AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 28938/95

                      by Monica and Evelyn BARRANTES

                      against Sweden

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

24 October 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   S. TRECHSEL, President

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 B. CONFORTI

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 M. VILA AMIGÓ

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

           Mr.   M. de SALVIA, Deputy Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 8 October 1995 by

Monica and Evelyn BARRANTES against Sweden and registered on 17 October

1995 under file No. 28938/95;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 6 September 1996 and the observations in reply submitted

by the applicants on 3 October 1996;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first applicant is a Peruvian citizen, born in 1969. The

second applicant is the first applicant's daughter, born in 1994. At

present the applicants reside at Saltsjö-Boo, Sweden. In the

proceedings before the Commission the applicants are represented by

Mr. Peter Bergqvist, a lawyer practising at Tyresö, Sweden.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

      The first applicant and her daughter, S, born on 28 May 1993,

arrived in Sweden from Peru in December 1993. The first applicant's

husband had at that time already arrived in Sweden and had applied for

political asylum. In support of his request for asylum he invoked that

he had been working for the Peruvian police in its anti-terrorist unit,

but that at the same time he had been in contact with a special

movement within the police - "Policia Progresista" - which was

struggling for a better police force in Peru. Having refused, together

with a colleague of his, to carry out an order to apprehend a person

he and his colleague were reported to the military court in Peru and

they were to be transferred to another district. He was summoned to

appear before the court on three occasions in 1992 but never did. His

colleague was allegedly killed. He tried to resign from the police

service but his request was refused. He left his work in January 1993

and went to Sweden where a brother of his was living. When he left the

country he was not wanted by the police but a check made later by his

brother showed that he was wanted by the Peruvian authorities in

February 1994. In respect of her own request for asylum the first

applicant claimed that she had been harassed by the police following

her husband's journey to Sweden and that the police had tried on one

occasion to force her into a car by means of threat. She also invoked

humanitarian reasons for being allowed to remain in Sweden.

      On 11 July 1994 the National Immigration Board (Statens

invandrarverk, hereinafter "the SIV") rejected the family's application

for a residence permit. The SIV did not find the reasons invoked

sufficient for considering the first applicant and her husband as

political refugees or so-called de facto refugees. The information

provided was not considered credible and it was noted that the

application for asylum had not been made upon their arrival in Sweden

but several weeks later. The family was ordered to leave Sweden and was

prohibited from returning to the country within two years without

permission from the SIV. However, they remained in Sweden and lodged

an appeal against the SIV's decision (cf. below "the expulsion order").

      On 24 November 1994 the first applicant's mother arrived in

Sweden and applied for a residence permit. On 4 July 1995 the Aliens

Appeals Board (Utlänningsnämnden, hereinafter "the Board") to which the

SIV had referred her case, rejected her application and ordered her

expulsion. A new application for a residence permit was turned down by

the Board on 29 November 1995. On 26 August 1996 the expulsion order

was enforced and the first applicant's mother was returned to Peru.

The care order concerning the second applicant

      On 5 January 1994 the family was reported to the social

authorities following a medical examination of the first applicant's

daughter S carried out at the S:t Göran Hospital in Stockholm at which

a fractured thigh bone was discovered. This as well as several bruises

indicated that she might have been assaulted. Following her treatment

at the hospital the social authorities arranged for the family to be

placed at a special investigation home under the supervision of the

social authorities. Traces of assault were noted also later in

January 1994 and it was considered that the parents lacked capacity to

take care of their daughter. However, no care order was issued at this

stage. In early March 1994 the family was allowed to leave the special

investigation home, but was requested to remain in regular contact with

the social welfare officers in charge of their case. New traces of

assault were discovered later in March 1994 and the family moved back

to the investigation home. Following further injuries in April 1994 S

died on 28 May 1994, only one year old. The investigation carried out

showed that S had been assaulted by her father who was found guilty on

14 July 1994 by the District Court of Stockholm (Stockholms tingsrätt)

of having killed his daughter and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment

to be followed by an expulsion from Sweden. The Court's judgment was

upheld on 2 December 1994 by the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt)

whose judgment has gained legal force.

      When S died the first applicant was pregnant. The social

authorities remained in contact with her and she received support in

accordance with the provisions of the Social Services Act

(socialtjänstlagen). She was placed at a special nursery home at

Klingsta awaiting the child to be born. She gave birth to her daughter

E (the second applicant) on 8 October 1994. On the same day the deputy

chairman of the Social District Council no. 7 of the municipality of

Stockholm decided to place the child in care with immediate effect in

accordance with section 6 of the 1990 Act with Special Provisions on

the Care of Young Persons (lag 1990:52 med särskilda bestämmelser om

vård av unga, hereinafter "the 1990 Act") which provides for such an

interim measure where care pursuant to the Act appears to be necessary

and where the young person's health or development or the

investigations to be made cannot await a court order.

      On 13 October 1994 the social authorities decided to place the

second applicant in a temporary foster home as a measure of emergency.

The reasons for separating the applicants were the first applicant's

alleged lack of ability to take care of her daughter, the trauma that

she was going through following the death of her first daughter, other

stress factors and that she was allegedly unable to understand the

reason why she had been placed at the nursery home at Klingsta.

Moreover, the decision was taken in view of the fact that Dr. F.S., a

child psychiatrist and a consultant to the social authorities, and the

staff at Klingsta had expressed the opinion that, in the present

conditions, the safety of the second applicant could not be guaranteed

if the applicants were placed together.

      On 19 October it was decided not to reveal the child's

whereabouts to the first applicant. However, as from 26 October 1994,

i.e. seven days later, she was allowed to see her daughter regularly

for which reason the decision was revoked on 2 November 1994 as it was

no longer considered necessary.

      The interim care order of 8 October 1994 was submitted to the

County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Stockholm on

14 October 1994 in accordance with section 7 of the 1990 Act. On

20 October 1994 the Court confirmed the interim care order. The

decision was appealed against to the Administrative Court of Appeal

(kammarrätten) of Stockholm which on 10 November 1994 upheld the

interim care order. No appeal was lodged against the decision of the

Administrative Court of Appeal.

      On 16 November 1994 the Social District Council requested the

County Administrative Court to issue a care order in accordance with

section 2 of the 1990 Act. The Council maintained that the second

applicant's parents lacked the ability to take care of their daughter

and that this implied a palpable risk of her health and development

being impaired. According to the arrangements suggested the care should

be provided in a foster home until it could be assessed whether the

first applicant herself could take care of her daughter.

      The first applicant and her husband opposed a care order. The

second applicant's father admitted that he was unable to take care of

his daughter in view of the long prison sentence he was serving.

However, both he and the first applicant objected to the statement that

the latter lacked the ability to take care of their daughter. The

second applicant's appointed counsel supported a care order. The Court

heard a number of witnesses and medical experts.

      By judgment of 11 January 1995 the Court granted the Social

District Council's request and ordered that care should be provided for

the second applicant in accordance with section 1, subsection 2 and

section 2 of the 1990 Act according to which care shall be ordered if

ill-treatment, improper exploitation, other lack of care for the child

or any other condition in the home entails a danger to the child's

health or development. In its judgment the Court analysed how the

parents had taken care of their daughter S and found that the first

applicant had been unable to protect S from injuries and violence. The

Court furthermore relied on professor R at Karolinska Sjukhuset in

Stockholm, an expert witness heard by the Court, and took into

consideration the fact that the first applicant needed more time to

cope with her husband's guilt and her own responsibility for S's death

when assessing her ability to take care of the second applicant. The

Court found it established that there were great deficiencies in the

first applicant's ability to take care of a child and that she failed

to see her lack of ability in spite of the qualified supporting

measures which had been taken by the social authorities. She had, in

the Court's view, been unable to benefit from the support she had

received in a satisfactory manner in order to satisfy a child's need

of care, protection and security. The Court finally found that the

second applicant's health and development could be secured only if she

was separated from her mother.

      The Court's judgment was appealed against to the Administrative

Court of Appeal. By judgment of 5 May 1995 the Administrative Court of

Appeal rejected the appeal following an oral hearing. The Court noted

that the situation for the first applicant had changed as compared to

the situation existing upon her arrival in Sweden. She had undergone

certain psychiatric and psychological treatment from which she had been

able to benefit. She had realised that her parental responsibility for

her daughter had been unsatisfactory. Still the Court found that there

were deficiencies in her ability to take care of the second applicant

inter alia as regards the practical elements of the daily care. The

Court found that the deficiencies entailed a palpable risk for the

second applicant's health and development and that there was therefore

a need for public care. The Court further pointed at an urgent need for

the applicants to be placed together once a proper treatment home for

mother and child had been found.

      The judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal was appealed

against to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) which on

29 September 1995 refused to grant leave to appeal.

      Following the above judgment of the Administrative Court of

Appeal of 5 May 1995 the first applicant was on 17 August 1995 granted

assistance under the Social Services Act for the purpose of undergoing

treatment at Duvnäshemmet, a special treatment home for families with

social problems. On 5 September 1995 it was decided also to move the

second applicant to Duvnäshemmet.

      On 12 June 1996 the Social District Council decided to

discontinue the care but the first applicant continues to receive

support from the staff at Duvnäshemmet. At present (October 1996) the

applicants are living together in a private apartment. The first

applicant has in May 1996 lodged an application with the District Court

of Nacka for a divorce from her husband, but no judgment has been

delivered yet.

The expulsion order

      As indicated above, the first applicant and her husband's

applications for residence permits were turned down by the SIV on

11 July 1994. The applicants appealed against the decision and invoked

in support of their appeal inter alia the fact that the second

applicant had been taken into care under the 1990 Act.

      On 4 July 1995 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the appeal. It

concluded inter alia as follows:

(Translation)

      "Considering that (the applicants) are without connection

      with Sweden, the Board finds it would be best for them to

      return to Peru together where, in the Board's opinion, they

      both have the possibility of finding proper ways to develop

      their future mother-child relationship. As for (the second

      applicant) the Board considers it to be an advantage that

      she is given the opportunity to develop her mother tongue

      in her own cultural environment where she also has close

      relatives. The Board has also considered that (the second

      applicant's) father, after having served his prison

      sentence, will be expelled to Peru. As for (the first

      applicant) the Board cannot but find that a return to Peru

      - together with her daughter - will mean that, with the

      support of her relatives, she will have a good opportunity

      to cope with the extreme pressure under which she has been

      living in Sweden and to make plans for the future."

      The Board finally pointed to the recent legislation in Peru which

emphasised the interest of the child, provided for care in cases of

neglect and ill-treatment and which, in the Board's view, complied with

the requirements of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

      A new request for a residence permit submitted by the first

applicant was rejected by the Board on 10 October 1995.

      On 28 March 1996 the Board rejected yet another request for a

residence permit. In the Board's view there was nothing new which could

constitute a reason for quashing the previous expulsion order and

nothing indicated that it would be in violation of humanitarian demands

to enforce the expulsion order. The Board noted that the medical

experts and the social authorities did not seem to have prepared the

first applicant for a return to Peru as a part of the treatment she had

received and stated that it supposed that the social authorities

together with the first applicant would now make plans for her and her

daughter's return to Peru. The Board thus found it appropriate to

postpone the enforcement and granted the applicants a residence permit

until 31 August 1996.

      It appears that a new application for a residence permit is at

present pending before the Aliens Appeals Board. In support of the

present application the applicants have submitted a report of

28 August 1996 drawn up by the Social District Council which states

inter alia as follows:

(Translation)

      "In her role as a parent (the first applicant) is in need

      of support from relatives as well as professionals.

      At present (the second applicant's) need of security and

      care can be best guaranteed through continuing support

      measures in Sweden. The Council considers, therefore, that

      (the applicants) should be granted a permanent residence

      permit in Sweden.

      The task of the social authorities is to ensure that

      children and juveniles grow up under safe conditions, and

      it is not limited only to those children who are placed in

      public care under the 1990 Act. It is for that reason very

      unfortunate that the social network, in which (the first

      applicant's mother) was a natural and important part, has

      been destroyed by the sudden enforcement of the expulsion

      order regarding (the first applicant's mother)."

COMPLAINTS

1.    The first applicant complains, under Article 8 of the Convention,

of the fact that her daughter, the second applicant, was taken into

care at birth and that she only had limited possibilities of seeing her

for a period of approximately one year.

2.    The first applicant also complains that the placement of her

daughter and "the circumstances connected thereto" were such an

important and traumatic "interference" that it would amount to a

violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

3.    The second applicant complains that her separation from her

mother during the first year of her life and her placement with

non-Spanish speaking foster parents violated Article 3 of the

Convention.

4.    In respect of the possible deportation to Peru the first

applicant maintains that she risks political persecution in that

country and that therefore it would be contrary to Article 3 to return

her.

5.    The second applicant complains, under Articles 3 and 5 of the

Convention, that a return to Peru would subject her to inhuman

treatment and loss of security of person due to the fact that her

mother, the first applicant, in incapable of taking proper care of her

in Peru.

6.    Finally, the applicants complain that they do not have an

effective remedy since the aliens authorities have decided to reject

the applications for asylum regardless of the fact that the social

authorities decided to take the second applicant into care.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 8 October 1995 and registered

on 17 October 1995.

      On 17 October 1995 the Commission decided to indicate to the

Government of Sweden, pursuant to Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure,

that it was desirable in the interest of the parties and the proper

conduct of the proceedings before the Commission not to deport the

applicants to Peru until the Commission had had an opportunity to

examine the application further.

      The Commission furthermore decided to invite the Government to

submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the

application.

      The Commission's indication under Rule 36 of its Rules of

Procedure has subsequently been prolonged until the Commission has had

an opportunity to examine the application in the light of the parties'

written observations.

      On 7 March 1996 the Commission decided to adjourn the examination

of the application pending the outcome of certain domestic proceedings.

Following the conclusion of these proceedings the Commission decided,

on 24 May 1996, to extend until 31 August 1996 the time-limit for the

submission of the Government's observations on the admissibility and

merits of the application.

      Following an extension of this time-limit the Government's

observations were submitted on 6 September 1996. The applicants'

observations in reply were submitted on 3 October 1996.

THE LAW

1.    In respect of the taking into care of the second applicant, the

first applicant complains that this was an unjustified interference

with her right to respect for her family life. She invokes in this

respect Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which reads as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

      family life, his home and his correspondence.

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      The Commission considers, which is undisputed, that the taking

into care of the second applicant interfered with the first applicant's

right to respect for her family life. Such an interference constitutes

a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention unless it was "in

accordance with the law", had an aim that was legitimate under Article

8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and was "necessary in a democratic society" for

the aforesaid aim (cf. e.g. Eur. Court HR, Margareta and Roger

Andersson v. Sweden judgment of 25 February 1992, Series A no. 226, p.

25, para. 73 with further references).

      In the present case it is undisputed that the interference was

in accordance with the law as the measures taken had their legal basis

in the 1990 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons.

Furthermore, in the Commission's view the relevant Swedish legislation

which was applied in this case is clearly designed to protect children

and there is nothing to suggest that it was applied for any other

purpose. The interference in question, which was intended to safeguard

the health and development of the second applicant therefore had, for

the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2), the legitimate aim

of protecting the "rights and freedoms of others".

      What remains is accordingly to examine whether the interference

was "necessary in a democratic society".

      According to the established case-law of the Commission and the

Court, the notion of necessity implies that the interference

corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is

proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining whether an

interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Commission

will also take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to

the Contracting States, but its review is not limited to ascertaining

whether a respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably,

carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, in exercising its supervisory

function, the Commission cannot confine itself to considering the

impugned decisions in isolation, but must look at them in the light of

the case as a whole. It must determine whether the reasons adduced to

justify the interference at issue were "relevant and sufficient" (cf.

e.g. Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988,

Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68).

      When applying the above criteria to the facts of the present case

the Commission recalls that the second applicant was taken into care

on an interim basis when she was born on 8 October 1994. The first

applicant maintains, and this is disputed by the Government, that there

was no reason for such a measure.

      The Commission considers that the taking into care of the second

applicant on 8 October 1994 pursuant to the provisions of the 1990 Act

was based on relevant and sufficient reasons. Prior to this interim

measure the first applicant had been in contact with the social

authorities on several occasions  due to severe problems in her family.

She had, as an asylum-seeker in Sweden, witnessed her husband's

ill-treatment of their daughter S, her death caused thereby and the

arrest and detention of her husband. The family had been accommodated

in a special home in order to obtain assistance which did not prevent

the tragic death of her first child. It was on the basis of this

information that the social authorities and the courts found that the

applicant was incapable of taking proper care of the second applicant.

Having regard to this the Commission finds that there were relevant and

sufficient reasons for the interim measure of care and, having regard

to the margin of appreciation of the Swedish administrative authorities

and courts, that these authorities and courts could reasonably consider

that such an order was necessary.

      Following the interim measure of care the issue was examined

again by the County Administrative Court, the Administrative Court of

Appeal and, in so far as the question of leave to appeal was concerned,

the Supreme Administrative Court due to the social authorities'

application for care pursuant to the relevant provisions of the 1990

Act. Their judgments were based on the examination carried out by the

social authorities, the conclusions of the expert appointed, the

statements of the first applicant and other witnesses as well as the

courts' own impressions obtained during the hearings held in the case

at two levels. The County Administrative Court and the Administrative

Court of Appeal established that the first applicant was not, in the

circumstances, capable of taking proper care of the second applicant

and that any other solution than public care would endanger her health

and development.

      The Commission also recalls that the care order did not mean that

the applicants were subject to total separation. The facts of this case

clearly show that measures were taken in order to ensure a continuing

contact between mother and child and that these measures were aimed at

reuniting them.

      In the light of these various elements the Commission finds that

the decisions taken by the administrative authorities and the courts

as to the imposition and maintenance of the care order from 8 October

1994 until 12 June 1996 did not interfere with the first applicant's

right to respect for her family life in a way which cannot be

considered as being justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8

(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The first applicant also complains in a more general manner that

the public care and "the circumstances connected thereto" were such an

important and traumatic "interference" that it would amount to a

violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention which reads as

follows:

      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

      degrading treatment or punishment."

      The Commission understands the first applicant's sentiments

having regard to the problems with which she was faced. However, the

present case does not disclose any reason for believing that the

Swedish authorities acted in a way which would call for a further

examination of this part of the application.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

3.    The second applicant complains, through her representative, that

her separation from her mother and her placement in a foster home

violated Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.

      The Commission recalls from above that the care order was made

in order to protect the second applicant during a period when she was

less than one year old. Nothing indicates that this separation, which

was not absolute, or her placement caused her such suffering - if any -

that a further examination of this complaint would be required.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

4.    In respect of the possible deportation to Peru the first

applicant maintains that she risks political persecution in that

country and that, therefore, a deportation would amount to a violation

of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The Government dispute this.

      The Commission recalls that Contracting States have the right to

control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. The right to

political asylum is not protected in either the Convention or its

Protocols (Eur. Court HR, Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom

judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 102).

However, expulsion by a Contracting State of an asylum-seeker may give

rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, and hence

engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where

substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person

concerned would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or to

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which

he or she is to be expelled (ibid., para. 103). A mere possibility of

ill-treatment is not in itself sufficient (ibid., p. 37, para. 111).

      In the present case the first applicant has not substantiated

that she would today face any political persecution or other real risk

of treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention if

returned to Peru. Thus, the Commission considers, on the evidence

before it concerning the first applicant's background, that it has not

been established that there are substantial grounds for believing that

she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment

contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention if returned to Peru.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

5.    The second applicant complains, through her representative, that

a return to Peru would subject her to inhuman treatment and loss of

security of person contrary to Articles 3 and 5 (Art. 3, 5) of the

Convention due to the fact that her mother is incapable of taking

proper care of her in Peru. She refers in particular to the views of

the social authorities which as recently as 28 August 1996 have

submitted that the first applicant in her role as a parent is in need

of support from relatives as well as from professionals and that the

second applicant's need of security and care can be guaranteed better

through continuing supporting measures in Sweden.

      The Government maintain that Article 5 (Art. 5) is not applicable

to the facts complained of and that in any event this complaint is

manifestly ill-founded. As regards Article 3 (Art. 3) the Government

point out that today the applicants have been living together for more

than a year and the care order was lifted already in June 1996.

Although, as a matter of Swedish law, there are no impediments against

enforcing the expulsion order today, the Government submit that this

should in any event "meet the child's needs and interests and

(presuppose) that a more normal relationship has been established

between (the applicants)".

      As regards Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention the Commission

agrees with the Government that this provision does not apply in the

circumstances of the present case. Furthermore, although the Commission

would not exclude that the second applicant would be better off were

she to remain in Sweden together with her mother, it recalls that such

a right is not guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, nor would

this as such be sufficient to establish that their return to Peru would

violate Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. Today no care order

exists in respect of the second applicant and the Commission does not

find it established that the first applicant's care for her daughter

would endanger the latter's health or development. Furthermore, the

Commission finds that the conditions in Peru are such that the second

applicant's return to that country, together with her mother, does not

disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

6.    Finally, the first applicant complains that there was no

effective remedy available to her for challenging the alleged

violations of the Convention. She invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention which reads:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy

      before a national authority notwithstanding that the

      violation has been committed by persons acting in an

      official capacity."

      The Government maintain that as the alleged violations are, in

their view, all manifestly ill-founded the applicant does not have any

arguable claims for the purpose of Article 13 (Art. 13). In any event

the Government maintain that the administrative courts and the Aliens

Appeals Board were effective remedies in respect of the claims made.

      The Commission finds it can be left open whether the first

applicant had any "arguable claims" for the purpose of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention. As far as the care proceedings are

concerned the issues were determined by the administrative courts which

are, undoubtedly, effective remedies within the meaning of Article 13

(Art. 13) of the Convention. Furthermore, in respect of the request for

a residence permit, the Commission notes that an appeal against the

SIV's decision lies with the Aliens Appeals Board which has the power

to decide the matter regardless of the outcome in the previous

proceedings. The mere fact that an appeal for reason of substance is

not successful does not mean that this remedy is not "effective" within

the meaning of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

        H.C. KRÜGER                         S. TRECHSEL

         Secretary                           President

     to the Commission                    of the Commission