AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                       Application No. 26282/95

                       by William BURNS

                       against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 4 September 1996, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 9 September 1994

by William BURNS against the United Kingdom and registered on

24 January 1995 under file No. 26282/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a United Kingdom national, was born in 1949 and

is resident in Queensferry, Scotland.

A.   The particular facts of the case

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

     On 18 February 1993 the applicant had been drinking in a bar and

took a taxi. Having refused to pay the £11.00 fare, the applicant

consented to being driven in the taxi to a police station where the

matter was dealt with by two police officers. Approximately three weeks

later the applicant received a summons from the Procurator Fiscal's

office with the charge of incurring a taxi fare without paying or

intending to pay it. In a letter dated 17 May 1993 to the Procurator

Fiscal's office, the applicant accused the two police officers of

stealing £11.00 from him when he was in the police station which

episode was, he alleged, revenge by the Masonic Lodge for complaints

he had previously made in relation to the police. The Procurator Fiscal

replied by confirming that a police investigation would be carried out.

By letter dated 8 June 1993 the Procurator Fiscal's office refused the

applicant's request for copies of the statements of the prosecution

witnesses.

     The case was first before the District Court on 10 May 1993 when

the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the hearing took

place on 17 December 1993. The applicant was not legally represented.

The taxi-driver and the two police officers gave evidence and were

cross-examined by the applicant. Both police officers stated that the

applicant had been cautioned and charged, was not put in a cell as he

alleged, that the applicant left the police station having completed

the necessary procedures after approximately one hour, that the

applicant had not offered to pay the taxi fare and that he had £16.53

with him on entering and on leaving the police station. When the

applicant put it to those officers that he had more money with him, the

Procurator Fiscal objected to the line of questioning stating that the

matter was irrelevant to the charges. The trial judge agreed.

     The applicant then submitted that the case against him should be

struck out as there was no case to answer. This application was refused

and the applicant proceeded to give evidence stating that he had

disagreed over the amount of the taxi fare. The applicant claimed that

he had approximately £60.00 when he entered the police station and he

applied for an adjournment in order to allow him to present witness

evidence to this effect which would counter the evidence to the

contrary given by the police officers. The judge refused the

application on the basis that the applicant had ample time before the

hearing to call defence witnesses having been advised of the need to

do so in the notice of trial issued. The trial judge also felt that it

was inappropriate at that stage to adjourn the proceedings. The

applicant then closed his case and led no witnesses. The judge found

the applicant guilty as charged. The applicant denied previous

convictions and, subsequently, on the receipt of the proofs of those

convictions he was sentenced on 18 February 1994 to pay a £60.00 fine

and the taxi fare within eight weeks.

     The applicant appealed to the High Court against his conviction

and sentence. He filed a six page document containing his grounds of

appeal challenging, inter alia, the trial judge's refusal to strike out

the case against him or to adjourn the proceedings, the trial judge's

findings on the facts and his sentence. On 19 April 1994 the District

Court judge completed a detailed report on, inter alia, the District

Court proceedings, the evidence led by the parties and her findings of

fact. By letter dated 3 June 1994 the Deputy Chief Constable informed

the applicant that no proceedings were to be issued against the police

officers pursuant to his complaint.

     On 30 August 1994 the High Court, having held a hearing,

delivered a detailed judgment rejecting the appeal. The judgment notes

that the High Court declined to allow the applicant to read his

prepared statement aloud. The court could see no purpose in such an

exercise since the three judges had already had the benefit of reading

that statement. As regards the refusal to adjourn the hearing at first

instance, the High Court found that the applicant was aware of the

existence of his witnesses and their evidence on the date of the trial

and concluded that the trial judge's decision not to adjourn was well

founded.

     On 22 September 1994 the District Court office demanded the

payment of the fines in default of which a warrant of arrest could

issue. By letter dated 24 September 1994 the applicant stated that he

would not pay or acquiesce with "the lawless freaks in the Satanic

cult". An arrest warrant subsequently issued, the applicant was

arrested on 10 June 1995 and he was detained until the following Monday

morning, 12 June 1995, when he was brought before the District Court.

The applicant agreed before that court to pay the fine and taxi fare

in default of which he would have to serve seven days imprisonment.

     On 14 June 1995 the applicant complained about his arrest to the

Chief Constable. The latter responded that it was a lawful arrest

pursuant to an arrest warrant. The applicant replied by accusing the

Chief Constable of having an allegiance with the "Satanic cult of

Freemasonry's Get-Burns-Task-Force". By letter dated 16 June 1995 the

applicant informed the Procurator Fiscal that he had reconsidered and

would submit to imprisonment rather than pay the fine. Accordingly,

from 30 June to 6 July 1995 the applicant served a prison sentence.

B.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     While there is no obligation on the prosecution to provide a list

of prosecution witnesses to the defence, as a matter of practice the

Procurator Fiscal provides a list of such witnesses on request on the

basis that the defence will reciprocate by providing a list of their

witnesses. Also as a matter of practice, the defence can discuss with

the Prosecutor Fiscal the nature of the prosecution evidence in order

that the defence may arrange, for example, the precognitions they find

necessary or consider an appropriate plea. There is no entitlement to

obtain copies of the prosecution witness statements.

     The defence may request precognition of prosecution witnesses

which means that those witnesses may be requested to submit to

questioning by the defence prior to the trial. There is no obligation

on the prosecution witness to give precognition although there is some

authority for the view that it is part of that person's civic duty to

do so. If a witness is reluctant, the defence can apply to the court

for precognition on oath. While there is some authority for the view

that precognition on oath should only be allowed in exceptional

circumstances, it has been held that the object of the statutory

provision is to place the defence on equal terms with the prosecution

in the preparation of the case (Brady v. Lochart 1985 SCCR 349).

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant complains that he was treated unreasonably by the

courts due to a conspiracy against him by the Satanic cult of

Freemasonry which involved, inter alia, the police, the courts and the

Procurator Fiscal. He complains under Article 6 para. 2 that he was

convicted when he was known to be innocent. He also complains under

Article 6 para. 3(a) of the Convention that he was not charged or

cautioned by the police and under Article 6 para. 3(d) that he was

refused an adjournment of the trial at first instance.

     He further complains under Article 10 of the Convention that the

High Court did not allow him to express himself fully as regards his

appeal and under Article 14 of the Convention that he was discriminated

against because of the conspiracy against him. He further complains

that he was detained in a prison cell on the night of 18/19 February

1993 and that the police officers lied about this also.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that he was treated unreasonably by the

courts, convicted when known to be innocent and alleges a conspiracy

by the "Satanic cult of Freemasons" involving the courts, the

Procurator Fiscal and the police. He specifically complains that he was

not allowed an adjournment to call defence witnesses. In this respect,

he submits that the two police officers lied in evidence as regards the

amount of money he had with him when he arrived at the police station

and submits that, since he was not allowed copies of their statements

prior to the hearing, he was accordingly taken by surprise by their

evidence and he should have been granted the adjournment to establish

the true facts. The High Court on appeal, according to the applicant,

ignored the statements he obtained from those defence witnesses. In

these respects, the applicant invokes Article 6 paras. 2 and 3(d) of

the Convention

     Since the specific guarantees contained in paragraph 3 of

Article 6 (Art. 6-3) of the Convention are specific aspects of the

general concept of a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1 of this

Article, in the circumstances of the present case, the Commission will

consider the complaint under Article 6 para. 3(d) (Art. 6-3-d) from the

angle of paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention taken

together with the principles inherent in paragraph 3 of that Article.

(see, for example, Eur. Court HR, Unterpertinger v. Austria judgment

of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 110, p. 14, para. 29). The Commission

also considers that the applicant's allegation made under Article 6

para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, as to he being convicted when it

was known that he was innocent, is more properly considered under

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as

relevant, reads as follows:

     "1.  In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,

     everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal

     established by law. ..."

     With regard to the judicial decisions in the case, the Commission

recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the

Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the

obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular,

it is not competent to deal with an application alleging errors of law

or fact on the part of domestic courts, except where it considers that

such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the

rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The Commission refers,

on this point, to its established case-law (see, for example, No.

12505/86, Dec. 11.10.88, D.R. 58 pp. 106, 110 with further references).

     The Commission further recalls that as a general rule, it is for

the national court, and in particular for the court of first instance,

to assess the evidence before them as well as the relevance and

admissibility of the evidence which the accused seeks to adduce.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not give an

unlimited right to have witnesses called and domestic courts may

exercise some discretion, provided that the Convention and particularly

the right to a fair hearing are respected in deciding whether the

hearing of defence witnesses is likely to establish the truth (Eur.

Court HR, Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v. Spain judgment of 6 December

1988, Series A no. 146, p. 31, para. 68, No. 8417/78, Dec. 4.5.79, D.R.

16 p. 200 and No. 8231/78, Dec. 6.3.82, D.R. 28 p. 5).

     Furthermore, only exceptional circumstances could lead the

Convention organs to conclude that a refusal to hear defence witnesses

violated Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see Vidal v. Belgium,

Comm. Report 14.1.91, Series A no. 235-B, pp. 38-39, paras. 47-49 and

Eur. Court H.R., Bricmont v. Belgium judgment of 7 July 1989, Series

A no. 158, p. 31, para. 89). The complete silence, for example, of a

judgment as to why a court rejected the hearing of a defence witness

is not consistent with the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., Vidal v. Belgium judgment, loc. cit,

pp. 32-33, paras. 33-34).

     As to the present applicant's complaint about the refusal of an

adjournment in order to allow him to call defence witnesses, the

Commission notes that the applicant wished to introduce witness

evidence to counter evidence given by the police officers that the

applicant had £16.53 with him on arrival and on leaving the police

station, the applicant maintaining that he had approximately £60.00 and

that the police officers stole money from him at the station. However,

the Commission notes that the issue before the court was whether or not

the applicant incurred a taxi fare of £11.00 without paying or

intending to pay it and not whether the police officers misappropriated

money from him or not.

     Insofar as the applicant submits that proof of his allegation of

theft would have discredited the evidence given by the police officers

in relation to the charge against him, the Commission notes that the

applicant claims that the police officers' evidence as to the amount

of money he retained and their denial of theft during the trial, took

him by surprise and he should therefore have been granted the

adjournment. However, the Commission notes that approximately six

months before the hearing the applicant lodged a complaint with the

Procurator Fiscal about alleged theft by those officers and therefore

the issue was not something which arose during the trial. In addition,

the Commission does not consider that it was unforeseeable that those

officers, in responding on cross-examination to questions posed by the

applicant, would have denied a charge of theft.

     Moreover, the trial judge carefully considered the application

for the adjournment. The judge refused the application on the basis,

inter alia, that the applicant had ample time before the hearing to

call defence witnesses having been advised of the need to do so when

the notice of trial issued. The High Court similarly considered this

submission by the applicant concluding that the applicant was aware of

the relevant defence evidence and witnesses on the day of the trial.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that, while there is no entitlement

to copies of the prosecution witness statements, the applicant has

submitted no evidence to demonstrate that he made any application for

a list of the names of prosecution witnesses, that he requested an

indication from the Prosector Fiscal as to the nature of the

prosecution evidence, that he attempted to take precognition of any

prosecution witness prior to his trial or that he applied to take

precognition on oath in the case of a reluctant witness.

     In such circumstances, the Commission considers that the refusal

of the adjournment of the trial does not disclose a violation of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

     As to the applicant's complaints about unreasonable treatment,

about a conspiracy against him and about he being convicted when the

authorities knew that he was innocent, the Commission finds no evidence

of a conspiracy as described by the applicant or at all or that the

applicant was convicted other than on the basis of the evidence against

him. In addition, it is noted that the hearing took place approximately

nine months after the summons issued against him, that the applicant

was given every opportunity to arrange his defence witnesses prior to

the trial, to make his case during the trial and to cross-examine

prosecution witnesses, that both courts carefully considered the

applicant's submissions and applications, that the District Court

delivered a detailed and reasoned report on the trial and that the High

Court's judgment was similarly detailed and reasoned. In such

circumstances, the Commission finds that these complaints of the

applicant do not disclose a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention.

     Accordingly, the applicant's complaints under Article 6

(Art. 6) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 3(a)

(Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention that he was not cautioned or charged.

He also complains about being placed in a prison cell on the night of

18/19 February 1993. The Commission considers that such matters are

more appropriately considered under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the

Convention. However, the Commission notes that the only evidence

submitted by the applicant in these respects is his suggestion, made

to the police officers during their cross-examination by him, that he

was not charged or cautioned and was so placed in a prison cell which

suggestions were denied by both police officers. The Commission finds

that insofar as the applicant's submissions in this respect raise

issues under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, they are

unsubstantiated and, accordingly, manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention that the High Court did not allow him to read aloud the

terms of his notice of appeal or of his prepared statement during the

appeal hearing and because he was not allowed to "express the full

terms of his appeal" at that hearing. The Commission has also

considered this complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.

     The Commission notes that the High Court had before it the

applicant's detailed notice of appeal (six pages) together with a copy

of his prepared statement. The High Court could not see any purpose in

allowing the applicant to read out his prepared statement since the

judges already had a copy of it before them. The Commission notes that

the applicant's detailed grounds of appeal were also before the High

Court, they having been previously filed in the High Court office. It

is also noted that the applicant does not allege that the judges of the

High Court did not have or did not read those documents. In addition,

the applicant has not specified in what other respect he was not

allowed to adequately express himself nor has he submitted that he was

prevented from making any oral submission.

     In such circumstances, the Commission considers that this

complaint of the applicant does not disclose a violation of Articles 6

or 10 (Art. 6, 10) of the Convention and, accordingly, is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.   Finally, the applicant further complains under Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention that he was discriminated against because

of the alleged conspiracy by the "Satanic cult of Freemasons" against

him.

     The Commission recalls that this Article protects individuals in

analogous situations from a discriminatory difference in treatment in

the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention

and its Protocols. The Commission considers that the applicant's

allegations as to a conspiracy against him are unsubstantiated and that

the application does not otherwise disclose any difference in treatment

of the applicant as regards the rights and freedoms recognised by the

Convention and its Protocols. The Commission therefore considers that

this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber