AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 24875/94

                      by Henry LOGAN

                      against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 6 September 1996, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 G.B. REFFI

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 6 November 1993

by Henry LOGAN against the United Kingdom and registered on 10 August

1994 under file No. 24875/94;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government received

     on 12 June 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the

     applicant received on 6 September 1995;

-    the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 6 September 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen born in 1957 and resident in

Denny, Stirlingshire. He is represented before the Commission by

Mr. Cameron Fyfe, a solicitor practising in Glasgow. The facts as

submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.

A.   Particular circumstances of the case

     The applicant was divorced from his wife K. on 30 March 1992.

There were 2 children of the marriage, C. born in 1987 and G. born in

1989. In or about March 1989, pursuant to an agreement by the applicant

and his wife with the Department of Social Security (DSS), the

applicant began paying £40 per month. This sum was increased a number

of times between 1989 and 1993, and at the date that the Child Support

Act 1991 (the 1991 Act) came into force on 5 April 1993, the applicant

was paying £121.33 per month.

     On 24 February 1993, the applicant was granted access to the

children by the Sheriff Court. Pursuant to the court order, the

applicant was allowed access every second Sunday from 10.00 to 16.00h.

He lives 30 miles from the children's home.

     On 23 April 1993, an application was made under the 1991 Act by

the applicant's former wife for a child support maintenance assessment

to be made in respect of both children. She was required to do so by

the Secretary of State pursuant to section 6 of the 1991 Act as she was

in receipt of income support.  A maintenance enquiry form was sent to

the applicant.  It was completed and signed by him on 30 April 1993 and

returned to the Child Support Agency on 21 May 1993.

     On 13 October 1993, a maintenance assessment was carried out and

set at £56.78 per week payable from 29 April 1993, the date on which

the enquiry form was sent to the applicant.  As from that date, the

former agreement as to maintenance made by the applicant with the DSS

under which the applicant paid £30.00 per week became unenforceable in

accordance with the provisions of the Act.

     On 22 November 1993, due to the applicant's failure to make

regular payments, a Deduction from Earnings Order issued by the

Secretary of State was sent to the applicant's employer who was obliged

to deduct each week from the applicant's salary the maintenance payment

due and a sum in respect of arrears that had accrued between

29 April 1993 (when the enquiry form was sent to the applicant) and

13 October 1993 (when the assessment was made). On 23 November 1993 the

applicant asked for the Deductions from Earnings Order to be cancelled

and this was agreed on the basis that he pay maintenance due under the

assessment every two weeks as originally specified and an additional

£5.00 per week towards arrears.

     On 17 January 1994, the applicant was informed that the

assessment had been reduced to £55.57 per week pursuant to a review

requested by him and that the assessment would be backdated to

29 April 1993.  The amount due per fortnight is therefore £111.14 with

a contribution for arrears, which the applicant has paid regularly.

     The applicant is a school librarian employed by a local

authority. He originally submitted that he received a net four weekly

income of £790. He claimed that his expenses (rent, loans, insurance,

utility bills etc. plus the child support payments and arrears) amount

to £604.61 per month which left him with the sum of £221.49 per four

weeks to pay for food, prescriptions, dental care and petrol.  He

claims that the cost of exercising his right of access, which he has

every second Sunday from 10.00 to 16.00h is £15 (£30 over a four week

period).  He includes in the £15 the cost of the 60 mile round trip and

taking his children out for the day. As a result of the increased

assessment, the applicant claims that he is now only able to visit his

children once per month instead of once per fortnight.

B.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     Assessment of child maintenance

     The Child Support Act 1991 (the Act) provides for the assessment,

collection and enforcement of periodical maintenance payable by parents

in respect of children not in their care. The Act was designed to

improve the position of children whose parents live apart.  Research

commissioned for the government white paper ("Children Come First",

1990 Cm. 1264) had indicated that 30 % of lone mothers and 3% of lone

fathers received regular child maintenance and that the average payment

was very low. It was considered that the burden of supporting lone

parents fell largely upon the State.

      The amount of child support maintenance payable by an absent

parent is fixed in accordance with a formula set out in Schedule 1 to

the 1991 Act, which takes into account four separate elements: the

amount needed to support the child, the assessable income of the

parents, the deduction rate or proportion of the assessable income

which will go to the child and the protected income, which is intended

to ensure that the standard of living of the absent parent is

maintained at a minimum level (the amount needed for basic living

expenses).

     A parent with care of a child may apply to the Secretary of State

for a maintenance assessment to be made. Where a parent caring for a

child claims state benefits (eg. income support, family credit) he or

she may be required to authorise the Secretary of State to recover

child support maintenance from the absent parent (section 6).

     Once a maintenance assessment is made, any prior maintenance

agreement becomes unenforceable insofar as it relates to periodic

maintenance payments for the children concerned (section 10 (2)).

     To implement the provisions of the 1991 Act, the Child Support

Agency (CSA) was established.

     Review procedures

     Pursuant to sections 17 and 18 of the 1991 Act, a person may

request the review of a maintenance assessment by a child support

officer if there has been a material change of circumstances since the

assessment was made or where the assessment was made in ignorance of,

or in mistake as to a material fact, or was wrong in law.

     Pursuant to section 20, any person aggrieved by the decision of

a child support officer on such a review  may appeal to the Child

Support Appeal Tribunal. The President of the Tribunals, a lawyer of

at least 10 years' standing, is also President of the Social Security

Appeals Tribunals and is appointed by the Lord Chancellor.  Each

Tribunal consists of a Chairman and two other persons. The Chairman is

required to be a lawyer of 5 years's standing, while the other persons

are drawn from a panel constituted by the President who have knowledge

or experience of the area where they are to work and be representative

of the persons living or working in the area.

     Appeals on points of law from the Tribunal lie to a Child Support

Commissioner who is a solicitor or barrister of more than 10 years

standing (section 24). Leave must be granted by either the Chairman of

the Tribunal which heard the case or by the Commissioner. If he finds

that a decision appealed against is wrong in law, he must set it aside

and either make the decision himself or send it back to the Tribunal

or to a different Child Support Officer with directions as to how it

is to be determined.

     Appeal may be made on point of law from the Commissioner's

decision to the appropriate court, namely the Court of Appeal or the

Court of Session (section 25). Leave must be obtained either from the

Commissioner or from the Court of Appeal or Court of Session.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that in determining the amount of

maintenance he has to pay, the CSA has determined his "civil rights"

such that he was entitled to access to an independent and impartial

tribunal.  He submits that there is no redress for any individual who

has been found liable to make a contribution where that contribution

has been correctly calculated in accordance with the applicable

provisions. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.

2.   The applicant complains that the level of maintenance payments

has been assessed at such a high rate that he can only afford to visit

his children once a month instead of once a fortnight, as he is

entitled to do.  He complains that this impedes the development of his

relationship with his children contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.

maintenance payments interferes with the practice of his religion. He

has been a practising Zen buddhist for six years. The nearest priories

are 120 and 200 miles away and the cost of transport is restricting his

ability to participate in buddhist groups and meetings. He invokes

Article 9 of the Convention.

4.   The applicant further complains that he has no effective remedy

for the alleged violations of his rights under the Convention contrary

to Article 13 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 6 November 1993 and registered

on 10 August 1994.

     On 17 January 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48

para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.

     The Government's written observations were received on

12 June 1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose.  The applicant's submissions in reply were received on

6 September 1995, also after an extension of the time-limit.

     On 23 January 1996 the Commission granted the applicant legal

aid.

     On 15 May 1996 the Commission decided to invite the parties to

an oral hearing.

     On 27 August 1996, the applicant submitted further documentary

materials.

     At the hearing, which took place on 6 September 1996, the

Government were represented by Ms. S.J. Dickson, Agent, Mr. D. Pannick

QC,  Counsel and three advisers, Mr. K. Baublys, Ms. J. Bell and

Ms. S. McCrory. The applicant, who was present, was represented by

Ms.  N. Stewart, Counsel and Mr. A. Philp, Solicitor.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention in that he is unable to challenge the

maintenance assessment before a court. Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention provides so far as relevant :

     "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or

     of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a

     fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an

     independent and impartial tribunal established by law."

     The Government submit that Article 6 (Art. 6) is inapplicable

since the proceedings do not involve a determination of the applicant's

"civil rights or obligations".  Rather, the Act sets out the rights and

obligations of the applicant and the CSA, in assessing the amount of

the maintenance payment, merely carries out calculations in accordance

with the provisions of the Act and regulations adopted thereunder

without being able to exercise any independent discretion.  It contends

that since the CSA is not resolving a legal claim or dispute, but

simply applying the power vested in it by the Act, and since the

applicant does not contend that the calculation carried out by the CSA

was incorrect, the application under Article 6 (Art. 6) is manifestly

ill-founded.

     In the alternative the Government submit that should the

Commission consider that the CSA does make determinations of civil

rights and obligations, the Act provides for the possibility of a fair

and public hearing in respect of matters of fact and law.

     The applicant submits that in assessing the level of maintenance

payments, his civil rights and obligations are being determined.  He

claims that the tribunals to which he does have access do not allow

consideration of the merits of his claim, since they only have

jurisdiction to consider whether the assessment was made correctly

within the terms of the Act and regulations made thereunder.  He

contends that the fact that no tribunal can take into account the

individual circumstances of the case (in his case the fact that it

cannot take account of where he lives and the cost of visiting the

children), deprives him of the right to have the merits of his case

considered before an impartial tribunal.

     The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies

only to disputes ("contestations") over rights and obligations which

can be said, at least on arguable grounds to be recognised under

domestic law. It does not in itself guarantee any particular content

for "rights and obligations" in the substantive law of Contracting

States nor does it require that there be a national court with

competence to invalidate or override national law (cf. Eur. court H.R.

James and others v. United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series

A no. 98, p.46, para. 81, Lithgow and others v. United Kingdom judgment

of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p.70 para. 192). It is also

established case-law that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) guarantees to

everyone who claims that an interference with his "civil rights" is

unlawful  the right to submit that claim to a tribunal satisfying the

requirements of that provision (Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven

and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43 p. 20 para.

44). The claim or dispute, however, must be of a "genuine and of a

serious nature" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Benthem judgment of 23 October

1985, Series A no. 97, p. 14, para. 32).

     As to whether there is a dispute as to any of the applicant's

civil rights or obligations, the Commission notes that the applicant

accepts that the maintenance assessment imposed on him by the CSA was

calculated correctly under domestic legislation. It is also uncontested

that there is no scope under the applicable provisions at the present

time for costs of access visits to be taken into account in the

assessment, which is the basis of the applicant's claims. In the

circumstances, the Commission therefore considers that there cannot be

said to be any dispute, or any dispute of a "genuine" or "serious

nature"  as to any civil right or obligation arising in this case.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.   The applicant contends that the amount of maintenance he is

required to pay under the Act leaves him with insufficient money to

enable him to maintain reasonable contact with his children in

violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, that provides:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life, his home and his correspondence."

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The Government deny that there has been any interference in the

applicant's family life and emphasise that the CSA is intended to

protect family life, maintenance payments being intended to provide for

children's basic living costs, which are the responsibility of both

parents and should come before the provision of less essential items

of expenditure.  Even assuming an interference with the applicant's

rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Government claim

that such interference would be justified and proportionate: there is

a pressing social need to ensure that parents fulfil their

responsibilities to their children and, the CSA strikes a fair and

reasonable balance between the absent parent's responsibilities for his

or her children and the need for a system that produces fair and

consistent results, preserves the parents' incentive to work and

reduces the dependency of parents with care on income support,

providing consequent savings to tax-payers.

     The applicant submits that after having paid maintenance payments

he is left with insufficient money to maintain reasonable contact with

his children and that such contact is a fundamental right and is as

essential as food and warmth and clothing.  The applicant adds that he

is not seeking to expend money on outings and gifts during access

periods but simply to gain regular contact with his children.  He

claims that this restriction impedes the development of his

relationship with his children contrary to their best interests and

discloses a failure to respect that relationship.

     The Commission has considered the applicant's complaints in the

context of the financial obligations that are acknowledged to exist

between the applicant and his children.  The Commission notes that the

relevant legislation, insofar as it seeks to regulate the assessment

of maintenance payments from absent parents, does not by its very

nature affect family life.  Nor, in the light of the factual

information supplied by the applicant regarding his income and

expenses, including the cost of visiting his children every fortnight,

does the Commission consider that the applicant has shown that the

effect of the operation of the legislation in his case is of such a

nature and degree as to disclose any lack of respect for his rights

under Article 8 (Art. 8).  In the circumstances, the Commission does

not therefore find it necessary to go on to consider whether, had there

been an interference, it would have been justified within the meaning

of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.   The applicant complains that the cost of the increased

maintenance order restricts the practice of his religion. He invokes

Article 9 (Art. 9) which provides:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience

     and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion

     or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others

     and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief,

     in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

     2.    Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be

     subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are

     necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public

     safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or

     for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

     The applicant who has practised zen buddhism for a period of at

least six years submits that the increased maintenance payments

restrict his ability to attend centres or meeting places of buddhist

worship, since the nearest priories are 120 and 200 km away from his

home.

     The applicant admits that it is possible for him to practise his

religion without making such visits but states that it is also of the

essence that he regularly spends time with the monks of his religion

who are to be found in the priories.

     The Commission finds that the applicant's complaints fail to

disclose any effective restriction on his freedom to manifest and

practise his religion of zen buddhism. Not every act which is motivated

by religion or belief falls within the concept of "practice" (e.g.

No. 11579/85, Dec. 7.7.86, D.R. 48 p. 253). The Commission is not

persuaded on the basis of the applicant's submissions that visits to

the priories can be considered as an indispensable element of the

applicant's religious worship.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.   The applicant complains that he had no effective remedy available

to him in respect of his complaints as required by Article 13

(Art. 13). That provision reads as follows:

     "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

     Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

     before a national authority notwithstanding that the

     violation has been committed by persons acting in an

     official capacity."

     The Government submit that insofar as Article 13 (Art. 13) is

being invoked to seek a remedy against legislation as such which is

considered not to be in conformity with the Convention, the complaint

is incompatible with the provisions of Article 13 (Art. 13).  Further,

that since there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)

or Article 8 (Art. 8), the question of a breach of Article 13 (Art. 13)

does not arise.

     The applicant submits that, assuming Article 6 (Art. 6) is

inapplicable, he has been denied an effective remedy in respect of the

interference with his rights under the Convention since he is unable

to complain to a court or other body which has the jurisdiction to

determine his claims.

     The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention requires a remedy in domestic law only in respect of

grievances which can be regarded as "arguable" in terms of the

Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom,

judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 14, para. 31).

     The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light

of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of his

Convention rights.

     It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

     DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber