ASSENOV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA
Doc ref: 24760/94 • ECHR ID: 001-3208
Document date: June 27, 1996
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 24760/94
by Anton ASSENOV, Fidanka IVANOVA
and Stefan IVANOV
against Bulgaria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
27 June 1996, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President
H. DANELIUS
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
B. MARXER
G.B. REFFI
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 6 September 1993
by Anton ASSENOV, Fidanka IVANOVA and Stefan IVANOV against Bulgaria
and registered on 3 August 1994 under file No. 24760/94;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 16 May
1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants
on 15 July 1995;
- the applicants' additional complaints submitted on 31 August and
14 September 1995;
- the supplementary observations submitted by the Government on
12 and 30 October 1995 and by the applicants on 10 November and
3 January 1996;
- the Commission's decision of 22 January 1996 to join the
procedure concerning the additional complaints to the original
application and to hold an oral hearing;
- the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 27 June 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are a family of Bulgarian nationals, residing in
the city of Shoumen, Bulgaria. The first applicant is born in 1978.
The second applicant, born in 1956 and the third applicant, born in
1952, are the first applicant's parents. Before the Commission the
applicants are represented by Mrs. Zdravka Kalaydjieva, a lawyer
practising in Sofia.
A. Particular circumstances of the case
The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be
summarised as follows.
Events of 19 September 1992 and the ensuing proceedings
On 19 September 1992, while gambling at the bus station square
in the city of Shoumen, the first applicant was approached by a
policeman and brought into a room at the bus station.
Subsequently the second and the third applicants, who were both
working at the bus station, entered the room where the first applicant
was detained and asked for his release. At some point more policemen
arrived. They forcefully took the first applicant and his father into
a police car and brought them to the police station. There they were
detained for about two hours and then released.
On 21 September 1992, the first working day following the
incident, the applicants visited a doctor. They explained to him that
the first applicant had been beaten by three uniformed men with a
truncheon and with the handle of a pistol, and that the second
applicant had been beaten by two uniformed men with a truncheon. The
doctor examined the first applicant and his mother and issued medical
certificates.
The certificate concerning the first applicant stated that the
boy had a band-like haematoma about 5 cm long and 1 cm wide on the
upper outer side of his right arm, the bruise being purple-bluish in
the periphery and pale in the centre, three band-like haematomas each
about 6 cm long and 1 cm wide on the right side of his chest, another
bruise about 4 cm long on the left scapula, a haematoma of about 2 cm
in diameter on the back haired part of the head, and also five grazes
each about 5 cm long on the right chest. The doctor concluded that the
bruises could have been inflicted through hitting with a truncheon and
the handle of a pistol.
The certificate concerning the second applicant stated that she
had a bruise about 5 cm long on her left thigh, which could have
resulted from a hit with a truncheon.
Shortly after the incident, the second applicant filed a
complaint with the District Directorate of Internal Affairs (Regionalna
directsia na vatreshnite raboti), alleging that while entering the room
at the bus station, she and her husband had seen that policemen were
beating and insulting their son. The parents asked the policemen to
stop because their son was suffering from heart disturbances. However,
the policemen continued to beat the first applicant, and also hit his
parents. The second applicant further stated that the first applicant
had been beaten again in the police station. She requested the
punishment of the officers responsible for the incident.
In reply to the second applicant's complaints, the District
Directorate of Internal Affairs on 13 November 1992 sent a letter,
stating that after an examination, it had been established that the
third applicant had beaten his son which had prompted the interference
of two police officers and that the conduct of the police officers had
been lawful.
On 12 December 1992 the second and third applicants filed with
the Regional Military Prosecution (Okrazhna voenna prokuratura) a
request for the criminal prosecution of the alleged offenders. In the
request they again described the events of 19 September 1992, while
adding that the third applicant, in an attempt to placate the policeman
and prevent the danger of further injuries to his son, had proposed to
punish the first applicant himself as a father and had lightly hit him
on the buttocks with a thin ply-wood strip. It was further stated that
the policeman had taken the third applicant to another room, that
shortly thereafter two other policemen had entered the room where the
first applicant had been held and had started beating him again with
truncheons and with their fists. The applicants stated that the second
applicant had entered the room again and had tried to stop the
policemen hitting her son, but had been hit with a truncheon on her
leg. The applicants further alleged that the first applicant had been
beaten again at the entrance of the police station by the two policemen
and also by the officer on duty, who had hit the first applicant with
the handle of the toy pistol which the boy had been carrying that day.
Finally the parents asserted that the first applicant had been held for
two hours in the police station handcuffed to a radiator. They enclosed
copies of the medical certificates of 21 September 1992, stating that
the type of injuries their son had suffered could not have been
inflicted by his father.
On 24 March 1993 the Regional Military Prosecution refused to
institute criminal proceedings against the policemen concerned. The
decision stated inter alia that it had been established that officer
X. had caught the first applicant while engaged in unlawful gambling
and had brought him to nearby premises, then had telephoned the police
station, from where officers Y. and Z. had been sent, and that in the
meantime the third applicant had entered the room where his son had
been held and had started beating him, explaining to officer X. that
he would punish his son himself, and therefore the boy should be
released. The decision further read that when officers Y. and Z. had
entered the room they had ordered the third applicant to stop hitting
his son and leave the room, but instead he had started shouting and
pulling the boy, which amounted to disobedience to police orders and
had caused the arrest of the first applicant and his father. The
decision also stated that the evidence, taken from witnesses, did not
establish the use of physical violence by the policemen against the
boy. The decision did not discuss the medical certificates.
Against this decision the applicants filed an appeal with the
General Military Prosecution (Prokuratura na vaorazhenite sili). They
stated that it was obvious from the decision that the only witnesses
examined had been the police officers, who were in fact the suspects;
that the medical certificates had not been taken into consideration;
and that it was untrue that the applicants had disobeyed police orders.
On 21 May 1993 the General Military Prosecution refused to open
criminal proceedings against the police officers on the same grounds
as the lower prosecution. The decision stated inter alia:
"V prepiskata e prilozheno meditsinsko udostoverenie, ot koeto
e vidno, che varchu tialoto na nepalnoletnia A. sa nalitse
kravonasiadania, socheshti na leka telesna povreda, a po
mehanisam otgovariashti da sa polucheni ot udari s tvard
lentoviden predmet.
Zamestnik okrazhniat prokuror pravilno e pretsenil, che dori i
da ima naneseni udari po tialoto na nepalnoletnia, sashtite sa
v resultat na nepodchinenie na militsionersko vziskvane.
Uprazhnenoto fizichesko nasilie i pomoshtni sredstva sa pri
usloviata na chl. 24 al. 1 t. 1 i 2 ot deistvuvashtia Zakon za
natsionalnata politsia."
[Translation]
"A medical certificate is enclosed in the file, from which it
appears that there were haematomas on the juvenile's body,
indicating superficial bodily harm, and corresponding, in terms
of mechanism of infliction, to blows with a band-like solid
object.
The Deputy Regional Prosecutor correctly considered that even
if blows were administered on the body of the juvenile, they
occurred as a result of disobedience to police orders. The
physical force and auxiliary means employed were in accordance
with Article 24 para.1 items 1 and 2 of the Law on the National
Police now in force."
On 20 June 1994 the applicants appealed to the Chief General
Prosecutor of Bulgaria (Glaven prokuror na Republika Bulgaria). The
appeal again explained the applicants' version of the facts. It added
that the beating of the first applicant had been accompanied by insults
referring to his gipsy ethnic origin, and that his parents had also
been called offensive names on the basis of their ethnic origin. The
applicants further asserted that there had been a lot of witnesses to
the incident as it had taken place at the city bus station, but no
effort had been made to take evidence from any of the bystanders. The
appeal also stated that there was a contradiction between the findings
of the Regional Military Prosecution, which found that physical force
had not been employed, and the conclusion of the General Military
Prosecution, which established that there had been use of physical
force, but that it had been legal. The appeal stated that violations
of Articles 3, 6 and 14 of the Convention had occurred in the case.
This appeal was apparently transferred to the General Military
Prosecution, which on 28 June 1994 wrote a letter to the applicants'
lawyer stating that there were no grounds for annulment of the previous
decision.
In examining the applicants' consecutive petitions, the various
levels of the prosecution authorities exchanged internal instructions
and information on the case. Upon such an instruction two witnesses
of the incident were examined and gave written depositions. One of them
confirmed that handcuffs had been used by the police. In an undated
information note the investigator at the Regional Military Prosecution
stated that the evidence in the case was "contradictory".
The first applicant's detention since July 1995
In January 1995 the prosecution authorities in Shoumen opened
criminal proceedings on several cases of theft and robbery. In January
1995 the first applicant was questioned, apparently as a suspect, in
the course of these proceedings. The investigations revealed the
alleged continuous criminal activity of six persons considered to have
been accomplices in numerous thefts and robberies.
On 27 July 1995 the first applicant was arrested. On 28 July 1995
he was brought before an investigator, who formally charged him,
decided to detain him on remand and questioned him. Present at that
moment in the office of the investigator were also prosecutor K. and
the first applicant's lawyer. The decision of the investigator to
detain the first applicant on remand was approved the same day by
prosecutor A., who apparently was not present when the first applicant
was charged and questioned.
The charges against the first applicant concerned ten or more
thefts allegedly committed between 9 January and 2 May 1995 and four
or more robberies committed between 10 September 1994 and 24 July 1995,
the last robbery having been committed several days before the arrest.
In addition to the first applicant, two other persons were formally
charged and one of them was also arrested.
On an unspecified date the first applicant's lawyer challenged
his detention on remand before the Shoumen District Court (Shoumenski
raionen sad), on the basis of Section 152(5) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Nakazatelno protsesualen kodeks), but on 19 September 1995
the court found that the detention was lawful.
The first applicant, his lawyer and his parents submitted to the
prosecution authorities several requests for the first applicant's
release. In his request dated 12 October 1995 the first applicant
stated inter alia: "My criminal activity, the crimes committed by me,
were established and proved in the course of the investigations. No
further evidence has to be collected as regards me.". On this ground,
and in view of the fact that he had a one year old daughter and a
newborn second child, the first applicant insisted on being released.
The requests for release also raised issues concerning the first
applicant's health. Thus, the requests of 17 August and 12 September
1995 stated that the first applicant had a cyst on his chin and that
he suffered from a valvular defect as from birth. The parents
complained that the investigating judge would not order an examination
by a cardiologist unless they presented their son's medical records,
which were unfortunately unavailable. Also, when they visited their son
in prison he appeared depressed and complained of heart pain.
In response to this request, on 15 September 1995 the District
Prosecutor (Raionen prokuror) in Shoumen ordered the first applicant's
examination by a cardiologist. The examination on 20 September 1995 did
not confirm the alleged ailment of the first applicant.
On 13 October 1995 the District Prosecutor dismissed two requests
for the first applicant's release. The decision stated inter alia that
the charges against him concerned serious crimes. Also, his criminal
activity had continued after the institution of the criminal
proceedings, only the arrest having put an end to it. Therefore there
was a danger that the first applicant would commit crimes if released.
As regards his alleged health problems, they were not confirmed by the
regular medical examinations. On 19 October 1995 the refusal to release
the first applicant was confirmed by the Regional Prosecutor (Okrazhen
prokuror).
The applicants then complained to the Chief General Prosecutor's
Office. They stated inter alia that there had been a "campaign" against
them because of their application to the Commission. On 8 December 1995
the Chief General Prosecutor's Office refused to release the first
applicant. The decision discussed in detail all arguments of the
applicants and stated inter alia: " ... the medical expert, a
cardiologist from the Regional Hospital of Shoumen, has concluded after
an examination that [the first applicant] does not suffer from any
cardiac disease, either congenital or acquired, and that there are no
counter-indications for him to stay in detention, as far as his cardio-
vascular status is concerned." The decision also stated that the
investigation against the first applicant had been completed in general
lines in September 1995. Nevertheless, his detention was still
necessary as there was a clear danger of his committing a crime.
The prosecutor's decision also stated that a prolonged detention
in the premises of the Shoumen police would be harmful to the first
applicant's "physical and mental development" and that therefore he
should be moved to the specialised Boychinovzi juvenile penitentiary.
The transfer took place three months later, on 25 March 1996.
On 22 March 1996 the preliminary investigation was completed. The
investigator found that on 10 September 1994 the first applicant had
seen in the street a woman wearing a golden necklace. He walked towards
her and, when passing by, caught her left arm, tore the necklace and
ran away. On 2 May, 18 July and 22 July 1995 the first applicant had
committed similar crimes, again stealing necklaces from strangers in
the street. The total value of the stolen property was about 20,000
leva. The investigator concluded that the first applicant had committed
four robberies which constituted a continued crime under Section 198
para. 1 of the Penal Code (Nakazatelen kodeks).
The case was then sent to the prosecution authorities for the
preparation of an indictment.
Other events in 1995
On 8 March 1995 the third applicant (the first applicant's
father) and several other persons who were standing around a public
telephone at the market square in Shoumen, were approached by three
policemen, handcuffed and taken to the police station as they had
allegedly participated in unlawful gambling. At the police station the
third applicant was ordered to show the contents of his pockets and was
allegedly hit in his face by a policeman. He was released after seven
or eight hours.
During an unspecified period of time in 1995 the family of the
applicants was allegedly often disturbed by telephone calls from people
who claimed that the first applicant had stolen certain belongings from
them and insisted on receiving them back. Some of these persons
allegedly explained that they had obtained the telephone number from
the police.
The applicants' home was allegedly visited on a number of
occasions and without any reason by uniformed or plain-clothes
policemen, who displayed a threatening behaviour.
On 15 May, 23 May and 8 September 1995 two daily newspapers
published articles about the present case. The articles, whose titles
stated that a gipsy gambler had "put Bulgaria on trial in Strasbourg",
explained in brief the events of September 1992 and informed the
readers that the applicants, when interviewed by journalists, had
denied having made an application to the Commission. The applicants
recalled having signed a form which they thought was for social
payments. In two of the articles the journalists concluded that perhaps
some gipsy activists had pushed the case and had misled Amnesty
International.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. In relation to the events of 19 September 1992
The Code of Criminal Procedure (Nakazatelno protsesualen kodeks)
Section 190
"Dostatachno danni za obrazuvane na predvaritelno proizvodstvo
sa nalitse kogato mozhe da se napravi osnovatelno predpolozhenie
che e izvarsheno prestaplenie."
[Translation]
"There shall be considered to exist sufficient evidence for the
institution of criminal proceedings where a reasonable
supposition can be made that a crime might have been committed."
Section 194(3)
Under this provision when a prosecutor has refused to institute
criminal proceedings, such proceedings can be instituted by a
higher prosecutor upon the petition of the interested person or
ex officio.
Section 237(6)
Under this provision the accused or the victim of a crime can
appeal, within a time limit of seven days, against a decision of
a prosecutor to terminate penal proceedings.
The Law on State Responsibility for Damages (Zakon za
otgovornostta na darzhavata za vredi prichineni na grazhdani)
This law provides that a person who has suffered damages due to
unlawful acts of State organs can bring a civil action against the
State organ, whose officers are responsible for the damages.
The Law on Obligations and Contracts (Zakon za zadalzheniata i
dogovorite)
This law provides in its Section 45 that a person who has
suffered damages can seek redress by bringing a civil action against
the person who has, through his fault, caused the damages. Under
Section 49, when the damages are caused in the process of an activity
mandated by another person, this person's responsibility is also
engaged. According to Section 110 the claim for damages is
extinguished with the expiry of a five year prescription period.
The Code of Civil Procedure (Grazhdansko-protsesualen kodeks)
Section 2
"Sadilishtata sa dlazhni da razgledat i razreshat vsiaka podadena
do tiah molba za zashtita i sadeistvie na lichni i imushtestveni
prava."
[Translation]
"The courts are obliged to examine, and to decide on, any claim
submitted to them for the safeguard of, or relief as regards,
personal and pecuniary rights."
Section 165
"Kogato sashtestvuva opasnost, che niakoe dokazatelstvo shte se
izgubi ili negovoto sabirane shte se zatrudni, stranata mozhe da
iska da se sabere tova dokazatelstvo predvaritelno."
[Translation]
"If there exists a danger that certain evidence might be lost or
its collection might become difficult, a party [to the
proceedings] can request the collection of this evidence in
advance."
Section 182
"Sadat spira proizvodstvoto:
...
*) kogato pri razglezhdaneto na edno grazhdansko delo se razkriat
prestapni obstoiatelstva, ot ustanoviavaneto na koito zavisi
izhodat na grazhdanskia spor."
[Translation]
"The court shall suspend the proceedings:
...
d) whenever criminal circumstances, the determination of which
is decisive for the outcome of the civil dispute, are discovered
in the course of the civil proceedings."
Section 183
"Proizvodstvoto se vazobnoviava sluzhebno ili po iskane na edna
ot stranite sled kato badat otstraneni prechkite za dvizhenieto
mu..."
[Translation]
"Proceedings which have been suspended shall be resumed ex
officio or upon a party's petition after the respective obstacles
have been removed ..."
Section 222
Vliazlata v sila prisada na nakazatelnia sad e zadalzhotelna za
grazhdanskia sad, koito razglezhda grazhdanskite posleditsi ot
deianieto otnosno tova dali e izvarsheno deianieto, negovata
protivopravnost i vinovnostta na deetsa."
[Translation]
"The findings contained in a final judgment of a penal court and
concerning the issue whether the act in question has been
committed, its unlawfulness and the perpetrator's guilt, are
binding on the civil court when it examines the civil conse-
quences of the criminal act."
Decision No. 12/1966 of the plenary of the Supreme Court's civil
chambers (* 12-66-****, **. 38), in so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
"Postanovlenieto na prokuraturata, s koeto e prekrateno
nakazatelnoto presledvane poradi tova, che obviniaemiat e scheten
za nevinoven da e izvarshil prestapnoto deianie, ne e
zadalzhitelno za grazhdanskia sad, koito se proiznasia po
grazhdanskite posleditsi ot tova deianie... Grazhdanskiat sad ...
s ogled na dokazatelstvata po grazhdanskia protses mozhe da
prieme druga facticheska obstanovka, napr., che nepozvolenoto
uvrezhdane e resultat na povedenieto imenno na sashtoto litse,
nakazatelnoto presledvane sreshtu koeto e bilo prekrateno.
Ako v grazhdanskia protses sled sabirane na dokazatelstvata se
razkriat novi prestapni obstoiatelstva, ot ustanoviavaneto na
koito zavisi izhodat na grazhdanskia spor, sadat e dlazhen da
spre proizvodstvoto po deloto saglasno chl. 182 b. "d" GPK."
[Translation]
"The decision of the prosecution to terminate the criminal
prosecution based on a finding that the accused is not guilty of
committing the criminal act does not bind the civil court which
is examining the civil consequences of this act... [T]he civil
court, based on the evidence [collected] in the course of the
civil proceedings, can reach different factual findings, for
example that the tort was in fact caused by the same person, the
criminal prosecution against whom had been terminated.
If in the course of the civil proceedings, after collection of
evidence, fresh criminal circumstances are discovered, the
determination of which is decisive for the outcome of the civil
dispute, the court is obliged to suspend the proceedings in
accordance with Section 182"d" of the Code of Civil Procedure."
2. Provisions in relation to the events since 1995
The Penal Code (Nakazatelen kodeks)
Section 198 para. 1
This provision, applied in conjunction with Section 63 which
concerns persons under 18 years of age, provides that the
punishment for robbery, which is defined as stealing with the use
of force or threats, is up to three years' imprisonment.
The Code of Criminal Procedure (Nakazatelno-protsesualen kodeks)
Section 152 para. 5
"... (5) Na zadarzhania se osiguriava nezabavno vazmozhnost da
obzhalva miarkata za neotklonenie pred saotvetnia sad. Sadat se
proiznasia v tridneven srok ot podavaneto na zhalbata s
opredelenie, koeto e okonchatelno."
[Translation]
"... (5) The detained person shall be provided immediately with
a possibility to file an appeal before the competent court
against the [imposition of detention]. The court shall pronounce
itself within a time limit of three days from the filing of the
appeal by means of a final decision."
Section 222
According to this provision the investigations must be brought
to an end within two months after they commenced. A further
prolongation of up to six months may be authorised by a Regional
Prosecutor. In exceptional cases, the Chief Public Prosecutor
may prolong the investigations up to nine months. If the period
is prolonged after two months, the Prosecutor will decide on the
detention on remand.
Sections 43, 176 - 178, 208, 219 - 220 and 235 - 237
These provisions concern the competence of the prosecutor in
penal proceed- ings. Section 43 provides that the prosecutor has
the following functions in penal proceedings: "to direct the
preliminary investigation"; "to participate in the judicial stage
of the proceedings as a State prosecutor"; and "to effect a
supervisory control of lawfulness at all stages of the penal
proceedings ...". At the preliminary investigation stage of the
proceedings according to Sections 176 - 178 the prosecutor is
competent, inter alia: to give mandatory instructions to the
investigator; to participate in examinations, searches or any
other acts of investigation; to withdraw a case from the
competence of an investigator and to assign it to another; to
conduct himself an entire preliminary investigation or particular
acts of investigation.
An investigator disagreeing with the instructions of the
prosecutor can submit objections to the higher prosecutor, whose
decision is final and obligatory for the investigator. Section
178 read in conjunction with Sections 219 and 220 provides that,
as an exception to this rule, the investigator is free to decide
whether to conclude his work on the preliminary investigation
with a proposal to terminate the proceedings or with a proposal
to prepare an indictment.
Under Sections 235 - 237 the prosecutor is competent, after
receiving the investigator's proposal, to terminate the
proceedings, to order additional investigations, or to prepare
an indictment and submit the case to the court.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants allege that three policemen employed excessive and
unnecessary physical force against the first applicant, who was a 14
year old boy, that they unnecessarily detained him, that they
intentionally administered blows with truncheons on his body, that they
kept the boy for two hours on his feet, handcuffed to a radiator in a
locked room at the police station, and that the policemen repeatedly
offended the boy in public and while detained by referring to his gipsy
ethnic origin.
The applicants submit that this treatment went beyond the minimum
level of severity of inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning
of Article 3 of the Convention. They state that this was so not only
in view of the treatment itself, but also because of the particular
circumstances such as the alleged victim's age, weight and height, his
unstable state of health caused by heart problems, and his position of
inferiority and vulnerability.
2. The applicants raise various complaints under Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention. Thus they had no access to an independent and
impartial tribunal in the determination of the question whether a
criminal act had been committed by the police officers. Moreover, in
the determination of this issue they were not allowed to take part in
the proceedings before the prosecutor or to adduce evidence.
The applicants further complain that they had no access to court
in respect of their civil right to compensation. No determination of
this right was possible as an action for damages for conduct, which
constitutes a criminal offence, would not be examined by the courts in
cases where the prosecution refused to prosecute the perpetrators.
Moreover, the civil proceedings would have had to be suspended
immediately after their institution and the matter be referred to the
prosecution again.
3. Under Article 13 of the Convention the applicants complain that
they had no effective remedy for the alleged violation of Article 3,
since under Bulgarian law the legal remedy available in such cases was
a request for the institution of criminal proceedings, which was dealt
with arbitrarily by the authorities. A civil action for damages was not
an effective remedy.
4. The applicants complain that the alleged insults about the first
applicant's gipsy ethnic origin indicate racial discrimination contrary
to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention. They
further claim that the prosecution handled their complaints arbitrarily
due to racial prejudice and this amounted to a violation of Article 14
in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention.
5. The applicants complain under Article 5 of the Convention that
the first applicant's continuing detention was unnecessary and
dangerous for his health; and that it has been unreasonably long and
extended beyond the time limits provided for under Bulgarian law. Also,
"contrary to the guarantees of Article 5 of the Convention the [first]
applicant was never brought in person before the prosecutor or the
judge acting in their capacity of judicial bodies authorised to assess
the lawfulness of the detention". Thus, the prosecutor who refused the
first applicant's request for release on 8 December 1995 decided in
camera, without the participation of any representative of the
applicants.
Furthermore, although the first applicant's detention had legal
grounds, it has become unnecessary and was used as a tool of pressure
against the applicants because of their application to the Commission.
Also, contrary to what was stated by the prosecution authorities in
their decisions of 13 October 1995 and 8 December 1995, the first
applicant was never seen by a doctor. Moreover, at least until 3
January 1996 he was not transferred to the specialised juvenile
penitentiary.
6. The applicants also submit that there has been a violation of the
respondent Government's obligation under Article 25 of the Convention
not to hinder the exercise of the right to individual petition. Thus,
the events complained of which occurred in 1995 amounted to a campaign
of pressure and threats against the applicants. Moreover, the
applicants were even expressly asked orally, by a representative of the
police, to withdraw their application to the Commission.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 6 September 1993 and registered
on 3 August 1994.
On 22 February 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government.
The Government's written observations were submitted on 16 May
1995. The applicants replied on 15 July 1995. On 4 July 1995 the
Commission granted the applicants legal aid.
The applicants submitted additional complaints by letters of 31
August and 14 September 1995 and elaborated their arguments by letters
of 10 November 1995 and 3 January 1996. The Government replied to the
additional complaints by letters of 12 and 30 October 1995.
On 22 January 1996 the Commission decided to examine the
applicants' additional complaints together with the initial application
and to hold a hearing on the admissibility and the merits of the
application.
The hearing took place on 27 June 1996. The Government were
represented by their Agent, Ms. G. Beleva, and also by Ms. S.
Margaritova of the Ministry of Justice and Lieutenant-Colonel V.
Parvanov of the Military Prosecutor's Office. The applicants were
represented by Mrs. Z. Kalaydjieva, a lawyer practising in Sofia, and
by Mr. P. Duffy, a barrister practising in the United Kingdom.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain, invoking Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14
(Art. 3, 6, 13, 14) of the Convention, that on 19 September 1992 the
first applicant was ill-treated by the police, that the prosecution
authorities refused arbitrarily the ensuing complaints against the
police officers and that a civil action for damages would not be an
effective remedy. They also complain that the first applicant's
continuing detention since 27 July 1995 involved breaches of Article
5 (Art. 5) of the Convention and that the applicants were put under
pressure to withdraw their application to the Commission.
The Government raise a preliminary objection that the application
was an abuse of the right of petition. Thus, the allegations about
discrimination based on the boy's ethnic origin were raised for the
first time before the Commission and were only after that put before
the Chief Public Prosecutor. Also, the application repeatedly refers
to the first applicant's alleged congenital cardiac disorder but the
results of the medical examinations, conducted by a cardiologist, have
shown that he never suffered from such disease.
The applicants reply that all complaints were made in substance
before the domestic authorities and that they have not relied on untrue
facts.
The Commission considers that the Government's objection could
only be accepted if it were clear that the application was based on
untrue facts in a deliberate attempt to mislead the Commission.
However, this is far from clear at this stage of the proceedings.
Noting in this respect the applicants' statement, in their letter to
the Commission of 3 January 1996, that the first applicant was not
examined by a doctor while in detention, the Commission also observes
that the Government presented the results of his examinations which did
not confirm the boy's alleged cardiac disorder. However, the
Commission need not establish whether the applicants' contentions in
this respect were untrue as the application is not "based" on them. The
Commission, therefore, considers that the application cannot be
rejected as constituting an abuse of the right of petition within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention
(No. 8317/78, Dec. 15.5.80, D.R. 20 p. 44; No. 21987/93, Dec. 19.10.94,
D.R. 79 p. 60).
2. The applicants' complaints relating to the events of September
1992 concern the first applicant's ill-treatment by the police, the
refusal of the prosecution authorities to open criminal proceedings
against the police officers and the alleged ineffectiveness of a
potential civil action for damages.
The Government contend that the applicants have not exhausted all
domestic remedies as required under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention. The Government maintain in particular that the appeal to
the Chief General Public Prosecutor against the refusal of the public
prosecutors to institute criminal proceedings against the police
officers concerned was submitted out of time. This was so because under
Section 237(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure there was a seven
days' time limit to appeal before a higher prosecutor against a
decision of a lower prosecutor, whereas in the present case the
decision of May 1993 was challenged on 20 June 1994.
The Government also state that the applicants could have brought
a civil action for damages under the Law on Obligations and Contracts
or under the Law on State Responsibility for Damages, but failed to use
this remedy. There are no obstacles for the civil courts to examine
such an action in cases where a prosecutor has refused to institute
criminal proceedings. The civil courts are bound only by a judgment of
a penal court, but not by a decision of a prosecutor. The Government
also submit that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the civil
action for damages is a remedy to be exhausted in cases of alleged
police ill-treatment.
The Government further maintain that the allegations relating to
the alleged police brutality are manifestly ill-founded. The short
arrest of the first applicant was necessary because the police had to
confiscate the proceeds of the unlawful gambling, which he had refused
to surrender. As the boy and his father resisted the orders to come to
the police station for this purpose, it was necessary and lawful to use
physical force. However, this did not include beating. The Government
stress that the medical certificate of the first applicant was issued
two days after the incident and that therefore the bruises on his body
could not be linked directly to his short arrest. Also, the public
prosecutors, who are independent from the executive branch in Bulgaria,
examined carefully the applicants' complaints and established that the
bruises on the first applicant's body had been caused by his father and
not by the police. Thus, the father had admitted hitting his son,
albeit allegedly only once and slightly. Also, the injuries as
described in the medical certificate corresponded to the version of the
police as the bruises were pale in the centre and purple-bluish in the
periphery, which did not correspond to the round form of a truncheon,
but rather matched the form of a thin flat piece of wood, used by the
father. Furthermore, the allegations of discrimination on the basis of
the applicants' ethnic origin are totally unfounded.
As regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies the applicants
reply that Section 237(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerns
appeals against decisions of the prosecutor to terminate criminal
proceedings. In the present case criminal proceedings were never
instituted. The applicable provision for appeals against refusals to
institute criminal proceedings is Section 194 and it contains no time
limits and no limit to the number of appeals. This is understandable,
as only the general prescription as regards the prosecution of a
criminal offence could bar a prosecutor from examining complaints for
alleged crimes.
The applicants also contend that Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, interpreted with the necessary degree of flexibility and
applied in a manner to ensure the effective protection of human rights,
does not require them to submit a civil action for damages after having
sought the prosecution of the police officers concerned.
Moreover, a civil claim for damages could not produce an
effective and timely result. In the present case the refusal to open
criminal proceedings was based on the finding that the policemen had
not beaten the first applicant. The civil court could not override this
finding, as by doing so the court would in fact hold that a crime had
been committed, which it was not competent to do. Even if the civil
court decided that it was competent to hold that the police had beaten
the boy, it would be obliged by law, before doing so, to suspend the
proceedings and again send the case to the prosecution authorities. It
is true that in a decision of December 1995, a district court in
Bulgaria awarded damages to a victim of police brutality despite the
refusal of the prosecution authorities to open criminal proceedings
(resh. ot 15.12.95 na Pazardjishkia raionen sad po gr.d. 69/94).
However, in that case the victim could not identify the responsible
police officers.
The applicants further maintain that the first applicant never
resisted police orders and did not deny his participation in gambling.
Therefore his arrest, and especially the use of handcuffs and
truncheons, were unnecessary and disproportionate measures.
Furthermore, the police have beaten the boy because: the version of the
police was not logical as it would imply that the father was severely
beating his son in the presence of three policemen and that they did
not intervene; the Government referred only to some of the bruises, no
explanation having been provided for five bruises measuring 2/0.5 cm
on the right chest and a haematoma measuring 2 cm in diameter on the
back haired part of the head which corresponded to the submissions of
the boy that he had been beaten with a truncheon and with the handle
of his toy pistol; a father would never inflict such severe injuries
on his son. Also, the medical certificate was issued on the first
working day following the incident, which happened on a Saturday.
The applicants further submit that their complaints to all levels
of the prosecution hierarchy were refused arbitrarily. The prosecution
authorities took their decision on the basis of the written depositions
of the applicants and of the implicated police officers, given before
the director of the local police. Only two witnesses were examined, but
after nearly a year following the incident. Moreover, the decision of
the General Military Prosecution of 21 May 1993 implied that the
applicants' version of the facts had been found plausible because it
stated that "even if blows [had been] administered on the body of the
juvenile, they [had] occurred as a result of disobedience to police
orders". Also, in a note written by an investigator in the case it was
stated that "the evidence [had been] contradictory". Nevertheless, the
authorities concluded that there had been "lack of sufficient evidence
to open penal proceedings", whereas Section 190 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure only required "a reasonable supposition that a crime might
have been committed". In the circumstances of the case it had been the
duty of the authorities at least to institute criminal proceedings,
thus giving the possibility to obtain a clarification of the facts.
As regards the alleged racial discrimination on the basis of the
applicants' ethnic origin the applicants maintain that the police did
use offensive language. They also refer to the findings of Amnesty
International in its last report on Bulgaria.
The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention it "may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law" and that this rule dispenses States from answering
before an international body for their acts before they have had an
opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system (Eur.
Court HR, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium of 18 June 1971, Series
A no. 12, para. 50).
The Commission further recalls that Article 26 (Art. 26) must be
applied in a manner corresponding to the reality of the applicant's
situation in order to guarantee him effective protection of his rights
and freedoms set forth in the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur.
Court H.R., Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A
no. 32, p. 12, para. 23; No. 19092/91, Dec. 11.10.93, D.R. 75 pp. 207,
215).
Based on these principles the Commission has found that in
certain circumstances a civil action for damages is a remedy to be
exhausted in respect of a complaint of ill-treatment contrary to
Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention and that the lodging of a criminal
complaint constitutes also an adequate remedy for the purposes of
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. On the other hand, compensation
could not be deemed to have rectified a violation in a situation where
the State had not taken reasonable measures to comply with its
obligations under Article 3 (Art. 3). Also, where there is a choice of
remedies Article 26 (Art. 26) must be applied to reflect the practical
realities of the applicant's position. The applicant must make "normal"
use of those remedies which are apparently effective and sufficient
(Nos. 5577-5583/72, Dec. 15.12.75, D.R. 4 p. 4; No. 8462/79, X. v. the
United Kingdom, Dec. 8.7.80, D.R. 20 p. 184; Nos. 14116/88 and
14117/88, Dec. 11.5.89, D.R. 61 p. 250; No. 17128/90, Dec. 10.7.90,
D.R. 71 p. 275).
The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants
complained of the alleged ill-treatment to the District Directorate of
Internal Affairs and to all levels of the prosecution authorities.
Under Section 194(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure there were no
specific time limits applicable to such complaints and they were in
fact examined on the merits. It follows that the applicants made full
use of the possibility to seek the institution of criminal proceedings
against the police officers, thus putting their complaints in the hands
of the authorities which were competent to pursue the matter.
The Commission further finds that in this situation the
applicants, after having submitted criminal complaints to all levels
of the prosecution authorities, were not required to embark on another
attempt to obtain redress by bringing a civil action for damages. The
present case has to be distinguished from situations where the
authorities, in the course of proceedings opened for this purpose, have
carefully examined the allegations of ill-treatment. Also, the
Commission finds that the applicants raised before the domestic
authorities the substance of all their complaints.
This part of the application cannot, therefore, be declared
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning
of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
Having examined the applicants' above complaints as a whole, the
Commission finds that they raise serious questions of fact and law
which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on
an examination of the merits. This part of the application cannot,
therefore, be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no other grounds
for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
3. As regards the complaints concerning the events in 1995 and 1996
the applicants complain that the first applicant's continuing detention
since 27 July 1995 involved breaches of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the
Convention and that the applicants were put under pressure to withdraw
their application to the Commission.
The Government first submit that the requirements of Article 26
(Art. 26) of the Convention are not complied with because the penal
proceedings against the first applicant are still pending. The
Government also maintain that the first applicant was arrested on
genuine charges of theft and robbery, which were investigated in the
course of the proceedings against him. These investigations revealed
that the first applicant had committed numerous thefts and robberies.
He had never had an employment, his persistent criminal activities
having become a main source of income.
The Government further submit that the lawfulness of the first
applicant's detention was reviewed by a court and also by several
levels of the prosecution authorities, which meets the requirements of
Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention. The length of the first
applicant's detention is in conformity with paragraph 3 of this
provision and with Bulgarian law. Thus, the preliminary investigation
against him was completed in March 1996 and the case has been sent for
trial. Also, all allegations about pressure on the applicants to
withdraw their application were untrue.
The applicants reply that the first applicant has committed very
few and minor thefts, to which he confessed. Nevertheless he has been
detained on remand for 11 months in appalling conditions, which was
unnecessary and could be explained only as a reaction to the fact that
the applicants complained to the Commission.
The applicants maintain that the prosecutors who examined their
petitions for the release of the first applicant were not independent
because the prosecution authorities under Bulgarian law actively
participate in the preliminary investigation against the accused. Also,
the court which reviewed the lawfulness of the first applicant's
detention examined the case in camera, without the participation of the
detained or his lawyer.
The Commission first notes that the applicants' complaints
concern the conformity of the first applicant's detention with the
requirements of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention and that the
remedies directed against the alleged violations, requests for release
to the prosecution authorities and an appeal before the District Court
under Section 152(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have been
employed by the applicants. The very fact that the penal proceedings
against the first applicant are still pending does not concern in any
way the complaints under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention.
Therefore, the Government's objection under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention must fail.
Furthermore, having examined the complaints related to the events
since July 1995, the Commission finds that they raise serious questions
of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination
should depend on an examination of the merits. This part of the
application cannot, therefore, be regarded as manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention,
and no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been
established.
Also, since it has been claimed that the applicants were put
under pressure to withdraw their application, the Commission considers
that in the ensuing proceedings it has the task to examine further the
allegations made in this respect.
For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the
merits of the case;
DECIDES to continue the examination of the applicants'
allegations of an interference with their right of petition
to the Commission.
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (S. TRECHSEL)