AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 26376/95

                      by Catherine Irene LAYLLE

                      against Germany

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 4 September 1996, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 29 November 1994

by Catherine Irene LAYLLE against Germany and registered on 1 February

1995 under file No. 26376/95;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

     10 October, 30 November 1995 and 8 February 1996 and the

     observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 7 December

     1995, 13 February, 3 April and 3 May 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant has British and French nationality and lives in

London.  The facts of the application, as submitted by the parties, may

be summarised as follows.

     The particular facts of the case

     The applicant married a German citizen in 1984.  Two children

were born, in 1985 and 1987.  The couple lived in London until after

the birth of the first child, when they moved to Germany.  In 1992, the

marriage broke down.  By a notarised agreement between the husband and

the applicant, it was agreed that the children would live with their

mother in London, continue their education at the French lycee, and

that most of their holidays would be spent in Germany with the father.

     The father failed to return the children to their mother after

the summer holidays in 1994.  On 30 August 1994, on the applicant's

originating summons, the High Court in London made an ex parte order

under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985.  The order provided

that the children were made wards of court, and that they were to be

placed in the interim care and control of the mother.  The order also

declared that the retention of the children outside England and Wales

was wrongful pursuant to Article 3 of the Hague Convention on the Civil

Aspects of International Child Abduction ("the Child Abduction

Convention", which has been incorporated into English law).  The

wardship was later lifted.

     The applicant began proceedings in Germany to secure the return

of her children under the Child Abduction Convention.  On 19 September

1994 the children were heard by the Verden District Court (Amtsgericht)

in the presence of a member on the local Youth Office (Jugendamt), but

not in the presence of the parents.  On 20 September 1994, after

hearing both parents and a member of the Youth Office, and after

considering an expert report presented by the father, the District

Court ordered the applicant's husband to surrender the two children to

the applicant so that they could return to the United Kingdom.  The

court recited the father's claims that return of the children would

entail the risk of psychological damage to the children, and the

applicant's claims that the children had been living with her for over

two years and that to return them would be in their interest and would

not entail any psychological damage.  The court referred to Article 12

of the Child Abduction Convention, found that there was no serious risk

of psychological damage to the children within the meaning of Article

13 of that Convention and that the children's expressed wish not to be

returned was not relevant because of their lack of years, and ordered

the return of the children.  The court also referred to the European

Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning

Custody of Children.

     According to the applicant, the father then arranged for the

children to be taken away from the court and examined, over a

considerable period of time, by a child psychologist.

     The father and the Youth Office appealed.

     It appears that on 30 September 1994 a further ex parte order of

the High Court in London declared that the father's retention of the

children was a wrongful retention within the meaning of Article 3 of

the Child Abduction Convention.

     On 20 October 1994 the Celle Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)

quashed the order of 20 September 1994 and refused the applicant's

request for return of the children.  The applicant was present and was

represented by two lawyers.  In the absence of the children's parents

and the Youth Office representative, the Court of Appeal heard the

children by way of a personal conversation lasting some 45 minutes.

The children repeated their wish to remain with their father.  The

Court informed the parties of the outcome of the conversation with the

children, and gave them the opportunity to comment.

     The Celle court accepted that the conditions for the application

of the Child Abduction Convention were met, and referred expressly to

Article 3.  It noted that the children had stated before the District

Court that they preferred to stay with their father, and that they had

repeated this wish before the Court of Appeal.  It also noted that its

function was not to determine what was in the children's best

interests, but rather (pursuant the Child Abduction Convention) to

bring about the status quo ante unless Article 13 of that Convention

applied.  It pointed out that there was no fixed age-limit below which

children's views could not be considered, and found that the children,

then 7 and 9 years of age, were of such an age and degree of maturity

that it was appropriate to take account of their views.

     The court continued:

     "A. ... pushed his mother away with his hands (at the beginning

     of the hearing).  To begin with he sat crying on one of the back

     rows of seats ...  After he had received evasive answers to his

     spontaneous questions whether he now had to go back to his

     mother, he hid his face in his ... arms and remained sobbing in

     this position ... He was told that on this day only the question

     of a provisional return would be decided, whilst the decision on

     his and his brother's custody would only be considered in future

     custody proceedings.  At this, A. became calm, but immediately

     asked for how long he would have to go back to his mother, if at

     all.  He did not accept the objection that he might be better off

     with his mother on educational grounds, at least until the

     question of custody has been decided, as he had a negative stands

     vis-à-vis the circumstances of his life in London hitherto ("weil

     er den Umständen seines bisherigen Lebens in London in jeder

     Hinsicht ablehnend gegenübersteht") ...  He gave as a reason for

     his decision that he wanted to live with his father ... that he

     was after all German.  ...  He considered [the English] had a

     different character, but could not explain that concept.  It

     became clear, however, from his description of various

     circumstances which obviously upset him.

     "He confirmed again that he has no friends in school, and, apart

     from his brother, he is the only German there and is insulted and

     teased as a "Nazi"...

     "... He explained that he talks English with his classmates.  He

     said that he generally gets up at 7.00 a.m. or 7.30 a.m., by

     which time his mother has already left.  Breakfast is made by the

     nurse, who brings him ... to school at about 8.30 a.m., and picks

     him up again in the late afternoon.  The mother comes home at

     about 6.00 p.m., but usually does not stay very long, but

     generally leaves the house again in the evening ...  The children

     speak French with their mother and English with the nurse ...

     "[In connection with the relationships within the family before

     the parents separated, A.] remembers that he lived in the

     Schlüterstraße in Hamburg ...  He did not accept the comparison

     between the French school in Hamburg and that in London, in

     particular because the school in Hamburg is attended by many

     German children, while in the school in London there were no

     other German children.  A. reproached his mother ... that she is

     never there, and only has time for the children at the weekend

     ...  The children seem to know very little about running around

     ... table games, trips and other activities.  On the other hand,

     A. clearly brightened up when talking about the school ... which

     he now attends.  He stressed particularly that in the short time

     since school began he has made friends with several children, and

     he reports enthusiastically about his father's house which is on

     its own in the woods ... and his games with his new friends.

     "On the basis of its extensive and intensive discussion with A.,

     the Court is convinced that this boy suffers from severe

     pressure.  He is convinced that his mother "simply took" him and

     his brother.  ... He obviously thinks in German and, to be

     understood, has to "translate" ...  His whole social environment

     is, from his point of view, dominated by foreign languages, as

     German is not spoken at home or in school ...  With regard to

     other socio-cultural differences, in particular the considerable

     effort needed at school and the corresponding lack of

     [recreational facilities], A.'s refusal to return to his mother

     is perfectly understandable.  So far as can be established in the

     framework of these proceedings ..., this refusal is not based on

     a sudden idea or a passing mood, as often happens with younger

     children, nor is it based on "emotional influences" from the

     [father] or on the continuing holiday mood, as the holidays ended

     almost two months ago ...  The members of the Court cannot be

     said to have no personal experience in this area, as they are all

     grandfathers or fathers of children of just this age. ...  It

     would be an act of violence not to take account of A's refusal.

     "The same applies mutatis mutandis for the brother.  C. cannot

     express himself as clearly as his brother because of his age.

     But he also refuses expressly and firmly to return to his mother

     ...  Even with the nurse he was only able to speak English ..."

     In her constitutional appeal, which she made in her own name and

her sons', the applicant alleged violation of Articles 6 paras. 2 and

3 and Article 2 para. 1 together with Article 1 of the Basic Law

(family rights and the right to dignity and development of the person),

and of the principles of fairness and of the rule of law.  She

emphasised in particular that the Court of Appeal had decided the

appeal on the basis of its own impression of the children's evidence,

without undertaking any enquiries (such as independent reports) which

could establish whether - especially as the children had been in close

contact with a child psychologist employed by the father - the children

were of an age that their opinion should be taken into account.

     The Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declined to

deal with the applicant's constitutional complaint on 9 March 1995.

It recalled that the assessment of facts and the interpretation of

ordinary law was a matter for the specialist courts, and it found no

indication that the Court of Appeal's decision involved a fundamentally

wrong consideration of the importance of the parents' rights or the

children's rights.  The Court saw no problems of constitutional law

arising from the fact that the judges decided the case on the basis of

their own findings, rather than calling for any further investigations.

     Substantive access proceedings are apparently still pending

before the German courts; the applicant did not pursue an appeal in

custody proceedings.

     Relevant law and practice

     Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction

     Article 3

     "The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered

     wrongful where -

     (a)   it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a

           person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or

           alone, under the law of the State in which the child was

           habitually resident immediately before the removal or

           retention; and

     (b)   at the time of removal or retention those rights were

           actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have

           been so exercised but for the removal or retention. ..."

     Article 12

     "Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms

     of Article 3 ..., the authority concerned shall order the return

     of the child forthwith."

     Article 13

     "Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the

     judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is

     not bound to order the return of the child if the person,

     institution or other body which opposes its return establishes

     that -

     ...

     (b)   there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose

           the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise

           place the child in an intolerable situation.

     The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order

     the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to

     being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at

     which it is appropriate to take account of its views.

     In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the

     judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account

     the information relating to the social background of the child

     provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority

     of the child's habitual residence."

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant alleges a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the

Convention.  She alleges that the decision of the Celle Court of Appeal

was arbitrary in that inter alia the court took its decision on the

basis of its own interrogation of two children aged 7 and 9, she was

not heard at all, no reference was made to the fact that she had not

seen the boys for over four months by the time of the decision and so

they must have been influenced by the father, and that the children

were too young for the case to be wholly decided on their own

statements.

     She also alleges that the local Youth Office is partial and is

ignoring the damage to her children, and that she has not been able to

visit the children properly whilst the proceedings were pending.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 29 November 1994 and registered

on 1 February 1995.

     On 4 July 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

     The Government's written observations were submitted on

10 October 1995, with an addition on 30 November 1995.  The applicant

replied on 7 December 1995, and the Government commented on that reply

on 8 February 1996.  On 13 February 1996 the applicant commented on the

Government's paper of 30 November 1995.  She made still further

submissions on 3 April 1996 and 3 May 1996.

     On 23 January 1996 the Commission granted the applicant legal

aid.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant alleges violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.  She complains that the Celle Court of Appeal was biased,

that its decision was arbitrary, and the proceedings before it were

unfair.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides, so far

as relevant, as follows.

     "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and obligations

     ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an

     independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."

     The Government submit that it is not clear whether Article 6

(Art. 6) applies to the proceedings at issue in the application before

the Commission, as the only question to be determined was the

application under the Child Abduction Convention, which aimed at

restoring the status quo ante in terms of the law on custody and

access, rather than determining substantive (civil) custody or access

rights.  They underline that at the hearing before the Celle Court of

Appeal, the applicant was present in person, and was represented by two

lawyers, who made submissions on the merits of the case.  The

Government see no indication whatever of any lack of impartiality on

the part of the court, and underline that the proceedings were

conducted strictly in accordance with the relevant provisions of

domestic law.  They note that the mere fact that there are lawyers and

doctors among the relatives of the children's father is not sufficient

to indicate bias, even in a relatively small town like Verden, and in

any event, the Verden decision was favourable to the applicant, and it

was the Celle Court which found against her.

     The applicant considers that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention

applies because the Child Abduction Convention concerns civil aspects

of child abduction.  In connection with the hearing before the Celle

Court of Appeal, she claims that by solely hearing the children,

without an interpreter, the court denied her rights.  She claims that,

in any event, the proceedings were not properly conducted because

children of 7 and 9 are far too young to be heard by a court, and

because they were accompanied by a psychologist chosen by the father

and had been subjected to undue influence by the father all summer.

The applicant also considers that the Court of Appeal was not impartial

because it took into account a report from the Verden Youth Office

which had not put questions to her, and because a member of the Youth

Office expressed the opinion that the children should remain in

Germany, at least for the interim.

     The Commission first notes that the present application is

limited to questions arising in connection with the proceedings under

the Child Abduction Convention, as it is only in that respect that the

applicant has put her complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court.

     The Commission next notes that the applicant had a right in

German law to go to the courts and to allege a violation of the Child

Abduction Convention, and that the result of such proceedings could

have been conclusive for the question of where the children were to

live.  Moreover, the proceedings were clearly to determine a dispute

as to the interpretation of that convention.  The Commission is not,

however required to decide whether that right was "civil" within the

meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, as even if

it was, the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following

reasons.

     As to compliance with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the proceedings in

the present case, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with

Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the

observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the

Convention.  In particular, it is not competent to deal with an

application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by

domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have

involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out

in the Convention.  The Commission refers, on this point, to its

constant case-law (see eg. No. 458/59, X v Belgium, Dec. 29.3.60,

Yearbook 3 pp.222, 236; No. 5258/71, X v Sweden, Dec. 8.2.73,

Collection 43 pp.71, 77; No. 7987/77, X v Austria, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R.

18 pp. 31, 45; No. 19890/92, Ziegler v. Switzerland, Dec. 3.5.93, D.R.

74 p. 234).

     As to the specific points raised by the applicant in connection

with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the Commission notes that

the applicant was present and represented at the hearing before the

Court of Appeal on 20 October 1994, and there is no indication that she

requested, through the lawyers, to be able to address the court

herself.

     The decision by the Court of Appeal to hear the children in the

absence of the parties cannot of itself violate the applicant's right

to a fair hearing under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention: in

hearing the children in a setting less formal than a court room in the

presence of all the parties, the Court of Appeal was attempting to

obtain the children's views on where they wished to live in

circumstances most likely to give rise to a true picture of their

opinions.  The Court of Appeal then informed the parties of the

outcome, and gave the opportunity to comment.

     The applicant also complains that the children were too young for

their views to be taken into consideration by the court, and that the

proceedings were therefore unfair.  However, the procedural rules to

be applied are, in the first place, a matter for the domestic

authorities; the Convention's concern is rather with the use made of

that evidence.  In the context of the present case, it was perfectly

natural for the Court of Appeal to wish to hear the views of the

children (as the Verden court had also done), and the Commission does

not accept that to base a decision on the - wholly relevant - views of

children can of itself violate Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     Finally in the context of Article 6 (Art. 6), the applicant

complains generally of bias on the part of all those involved: the

Celle Court of Appeal, the Youth Office and the psychologist allegedly

employed by the father.  It suffices for the Commission to note that

in the present case the Youth Office exercised a solely advisory

function concerned with child and juvenile welfare, and it did not take

any decision affecting the applicant's rights; and that any

psychologist employed by the father similarly took no decisions which

affected the applicant's rights.  The Commission finds no reason to

question the impartiality of Court of Appeal, either in the way with

which it dealt with the evidence from these sources, or in the way it

approached the case generally.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.   The applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the

Convention in connection with the refusal of the German courts to

return her children to her after their wrongful retention by their

father.

     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides, so far as

relevant, as follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence.

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The Government express doubt as to whether a decision to return

a child under the Child Abduction Convention can at all constitute an

interference with family life, but consider that even if it can, any

interference in the present case was justified.  They point out that

the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the relevant

provisions of the domestic legislation, and that the aim of both the

Child Abduction Convention and the courts - to serve the best interests

of the child - was clearly legitimate.

     As to the proportionality of any interference, the Government

underline that the Child Abduction Convention does not set up an

absolute rule requiring children who have been wrongfully retained to

be returned: rather, it permits of exceptions to the general rule,

allowing account to be taken of the child's best interests in a

particular case.  They add that the courts went to considerable lengths

to establish whether the children's wishes should be taken into

account, and what those wishes were, and point to a number of decisions

of the English courts which lay great importance on the opinion of

young children.  They consider that the Court of Appeal correctly and

sufficiently substantiated why it was that the children's expression

of their wishes reflected those wishes, and was based on a thought

process sustained by a certain degree of maturity, not simply on a

childish mood.  As to the absence of expert reports, the Government

note that the decisions in the case were taken on the basis of a full

hearing of the children, and conformed with the relevant domestic

procedural requirements.  They point out that the family panels in the

Courts of Appeal are composed of judges with many years' experience in

family cases.  They underline that the Youth Office is an independent

advisory body with a particular expertise in youth matters.  It is

required to protect children against dangers to their best interests;

any tension between the applicant and the Youth Office arose because

the applicant did not comply with the terms of an access agreement, and

tried to photograph an official.

     The applicant does not agree with the Government.  She complains

about the behaviour of her husband and the courts in the custody and

access proceedings and, with particular reference to the proceedings

under the Child Abduction Convention, considers that it was impossible

to establish the real wishes of the children in the present case

because they had been separated from their normal surroundings for such

a length of time.  She also considers that it is not appropriate for

a court to decide under Article 13 of the Child Abduction Convention

unless it has had the benefit of reports from the Central Authority and

other authorities referred to in the third paragraph of Article 13 of

that Convention.  She claims that the Celle court should have laid more

weight on the decisions of the High Court in London that the retention

of the children was wrongful.

     The applicant notes that the term "the well-being of the child"

is not a term which is used as such in the preamble to the Child

Abduction Convention, which stresses the importance of immediate return

of children who have been wrongfully retained.  She concludes that

because the Celle court was in effect taking a custody decision when

it should have been taking a decision under the Child Abduction

Convention, the interference had no legitimate aim.

     Finally, in connection with the proportionality of the

interference with any legitimate aim, the applicant does not accept

that it is possible to decide under the Child Abduction Convention

purely on the basis of the subjective feelings of children aged 7 and

9.  She points out that any child will answer questions on the basis

of short-term considerations, and its well-being may not be best served

by those considerations.  She also points out that the Celle court made

no allowance for the fact that the children had been brought up in a

tri-lingual background, and that it failed to give due consideration

to the points militating in favour of return of the children such as

their success in school in England, and the need to maintain relations

with people even when they insult (she refers to the incident where A

said that he was teased as a "Nazi").

     The Commission considers that, on the basis of the intention and

wording of the Child Abduction Convention and the wrongful retention

of the children by their father, the applicant could reasonably expect

that the children would be returned to her, and that custody and access

proceedings (if any were necessary) would then take place in England.

The decisions of the German courts not to order the children's return

can therefore be regarded as an interference with her right to respect

for her family life.  The interference was, however, in accordance with

the law as the German courts were applying the domestic legislation

which, itself, derived from an international convention designed to

assist in the resolution of problems of precisely the type raised in

present application.  The aim of the interference was to implement the

Child Abduction Convention, and thereby attain the most appropriate

balance between the interests of the children and, secondarily, the

respective parents.  The interference therefore pursued the legitimate

aim of protecting the "rights and freedoms of others".

     As to the necessity for this interference, the Commission recalls

that the review of the Convention organs is not limited to ascertaining

whether a respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably,

carefully and in good faith.  In addition, in exercising their

supervisory jurisdiction, they must look at the case as a whole, and

must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interferences

at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (see Eur. Court HR, Olsson v.

Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).

In a case such as the present, the Commission must also bear in mind

that the interference at issue concerned a conflict not between a State

which has deprived a parent of custody and the parent, but rather

between two parents who were arguing over the custody of their

children.  It is not unreasonable for the State to set up criteria

relating to the well-being of the children when deciding how to

determine such matters.  Indeed, in a different type of dispute between

parents over custody, the European Court of Human Rights has noted

that Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5) (not ratified by Germany, but

not pleaded in the case at issue) makes it clear that as regards

parental rights, the interests of the children are paramount (Eur.

Court HR, Hoffmann v. Austria judgment of 23 June 1993, Series A no.

255-C, p. 59, para. 35).

     Applying these criteria to the facts of the present case, the

Commission first notes that the Child Abduction Convention clearly and

unambiguously permits, by the second paragraph of its Article 13, a

refusal to order the return of a child where the child objects to being

returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is

appropriate to take account of its views.  The Commission cannot

therefore share the applicant's objection that taking account of the

views of the child is tantamount to taking a custody decision which is

outside the scope of the Child Abduction Convention.

     It is not clear whether the provisions of the third paragraph of

Article 13 of the Child Abduction Convention require, as the applicant

claims, the obtention of information from the relevant Central

Authority or other competent authority when a decision is being taken

under the second paragraph, whether that paragraph only applies in

connection with the first paragraph, or whether it only applies where

such information has been received.  However, the Commission is not

required to determine this question because, in any event, the

applicant did not refer to the third paragraph of Article 13 during the

proceedings before the Celle Court of Appeal, nor in her constitutional

complaint.  She has therefore not exhausted domestic remedies in this

respect.

     The Commission next notes that the Court of Appeal decided the

case on the basis of the statements of the children, having found that

they were of an age and maturity at which it was appropriate to take

account of their views.  The Commission agrees with the applicant to

the extent that if a court were to base a decision on the views of

children who were palpably unable to form and articulate an opinion as

to their wishes, the "necessity" for such a decision may not be readily

apparent.  The Commission in the present case can certainly not exclude

that children of the age of 7 and 9 may be capable of holding and

expressing firm and coherent views on where they wish to live, and

finds nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeal which could

indicate that the views of the boys in the present case were not

genuine and tenable.

     Finally, the Commission recalls the limited nature of the

exercises undertaken both by the Celle Court of Appeal and by itself.

The Celle Court of Appeal was only deciding whether to return the

children to the applicant under the Child Abduction Convention.  It

took no decision whatever as to custody and access, and none of the

subsequent proceedings are before the Commission.  The Commission

itself exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over the domestic

decisions, but that jurisdiction is not intended to be primary in the

sense that the Commission substitutes its opinion for that of the

domestic authorities.

     In the light of these considerations, the Commission finds that

the reasons given by the Celle Court of Appeal for its decision of

20 October 1994 were "relevant and sufficient" within the meaning

ascribed to that phrase by the case-law of the Convention organs.  The

interference with the applicant's right to respect for her family life

can therefore be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society ... for

the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.   The applicant alleges a violation of Article 14 of the

Convention, taken with Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 14+6+8) of the

Convention.  Article 14 (Art. 14) provides as follows:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

     opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

     minority, property, birth or other status."

     The Commission notes that the applicant did not refer to

Article 3 of the Basic Law (equality before the law) in her application

to the Federal Constitutional Court, and it is therefore not clear

whether she has exhausted domestic remedies in connection with her

allegations of discrimination.

     However, even if the applicant could be said to have raised a

complaint of discrimination in substance before the Federal

Constitutional Court, the allegation of a violation of Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention would nevertheless be inadmissible as the

Commission has found no indication in the documents submitted by the

parties that the authorities behaved in any way discriminatorily

against the applicant in the enjoyment of her Convention rights.

     It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber