AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                       Application No. 25648/94

                       by Timothy ROBSON

                       against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 27 June 1994 by

Timothy ROBSON against the United Kingdom and registered on

14 November 1994 under file No. 25648/94;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     22 November 1995 and the observations of the applicant in reply

     submitted on 13 February 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen born in 1962 and resides in

Argyll, Scotland.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

     The applicant was questioned by police on 4 and 5 April 1992 and

claims that he was, inter alia, assaulted and refused a solicitor

during questioning. The standard form filled in by the police and

entitled "Arrest-Rights of Accused" (submitted by the applicant to the

Commission) noted that the applicant was informed of his right to have

a solicitor present at 07.34 on 4 April 1992. The handwriting on the

form notes that the applicant's then solicitor and the duty solicitor

could not be contacted. At 15.50 on the same day it was again noted on

the form that the applicant's own solicitor could not be contacted and

that the duty solicitor "attends".

     The applicant, along with two others, was charged on indictment

with eight offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act")

and with two charges of reset. The applicant appeared before a court

on 6 and on 13 April 1992, on which latter date he was released on

bail.

     The applicant received legal aid from the Scottish Legal Aid

Board ("S.L.A.B.") for the preparation of his defence and for legal

representation at his trial.

     The applicant was represented at his trial in the High Court in

Scotland by a solicitor and by counsel. During the trial the

prosecution relied on certain statements made by the applicant during

his questioning by police. The defence argued, in the presence of the

jury, that certain of those statements were obtained through, inter

alia, assaults, intimidation and deprivation. The prosecution disputed

this and submitted that the statements had been fairly obtained. In his

summing up to the jury, the trial judge noted the submissions of the

defence and the prosecution in this respect and directed the jury that

before they could accept any such statements they must be satisfied of

three matters: that the statements were in fact made, that any such

statements were accurately recorded and that they were freely made and

obtained. The trial judge continued as follows:

     "Whether it was or not is something you have

     to decide and in reaching that decision you should be guided by

     the following principles. Fairness in relation to the

     admissibility of statements really involves both sides of the

     case. On the one hand, it is in the public interest that crimes

     should be investigated and those who commit them brought to

     justice. On the other hand, those who are suspected or accused

     must be fairly dealt with. Information from them must be obtained

     fairly and it must be freely given by them. There should be no

     threats, inducements or intimidation ... If you thought that the

     ... statement was unfairly obtained then you should exclude it

     from your consideration ...".

     On 5 April 1993 the jury found the applicant guilty on four of

the charges under the 1971 Act and on one of the charges of reset. The

judge sentenced the applicant to five terms of imprisonment to run

concurrently - two sentences of 5 years, one sentence of 2 years, one

sentence of 6 months and one sentence of 4 months. On the same day a

forfeiture order was made in relation to the applicant's mother's car

which the applicant had been using and in which certain quantities of

drugs had been found.

     On 8 April 1993 the applicant lodged an intimation of his

intention to appeal together with a note of appeal against conviction

and sentence. The grounds of appeal, outlined in the note of appeal,

simply challenged the severity of the sentence and noted that the

applicant wished to apply for an appeal against sentence or "possibly"

for a retrial on the charges of which he had been found guilty.

     On 4 May 1993 the transcript of the trial judge's summing up to

the jury was filed. On 20 August 1993 the report of the trial judge on

the trial was also filed pursuant to section 236A of the Criminal

procedure (Scotland) Act 1974. In that report, the trial judge

described the evidence against the applicant, the reasons for the

sentences given, including his consideration of mitigation offered on

the applicant's behalf, and as regards the applicant's request for a

retrial, stated that "during the trial no objections were made to the

admission of any evidence".

     While the legal aid the applicant received for his trial would

have covered legal advice in connection with his appeal including

obtaining the opinion of counsel as to the appeal's chances of success,

it did not cover legal representation for the appeal hearing and, for

this, the applicant made a further application for legal aid on 6 May

1993.     On 25 November 1993 the applicant's solicitors wrote to the

S.L.A.B. requesting the granting of legal aid and advising that counsel

was indisposed but had advised orally that counsel was of the opinion

that the applicant's appeal was not stateable. That letter notified the

S.L.A.B. of the date of the forthcoming appeal which was 3 December

1993. On the same day the applicant's solicitor wrote to the applicant

indicating that counsel did not consider that he had any ground of

appeal whatsoever and that it was likely that he would have to

represent himself at the hearing of his appeal.

     On 3 December 1993 the S.L.A.B. refused to grant legal aid on the

basis that the S.L.A.B. did not consider that the applicant had shown

substantial grounds for making the appeal and that it was not

reasonable, in the circumstances of the case, that legal aid should be

made available to the applicant. The S.L.A.B. indicated that, while

they did not receive a written opinion from counsel in connection with

the prospects of an appeal, the applicant's solicitor had informed

S.L.A.B. that counsel had advised orally that the appeal was not

stateable.

     When the appeal came on for hearing, on 3 December 1993 the High

Court granted the applicant's solicitors and counsel leave to withdraw

from acting for the applicant. An adjournment of the appeal hearing was

also granted to a later date on the basis that on that date the

applicant would be in a position to represent himself. The High Court

also suggested that, if the applicant wished to continue his appeal,

he should lodge amended grounds of appeal.

     Pursuant to complaints made by the applicant against the police

who had interviewed him, the applicant was informed by letter dated

13 December 1993 that the Regional Prosecutor Fiscal did not intend

initiating criminal proceedings against any of the police officers

concerned.

     On 6 January 1994, when the appeal again came on for hearing, the

applicant obtained an adjournment for a month so that he could apply

again for legal aid. On 3 February 1994 the case was again continued

as the court had insufficient time to consider the appeal. The

applicant had no success in obtaining legal aid and on the 2 March 1994

he presented his appeal in person. The applicant indicated that he had

abandoned his appeal against conviction but that he wished to maintain

his appeal against sentence. Having heard the applicant and considered

the documents and information before it, the High Court refused the

applicant's appeal.

     On 28 June 1994 the Justiciary Office of the High Court confirmed

to the applicant that, in order to challenge the forfeiture of her car,

the applicant's mother should have made an application within a year

of the forfeiture order for the return of the car.

     On 1 December 1995 the applicant was released from prison.

Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Criminal trials - Solemn proceedings

     It is open to the defence to make formal objections to the

admissibility of evidence which objections require the judge to ask the

jury to withdraw, to hear counsel's submissions on the point in the

absence of the jury and to decide whether the evidence should be opened

to the jury or not. The cases where this occurs are concerned almost

exclusively with the admissibility in evidence of statements made to

the police.

2. Prior to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act")

(a)  Criminal appeals - Solemn proceedings

     In solemn proceedings in Scotland where the trial proceeds upon

an indictment before a judge sitting with a jury, a person convicted

of a criminal charge has an automatic right of appeal granted by

statute (section 228 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 -

"the 1975 Act"). No leave to appeal is therefore required.

     In an appeal, the appellant may ask the court to review an

alleged miscarriage of justice in the proceedings in which he was

convicted (section 228(2) of the 1975 Act). A miscarriage of justice

is not defined by statute but the term includes such matters as

misdirections by the trial judge, wrong decisions on the admissibility

of evidence and breaches of natural justice. The nature of the alleged

miscarriage of justice must be specified in the grounds of appeal which

must be lodged within eight weeks of the date when sentence is imposed

upon the appellant (section 233(1) and (2) of the 1975 Act). An

appellant may not, at the appeal hearing, found any aspect of his

appeal on a ground which is not contained in the notice of appeal

unless, exceptionally and on showing cause, he obtains the leave of the

court to do so (section 233(3) of the 1975 Act.

     Pursuant to section 236A of the 1975 Act the trial judge must,

as soon as is reasonably practicable after receiving a copy of the

notice of appeal, furnish a report in writing giving the trial judge's

opinion on the case generally and on the grounds contained in the

notice of appeal. Section 234 of the 1975 Act provides that the

appellant can opt to present his case in writing instead of orally.

However, in practice appellants present their case orally.

     While there is no statutory provision relating to the conduct of

the appeal hearing (other than defining the quorum of judges as being

three), the practice is that an appellant is afforded an opportunity

to make oral submissions at such a hearing in support of his appeal and

is also permitted to lodge other documents in support of the appeal.

It is also open to the judges at that hearing to ask questions, or to

put points to, the appellant. In addition, where an appellant refers

to a pre-prepared statement, the practice is for the court to ask the

appellant to present that statement orally or to provide copies of the

statement to the judges to read for themselves.

     The Crown is always represented by counsel (the Advocate Deputy)

at the hearing of criminal appeals. The duty of such counsel is to act

solely in the public interest and not to seek to uphold a wrongful

decision. Accordingly, they will only address the court if requested

to do so or if it is necessary to bring to the attention of the court

some matter relevant to the appeal, whether favourable or not to the

prosecution.

     The court may dismiss the appeal and affirm the verdict of the

trial court. In addition, the trial court verdict can be set aside

either by the appeal court either by quashing the conviction or by

substituting an amended verdict of guilty or by authorising a new

prosecution (section 254 of the 1975 Act).

(b)  Legal Aid for Criminal Appeals - Solemn proceedings

     Responsibility for the administration of legal aid in Scotland

is vested in the Scottish Legal Aid Board which is an independent body

whose members are appointed by the Secretary of State.

     Legal aid, which has been available for the trial, extends

normally to include consideration and advice (by a lawyer and by

counsel previously involved in the case) on the question of an appeal.

Where appropriate legal aid is also available to enable a solicitor to

draft and lodge the statutory intimation of intention to appeal and the

notice of appeal setting out the grounds of appeal.

     To extend legal aid beyond this point a further application to

the Legal Aid Board is required. This application will be granted on

fulfilling two conditions. In the first place, the appellant must be

financially eligible for legal aid. Secondly, the appellant must have

substantial grounds for making the appeal and it must be reasonable

that legal aid should be made available in the circumstances. In

deciding on these issues the Legal Aid Board will take into account,

inter alia, any opinion prepared by counsel as to the appeal's

prospects the success.

     If legal aid has been refused and the appellate court is of the

view that, prima facie, the appellant may have substantial grounds for

taking the appeal and that it is in the interests of justice that the

appellant should have assistance with the costs of legal representation

to argue these grounds, that court can adjourn the hearing and

recommend that the Legal Aid Board review their decision. This practice

was formalised by the circulation of a Practice Note to this effect in

1990 following the judgment of the Court in the Granger application

(Eur. Court H. R., Granger judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no.

174). Where such a recommendation is made, legal aid is automatically

granted (paragraph 6.12 of the Manual of Procedure of the Scottish

legal Aid Board).

3.   The 1995 Act - criminal appeals and legal aid for such appeals

     The 1995 Act, which applies to appeals from convictions handed

down on or after 26 September 1995, provides that an appellant must

apply for leave to appeal and such leave will be granted when the

appellant shows arguable grounds for appeal. In line with that new

appeals system, the 1995 Act also provides that legal aid will be

granted for an appeal where the applicant is financially eligible for

legal aid and where leave to appeal has been granted.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that he was wrongly convicted and, in

this respect, makes a number of complaints about irregularities

surrounding the proceedings against him.

     In the first place, the applicant complains about his treatment

by the police while he was questioned by them and that he was refused

a solicitor during that time.

     Secondly, he complains about the prosecution witnesses at his

trial, the failure to issue a fresh indictment sheet listing only the

matters in respect of which he was charged and about mistakes made

during his trial. He also complains that his solicitor had no interest

in his case or the trial, was in collusion with the Procurator Fiscal

and did not present the necessary defence evidence at trial. He further

complains that the trial judge's report to the appeal court was unfair,

untrue and inaccurate and that the appeal court relied on this report.

2.   The applicant complains about the forfeiture order made on

5 April 1993 by the trial court in relation to his mother's car and

alleges that the police have failed to return some of his property

which was in the car when it was seized.

3.   The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 3(c) of the

Convention that he was refused legal aid for his appeal claiming that

he was therefore obliged to present his own appeal and to drop his

appeal against conviction.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 27 June 1994 and was registered

on 14 November 1994.

     On 6 September 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government, to request the Government to

submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's

complaints under Article 6 para. 3(c) of the Convention and to request

the applicant to provide further information in relation to his

allegation of a refusal of access to a solicitor during questioning by

police.

     The Government's observations were received on 22 November 1995

and those of the applicant were received on 13 February 1996.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that he was wrongly convicted and, in

this respect, he makes a number of allegations as to irregularities

surrounding the proceedings against him.

     At the outset the Commission would recall that, as regards the

judicial decisions in the case and in accordance with Article 19

(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance

of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In

particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging

errors of law or fact on the part of domestic courts, except where it

considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of

any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The

Commission refers, on this point, to its established case-law (e.g. No.

12505/86, Dec. 11.10.88, D.R. 58 pp. 106, 110 with further references).

     The Commission has therefore considered the applicant's

allegations of irregularities in the proceedings against him and

considers that those allegations can be considered under Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which Article, insofar as

relevant, provides as follows:

     "1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

     everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law..."

     In this respect, the Commission must consider whether the

proceedings as a whole were conducted in conformity with the provisions

of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see, for example, Can v.

Austria, Comm. Report 12.7.84, Eur. Court H.R. Series A no. 96) and has

concluded, in relation to the allegations of the applicant as regards

the proceedings against him, as follows.

(a) In the first place, the applicant complains about his treatment by

the police when he was questioned by them. In this latter respect, he

alleges that he was assaulted, threatened and tricked by the police

during his interviews with them, that he suffered during that detention

due to lack of sleep for several days, lack of food and lack of

medication for his migraines and that his interview tapes were tampered

with.

     The applicant also complains about his being refused a solicitor

when he was questioned by the police.

     As regards the applicant's allegations about his treatment by the

police when questioned, the Commission notes the following. The

applicant's counsel did raise such issues before the jury during his

trial (as a basis for challenging the evidentiary value of statements

made by the applicant during questioning by the police) and the

applicant also complained about such treatment to the police

authorities. However, the applicant does not appear to have submitted

any evidence whatsoever of any such treatment to the trial court or to

the police authorities and he has not done so before the Commission.

     In addition, the Commission finds it significant that there is

no evidence that any formal objection was made to the trial judge, as

to the admissibility of the statements made by the applicant when

questioned by police, on the basis of such treatment. It is also

noteworthy that the applicant has not commenced civil proceedings for

assault against those police officers. Furthermore, such treatment by

the police cannot be assumed from the applicant's allegations as

regards a refusal of access to a solicitor, particularly in view of the

findings of the Commission below as to the efforts made by the police

to contact certain solicitors.

     Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the applicant's

complaints, as regards his treatment by the police during questioning,

are unsubstantiated.

     As to the applicant's complaints about a refusal of access to a

solicitor when he was questioned by the police, the Commission finds

that the applicant was informed of his right to have a solicitor

present at 07.34 on 4 April 1992, that various attempts were made to

reach the applicant's solicitor together with a duty solicitor and that

those solicitors were, at least immediately, unavailable. The

Commission also finds that the form submitted by the applicant in this

respect admits of the possibility that the applicant was questioned for

a period of time without a solicitor being present and the Commission's

consideration below is based on this assumption.

     However, the Commission recalls that the right of access to a

lawyer can be subject to restrictions and the question to be considered

is whether any questioning of the applicant without his solicitor is

in conformity with the general principle of fairness laid down in

Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see, for example, No. 11256/84,

Dec. 5.9.88, D.R. 57 p. 47 and No. 12391/86, Dec. 13.4. 89, D.R. 60

p. 182).

     Insofar as the applicant complains that the absence of his

solicitor, of itself, led to the proceedings being unfair, the

Commission considers that the period of time during which the applicant

was deprived of access to his solicitor was relatively short (being

4 and 5 April 1992 at the longest). Furthermore, it is not alleged that

the applicant's access to a solicitor was inhibited in any way after

5 April 1992 to the date of his trial in April 1993.

     Insofar as the applicant complains that his proceedings were

rendered unfair by the admission during his trial of statements made

to the police in the absence of his solicitor, the Commission again

notes that there is no evidence of any formal objection being made to

the trial judge against the admissibility of such statements, the

success of which objection would have meant that the statements would

not have been even opened to the jury.

     The defence did make certain submissions to the jury as to the

evidentiary value of certain of the applicant's statements in light of

the circumstances surrounding the applicant's questioning by the

police. However, the Commission notes the trial judge's detailed and

clear summing up to the jury in this respect. The trial judge noted the

prosecution and defence submissions as regards the circumstances

surrounding the making of those statements and clearly pointed out that

the jury must be satisfied that the relevant statements were in fact

made, that they were accurately recorded and that they were freely made

and obtained. He went on to clarify that if the jury were not so

satisfied, then the applicant's statements to the police could not form

part of the body of evidence against the applicant to be taken into

account by the jury. The Commission also recalls that the applicant

does not maintain that the jury were other than independent and

impartial.

     The Commission therefore concludes that, insofar as the applicant

has substantiated his complaint about the absence of a solicitor when

he was questioned, this complaint does not disclose a violation of the

Convention.

(b) The applicant also complains about the failure to issue a fresh

indictment sheet (separate to indictment sheets relating to his two co-

accused) listing only the matters in respect of which the applicant was

charged and about mistakes made during his trial. He further complains

about the prosecution witnesses and that the necessary defence evidence

was not produced at his trial. He also complains about his solicitor

(claiming that he had no interest in the applicant's trial and that he

was in collusion with the Procurator Fiscal) and about his counsel.

Finally, the applicant complains that the trial judge's report to the

appeal court was unfair, untrue and inaccurate and that the appeal

court relied on this report.

     In the first place, the Commission considers that the alleged

failure to issue a fresh indictment sheet listing the charges against

the applicant only, even if substantiated, does not disclose any

procedural prejudice to the applicant. Secondly, the Commission also

considers that the applicant's allegations of mistakes made during his

trial and about the trial judge's report to the appeal court are vague

and unsubstantiated.

     Thirdly and as regards the applicant's complaint about the non-

production of defence evidence during the trial and in relation to

prosecution witnesses, the Commission notes that the applicant was

represented by a solicitor and counsel during his trial and that his

counsel would have had the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution

witnesses and to introduce evidence and call witnesses on behalf of the

defence during the trial.

     Fourthly and as regards the applicant's complaints about his

legal representatives, the Commission recalls that the State's

liability is engaged, in relation to the actions of lawyers in respect

of whom legal aid is granted, only to the extent that "effective

assistance" be provided to the person represented (Eur. Court H.R.,

Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, p. 18, para. 36).

     In the present case, the Commission does not consider that the

applicant has substantiated his allegation that his solicitor conspired

with the Procurator Fiscal or that his solicitor had no interest in the

defence of the charges. In addition, the Commission considers that an

examination of the file does not show that the applicant's legal

representation as regards his trial constituted ineffective assistance

within the meaning of the Artico judgment. The Commission finds

therefore that the State's liability is not engaged in relation to the

complaints relating to the applicant's legal representatives.

     Accordingly, the Commission considers that the complaints listed

above under (b) do not disclose a violation of the Convention.

     In light of the Commission's conclusions above, that the

applicant's submissions noted at (a) and (b) do not disclose a

violation of the Convention, the Commission considers the applicant's

complaint, as to the wrongfulness of his conviction, manifestly ill-

founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant also complains about the forfeiture order made on

5 April 1993 by the trial court in relation to his mother's car which

he was in the habit of using and that the police have not returned

certain of his possessions which were in the car, to which items the

forfeiture order did not relate.

     However and insofar as the applicant can claim to be a victim of

a violation of the Convention in relation to the forfeiture order, the

Commission notes that the applicant's mother did not petition the court

for the return of the car, as she was entitled to do, within the time

allowed for such a petition or at all. Neither has the applicant taken

any action against the police for the return of his property.

Accordingly, this complaint is inadmissible on grounds of non-

exhaustion of domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of

the Convention. An examination of the application reveals no reasons

why the applicant should be absolved from the requirement that domestic

remedies should be exhausted, the Commission considering that the

applicant's specific submission, that he fears arrest if he commences

any proceedings against the police to recover his property, is not

substantiated.

     The Commission therefore finds this complaint inadmissible

pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains about the refusal of legal aid

for his appeal and he invokes Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the

Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "3.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following

     minimum rights: ...

           c.  to defend himself in person or through legal assistance

           of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to

           pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the

           interests of justice so require; ... "

     The Government request that the application be struck out insofar

as it relates to the applicant's complaint about the lack of legal aid

for the appeal hearing. They argue that it is no longer justified to

continue the examination of this complaint given the changes made to

the criminal appeals and criminal legal aid systems in Scotland by the

1995 Act, which Act was enacted following the Boner and Maxwell

judgments of the Court (Eur. Court H.R., Boner and Maxwell judgments

of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-B and 300-C). The applicant points

out that the provisions of the 1995 Act do not relate to him or to his

appeal in any way since his appeal had been determined prior to

26 September 1995.

     The Commission notes that the provisions of the 1995 Act apply

to appeals from convictions handed down on or after 26 September 1995

only and clearly do not benefit the applicant in any way as regards his

complaint under Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention,

his legal aid application and appeal having been determined pursuant

to the 1975 Act (mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., Axen judgment of

8 December 1983, Series A no. 72, p. 11, para. 24). In such

circumstances, the Commission cannot accede to the Government's

request.

     As regards the substance of the complaint under Article 6

para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, the applicant submits that

the refusal of legal aid meant that he felt he had to drop his appeal

against conviction and prevented the proper presentation of his appeal

against sentence and thereby led to his appeal hearing being unfair.

The Government has no observations on the substance of this complaint

in light of the Court judgments in the Boner and Maxwell cases (Eur.

Court H.R., Boner and Maxwell judgments,  loc. cit.).

     The Commission considers that this complaint of the applicant

raises issues of fact and law which are of such complexity that their

determination should depend on an examination of the merits. This

complaint cannot therefore be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the

     applicant's complaints about the refusal of legal aid for his

     appeal;

     DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)