Lexploria

SUR LA RECEVABILITÉ

Application No. 26700/95

by János SOMOGYI

against Hungary

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 4 September 1996, the following members being present:

Mrs. J. LIDDY, President

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

C.L. ROZAKIS

G.B. REFFI

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 19 December 1994

by János SOMOGYI against Hungary and registered on 14 March 1995 under

file No. 26700/95;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Hungarian citizen born in 1945 who resides in

Budapest. He is a lawyer.

The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

applicant, may be summarised as follows.

In May 1990 the applicant brought an action before the Veszprém

District Court (Veszprémi Városi Bíróság) regarding the alleged

voidness of a real estate exchange contract. In October 1990 the Court

dismissed his motion to challenge the judge for bias. It appears that

subsequently two court hearings took place in 1990/91. In July 1992,

upon the applicant's request, the Court appointed a real estate expert.

On 24 March 1994 the Court established that the proceedings were

interrupted, due to the death of one of the defendants. The Court

ordered the other defendants to arrange for the legal successor of the

deceased defendant to join the proceedings. They apparently failed to

do so.

On 27 September 1994 the Court ordered the applicant to arrange

for the legal successor of the deceased defendant to join the

proceedings. On 24 April 1995 the Court again issued such an order and

informed him that, if the legal successor of the deceased defendant

should not join the proceedings, they would be discontinued. On

15 May 1995 the applicant submitted to the Court that, in the absence

of any other heir to the deceased defendant, the Hungarian State was

the intestate successor to the deceased defendant and that he intended

to involve the Hungarian State in the proceedings. On 18 May 1995 the

Court ordered the applicant to show by a document issued by a notary

public, that the Hungarian State was the legal successor in question.

On 7 November 1995 the Court held a hearing in the case and

ordered the applicant to substantiate the amounts of his claim. The

applicant alleges that this information, having been substantiated by

an expert's opinion, had already been available to the Court as early

as mid-1993.

On 7 March 1996 the Court held a hearing to which allegedly the

applicant was not summoned. In the minutes taken at the hearing, the

Court established that the applicant had been absent despite of his

having been duly summoned. On 15 March 1996 the applicant requested the

Court to rectify its findings laid down in the minutes taken at the

hearing of 7 March 1996.

On 9 April 1996 the Court discontinued the proceedings. The Court

considered that the applicant had revoked his claim against the State.

The applicant's appeal against the decision of 9 April 1996 is pending

before the Veszprém County Regional Court (Veszprém Megyei Bíróság).

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that

the proceedings in question were unfair and the District Court was not

impartial.

2. He further complains that the proceedings have lasted

unreasonably long.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) that

the proceedings were unfair and the District Court was not impartial.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), as far as relevant, reads as

follows:

"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,

everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and

impartial tribunal established by law."

As regards the alleged unfairness of the proceedings and

partiality of the District Court, the Commission recalls that, under

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with an

application after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according

to the generally recognised rules of international law. In this respect

the Commission notes that the applicant's appeal against the decision

of 9 April 1996 discontinuing the proceedings are pending before the

Veszprém County Regional Court. Accordingly, this part of the

application is inadmissible under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant further complains that the proceedings have lasted

unreasonably long.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), so far as relevant, provides that

"in the determination of his civil rights and obligations..., everyone

is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time".

The Commission observes that the applicant's complaint relates

to proceedings, which started in May 1990, i.e. prior to

5 November 1992, which is the date of the entry into force of the

Convention and of Protocol No. 1 with respect to Hungary. However, the

Commission recalls that the Convention only governs, for each

Contracting Party, facts subsequent to its entry into force with

respect to that Party (cf. No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14 p. 146).

The proceedings in question had lasted for about two and a half years

prior to the ratification of the Convention by Hungary on

5 November 1992. This period would, if considered alone, fall outside

the scope of the Commission's considerations ratione temporis. However,

in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after

5 November 1992, account must be taken of the then state of proceedings

(cf., Eur. Court HR., Foti and others v. Italy judgment of

10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, p. 18, para. 53).

The Commission notes that the proceedings in question have lasted

so far for about three and a half years subsequent to the Hungarian

ratification of the Convention.

The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case, namely, complexity, the conduct of the

applicant and the conduct of the judicial authorities. In this instance

the circumstances call for an overall assessment (cf., Eur. Court HR.,

Ficara v. Italy judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A, no. 196-A,

p. 9, para. 17).

The parties appear to have caused some delays between

March 1994 and May 1995, namely, they failed to arrange for the

participation of the legal successor of a defendant who had died in the

course of the proceedings. Thus, a delay between March 1994 and

September 1994 appears to be attributable to the defendants, and a

delay of further eight months to the applicant.

As regards the conduct of the judicial authorities, the

Commission finds that some delay occurred between the end of 1992 and

March 1994. Moreover, the Veszprém District Court's conduct appears to

have contributed to the delay following the interruption of the

proceedings on 24 March 1994 until the next hearing in the case in

November 1995. However, the delays on the courts' part do not, as a

whole, appear substantial enough for the total length of the

proceedings to date to have exceeded an acceptable limit in the

circumstances of the present case (cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court

HR., Cesarini v. Italy judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A, no. 245,

p. 26, para. 20).

Consequently the applicant's complaint about the length of

proceedings does not disclose any appearance of a violation of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).

It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY

Secretary President

to the First Chamber of the First Chamber

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SOMOGYI v. HUNGARY

SOMOGYI v. HUNGARY

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