AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 26299/95

                      by Maurice KIRK

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 18 July 1994 by

Maurice KIRK against the United Kingdom and registered on

28 January 1995 under file No. 26299/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen born in 1945 and resident in

Guernsey. He is represented before the Commission by Bobbetts Mackan,

solicitors practising in Bristol. This is the fifteenth application by

the applicant to the Commission. The previous fourteen were declared

inadmissible, the latest being No. 20890/92 declared inadmissible on

1 July 1993.

     The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as

follows.

     The applicant is a practising veterinary surgeon who moved to

Guernsey from England with his family in 1979.  Since his arrival in

Guernsey, the applicant has been involved in a large number of cases,

criminal and civil. He speedily formed the view that the administration

of justice on the island was conducted in an arbitrary and archaic

manner by persons ill-begotten of their high office. The applicant did

not hesitate to communicate his opinions to the relevant authorities

and drew attention to what he and others considered to be a feudal

system of political and judicial administration. As a result, the

applicant states that he became "persona non grata" with the political

and judicial administration on the island and a clear desire was

evinced by those in authority to ensure that the applicant was forced

to leave the island. This was demonstrated, inter alia, by the bringing

of further criminal charges against him which would ensure that his

name was removed from the register of persons permitted to practise as

veterinary surgeons.

     The applicant refers in particular to the following decisions and

proceedings:

A.   On 17 July 1984, the applicant was convicted of contempt of court

and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment following an incident on

12 December 1983 in which the applicant had left the dock and advanced

in a threatening manner towards the magistrate sitting to hear a charge

of drunk driving against the applicant. The applicant appealed to the

Guernsey Court of Appeal, explaining, inter alia, that the magistrate

had not constituted a "competent court" and he had intended to carry

out a citizen's arrest on the magistrate. The applicant's appeal was

rejected on 5 October 1984.

B.   Between 4 June and 31 December 1984, the applicant states that

the prison authorities prevented him from receiving (at least 16 were

never received) or sending communications (exceeding 65 in number)

which hampered him in contacting lawyers, witnesses and other helpers

and in thus preparing for various court proceedings. The applicant

complained to the Prison Board. By letter dated 27 July 1984, the Board

stated that the applicant as a prisoner on remand or pending his appeal

had been or was entitled to necessary facilities for the preparation

of his defence or appeal. By further letter dated 26 September 1984,

the Board rejected the applicant's claim that he had insufficient time

to prepare his case, referring to the 600 letters already sent by him

and to the fact that he was allowed to work on his case during the time

that he should have been working and noting that in association time

he was making use of the leisure facilities. A letter dated 11 December

1984 from the Home Officer in response to enquiry by the applicant's

Member of Parliament stated that the applicant had been allowed to send

more than 1000 letters while in prison  which was far in excess of the

statutory entitlement: only one incoming letter had been stopped (from

a mentally ill patient) and 32 outgoing letters  which were mostly of

an excessive length and contained cartoons and press cuttings not

relevant to his litigation or pending appeal. By petition dated

16 February 1991, the applicant complained about this and other matters

to the Privy Council requesting special leave to appeal. By report

dated 21 May 1991, the Privy Council refused special leave to appeal.

C.   On 4 June 1990, the applicant was fined £1000 (term of

imprisonment in default) for contempt of court in respect of the

publication of a leaflet "Guernsey's Corrupt Judicial System" which

contained scandalous statements about a magistrate. The text of the

court order indicates that the applicant elected to represent himself.

The applicant considered that he required the transcript of the

proceedings  in order to appeal but his application to be provided a

transcript free of cost was rejected on 7 January 1991, since he had

not provided sufficient details about his financial position which

could satisfy the court that he would be eligible for legal aid. It

seems that his appeal lapsed, no subsequent documents relating to it

being provided.

D.   On 12 October 1990, the applicant was convicted for criminal

damage and fined £100. On 24 October 1990, he was convicted for

contempt and sentenced to one months'imprisonment. He was granted bail

pending his appeal. He appears to have applied for a full copy of the

transcript (extracts were before the courts) but was not eligible to

obtain a free copy. The appeal against the contempt was adjourned at

his request in April 1991 pending his appeals to the Privy Council. On

rejection of the Privy Council petitions, the appeal was dismissed on

22 October 1991.

COMPLAINTS

A.   In respect of his conviction for contempt of 17 July 1984, the

applicant invokes Articles 3, 5 paras. 1, 2 and 3, 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c)

and 10 of the Convention.

B.   In respect of the stopping of his letters during his detention

between June and December 1984, the applicant invokes Articles 3, 5,

6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (c), 8 and 13 of the Convention.

C. In respect of his conviction for contempt on 4 June 1990, the

applicant invokes Articles 5 paras 2 and 3 and 6 in that he was

deprived of the opportunity to answer the allegations  or to represent

himself.

D. In respect of his convictions in October 1990, the applicant invokes

Articles 5 paras. 2 and 3, 6 and 8 in that he was deprived of the

opportunity to appeal, answer the allegations  or to represent himself.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     On 29 October 1991, the applicant's counsel submitted a faxed

outline application on his behalf. A letter containing complaints, with

documents, had previously been submitted by the applicant personally

on or about 24 October 1991. On 31 December 1991, solicitors contacted

the Secretariat stating that they were now representing the applicant.

The Commission's application form was sent to the solicitors on

21 January 1992. It was drawn to the attention of the applicant's

representatives that many of the matters raised had also been

considered in previous applications by the applicant and copies of the

Commission's decisions were sent. They were also warned that failure

to return the application form within a short period might affect the

date of introduction of the application.

     By letter dated 12 June 1992, the applicant's representatives

referring to "two separate and distinct petitions" submitted in October

1991 stated that the first concerned new matters unrelated to previous

applications and in respect of the second, made by the applicant

personally, there was the new element of a Privy Council decision by

way of exhaustion of domestic remedies. By letter dated 17 July 1992,

the Secretariat reminded the applicant's representatives that they had

not returned the Commission's application form sent to them in January

1992 but informing that there was no need to repeat information

previously submitted.

     On receipt of the Commission's application form on 9 November

1992, with enclosures repeating largely earlier submissions made by

counsel on 29 October 1991, the Secretariat informed the applicant's

representatives that the application had been registered under No.

20890/92 on 29 October 1992 and that it was considered as having been

introduced in October 1991.

     The Commission sitting by way a committee rejected the

application as manifestly ill-founded on the basis of all the material

in the file on 1 July 1993.

     The decision was sent to the applicant's representatives on

13 July 1993. A further copy was sent on 11 August 1993 when it

appeared the first was misdirected. By letter dated 21 September 1993,

the applicant's representatives wrote requesting further details of the

Commission's reasoning.  By letter dated 29 September 1993, the

Secretariat informed them that no further reasons could be disclosed

and explained the nature of the committee proceedings.

     By letter dated 18 July 1994, the applicant's representatives

referred to the application lodged on 24 October 1991 and enclosed

their formal submissions. By letter dated 22 August 1994, the

Secretariat informed them that the application No. 20890/92 introduced

on that date had been declared inadmissible.

     By letter dated 5 September 1994, the applicant's representatives

contended that two sets of papers had been submitted on 24 October

1991, one from the applicant and the other from his counsel.  They

accepted that one application had been determined and asked to proceed

with the second one. By letter dated 24 November 1994, the Secretariat

informed them that the two sets of papers had been registered as one

application under No. 20890/92 and that the Commission's decision

concerned both. By letter dated 30 November 1994, the applicant's

representatives stated that they had never been informed that the two

sets of papers had been linked under one application number and that

detailed submissions had only been provided concerning one: the

detailed submissions now provided related to the second.

     By letter dated 26 January 1995, the Secretariat informed the

applicant's representatives that their current complaints had been

registered under No. 26299/95 with the introduction date of 30 November

1994 but that to the extent that the matters raised were substantially

the same as those dealt with under the previous application they were

likely to be rejected under Article 27 para. (1) b. They were also

informed that the introduction date would be taken from the date of

their recent submissions.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains principally of his conviction for

contempt of 17 July 1984, the stopping of his letters between June-

December 1984 and his convictions for contempt in June and October

1990.  The Commission notes that the first two complaints were examined

and rejected in the Commission's decision in Application Nos. 13352/87

and 13496/88 of 8 March 1989 and were also contained in the materials

submitted to the Commission and registered under Application No.

20890/92 rejected on 1 July 1993. The convictions of the applicant for

contempt in June and October 1990 were also included in the complaints

submitted in the application No. 20890/92 which was rejected on 1 July

1993.

2.   The Commission notes that the applicant and his representatives

consider that there has been a confusion as to the complaints which

were to be examined by it under Application No. 20890/92 and that they

were under the impression that only one of the "sets of papers"

submitted was registered under that application number. The Commission

is prepared to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt as the

genuineness of his misunderstanding. It has therefore not applied

Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) in respect of complaints which

were referred to in outline in the materials before the Commission and

registered under Application No. 20890/92.

3.   The Commission recalls however that the applicant's solicitors

wrote to Secretariat by letter dated 18 July 1994 stating that with

reference to the application lodged on 24 October 1991 they enclosed

the formal submissions. These submissions provided a more detailed

expansion of some matters referred to in the applicant's letter and

annexes of 24 October 1991. The Commission would note that its task in

examining the applicant's complaints which refer to a large number of

different proceedings has not been assisted by the manner of its

presentation. While difficulties may inevitably arise from the

intricacy of events, the Commission has found inconsistencies and

contradictions in submissions of facts and in allegations of complaint.

     According, however, to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention,

applications to the Commission must be introduced within six months of

the final decision taken in respect of their subject-matter.  The

Commission's established practice is to consider as the date of

introduction the date of the applicant's first letter indicating his

intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the

nature of the complaints which he wishes to raise.  However, where a

substantial interval follows before the applicant submits further

information regarding his proposed application, the Commission must

examine the particular circumstances of the case in order to decide

what date should be regarded as the date of introduction of the

application, interrupting the running of time for the purpose of the

six month time-limit (see eg. No. 15213/89 dec. 1.7.91 D.R. 71 p. 230).

     The Commission considers that the purpose of the six month rule

is to maintain reasonable legal certainty and ensure that cases raising

issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time.

This also facilitates the establishment of facts in a case, the passage

of time rendering problematic any fair examination of the issues

raised. It would therefore be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the

six month rule laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention to

accept that by means of an initial letter an applicant could set in

motion the procedure provided for in Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention only to remain inactive thereafter for an unlimited and

unexplained period of time (see eg. No. 10626/83, Dec. 7.5.85 D.R.42

p. 205).

     In the present case, there has been a lapse of two years and nine

months between the applicant's letter introducing his complaints and

the provision of "formal submissions" concerning these matters on his

behalf by his solicitors. While there was correspondence between the

solicitors and the Commission's Secretariat during 1992 and 1993

concerning the applicant's Application No. 20890/92, the applicant's

solicitors maintain that this application dealt with separate and

distinct matters. In any event, there was a gap of more than a year

between the decision rejecting that application  on 3 July 1993 and the

submission of "formal submissions" in relation to this application  on

18 July 1994, a delay for which no explanation has been given. The

Commission notes that the applicant's solicitors were warned of the

possible effect of delay on the calculation of the introduction date

in the first letter sent to them on 21 January 1992. The Commission

finds therefore that the date of introduction for the purposes of this

application must be taken as 18 July 1994.

     The Commission recalls that the applicant claims that the final

decision relating to his complaints about the contempt conviction of

17 July 1984 and the stopping of his correspondence while he was in

prison between June and December 1984 was the decision of the Privy

Council rejecting his request for special leave to appeal on 21 May

1991. Even assuming therefore that the applicant's petition to the

Privy Council more than five years after the events in question could

be regarded as an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 26

(Art. 26), the refusal of special leave was given more than six months

before the introduction of this application.

     As regards the complaints concerning convictions in June and

October 1990, the Commission notes that the final decisions regarding

these matters were given on 7 January 1991 and 21 October 1992

respectively though it also appears that some reference to these

matters was also included in the applicant's petition to the Privy

Council which was rejected on 21 May 1991. These decisions were also

issued more than six months before the introduction of this

application.

     The Commission finds no special circumstances arising on the

facts of this case which could be considered as interrupting the

running of the six month period.

     Consequently, the applicant's complaints must be rejected as out

of time pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

Secretary to the First Chamber       President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)