen

judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 299-A, p. 19, para. 53).

a)    The road construction plan

      The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)

comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first

sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates

the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule,

contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers

deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions.

The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that

Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the

use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three

rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second

and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference

with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore

be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the

first rule (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Fredin judgment of 18 February 1991,

Series A no. 192, p. 14, para. 41).

      The Commission observes that the road, which has apparently been

at least partly constructed, has been constructed over the applicants'

properties by virtue of a right of way encumbering their properties and

favouring certain other properties. For this purpose the applicants had

to give up land on a permanent basis. Although this did not take place

by way of expropriation proceedings leading to the transfer of a formal

title of ownership, in the circumstances of the case the creation of

the right of way constituted a deprivation of the applicants' property

to the extent that this property was encumbered by the right of way.

Whilst this deprivation did not transfer property from the applicants

to the State, it resulted from a plan drawn up by the Forestry Board

and confirmed by the Experts and Trustees. The Commission therefore

considers that, regardless of the fact that a private road was at

issue, the deprivation incurred State responsibility (see H. v.

Finland, Comm. Report 5.4.1995, para. 124).

      The Commission recalls that a deprivation of possessions must,

firstly, pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest. This

requirement may be fulfilled even if the community at large has no

direct use or enjoyment of the property deprived from the applicants

(cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., James and Others judgment of

21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, pp. 30-32, paras. 39-45). Secondly,

there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between

the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (ibid., p. 34,

para. 50). Furthermore, the requirement that a deprivation must be

"subject to the conditions provided for by law" presupposes the

existence of and compliance with adequately accessible and sufficiently

precise domestic legal provisions (Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and Others

judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 47, para. 110).

      In the present case, the Commission considers that the

deprivation of parts of the applicants' property had the legitimate aim

of facilitating and stimulating forestry in the area served by the

road. In these circumstances and having regard to the State's margin

of appreciation the Commission accepts that the deprivation took place

in the public interest.

      As for the requirement that a deprivation must be "subject to the

conditions provided for by law", the Commission recalls that its power

to review compliance with domestic law is limited (cf., the above-

mentioned Fredin judgment, pp. 16-17, para. 50). The Commission

considers that the phrase "conditions provided for by law" refers

primarily to such matters as the power to expropriate (or otherwise

take) property and to compensation terms which, accordingly, must be

defined by the law with reasonable precision. Although the second

sentence of the first paragraph or any other provision of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) does not contain any explicit procedural

requirement, the prohibition of arbitrariness is inherent in the

provision in question.

      The Commission recalls that the planning procedure before the

Forestry Board took place in 1988. Having regard to the Commission

competence ratione temporis, these proceedings can be taken into

account merely as a background.

      As regards the subsequent domestic proceedings, the Commission

notes that the applicants were summoned to the proceedings before the

Expert and Trustees by registered letters. The applicants, save for the

third applicant, were present at these proceedings. Furthermore, the

national courts held that the relevant provisions of the Act on Private

Roads had been complied with. Recalling its limited power to review

compliance with domestic law, the Commission considers that it has no

reason to dispute those findings in so far as the substantive

conditions are concerned.

      Finally, the Commission notes that the applicants had the

opportunity to receive the forestry improvement subsidy. In these

circumstances, and taking into account the fact that the applicants can

themselves make use of the road, the Commission finds that there was

a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed

and the aim sought to be realised.

      Consequently, the Commission finds that there is no appearance

of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention

as regards the confirmation of the road construction plan.

b)    The road costs

      Recalling its finding as regards the State responsibility for the

deprivation of part of the applicants' property, the Commission

observes that, although the road costs were not levied by the State,

they nevertheless resulted from the plan adopted by State organs. The

obligation to participate in these costs thus also led to State

responsibility.

      The Commission considers that the applicants' obligation to

participate in the road costs constituted an interference with their

property rights which falls to be examined under the second paragraph

of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) as to its lawfulness, purpose and

proportionality (see H. v. Finland, Comm. Report 5.4.1995, para. 136).

      The Commission considers that the interference complained of had

the same legitimate aim as had the confirmation of the road

construction plan: to facilitate and stimulate forestry in the area

affected by the road. This purpose was, moreover, in the general

interest.

      As regards the proportionality, the Commission notes that the

applicants had the opportunity to receive forestry improvement subsidy

and that they have the opportunity to make use of the road. In these

circumstances the Commission considers, in view of the wide margin of

appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in the relevant area,

that the distribution of the road costs cannot be considered to be

disproportionate to the legitimate aims.

      The Commission therefore finds that the interference with the

applicants' rights to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, as

regards the road costs, was justified under the terms of the second

paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicants complain, furthermore, that their right to respect

for their private life and their home has been violated through the

institution of enforcement proceedings in relation to the road costs

and through the visiting of their homes in an attempt to persuade them

to participate in the project. In this respect they invoke Article 8

(Art. 8) of the Convention.

      The Commission finds, in the light of the applicants'

submissions, that there has been no interference with their rights as

guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    As regards the proceedings concerning the subsidy for the

relevant road construction works, the applicants complain that neither

the Appellate Board nor the Supreme Administrative Court gave them an

opportunity to comment on the case-documents. In this respect they

invoke Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

      The Commission notes, firstly, that the applicants had not

applied for the relevant subsidy from the Forestry Board. The

Commission finds that the Forestry Board's decision to grant certain

other property owners a subsidy did not concern the applicants' civil

rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      The Commission finds that this part of the application is

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.    The applicants complain, furthermore, that they have not had an

effective remedy as regards the road construction plan and the

distribution of the road costs. They invoke Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention in connection with their property rights. Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention reads:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

4.1.  The Commission notes that the question of the road construction

plan and the distribution of the road costs was decided in the

proceedings before the Expert and Trustees on 2 February 1990 and

13 June 1990, in the Land Court on 11 October 1990 and, finally, in the

Supreme Court on 18 February 1991.

      It is true that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention secures

to everyone whose rights as set in the Convention are violated the

right to an effective remedy before a national authority.

      However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not

the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a

violation of this provision, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention

provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within

a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was

taken".

      In the present case the decision of the Supreme Court, which was

the final decision regarding the subject of this particular complaint,

was given on 18 February 1991, whereas the application was submitted

to the Commission on 17 May 1994, that is, more than six months after

the date of this decision.  The Supreme Court's subsequent judgments

concerning the requests for a re-opening of the case are irrelevant in

this respect. Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose

the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted

or suspended the running of that period.

      It follows that this part of the application has been introduced

out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3

(Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

4.2.  The applicant complain furthermore, under Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention, that they have not had an effective remedy

as regards the subsequent proceedings linked with the road construction

plan. They maintain that the judgments made by the courts were

unlawful.

      The Commission recalls that the word "remedy" within the meaning

of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not mean a remedy which

is bound to succeed. The applicant must have an opportunity for his

claim to be examined by a national authority conforming to the

requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) which is able to examine the

merits of his complaint.

      The Commission notes, firstly, that the division of the road

costs was confirmed on 12 April 1991 by the decision of the

Association's general meeting, which acquired legal force since it was

not appealed against.

      The enforcement proceedings for payment of the road costs began

in 1994. The Commission notes that the applicants had the opportunity

to appeal against the enforcement of the road cost payments to the Land

Court, which gave its judgment on 28 February 1995, and thereafter to

apply for leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, which refused them

such leave on 8 September 1995. The Commission notes, furthermore, that

the applicants made use of these remedies. The Commission has not found

any substantiated facts which could lead to the conclusion that these

remedies were not effective remedies within the meaning of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention.

      As regards the Association's decision made in its general meeting

on 27 June 1994, the Commission notes that the applicants had the

opportunity to appeal against the Association's decision to the

relevant municipal board and thereafter to the Land Court. Furthermore,

with leave, the applicants could have brought the matter before the

Supreme Court.

      In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicants

had at their disposal an effective remedy within the meaning of Article

13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    Finally, the applicants complain that their rights under Article

17 of the Convention have been violated. Article 17 (Art. 17) of the

Convention reads:

      "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying

      for any State, group or person any right to engage in any

      activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any

      of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their

      limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the

      Convention."

      Having regard to its findings above, the Commission finds no

appearance of a violation either of Article 17 in conjunction with

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1(Art. 17+P1-1) or in conjunction with

Articles 6, 8 or 13 (Art. 17+6+8+13) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)

                               APPENDIX

Name                      Born         Residence       Profession

HIIPAKKA, Nadesta         1919         Soini           Pensioner

LAASASENAHO, Jouko        1941         Vantaa          Assistant

                                                       professor

LEIKKARI, Ritva           1945         Ähtäri          Farmer

VAKKURI, Tauno            1923         Soini           Farmer